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The United States Congress claims plenary and exclusive power
over federal affairs with the Indian tribes, based primarily on the Consti-
tution's Indian Commerce Clause. This article is the first comprehensive
analysis of the original meaning of and understanding behind, that con-
stitutional provision. The author concludes that, as originally under-
stood, congressional power over the tribes was to be neither plenary nor
exclusive.
"[A]s exception strengthens the force of a law in cases not excepted;
so enumeration weakens it in cases not enumerated."
- Sir Francis Bacon'
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For many years, Congress has claimed, and the Supreme Court has
conceded,3 a plenary power over American Indian tribes.4 As is true of
so much else in Indian law, 5 the constitutional basis of this power is un-
clear.
6
Courts and commentators have offered a variety of justifications for
the plenary congressional power theory, all defective in various ways.
One such justification is the doctrine of inherent sovereign authority: that
federal control over Indian affairs is inherent in the nature of federal sov-
ereignty. 7  The idea is that the British Crown transmitted extra-
constitutional sovereign authority to the Continental Congress, which
then passed it to the Confederation Congress, which in turn conveyed it
to the federal government.
8
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the theory, but only rarely
and in limited respects. Dicta by Chief Justice Marshall are sometimes
cited as recognizing it,9 but in fact they do not. 10 A passage in Chief
Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford'1 suggests an inherent
sovereignty theory,' 2 but later in the opinion Taney made it clear that he
was invoking an enumerated power.13  United States v. Kagama,14 de-
cided in 1886, did recognize unenumerated federal power over Indian
affairs, but the Court's justification was Indian dependency on the fed-
3. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 319 (1978) ("Congress has plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters,
including their form of government."); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886); see also PRICE & CLINTON, supra note 2, at 132-35 (discussing
the plenary power doctrine); PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 51 (discussing congressional claims of ple-
nary power); Savage, supra note 2, at 61 ("Congress enjoys a plenary power over Native Americans
4. See BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 62-84, 112-34 (discussing the rise and devel-
opment of the plenary power doctrine).
5. That Indian law is chaotic seems to be one of the few points of agreement among com-
mentators on the subject. Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1074-75 (collecting sources).
6. BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 137-48 (criticizing as unprincipled judicial deci-
sions in this area); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 43
(1996) ("The text of the Constitution lacks much of a hint of any plenary power."); Prakash, Fungi-
bility, supra note 2, at 1079 ("[T]he Court has never explained how seemingly modest grants of
authority might ever grant plenary authority over all Indian tribes.").
7. COHEN, supra note 2, at 397-98 (discussing the theory); see also Fletcher, Same-Sex
Marriage, supra note 2, at 65-66 (stating that federal Indian law is "derived in large part from the
Indian Commerce Clause, treaties with Indian tribes, and a 'pre-constitutional' federal authority to
deal with Indian tribes").
8. United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936).
9. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201-02 (2004) (citing Marshall's opinion for the
Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).
10. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
11. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
12. Id. at 443-45 (taking the position that federal territories acquired after adoption of the
Constitution were administrated not pursuant to the Territories and Property Clause but from a
"general right of sovereignty" derived from the ability to acquire new states).
13. Id. at 447 (resorting to the text of the Constitution authorizing the admission of new
states).
14. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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eral government, not inherent sovereignty. 15  Seven years later, in Fong
Yue Ting v. United States,16 the Court discussed the concept of inherency
(although outside the Indian context), but the case can be read to mean
that the power under consideration was inherent in the Constitution's
enumerated powers rather than in extra-constitutional sovereignty.
17
Kansas v. Colorado (1907), 18 the Supreme Court's clearest pro-
nouncement on inherent sovereign authority in internal affairs, actually
rejected the doctrine. United States v. Curtiss-Wright19 resuscitated it,
but only for foreign affairs. In 2004, the Court suggested an application
to Indian concerns, but the Court's language was neither definitive nor
necessary to its decision.
20
The Supreme Court's reluctance to fully accept inherent sovereign
authority is understandable, for the doctrine is fundamentally unconvinc-
ing. It clashes with the Constitution's underlying theory of enumerated
powers, 2 1 and would render some enumerated powers redundant.
22
Moreover, as several commentators have pointed out, its historical as-
sumptions are flatly false:23 As a matter of historical record, the British
15. Id. at 384 ("From the [tribes'] very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been prom-
ised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.").
16. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
17. Id. at 711-13 (discussing inherent power to expel aliens as part of the foreign affairs
power, but also using the term "inherent" as including powers within or incident to enumerated
powers).
18. 206 U.S. 46 (1907). The court stated:
[Tihe proposition that there are legislative powers affecting the nation as a whole which
belong to, although not expressed in the grant of powers, is in direct conflict with the
doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers .... This natural construction of
the original body of the Constitution is made absolutely certain by the Tenth Amendment.
Id. at 89-90.
19. 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936).
20. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) ("Moreover, 'at least during the first
century of America's national existence ... Indian affairs were more an aspect of military and for-
eign policy than a subject of domestic or municipal law.' Cohen 208 (footnotes omitted). Insofar as
that is so, Congress's legislative authority would rest in part, not upon 'affirmative grants of the
Constitution,' but upon the Constitution's adoption of preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent
in any Federal Government, namely, powers that this Court has described as 'necessary concomi-
tants of nationality.' United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-322.").
21. Kansas, 206 U.S. at 89; Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1103 ("Of course, none of
these rationales will win over those who steadfastly believe that the federal government is a govern-
ment of enumerated powers."). The inherent power doctrine has a few defenders. See, e.g., Philip P.
Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 36-37 (1996). Like most other
commentators, Professor Frickey does not address the Tenth Amendment, which explicitly forestalls
any extra-constitutional powers in the federal government. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying
text.
22. Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1105. The presumption against superfluity was
accepted in the Founding Era. 19 VINER, supra note 2, at 548 ("It is a known rule in interpretation
of statutes, that such a sense is to be made upon the whole, as that no clause, sentence, or word shall
prove superfluous, void, or insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be made useful
and pertinent.").
23. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 26-33 (1972) (pointing out that sovereign foreign affairs powers could not have been trans-
mitted directly from the Crown to Congress because the states exercised those powers for a time);
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Crown did not transfer its foreign affairs powers to the Continental Con-
gress, but to the states. 24 The Confederation Congress did not receive its
authority from the Continental Congress, but from the states.25 The fed-
eral government did not receive its powers from the Confederation Con-
gress, but from the people.
26
As already observed,27 appeals to the authority of Chief Justice John
Marshall do not add to the persuasiveness of the case for inherent sover-
eign authority because Marshall's dicta simply do not support the doc-
trine. Marshall observed in Cherokee Nation v. Georgiaa8 that the fed-
eral-tribal relationship "resembles that of a ward to his guardian." 29 But
a guardianship analogy implies a restricted, fiduciary power. The Foun-
ders themselves used the fiduciary analogy to emphasize the limited na-
ture of federal authority.30  Similarly, while Marshall's dictum in
Worcester v. Georgia31 suggested that federal governance of Indian af-
fairs was exclusive of the states,32 the pronouncement was unrelated to
inherent sovereign authority. Neither dictum would be particularly pro-
bative of the Constitution's original meaning in any event, since they
were issued more than four decades after the Constitution's ratification.
33
Finally, the doctrine of inherent sovereign authority is simply con-
tradicted by the text of the Constitution. Any extra-constitutional author-
ity inhering in the federal government in 1789 was destroyed two years
Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 555, 571-73
(1938) (criticizing the theory as inconsistent with the Founders' rejection of the royal prerogative);
David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory,
55 YALE L.J. 467, 478-90 (1946) (making the same point as Berger); Charles A. Lofgren, United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE. L.J. 1, 12-32
(1973) (criticizing Curtiss-Wright for faulty reliance on Joseph Story's Commentaries and other
sources and for failure to recognize that before the Constitution's adoption the states had foreign
affairs powers); Ramsey, supra note 2, at 387 (criticizing the doctrine as unhistorical).
24. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 150 (pointing out that by the 1783 Treaty of Paris, the
British King recognized the individual states, not Congress, as sovereign).
25. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. III ("The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of
friendship with each other ... ").
26. U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People ....
27. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
28. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 2, at 173-74 (discussing the use
of Cherokee Nation in Kagama).
29. 30 U.S. (5 Pct.) at 17. The language was dictum, for the holding of the case was to deny
federal judicial power over a tribal challenge to a state claiming authority over that tribe. Id. at 20.
30. Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 2, at 1137-42 (explaining how "public trust" doctrine,
invoked partly by identifying public officials as "guardians," required limitations on their authority).
31. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201-02 (2004) (citing
Worcester in conjunction with the inherent sovereign authority doctrine).
32. Marshall's statement that the Constitution conferred exclusive power over relations with
all Indians was dicta; his ruling that the federal government had exclusive power over relations
specifically with the Cherokees was not. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
33. Natelson, Founders, supra note 2 (discussing the low probative level of post-ratification
evidence); see also infra Part IV.B. (discussing the post-ratification adoption of an Indian Inter-
course Act).
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later, when the Tenth Amendment 34 became effective. By its terms that
Amendment precluded any federal power beyond those bestowed by the
Constitution. 35 Indeed, one reason for the Amendment was precisely to
re-assure Anti-Federalists who feared that the new government might
claim powers beyond those enumerated.36
2. Justifying Plenary Authority by Constitutional Clauses
In addition to relying on the doctrine of inherent sovereign author-
ity, apologists for plenary congressional control over Indian affairs resort
to several of the Constitution's enumerated powers. These include the
War Power,37 the Executive Power,38 the Necessary and Proper Clause,39
the Treaty Clause, 40 the Territories and Property Clause,41 the Indian
Commerce Clause,42 and an occasional combination of two or more of
the foregoing.
43
As foundations for plenary congressional control over Indian af-
fairs, most of those provisions can be readily dismissed. The War Power
34. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89-90 (1907) (stating that the lack of any inherent
sovereign authority "is made absolutely certain by the 10th Amendment"); Ramsey, supra note 2, at
380.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
36. See, e.g., The Fallacies of the Freeman Detected by A Farmer, PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN'S
J., Apr. 1788, reprinted in 3 STORING, supra note 2, at 190 ("All the prerogatives, all the essential
characteristics of sovereignty, both of the internal and external kind, are vested in the general gov-
ernment, and consequently the several states would not be possessed of any essential power, or
effective guard of sovereignty."); Essays of an Old Whig, Essay 11, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT
GAZETTER, Oct. 1787 - Feb. 1788, reprinted in 3 STORING, supra note 2, at 24 (claiming that grant
of effectual sovereignty to the federal government would make it a government of uncontrolled
power).
Concerns over the issue may have arisen because some "ardent nationalists" had been espousing
the doctrine that the Continental and Confederation Congresses had inherent powers. MCDONALD,
supra note 2, at 149-50.
37. PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 51 (calling it "national defense"); Prakash, Fungibility, supra
note 2, at 1097-99 (criticizing this view).
38. Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1099-1102 (criticizing this view).
39. E.g., COHEN, supra note 2, at 391 (stating that the clause broadens the reach of other
constitutional powers).
40. COHEN, supra note 2, at 393-95; PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 51; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .... ").
41. COHEN, supra note 2, at 391-93; PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 51 (calling it the "national
domain clause").
42. COHEN, supra note 2, at 395-97; PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 51; WILKINSON, supra note 2,
at 12 n.27.
43. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-02 (2004) (citing the military and foreign
affairs powers, the treaty power, the Indian Commerce Clause, and preconstitutional powers); David
F. Forte, Commerce with the Indian Tribes, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 107,
108 (Edwin Meese III, David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2005) ("One can derive the plenary
authority of Congress over the Indians from the Commerce Clause, the Treaty Clause... the Prop-
erty Clause... and from the nature of the sovereign power of [the] federal government in relation to
the Indians.").
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is effective only during time of war44 and perhaps for a short time there-
after.45 The Executive Power is not congressional at all, and in any event
is not plenary. 46 The Necessary and Proper Clause depends for its opera-
tion on other enumerated powers,47 and, as leading Founders affirmed, is
but a recital of the eighteenth-century doctrine of implied incidental
powers, 48 without independent substantive force.49  Treaties may grant
substantial competence to Congress, 50 but many Indian tribes have never
44. Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1098 ("The mere existence of a war in the past does
not sanction the indefinite existence of wartime powers.").
45. Cf Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 147 (1948) (upholding exercise of
federal power to minimize post-war disruptions).
46. Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1099-1102 (identifying the weaknesses in the execu-
tive power as a basis for plenary congressional jurisdiction).
47. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power .... To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.") (emphasis added).
48. See generally Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004) (explaining how the clause and others like it were used
in eighteenth century documents); Natelson, Tempering, supra note 2 (containing general discus-
sions of the doctrine of principals and incidents and how it was embodied in the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
49. On the Clause's lack of independent force, see also 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at
141 (reporting Archibald MacLaine as making this point at the North Carolina ratifying convention);
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 158 (No. 33, Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the Clause was
"only declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication
from the very act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain specified pow-
ers"); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 234-35 (No. 44, James Madison) ("Had the Constitution
been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of
executing the general powers, would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication.").
50. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokee art. 9, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, reprinted in
KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 10 ("[T]he United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and
exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such manner
as they think proper.").
Recent scholarship has cast doubt on whether the treaty power really gives Congress as much
flexibility as the Supreme Court has claimed. See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The
Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2006) (arguing that even self-executing treaties
must implement other powers in the Constitution); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the
Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1867 (2005) (concluding that Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), was wrongly decided as a matter of text and original meaning and that, according to the
original meaning, Congress may not exercise authority it would not otherwise have by passing laws
under non-self-executing treaties).
Both of these articles are well-argued. It is also true, though, that during the ratification debates
over the Constitution, Anti-Federalists made predictions that the treaty power could be used by the
federal government to exceed its enumerated powers, such as by establishing a national religion,
and, outside the limits of public trust, Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 2, at 1151-52, these repre-
sentations were largely uncontested. See, e.g., Hampden, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1788,
reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 666 ("Treaties may be extended to almost
every legislative object of the general government. Who is it that doth not know that by treaties in
Europe the succession and constitution of many sovereign states hath been regulated."); 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 514 (quoting Robert Whitehill) (warning at the Pennsyl-
vania ratifying convention that "[t]reaties may be so made as to absorb the liberty of conscience,
trust by jury, and all our liberties"); 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 191-92 (quoting Henry
Abbott at the North Carolina ratifying convention, as stating that "[iut is feared, by some people, that,
by the power of making treaties, they might make a treaty engaging with foreign powers to adopt the
Roman Catholic religion in the United States, which would prevent the people from worshipping
God according to their own consciences.").
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signed treaties. Indeed, no Indian treaty has been signed since 1868, 5
for in 1871 Congress announced that the federal government no longer
would deal with the Natives in that way. 52  Congressional authority
granted by Indian treaty is thus a tribe-by-tribe inquiry, and not a basis
for plenary congressional power over all tribes. 53 Finally, the Territories
and Property Clause enables Congress to adopt "needful" rules and regu-
lations for federal lands. 54  Although this was a substantial source of
congressional power over Indians when most of them lived in federal
territories, this is no longer true. Today less than one percent of reserva-
tion land is titled beneficially to the federal government, and very few
Indians live in federal territories.
55
3. Justifying Plenary Authority by Trusts and Treaties
It is said that the federal government holds reservation land in trust
for the various tribes. 56 If this theory is viable, then legal title to this land
is federal "property" subject to congressional management under the
Territories and Property Clause, and such title would give Congress at
least some jurisdiction over the minority of Indians 57 who reside on res-
ervations. But this begs the question of the source of authority for hold-
51. The list of Indian treaties appears at http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/
Toc.htm.
52. 25 U.S.C.A. § 71 (2007) ("No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the
United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with
any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.");
COHEN, supra note 2, at 395. The decision apparently arose from the demand of the House of Rep-
resentatives that it enjoy a more active role in effectuating agreements with the Indians, since appro-
priations frequently were necessary to carry out Indian treaties. Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 2, at
167-68; see also BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 67-69 (discussing adoption of this legisla-
tion).
53. COHEN, supra note 2, at 394 (claiming that Congress may act toward the Indians in ways
apparently outside its enumerated powers if acting pursuant to treaty).
54. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States .... "); see also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (stating a broad scope for
the Property Clause).
55. Chart 675, Acreage ofIndian Lands, by State, in STATISTICAL RECORD OF NATIVE NORTH
AMERICANS, supra note 2, at 1053-54 (showing in 1990 that of 56,611,426.99 acres on Indian reser-
vations, 46,327,469.33 acres are owned by tribes, 9,862,551.18 acres are owned by individuals
[presumably including private entities], and 421,296.48 acres, about 0.74% of the total, are owned
by governments, presumably not all by the federal government); see also COHEN, supra note 2, at
392 (stating that Indian lands are not administered under the Property Clause); Prakash, Fungibility,
supra note 2, at 1092-94 (pointing out that no tribes are located in federal territories).
56. E.g., 25 U.S.C.A. § 463f (2007) (authorizing the federal government to take land for
certain Indians in trust); 25 U.S.C.A. § 465 (2007) (authorizing acquisition by federal government of
land for tribes).
57. Chart 150, American Indian Population On and Off Reservations, by Selected Tribal
Affiliation, 1991, in STATISTICAL RECORD OF NATIVE NORTH AMERICANS, supra note 2, at 254-55
(showing, for selected tribes, more tribal membership residing off than on reservations); see also
Chart 151, American Indian Population, by Reservation and Non-Reservation States, 1960, id. at
255-57 (showing with more complete - although much older - figures, more Indians in states with-
out any reservations than in states with reservations, even though not all Indians in the latter states
live on reservations).
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ing reservation land in trust. 58  As already noted, pre- or extra-
constitutional power is not a viable answer.59 Nor, as originally under-
stood, is the Territories and Property Clause, for that Clause originally
granted Congress the unlimited power to dispose of federal lands within
state boundaries, but not the unlimited capacity to retain or acquire such
lands.60 As for the treaty power, it happens that not a single Indian trea-
ty provides that the government has retained or acquired trust title to the
reservation.6 1 The sole references to trust arrangements in Indian treaties
are peripheral provisions, such as temporary trusts incident to sale 62 and
trusts to fund Indian schools and other amenities.
63
4. Justifying Plenary Authority by the Indian Commerce Clause
The defects in all these theories of plenary congressional power,
therefore, leaves only one other justification remaining: the Indian
Commerce Clause.
64
In Kagama, the Supreme Court rejected the Indian Commerce
Clause as a source of plenary congressional authority.65 Since that time,
however, that Clause has become "the most often cited basis for modem
58. Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1094-95 (pointing out that justifying the trust rela-
tionship through the plenary power doctrine is a form of bootstrapping).
59. See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text. For an effort to trace both the plenary
power and trust doctrines to pronouncements by the Marshall court, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The
Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REv. 627, 654-61 (2006). The "Marshall Trilogy"
consists of Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Id. at 628; see also
WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 78-79 ("The Marshall Trilogy legitimized these congressional activities
and announced federal powers under the Indian Commerce Clause that 'comprehend all that is
required' to regulate Indian affairs.").
60. Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution 's Property Clause: The
Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 327, 376-77 (2005) (concluding that it violates the
original understanding of the Constitution for the federal government to hold land within the states
indefinitely for unenumerated purposes); see also Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1092 n. 142
(collecting citations).
61. This is based on a computer search of the word "trust" in KAPPLER, supra note 2 (which
contains all federal Indian treaties), available at http://digital.library.okstate.edu/search.htm.
62. E.g., Treaty with the Ottawa and Chippewa art. 1, July 31, 1855, 11 Stat. 621, reprinted in
KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 725, 727 (authorizing trust of land title for ten years after land sales);
Treaty With the Potawatomi art. 5, Nov. 15, 1861, 12 Stat. 1191, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note
2, at 824, 826 (creating trust for funds from land sale).
63. Treaty with the Osage art. 2, Sept. 29, 1865, 14 Stat. 687, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra
note 2, at 878, 879 (indicating proceeds of land sales to be held in trust "for building houses, pur-
chasing agricultural implements and stock animals, and for the employment of a physician and
mechanics, and for providing such other necessary aid as will enable said Indians to commence
agricultural pursuits under favorable circumstances"); Treaty with the Potawatomi art. 6, Nov. 15,
1861, 12 Stat. 1191, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 824, 827 (creating trust for church and
school).
64. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 2, at 392 (claiming that trust statutes are authorized by the
Indian Commerce Clause).
65. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886) (stating that it would be a "very
strained construction" of the Clause to conclude that it authorized creation of a federal criminal code
for Indian country).
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legislation regarding Indian tribes." 66 Modem Supreme Court doctrine is
that "the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide
Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs."
67
This Article will examine whether the Indian Commerce Clause can bear
that much weight.
B. The Elusive Basis for Exclusive Authority
During the nineteenth century, judges and advocates began to ad-
vance the view that the federal power over foreign, interstate, and Indian
commerce is exclusive, implicitly barring all state regulation within
those spheres. 68  Their twenty-first century descendants make the same
sort of claim about the Indian portion of the Commerce Power.
69
Like the constitutional basis for the doctrine of congressional ple-
nary power, the basis for the Indian version of the exclusivity doctrine is
unclear. 70  The most frequently-cited ground 71 for the doctrine is Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,72 decided long after
the ratification, in which the Court ruled that federal power to deal with
the Cherokee tribe was exclusive. However, that case was governed by
treaties requiring an exclusive federal-Cherokee relationship.
73
66. COHEN, supra note 2, at 397; see also Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra note 2, at
137 ("As a matter of federal constitutional law, the Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress the
only explicit constitutional authority to deal with Indian tribes.").
67. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); see also United States
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,200 (2004); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 172
n.7 (1973) ("The source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some confu-
sion, but it is now generally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for regu-
lating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making.").
68. See STUART STREICHER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 66-97 (2005). During
the first few decades of operation under the Constitution, the validity of state commercial regula-
tions, if not pre-empted by Congress, was taken for granted. When advocates of exclusive federal
power began to raise their arguments during the ante-bellum period, they were forced to accommo-
date this understanding by classifying state commercial laws as "police power" measures rather than
commercial regulations. Id. at 70.
69. Lara, 541 U.S. at 194; COHEN, supra note 2, at 398; DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 2, at
2-3 (claiming that the congressional commerce power is "exclusive"); PRICE & CLINTON, supra note
2, at 73 (claiming that the Constitution gave "exclusive control over Indian affairs" to the federal
government); Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 2, at 61 ("[I]t seems clear that the Founders
intended to retain exclusive federal authority to deal with the Indian nations," while conceding, "but
the Clause does not expressly state this.").
70. For an example of how this issue is fudged, see, e.g., DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 2, at
2-3 (claiming that the congressional commerce power is "exclusive," and adding that word to a
paraphrase of the Commerce Clause).
71. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959) (claiming without examination that
Worcester established the exclusivity principle for all Indians); Native Am. Church of N. Am. v.
Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959) (relying on Worcester for the conclusion
that "Indian tribes ... have a status higher than that of states. They are subordinate and dependent
nations possessed of all powers as such only to the extent that they have expressly been required to
surrender them by the superior sovereign, the United States").
72. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
73. The problems with relying on Worcester as a basis for the exclusivity doctrine are dis-
cussed infra Part IV.D.3.
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On a practical level, the Indian branch of the commercial exclusiv-
ity doctrine raises the same sort of difficulties that ultimately led to the
substantial rejection of its more expansive forerunner. 74 When coupled
with the plenary power doctrine, "exclusivity"--literally construed-
would mean that the states could not regulate any conduct by Indians,
75
even when state laws do not contradict federal legislation and even
though Indians are enfranchised state citizens. 76 Purchases made off the
reservation by individual Indians would not be subject to the local ver-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code. Indians visiting New York City
would not have to obey the Big Apple's traffic laws. In the face of such
difficulties, the Supreme Court has acknowledged exclusivity in some
cases, 77 but rejected it in others. The border between the two domains
has been less a border than a smudge.
78
As this Article explains, all of this haze is unnecessary. The draft-
ing history of the Constitution, 79 the document's text and structure, 80 and
its ratification history81 all show emphatically that the Indian CommercePower was not intended to be exclusive.
C. The State of the Literature and Role of this Article
Scholarly commentary on the original force of the Indian Com-
merce Clause is relatively sparse, although some writers have touched on
the issue within broader contexts. 82  Most of their commentary is con-
fessedly agenda-driven. 83  Most is also plagued by errors of historical
74. See supra note 69. Aside, of course, from the fairly restricted realm of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
75. Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 2, at 66 ("States have, as a general matter, no
authority over reservation Indians.").
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.").
77. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996) (Rehnquist, J.) ("[T]he States
still exercise some authority over interstate trade but have been divested of virtually all authority
over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.").
78. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) ("[T]here is no rigid
rule by which to resolve the question whether a particular state law may be applied to an Indian
reservation or to tribal members."); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) ("[T]his Court has
modified these [exclusivity] principles in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and
where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized . .
79. See infra Part ll.B.
80. See infra Part lI.D.
81. See infra Part Ill.
82. Abel, supra note 2, at 467-68; Clinton, Dormant, supra note 2, at 1058; Clinton, Suprem-
acy, supra note 2, at 114-16; Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1069-74; Prakash, Uniformity,
supra note 2, at 1149-51; Savage, supra note 2, at 59-60; Stem, supra note 2, at 1342; see also
BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 59 (discussing in passing the original meaning of "Com-
merce").
83. See, e.g., Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 2. Professor Clinton characterizes his article in
this way:
[A]n essay intended to translate into American constitutional terms the pride in tribal so-
vereignty and the deep grief over America's illegitimate colonial expropriation of that au-
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method.84 As a general proposition, the commentary reveals little or no
familiarity with such fundamental interpretive tools of originalist analy-
sis as eighteenth-century dictionaries, surveys of period literature, or
contemporaneous legal materials. 85  A few authors address the federal
convention proceedings, but only one-Professor Robert Clinton-
examines the ratification.
86
This Article represents an effort to ascertain, in a more comprehen-
sive and objective 87 way, the original force of the Indian Commerce
Clause. It addresses two principal kinds of questions. The first kind
pertains to the scope of the Clause: Did it confer a broad police power or
something narrower? If the scope was narrower, how can it be defined?
The second kind of question pertains to exclusivity: Was the power
granted to Congress exclusive of concurrent state jurisdiction? If not,
what sort of state jurisdiction was to survive?
The standard of interpretation applied here is the same the founding
generation would have applied. The standard calls for an inquiry into
what eighteenth-century lawyers and judges called the "intent of the
makers." The "makers" of the United States Constitution were under-
stood to be the ratifiers. Their "intent" was their subjective understand-
ing where recoverable. If not recoverable, the objective public meaning
was sought and presumed to be the makers' intent.
88
In employing the Founding-Era standard, one can proceed from ei-
ther of two directions. One may seek the ratifiers' subjective understand-
ing and then fill in any blanks with the original public meaning. Or one
may first seek the original public meaning, and then determine if the
thority that the author has learned from working with tribal people for over a quarter-
century .... [T]his paper is intended to provide a legal framework and constitutional
roadmap for giving voice, in American constitutional terms, to legitimate tribal claims of
federal encroachment on their sovereignty.
Id. at 113; see also BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 2, at ix-x ("[W]e hope to transform, rather
than negate, the consciousness of non-Indian Americans and preserve the continuity of both tribal
and national government."); Abel, supra note 2 (dealing with the Indian Commerce Clause as a way
to criticize the definition of interstate commerce promoted by advocates of the New Deal); Stem,
supra note 2 (dealing with the Indian Commerce Clause as a way to defend the definition of inter-
state commerce promoted by advocates of the New Deal).
84. See infra Part IV. (discussing common errors, including errors of historical method).
85. See, e.g., infra Part II.A. (showing that eighteenth-century word usages contradict the
claim that the phrase "Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes" had a broader meaning than "trade
with the Indian tribes"); see also infra Part IV. (discussing instances of historical errors found in
legal commentary, including use of anachronistic material and word-meanings).
86. Clinton, Dormant, supra note 2, at 1058-63. For example, Professor Saikrishna Prakash's
otherwise fine study of the Indian Commerce Clause stopped with the proceedings at the federal
convention. Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1090. Professor Francis Paul Prucha spent no ink
on the ratification process whatsoever, other than quoting in a completely different context one of
Madison's numbers in The Federalist. PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 38.
87. The author is not involved in Indian affairs controversies and has no wider agenda pertain-
ing to them.
88. See infra Part IIIA.
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evidence on the subjective understanding contradicts it. This Article
employs the latter approach.
Thus, after this Introduction (Part I), Part II ascertains the original
public meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause-that is, the meaning to
an objective and reasonably-well-informed observer during the ratifica-
tion era. Part III then seeks any specific understandings among the rati-
fiers to the contrary. Part IV examines some significant mistakes made
by prior commentators on the Indian Commerce Clause. Part V is a short
conclusion.
II. THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF "To REGULATE 'COMMERCE'..
. WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES"
A. The Meaning of "Commerce" and "Affairs"
When deducing original public meaning, one usually begins with
purely textual analysis, and then turns to surrounding materials. The
level of misunderstanding in the literature on this subject 89 renders it
prudent to reverse the order and review the contemporaneous historical
and legal environment before turning to the text.
The misunderstandings in the literature begin with the meaning of
the word commerce. Some have argued that the Founders intended
commerce to encompass not only trade but all gainful economic activ-
ity,90 or even any and all intercourse whatsoever. 91 Although such an
expansive meaning seems out-of-place in a listing of enumerated pow-
ers-and, indeed, counter-intuitive generally-several recent studies
have taken it seriously enough to examine how the word was employed
in the lay and legal contexts before and during the Founding Era.
92
Those studies have found that, in the legal and constitutional context,
"commerce" meant mercantile trade, and that the phrase "to regulate
Commerce" meant to administer the lex mercatoria (law merchant) gov-
erning purchase and sale of goods, navigation, marine insurance, com-
mercial paper, money, and banking. 93 Thus, "commerce" did not include
manufacturing, agriculture, hunting, fishing, other land use, property
89. See infra Part IV. (discussing various common errors among commentators on the Indian
Commerce Clause).
90. Natelson, Commerce, supra note 2, at 791-95 (collecting the sources).
91. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-08 (2005) (stating
that commerce includes "all forms of intercourse in the affairs of life"). Professor Amar argues that
certain provisions of the Indian Intercourse Act of 1790 suggest a broader understanding in the First
Congress of the term "commerce." But see infra Part IV.B. (pointing out that the Indian Intercourse
Act was adopted pursuant to the Treaty Power, not the Commerce Power).
92. See generally Randy E. Bamett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REv. 847 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 101 (2001); Natelson, Commerce, supra note 2.
93. Natelson, Commerce, supra note 2, at 845. On the coinage power as part of regulating
commerce, see Robert G. Natelson, Paper Money and Original Understanding, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2008).
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ownership, religion, education, or domestic family life. This conclusion
can be a surprise to no one who has read the representations of the Con-
stitution's advocates during the ratification debates. They explicitly
maintained that all of the latter activities would be outside the sphere of
federal control.94
The sources further demonstrate that the meaning of commerce was
no broader in the Indian context than in the context of foreign and inter-
state relations.95 There would be a presumption against this in any event.
Contemporaneous legal sources testify to a rule of construction holding
that the same word normally had the same meaning when applied to dif-
ferent phrases in an instrument.96 Varying the meaning of "Commerce"
with varying phrases of modification ("with foreign Nations," "among
the several States," and "with the Indian Tribes") would have violated
that rule.
New technology enables one to examine the use of a given phrase
throughout tens of thousands of eighteenth-century documents. Using
the Thomson Gale database Eighteenth Century Collections Online and
the Readex database Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-
1800, I undertook searches of such phrases as "commerce with the Indi-
ans" and "commerce with Indian tribes." The results showed those ex-
pressions almost invariably meant "trade with the Indians" and nothing
more. 97  Other computer searches revealed that "regulation" of Indian
94. See generally Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2.
95. The question of whether "commerce" means the same thing in Indian commerce as in
interstate commerce became a political football during the New Deal era. Commentators who sup-
ported the New Deal argued that Indian commerce had a very broad meaning, so interstate com-
merce must have one also. Stem, supra note 2, at 1137, 1342. Commentators who opposed the New
Deal, or at least opposed the New Deal version of the Commerce Clause, argued that "commerce" in
the interstate context was different than in the Indian context. Abel, supra note 2, at 465-68. Both
parties' treatments of the issue display the defects of outcome-orientation and insufficient attention
to the ratification record.
96. Flower's Case (K.B. 1598) 5 Co. Rep. 99a, 77 Eng. Rep. 208 ("[l]n good construction this
branch shall have reference to the first, and shall be expounded by it, and so one part of the Act shall
(a) expound the other."); The Case of Chester Mill (Privy Council 1609) 10 Co. Rep. 137b, 138b, 77
Eng. Rep. 1134, 1135 ("And always such construction ought to be made, that one part of the Act
may agree with the other, and all to stand together."); 19 VINER, supra note 2, at 526 ("It is the most
natural and genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part of the Statute by another part of the
same statute, for that best expresses the meaning of the makers .... ); Id. at 527 ("One part of an
act of parliament may expound another.").
See generally Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 2, at 131 (not identifying the contemporaneous
rules of construction, but arguing that the same word should be presumed to mean the same thing for
all three contexts); Prakash, Uniformity, supra note 2, at 1150 (making the same point).
97. See, e.g., Examination of Dr. Benjamin Franklin in the House of Commons (1766) (on file
with the Denver University Law Review) ("The trade with the Indians, though carried on in America,
is not an American interest. The people of America are chiefly farmers and planters; scarce any
thing that they raise or produce is an article of commerce with the Indians.") (emphasis added); see
also STATE OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA, WITH RESPECT TO
NUMBER OF PEOPLE, FORCES, FORTS, INDIANS, TRADE AND OTHER ADVANTAGES 42 (London 1755)
("By means of this post they may be enabled to intercept, or least disturb the trade ... and could
they destroy the commerce of those Indians .... "); 5 THE WORLD DISPLAYED 65 (London 3d ed.
1769) (discussing commerce with Indians in Canada to mean trade); Letter from Governor Franklin
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commerce or of Indian trade was generally understood to refer to legal
structures by which lawmakers governed the conduct of the merchants
engaged in the Indian trade, the nature of the goods they sold, the prices
charged, and similar matters. 98 (Examples appear in the footnote. 99)
This is the same sort of subject-matter one encounters in other kinds of
eighteenth-century commercial regulation, adjusted somewhat to address
problems specific to the Indian trade.'00 I have been able to find virtu-
ally no clear 1° 1 evidence from the Founding Era that users of English
varied the meaning of "commerce" among the Indian, interstate, and
foreign contexts.
to Benjamin Franklin (Dec. 17, 1765), reprinted in 10 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS,
supra note 2, at 681-82 (speaking of "commercial Advantages" of traders having free access to
Indian country); I EDWARD LONG, THE HISTORY OF JAMAICA 333-34 (London 1774) (discussing
various trade advantages of the island of Ruatan [now Roafm], including the benefit to "profitable
commerce with the Indian tribes"); A MERCHANT OF LONDON, THE TRUE INTEREST OF GREAT
BRITAIN WITH RESPECT TO HER AMERICAN COLONIES STATED AND IMPARTIALLY CONSIDERED 26-
27 (London 1766) (using "trade" and "commerce" in the Indian context and generally); 1 MALACHY
POSTLETHWAYT, GREAT-BRITAIN'S COMMERCIAL INTEREST 504 (London 2d ed. 1759) (using the
phrase "commerce with the Indians" to mean trade with the Indians); 5 T. SMOLLETT,
CONTINUATION OF THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 277 (London 1765) ("Lastly, every Indian
trader was to take out a license from the respective governors for carrying on commerce with the
Indians."); HENRY TIMBERLAKE, THE MEMOIRS OF LIEUT. HENRY TIMBERLAKE 62-63 (London
1765) (using, with respect to the Indians, "trade" and "commerce" interchangeably; M. DE VATTEL,
THE LAW OF NATIONS 226 (Dublin 1787) (using, in an English translation, the phrase "commerce
with the Indians" in a general discussion of trade); see also GRENVILLE, supra note 2, at 20 (discuss-
ing how licensing of traders is necessary to regulate "commerce" and the "Indian trade").
98. See infra Part II.B.2. (discussing such schemes).
99. See Letter from the Earl of Hillsborough to Superintendent Stuart (Jul. 3, 1771), reprinted
in 14 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 316 (arguing that the colonial assem-
blies should regulate the "Indian Commerce"); Letter from Governor Franklin to the Earl of Hills-
borough (Jan. 14, 1771), reprinted in 10 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at
691 (using interchangeably the terms "trade" and "commerce" with the Indians in discussing
claimed need for regulation); 5 VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA 221 (Philadelphia 1775) (calling the "Indian Commerce of the
Province "a most important Branch of the [total] Trade thereof"); 2 THE POLITICAL AND
COMMERCIAL WORKS OF CHARLES D'AVENANT 137 (London Charles Whitworth ed., 1771)
("[T]his [Indian] Trade cannot be preserved by an alliance and treaty of commerce with the Indi-
ans"). Compare Letter from Superintendent Stuart to the Earl of Hillsborough (Apr. 27, 1771),
reprinted in 14 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 315-16 (complaining of the
"want of Regulation among the Indian Traders" and "merchants engaged in the Indian Trade"), with
Letter from Earl of Hillsborough to Superintendent Stuart (Jul. 3, 1771), reprinted in 14 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 316-17 (acknowledging, apparently in response,
"the want of a proper regulation for the Indian Commerce").
100. For example, commercial regulations designed to prevent defrauding the Indians had to
deal with the problem of alcohol to a greater extent than did regulations to prevent fraud against
foreign nations. Regulation of trade with Europe would have to address the validity of commercial
paper, which was not used widely among Indians. And so forth.
101. "Clear" because, as invariably occurs, some passages are ambiguous. For example, one
historical work seemed to use "commerce" to mean "communication," although the passage referred
also to obtaining plate of precious metal, which gave it an economic flavor. 1 WILLIAM DAMPIER, A
NEW VOYAGE ROUND THE WORLD 272 (London 5th ed. 1703) (stating that a sea captain elected to
remain in a particular location partly to "get a Commerce with the Indians there" so as to make a
discovery; but also "by their Assistance to try for some of the Plate of New Mexico"). An additional
problem with this passage is that it was published too early to be considered within the Founding
Era. Still another is that the author writes in a historical rather than a political or official context,
where "commerce with the Indians" virtually always referred to trade.
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Thus, just a few months before the Constitution was drafted, a
committee of the Confederation Congress employed the phrase "com-
merce with the Indians" to mean "trade with the Indians," when it ap-
proved instructions to its superintendents of Indian affairs.10 2  (Among
the members of the committee were James Madison and William Samuel
Johnson,' 0 3 both subsequently delegates to the federal convention and
leading ratification figures.' 0 4)
When eighteenth-century English speakers wished to describe inter-
action with the Indians of all kinds, they referred not to Indian commerce
but to Indian "affairs." Contemporaneous dictionaries show how differ-
ent were the meanings of "commerce" and "affairs." The first definition
of "commerce" in Francis Allen's 1765 dictionary was "the exchange of
commodities." The first definition of "affair" was "[s]omething done or
to be done."' 1 5  Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined "commerce"
merely as "[e]xchange of one thing for another; trade; traffick."'106 It de-
scribed "affair" as "[b]usiness; something to be managed or trans-
acted."' 0 7  The 1783 edition of Nathan Bailey's dictionary defined
"commerce" as "trade or traffic; also converse, correspondence," but it
defined "affair" as "business, concern, matter, thing."'
0 8
Pre-constitutional congressional documents accordingly treated "af-
fairs" as a much broader category than trade or commerce. A 1786 con-
gressional committee report proposed reorganization of the Department
of Indian Affairs. The members of the committee were all leading Foun-
ders: Charles Pinckney, James Monroe, and Rufus King.10 9 Their report
showed the department's responsibilities as including military measures,
diplomacy, and other aspects of foreign relations, as well as trade.
10
102. Report of Committee on Indian Affairs, 32 J. CONT'L CONG. 66, 68 (Feb. 20, 1787) (recit-
ing that "the commerce with the Indians will be an object of importance," then immediately proceed-
ing to discuss policy toward trade and traders). The form for these instructions can be found at
WAR-OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPERINTENDENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS FOR
THE DEPARTMENT (1787), available at Early American Imprints: Series 1, 1639-1800 (Readex Sept.
14, 1995); see PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 46-47 (discussing the congressional ordinance and the
instructions).
103. 32 J. CONT'L CONG. 66, 66 (Feb. 20, 1787).
104. See infra Part IV.E. (discussing Johnson).
105. ALLEN, DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (unpaginated) (defining "affair" as "[s]omething done
or to be done. Employment; the concerns and transactions of a nation. Circumstances, or the condi-
tion of a person" and "commerce" as "the exchange of commodities, or the buying and selling mer-
chandize both at home and abroad; intercourse of any kind"). The last definition ("intercourse of
any kind") was rarely used in the legal context. Natelson, Commerce, supra note 2, at 806-30.
106. 1 JOHNSON, DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (unpaginated) (defining "commerce").
107. Id. (defining "affair").
108. BAILEY, DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (unpaginated) (defining "commerce" and "affair").
109. 30 J. CONT'L. CONG. 367, 368 (Jun. 28, 1786). King and Pinckney were federal constitu-
tional convention delegates and leading ratification figures in Massachusetts and South Carolina,
respectively. James Monroe, the future President, was a moderate Anti-Federalist and floor leader of
the Anti-Federalist forces at the Virginia ratifying convention. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 2, at 207-22 (recording one of his speeches).
110. 30 J. CONT'L. CONG. 367, 368-72 (Jun. 28, 1786).
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The congressional instructions to Superintendents of Indian Affairs re-
ferred to earlier11' clearly distinguished "commerce with the Indians"
from other, sometimes overlapping, responsibilities." 2  Another 1787
congressional committee report listed within the category of Indian af-
fairs: "making war and peace, purchasing certain tracts of their lands,
fixing the boundaries between them and our people, and preventing the
latter settling on lands left in possession of the former."
113
B. History Before the Articles of Confederation
1. The Jurisdictional Problem
A recurrent issue in early America was the proper division of power
over Indian affairs among different levels of government. The govern-
ments involved were both central and local. The central governments
were, initially, the British Crown; later the Continental and Confedera-
tion Congresses; and finally the federal government. The local govern-
ments were at first the colonies and later the states. Two types of issues
were involved in allocating authority. The first was the level or levels of
government that should control each aspect of Indian affairs. For exam-
ple, should treaty negotiations be carried on solely by the central gov-
ernment, solely by the colonies/states, or by both? Which level of gov-
ernment should approve Indian land sales to whites? Which level of
government should regulate the white traders? And so forth.
The other type of issue was the level or levels of government that
should interact with each category of Indians. Indians, like other people,
were different from each other. Some, even if members of tribes, were
modestly integrated into the life of the colonies or states. Others were
governed primarily by their tribes, but lived within colonial or state
boundaries. Still others, governed primarily by their tribes, lived outside
colonial or state boundaries. It was not always obvious which level of
government was best suited to deal with each category.
Herein lay the difficulty: even purely local interactions might have
wider consequences-negative externalities. Negative externalities sug-
gested a need for central control. For example, during the British impe-
rial period, the regional effects of colonial failure to properly regulate
trade argued for central trade regulation by the British government.
1 4
On the other hand, the cost of central control sometimes exceeded the
111. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
112. 32 J. CONT'L. CONG. 66, 66-69 (Feb. 20, 1787).
113. 33 J. CONT'L. CONG. 454, 458 (Aug. 3, 1787). The membership of this committee in-
cluded Melancton Smith, a moderate New York Anti-Federalist and a leading state convention
spokesman. Id. at 455. As a result of a carefully brokered deal, Smith ultimately voted for ratifica-
tion. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 412.
114. PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 20-21, 27 (dis~ussing cause and effect of failure adequately to
regulate trade).
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cost of negative externalities. For example, remote British colonial ad-
ministration was encumbered by all sorts of practical problems, 115 which
argued for regulating trade at the colonial level.' 16  Consequently, the
most appropriate level of government to handle a particular problem did
not always appear obvious.
2. The Regulation of Commerce Before the Articles of Confedera-
tion
During the Colonial Era, the lines of jurisdiction between Crown
and colonies over Indian affairs sometimes changed and often over-
lapped. As a general matter, regulation of commerce with the Indians
was primarily a matter for the individual colonies, 117 while both Crown
and colonies engaged in diplomacy with the tribes. In 1764 the Board of
Trade 118 promulgated a plan to centralize in London the regulation of
Indian commerce, but this plan lasted only four years." 9 In 1768 the
Board of Trade formally divided authority so that London retained con-
trol over treaty talks and over issues of land titles outside any colony,
while local colonial assemblies handled other governmental functions,
including the regulation of commerce with the Indians. 120  Such was the
division of authority when the Revolution began.
Before the Revolution, most of the colonies adopted regulations go-
verning the Indian trade.' 2' The perceived need for these regulations
115. See infra Part II.B.2., particularly note 117.
116. Natelson, Commerce, supra note 2, at 841-45 (discussing the Founders' decision to leave
to the states alone some powers, even while understanding that the exercise of those powers would
have consequences beyond state boundaries).
117. PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 21 ("[M]anagement of the trade remained to a great extent in
colonial hands.").
118. The Privy Council was the agency ultimately responsible for American affairs. Until
1768, it administered the colonies through the Secretary of State for the Southern Department. The-
reafter it operated through a new official, the Secretary of State for American Affairs. The Earl of
Hillsborough served as Secretary of State for American Affairs until 1772, when he was succeeded
by Lord Dartmouth, who held the office until 1775.
At all times, the relevant secretary of state was advised by the Board of Trade and Plantations,
consisting of sixteen members, eight active and eight honorary. At various times in the colonial
period, the Board was relatively more or less powerful than other decision makers. Responsibility
for colonial decision making was always fractured among these and other agencies, a fact that fre-
quently aggravated British-colonial relations. See ESMOND WRIGHT, FABRIC OF FREEDOM 1763-
1800, at 27-30 (rev. ed. 1978).
119. PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing the content and eventual fate of the Plan of
1764).
120. Letter from Earl of Hillsborough to Governor Tryon (Apr. 15, 1768), reprinted in 14
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 265-66 (outlining the division of author-
ity); Letter from Governor Bull to the Earl of Hillsborough (Aug. 16, 1768), reprinted in 14 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 268-69 (stating that the issue of Indian trade regu-
lation was postponed until the next session of the colonial legislature); Letter from Superintendent
Stuart to Governor Tryon (Sept. 15, 1768), reprinted in 14 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS,
supra note 2, at 270-71 (explaining further the division of authority); see also PRUCHA, supra note 2,
at 26-27 (discussing the plan's withdrawal).
121. Following are a few examples set forth by jurisdiction. Most states had multiple laws on
the subject. Law to Regulate Trade with the Indians, GA. (1735), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN
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arose primarily from abuses by merchants ("traders") dealing with the
Indians. Abuses included fraud in the sales of goods, exorbitant prices
for goods, use of liquor to acquire goods and land at unfairly low prices,
extortion, trading in stolen goods, gun-running, and physical invasion of
Indian territory. 122  Such conduct by white merchants sometimes pro-
voked Indian retaliation. 
123
The most assiduous regulatory experimentation was conducted by
South Carolina, which adopted, amended, and extended its Indian trade
statutes many times.' 24  By 1751, its code of regulations was the most
extensive among North American colonies. 1
25
South Carolina governed Indian commerce in several different
ways. Some regulations were directed at the identity of those carrying
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 363; Law to Regulate Trade With the Eastern Indians, MA.
(1753), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 200; Law to Pre-
vent Unlicensed Trade With Indians, N.H. (1713), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 232; Law to Regulate Trade in Liquor with Indians, N.J. (1682),
reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 666; Law to Regulate the
Indian Trade, N.Y. (1742), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at
618; Law to Regulate Trade with the Cherokees, N.C. (1778), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 74; Law to Regulate Trade, N.C. (1757), reprinted in 16
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 55 (reproducing a pre-1768 statute); Law
to Regulate the Indian Trade, PA. (1758), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS,
supra note 2, at 764; Law to Regulate Indian Trade, VA. (1714), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 133; Law to Regulate Indian Trade, VA. (1765), reprinted in
15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 216; Law to Appoint Commissions for
the Indian Trade, VA. (1769) reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2,
at 224 (reproducing law passed in response to British decision to devolve trade regulation to the
colonies).
122. See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 18-20; see also Letter from Earl of Hillsborough to
Governor Tryon (Apr. 15, 1768), reprinted in 14 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra
note 2, at 265-66 (complaining of "atrocious Frauds and Abuses" against the Indians); Letter from
Cameron to Superintendent Stuart (Oct. 11, 1773), reprinted in 14 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 334-36 (complaining of merchants trading rum for stolen horses and
stating need to "enforce the Old Regulations"); Letter from Superintendent Stuart to the Earl of
Dartmouth (Jan. 3, 1775), reprinted in 14 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at
359 (complaining of the practice of getting land titles for presents or liquor, and of the weakness of
colonial regulation); Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Gage (Nov. 18, 1772), reprinted in 10
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 600-02 (complaining of traders' use of
liquor).
123. PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 20; see also GRENVILLE, supra note 2, at 19 (referring to the
tendency of abuses to raise animosity among the Indians).
124. The numerous South Carolina statutes on the subject are set forth in 16 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 112 (1691 statute); id. at 128 (1703 statute); id. at 133 (1706
statute); id. at 136 (1707 statute-a sweeping measure); id at 153 (a 1711 statute regulating mer-
chants from other colonies); id. at 193 (1716 statute); id. at 197 (a 1716 statute introducing rules
preventing evasion through the use of agents and a seizure remedy); id at 214 (a sweeping 1719
statute); id. at 230-33 (a 1721 statute punishing, inter alia, extortion of Indians); id. at 235 (1722
statute); id. at 252 (another 1722 statute); id. at 256 (a 1723 statute); id. at 263 (a 1731 statute); id at
271 (a 1733 statute); id. at 276 (a 1734 statute); id. at 279 (a 1736 statute); id. at 287 (a 1739 statute);
id. at 330 (a 1751 ordinance); and id. at 342 (a 1762 law regulating trade with the Cherokees); see
PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 19 n.29 (commending and discussing the South Carolina scheme and its
relatively effective enforcement).
125. See Ordinance to Regulate Indian Affairs, S.C. (1751), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 330-31.
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on that commerce. A trader had to be licensed. 126 He had to be of good
moral character and post a bond. 127  A potential applicant's name was
posted publicly before applying, so anyone with objections would have
an opportunity to raise them. 128 Traders were restricted as to whom they
could employ as their agents. 129 The names of potential agents had to be
disclosed. 130  Traders who violated these rules by, for instance, trading
without a license, were subject to substantial penalties.
31
In addition, South Carolina law specified where trade could be car-
ried on. A trader's license stated where he was authorized to trade, and
he could not work elsewhere.' 32 It was illegal to bring natives into white
settlements without prior permission. 33 It was illegal for whites to travel
into Indian country without prior permission.' 
34
South Carolina also laid down rules for the conduct of merchants
engaged in Indian commerce. Fraud, duress, and other bad conduct was
interdicted and punished. 35 Traders were expected to cooperate in en-
forcement of the law. 136  They were not to discuss politics with Indi-
ans. 137 Traders' goods sometimes were subject to price controls, 138 and
usually could not be sold on credit.'
39
126. Regulations for Indian Affairs, S.C. (1751), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 331.
127. Id. at 332.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 333-34.
130. Id. at 333.
131. Id. at 331 (providing for fine of E200), 334 (providing for forfeiture of bond).
132. Id. at 333 (limiting traders to locations they are licensed for), 334 (stating that the com-
missioner is to apportion traders among towns); Ordinance for Regulating the Cherokee Trade, S.C.
(1751), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 335 (limiting trad-
ers to locations they are licensed for).
133. Regulations for Indian Affairs, S.C. (1751), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 334.
134. See, e.g., Law to Preserve Peace and Promote Trade with Indians art. 1, S.C. (1739),
reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 287 (banning unlicensed
persons from Indian country).
135. Ordinance for Regulating the Cherokee Trade, S.C. (1751), reprinted in 16 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 335 (requiring traders to "behave justly and hon-
estly toward the Indians" and banning seizure of Indian goods).
136. Regulations for Indian Affairs, S.C. (1751), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 332. In addition, merchants were required "to keep a Journal of all
remarkable Occurrences which they are to deliver to the Commissioner to be laid before the General
Assembly," id at 333, and to notify the authorities of "any Matter or Thing in the Indian Country
that may affect the Peace and Tranquility of this Government... " Id. Merchants who witnessed
liquor inventory in the hands of other merchants were expected to seize it. Ordinance for Regulating
the Cherokee Trade, S.C. (1751), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra
note 2, at 336.
137. Regulations for Indian Affairs, S.C. (1751), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 333.
138. Id. (stating traders must honor any price-control stipulations in a forthcoming Cherokee
treaty).
139. Id. at 332. Merchants also were required to disclose to Indians that any debts Indians
contracted were unenforceable. Id. at 333.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
Other regulations focused on the inventory for trade. The items
given to and received from the Indians had to be disclosed to the authori-
ties. 140 Traffic in liquor-and sometimes in other goods141-was prohib-
ited or strictly limited.142 Goods had to meet quality standards.143 Trad-
ers had to employ honest weights and measures. 144
South Carolina law erected an administrative apparatus. Commis-
sioners were appointed and empowered to enforce laws and to judge
disputes between traders and between traders and Indians. 145 Commis-
sioners were required to take an oath, 146 to keep adequate records, 147 and
to refuse or surrender gifts. 148 The legislature authorized license fees to
pay for this system. 1
49
Apart from its thoroughness, the South Carolina scheme was not
unusual. Most of the provisions listed above appeared in the laws of
other jurisdictions. 150 They also appeared in treaties. 151 In other words,
this was the sort of scheme the founding generation envisioned when it
granted a federal power to "Regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tri-
bes."
152
Experience with commercial regulation at the colonial level (and,
later, the state level) was fundamentally unsatisfactory. 153 Most jurisdic-
tions did not have schemes as sweeping as those of South Carolina, and
the laws that were enacted were not always enforced efficiently. During
140. Id.
141. E.g., Law to Regulate Trade with Indians, S.C. (1707), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 137 (barring sale of firearms to enemy Indians); id. at 137-38
(barring sale of free Indians as slaves); see also PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 20 (discussing restrictions
on sale of rum).
142. E.g., Ordinance for Regulating the Cherokee Trade, S.C. (1751), reprinted in 16 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 336 (authorizing seizure of liquor).
143. Id. at 335 (regulating quality of hides).
144. Id.
145. Regulations for Indian Affairs, S.C. (1751), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 332.
146. Id. at 331.
147. Id. at 331-32.
148. Id. at 332.
149. E.g., id. (E4 license fee).
150. See, e.g., Law to Regulate the Indian Trade, PA. (1758), reprinted in 17 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 765-66, 768-69 (appointing commissioners of
Indian affairs, empowering them to appoint a place for trade, barring them from trading for their own
account, authorizing price controls, barring sale of "spirituous liquors," and providing penalties for
breach); see also PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 19-20 (generalizing about colonial regulatory schemes).
151. E.g., Treaty with the Delawares art. V, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, reprinted in KAPPLER,
supra note 2, at 4:
[A]s far as the United States may have it in their power, by a well-regulated trade, under
the conduct of an intelligent, candid agent, with an adequate salary one more influenced
by the love of his country and a constant attention to the duties of his department by pro-
moting the common interest, than the sinister purposes of converting and binding all the
duties of his office to his private emolument.
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
153. PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 20-21 (discussing failure of colonial regulatory efforts).
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the Colonial Era, the British superintendents of Indian affairs complained
bitterly about abuses in Indian trade and about what they saw as the un-
willingness of colonial officials to correct the problems. 154 Native lead-
ers also frequently complained, urging British officials to further limit
trading posts to fixed locations, to tighten trader licensing, and to invali-
date land titles received without government authorization.
155
3. Other Colonial and Early State Governance of Indian Affairs
Throughout the Colonial and Revolutionary period, colonies and
states frequently entered into treaties with Indians within their territorial
limits.1 56 New York even appointed treaty commissioners after the Con-
stitution had been issued and ratified. 157 Less well known'58 is the fact
that colonies (and later states) regularly exercised, or attempted to exer-
cise, police power over those Native Americans, tribal and non-tribal,
who lived within their borders. This power was in accordance with Eng-
lish case authority, since in 1693, the Court of King's Bench had ruled in
Blankard v. Galdy15 9 that foreign peoples within British domains might
initially keep their own laws, but that British law applied once it was
"declared so by the conqueror or his successors." 160 During this period,
154. See, e.g., Letter from Superintendent John Stuart to the Earl of Hillsborough (Apr. 27,
1771), reprinted in 14 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 315-16 (complain-
ing of "the want of Regulation among the Indian Traders" and "merchants engaged in the Indian
Trade"); Royal Instructions to Governor William Campbell of South Carolina (Aug. 5, 1774), re-
printed in 14 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 345-46 (complaining of
abuses and requiring a regulation of the Indian trade); Letter from Superintendent John Stuart to the
Earl of Dartmouth (Jan. 3, 1775), reprinted in 14 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra
note 2, at 359 (complaining of the practice of getting land titles for presents or liquor and of the
weakness of colonial regulation); Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Gage (Nov. 18, 1772),
reprinted in 10 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 600-01 (complaining of
abuses and "total want of any regulations").
155. E.g., Proceedings with the Six Nations (1773), reprinted in 10 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 605, 607 (recording Indian complaints of a range of abuses and pro-
posals for fixed trading posts and proper regulation); Six Nations Congress (1774), reprinted in 10
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 618 (reporting Indian complaints about
invasion of hunting grounds by traders and trafficking in liquor).
156. The numerous colonial and state treaties are scattered among the volumes of EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2. See, e.g., Lancaster Treaty, 5 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 51 (reproducing negotiations and 1744 treaty between the
colonies of Maryland and Virginia and the Six Nations).
157. An Act for appointing Commissioners to hold Treaties with the Indians, within this state,
L. N.Y. c. XLVII (Mar. 1, 1788); An Act to continue and amend an Act, entitled An Act for appoint-
ing Commissioners to hold Treaties with the Indians in this State, L. N.Y. c. XXI (Feb. 12, 1789).
158. Most commentators seem to be unaware of this police power. See, e.g., Savage, supra
note 2, at 97 (claiming the states had no power over the Indians during the Confederation Era);
Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 2, at 72 ("[T]he Founders wrote that [Indian Commerce]
clause with the understanding that Indian tribes would remain outside the borders of the United
States, with no serious discussion or expectation that the tribes would survive being surrounded by
the states.").
159. (K.B. 1693) 2 Salk. 411, 91 Eng. Rep. 356.
160. Id. (Blankard arose in Jamaica, said by the court to have been "conquered from the Indi-
ans and Spaniards"); see also I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 105 ("But in conquered
or ceded countries, that have already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and change those
laws; but, till he does actually change them, the antient [sic] laws of the country remain, unless such
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the colonies and states had "declared so" in numerous statutes. Many of
these statutes remained on the books right through the Ratification Era.
The best known of these measures were laws and state constitu-
tional provisions curbing land sales from Indians to whites. 161  These
measures were directed mostly at whites, but had obvious effects on In-
dians as well. For example, such measures could result in the voiding of
perfectly reasonable deed transfers by individual Indians or by tribes.
1 62
In addition, numerous statutes were directed specifically at conduct by
Indians. Some were criminal, others civil, governing matters as harmful
as theft or as beneficial as conveyancing. 163  Further, colonial govern-
as are against the law of God, as in the case of an infidel country. Our American plantations are
principally of this latter sort."). Calvin's Case (K.B. 1608) 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, on
which Blackstone relied, actually suggested that for non-Christian countries (such as those seized
from the Indians), it was not even necessary for the conqueror to declare abrogation of former laws.
7 Co. Rep. at 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 398. A case, unreported and not decided by a regular court, is
sometimes cited for the contrary position. It is discussed infra Part IV.E.
161. See, e.g., An Act Concerning Purchasers of Native Rights to Land, CONN. ACTS AND
LAWS (1786) (adopted 1717); An Act for empowering certain Persons to examine the Sales that have
been made by the Moheaunnuk Tribe of Indians, and for regulating the future Sales and Leases of all
lands from the said Tribe of Indians, I PERPETUAL LAWS OF MASS. 124 (1784); An Act for regulat-
ing the purchasing of land from the Indians, L. N.J. 1 (1703); An Act to punish Infractions of that
Article of the Constitution of this State, prohibiting Purchases of Lands from the Indians, without the
Authority and Consent of the Legislature; and more effectually to provide against Infractions on the
unappropriated Lands of this State, L. N.Y. 366 c. LXXXV (1788); An Act to restrain and prevent
the purchasing Lands from Indians, PUB. L. S.C., 160-61 (1790) (adopted 1739); Law to Regulate
the Purchases of Indian Lands, VA. (1779), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS,
supra note 2, at 233. See also GRENVILLE, supra note 2, at 19 (discussing the need for such meas-
ures).
162. See, e.g., Law to Regulate the Purchases of Indian Lands, VA. (1779), reprinted in 15
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 233 (providing that Indian deeds to certain
lands are "utterly void and of no effect").
163. Here are a few additional examples of colony and state police power laws over Indians:
An Act for the well-ordering and governing the Indians in this State; and securing their Interest,
CONN. ACTS AND LAWS 101-02 (1784) (adopted 1702) (regulating various crimes and land transac-
tions by Indians); A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 57 (1968) (stating that in Maryland, Nanticoke Indians agreed by
treaty in 1687 "that if any Indian commits an offence [sic] against the English he should be tryed
[sic] by the English law"); Law to Confine Free Indians to Three Towns, MA. (1681), reprinted in
17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 140; An Act for the better regulating of
the Indian, Mulatto and Negro Proprietors and Inhabitants of the Plantation called Marshpee, 2
PERPETUAL LAWS OF MASS. 63 (1789) (adopted 1790) (setting up a board of overseers to govern all
affairs of the settlement, and establishing various other regulations); Law to Regulate Indian Affairs,
N.J. (1757), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 707-09 (regu-
lating contracts by, and debts of, Indians and methods of land conveyancing); Law to Reward the
Killing of Wolves and Panthers, N.Y. (1742), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 619 (extending reward system to Indians, free blacks, and slaves);
Law to Punish Indians for Drunkenness, PLYMOUTH L. (1662), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 27; Law to Punish Indians for Stealing Hogs, PLYMOUTH L.
218, 218 (1666), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 29; Law
to Allow Indians to be Witnesses in Court, PLYMOUTH L. (1674), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 41; Law to Punish Idleness and Stealing by Indians,
PLYMOUTH L. (1674), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 41;
Laws to Govern Indians, PLYMOUTH L. (1685), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 56-60; An Act to prevent the Stealing and Taking away of Boats and
Canoes, PUB. L. S.C., 2 (1790) (adopted 1695) (regulating theft by Indians); id. at 166 (specifying
how testimony by Indians is to be received), 167 (regulating various thefts or damage by Indians,
among others); Law to Punish Slaves and Regulate Free Indians, VA. (1748), reprinted in 15 EARLY
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ments sometimes imposed fines or tort liability on Native chieftains for
injury caused by themselves or by other Indians at their direction.
164
Today, many people might believe that some or most of these assertions
of police power were unjust, unenforceable, or both. Perhaps they were.
But they demonstrate that the colonies and states did exercise authority
over Native Americans within their borders. At least two significant
Founders, Thomas Jefferson 165 and William Samuel Johnson,' 66 are on
record as alluding specifically to this authority.
4. The Drafting of the Articles of Confederation
When Americans began to consider a common government other
than the Crown, they had to weigh the same issues of how to divide cen-
tral and local control over Indian affairs. These were not easy questions.
The Indian tribes were (then as now 167) sui generis-neither wholly for-
eign nor wholly part of the body politic, so foreign and domestic affairs
precedents offered no obvious rule for dividing jurisdiction. There cer-
tainly was not, as some writers have claimed, any emerging consensus in
favor of central over local control. 1
68
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 180 (specifying procedures and punishments in
response to a variety of crimes by Indians as well as slaves and mulattos); Law to Allow Nottoways
to Lease Their Lands, VA. (1772), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra
note 2, at 226.
164. United Colonies Fine Narragansetts for Abusing Southertown Settlers (1662), reprinted in
19 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 374.
165. 6 J. CONT'L CONG. 1077, 1077-78 (July 26, 1776) (referring to the fact that Indians within
states were subject to state laws "in some degree").
166. See infra Part IV.E. (discussing Johnson). Johnson alluded to colonial laws applying to
Indians, "which subject them to Punishment for Immoralities, and crimes, and enact various regula-
tions with respect to them." SMITH, supra note 2, at 434 n.109.
167. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (discussing the
unique nature of Indian tribes).
168. The claim appears in Clinton, Dormant, supra note 2, at 1082; PRUCHA, supra note 2, at
37. However, each of these authors is honest enough to admit the evidence to the contrary, so each
has to struggle mightily to preserve the claim of an emerging consensus in favor of central over local
control. For example, Professor Clinton reports copious evidence that there was no such consensus.
See, e.g., Clinton, Dormant, supra note 2, at 1082-84, 1086 (describing how colonial governors of
Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania resisted efforts at central control); id. at 1088-89, 1094-
95 (showing how British efforts at centralized control helped bring on the Revolutionary War); id at
1094-95 (admitting that the Board of Trade's plans for more centralized control were abandoned
partly because of colonial opposition); id at 1102 (describing how those who favored centralized
control through the Articles of Confederation had to compromise by conceding broad authority over
Indian affairs to the states); id. at 1105 ("During the confederation period, the Continental Congress
continually struggled with some of the states over the scope of each government's respective power
under the Indian affairs clause of the Articles of Confederation."). For examples of Clinton's strug-
gle to preserve the claim of consensus, see, e.g., id. at 1110 (characterizing a defeat for centralizing
proposal sponsored in Congress by Rhode Island as "significant support"); id. at 1112-13 (character-
izing similarly another defeated proposal); id. at 1123 (claiming that a compromise requiring the
congressional superintendents to "act in conjunction with the Authority" of the states was a victory
for centralization).
Professor Prucha similarly reports events that show clearly the absence of a consensus in favor of
centralization. See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 37-38 (describing the debate over federal versus
state control during the drafting of the Articles of Confederation); id. at 44-45 (describing New
York's challenge to the authority of the Confederation Congress); id at 47 (describing Georgia's
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In 1754, Benjamin Franklin drafted a proposed Albany Plan of Un-
ion. It was similar to all succeeding proposals for American unity in that
it divided responsibility over Indian affairs between central and local
authorities, but it reflected Franklin's view that central governance
should predominate. The Albany Plan would have granted to the central
authority control over those Indian treaties "in which the general interest
of the Colonies may be concerned,"' 169 leaving, presumably, Indian af-
fairs with only local impact in the hands of individual colonies. The cen-
tral colonial government also would be empowered to make "peace or
declare war with Indian nations,"'1 70 and to promulgate "such laws as [it]
judge[s] necessary for regulating all Indian trade."'171 The central gov-
ernment would have been empowered to acquire Indian lands, but only
outside the boundaries of the colonies.' 72 Colonial police power appar-
ently would have remained largely intact, but subject to being overridden
by central trade regulation.
On July 21, 1775, after the Revolutionary War had begun but before
Independence had been declared, Franklin renewed his plea for Ameri-
can unity. That day, he presented to the Continental Congress his own
"articles of confederation."' 173  This draft also embodied his view that
central control over Indian affairs should predominate over local control.
It specified that colonies could wage offensive war against the Indians
only with the consent of Congress, 174 and would have empowered Con-
gress to appoint commissioners to regulate the Indian trade. 175 It would
challenge); id. at 49 (recording a challenge, apparently successful, by North Carolina)--all of which
contradict his generalization. In the teeth of such evidence, though, Professor Prucha inserted gener-
alizations such as, "In the end, the overall necessities of [central Indian control] prevailed," id at 37,
and "[t]he centrifugal force of state sovereignty and state pride was never strong enough to destroy
the centralization of Indian control," id. at 49. He does this even when countervailing material
appears in close proximity on his own pages. See, e.g., id. at 37-38 (claiming that "the overall ne-
cessities of [central Indian control] prevailed," while describing on the very next page the large
reservation of control to the states under the Articles of Confederation).
169. ALBANY PLAN OF UNION, art. X (1754).
170. Id. at art. XI.
171. Id.
172. Id. at art. XII.
173. 2 J. CONT'L CONG. 194, 195 (July 21, 1775).
174. Id. at 197 (ART. X. "No Colony shall engage in an offensive War with any Nation of
Indians without the Consent of the Congress, or great Council above mentioned, who are first to
consider the Justice and Necessity of such War.").
175. Id- at 198:
ART. XI. A perpetual Alliance offensive and defensive, is to be enter'd into as soon as
may be with the Six Nations; their Limits to be ascertain'd and secur'd to them; their
Land not to be encroach'd on, nor any private or Colony Purchases made of them hereaf-
ter to be held good; nor any Contract for Lands to be made but between the Great Council
of the Indians at Onondaga and the General Congress. The Boundaries and Lands of all
the other Indians shall also be ascertain'd and secur'd to them in the same manner; and
Persons appointed to reside among them in proper Districts, who shall take care to pre-
vent Injustice in the Trade with them, and be enabled at our general Expence by occa-
sional small Supplies, to relieve their personal Wants and Distresses. And all Purchases
from them shall be by the Genefal Congress for the General Advantage and Benefit of the
United Colonies.
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have made Congress the sole agent for purchase of Indian lands, whether
within or outside the boundaries of individual colonies.
176
Franklin's proposal was not acted on, but the following November
Congress did empower a committee to draft regulations for the Indian
trade.177 In June of the succeeding year, when Congress adopted a reso-
lution calling for independence, it also authorized preparation of a plan
of "confederation."1
78
The committee that prepared the first official draft of the Articles
was chaired by John Dickinson, and the draft is in his handwriting.
179
This draft was reported to Congress on July 12, 1776.180 Its Indian af-
fairs provisions were in some ways more nationalist 18 than the Franklin
draft and in some ways less. As in the Franklin proposal, states were not
to wage offensive war against the Indians except with congressional au-
thorization.182 Dickinson's version granted Congress the exclusive pow-
er to acquire land from the Indians, but-unlike Franklin's proposal-
only outside state boundaries, once those boundaries had been estab-
lished. 183 The Dickinson version added a clause empowering Congress
to "have the sole and exclusive Right and Power of ... Regulating the
Trade, and managing all Affairs with the Indians."' 84  Despite the
breadth of this language, Dickinson himself did not think it necessarily
176. Id.
177. 3 J. CONT'L CONG. 364, 366 (Nov. 23, 1775).
178. 5 J. CONT'L CONG. 432, 433 (June 12, 1776).
179. 5 J. CONT'L CONG. 545, 546 n. 1 (July 12, 1776).
180. Id. at 546.
181. Historians writing of the Founding Era generally adopt the term "nationalist" to refer to
ideas and persons favoring a strong central government.
182.
ART. XIII. No Colony or Colonies shall engage in any War without the previous Consent
of the United States assembled, unless such Colony or Colonies be actually invaded by
Enemies, or shall have received certain Advice of a Resolution being formed by some
Nations of Indians to invade such Colony or Colonies, and the Danger is so imminent, as
not to admit of a Delay, till the other Colonies can be consulted.
Id. at 549.
183.
Art. XIV. A perpetual Alliance, offensive and defensive, is to be entered into by the
United States assembled as soon as may be, with the Six Nations, and all other neigh-
bouring Nations of Indians; their Limits to be ascertained, their Lands to be secured to
them, and not encroached on; no Purchases of Lands, hereafter to be made of the Indians
by Colonies or private Persons before the Limits of the Colonies are ascertained, to be va-
lid: All Purchases of Lands not included within those Limits, where ascertained, to be
made by Contracts between the United States assembled, or by Persons for that Purpose
authorized by them, and the great Councils of the Indians, for the general Benefit of all
the United Colonies (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
Id.
184. Id. at 550 ("Art. XVIII. The United States assembled shall have the sole and exclusive
Right and Power of... Regulating the Indian Trade, and managing all Indie Affairs with the Indi-
ans.").
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granted Congress truly exclusive power, for he inserted a marginal note
querying, "How far a Colony may interfere in Indian Affairs?"'
185
In a committee of the whole, Congress recurrently debated and re-
fined the Articles until November 15, 1777, when Congress finally ap-
proved the Articles and sent them to the states for ratification. 186 Unfor-
tunately, most of the congressional debates on the subject during 1776
and 1777 have not been preserved. We do know that jurisdiction over
Native affairs remained a controversial point. 187 John Adams' notes tell
us that in July 1776 James Wilson of Pennsylvania, among others, ar-
gued eloquently for exclusive congressional jurisdiction over all Indian
affairs, but that Wilson and his allies lost this point on the floor. 188 Ed-
ward Rutledge and Thomas Lynch, Jr., whose state of South Carolina
had, as we have seen, made a heavy investment in regulating the Indian
trade, 189 "oppose[d] giving the power of regulating the trade and manag-
ing all affairs of the Indians to Congress."' 190  Thomas Jefferson of Vir-
ginia pointed out that Indians who lived within state boundaries already
were "subject to [state] laws in some degree.'' 191 He proposed that Con-
gress control only Indian land sales outside state boundaries. 192 Thus,
Congress was wrestling with both kinds of jurisdictional questions:
193
How should the subject matter of Indian affairs be divided between states
and Confederation? And, assuming Congress controlled affairs with
Indians outside state boundaries, which levels of government should re-
gulate affairs with Indians within state boundaries?
On August 20, 1776, the committee of the whole presented to Con-
gress a revised draft of the Articles. This draft continued the ban on
states engaging in offensive war against the Natives 194 and dropped the
specific reference to land sales. It provided that Congress would have
"the sole and exclusive right and power of. . . regulating the trade, and
185. Id. at 549 n.2.
186. E.g., 5 J. CONT'L CONG. 598, 600, 603-04, 608-09, 612, 615 (July 22-29, 1787) (referring
to congressional debate over the Articles of Confederation; there are many other references).
187. PRUCRA, supra note 2, at 37 ("Congressional control of Indian affairs, however, was not
accepted by all, and the debate on July 26 [1776] indicated a decided divergence of views."); id. at
38 (noting of a draft of the Articles limiting congressional control to matters involving "Indians, not
members of any of the States" and that "[e]ven this did not satisfy the advocates of state control").
188. 6 J. CONT'L CONG. 1077, 1077-79 (July 26, 1776).
189. See supra notes 124-150 and accompanying text. See also id. at 1078 (quoting Rutledge
and Lynch on South Carolina's investment in Indian affairs).
190. Id. at 1077.
191. Id. at 1077-78.
192. 6 J. CONT'L CONG. 1076, 1076 (Jul. 25, 1776).
193. See supra Part II.B. 1.
194. 5 J. CONT'L CONG 672, 679 (Aug. 20, 1776):
ART. XL. No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in
Congress Assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have re-
ceived certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade
such State, and the danger is so imminent, as not to admit of a delay, till the other States
can be consulted.
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managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the
States."' 95 As contemporaneous dictionaries make clear, the requirement
that an Indian be a "member" of a state meant that he had to be inte-
grated into the body-politic as a citizen-or at least a taxpayer-of the
state. 196 Congress was to regulate all affairs with Indians outside of state
boundaries. It also was to regulate affairs with Indians within state
boundaries if they lived subject to their tribes, rather than as taxpayers or
citizens. "Indians not paying taxes," whom another part of the Articles
excluded for purposes of determining state financial contributions to
Congress, 197 were presumed not to be "members" of their states. Mem-
ber-Indians would remain subject to exclusive state jurisdiction under a
clause providing that "[e]ach State reserves to itself the sole and exclu-
sive regulation and government of its internal police, in all matters that
shall not interfere with the articles of this Confederation.
'' 9 8
The division of power in the draft of August 20, 1776, was unsatis-
factory to many because it permitted Congress to interfere with long-
established state jurisdiction over affairs with tribal Natives residing
within state boundaries. Accordingly, some congressional delegates of-
fered amendments to broaden the Member-Indian exception to the Indian
affairs power. One of these amendments, offered on October 27, 1777,
would have restricted congressional power to affairs with Indians "not
residing within the limits of any of the United States."' 99 Relations with
all Native Americans within state lines would have been subject to state
government only. Another delegate moved that Congress be restricted to
"managing all affairs relative to war and peace with all Indians not mem-
bers of any particular State, and regulating the trade with such nations
and tribes as are not resident within such limits wherein a particular State
claims, and actually exercises jurisdiction. 200 This would have limited
congressional power to diplomacy with tribal Indians (wherever located)
and to commerce with Indians in those parts of the West where state land
claims had not been renounced.
Neither of these proposals passed, but they showed that some dele-
gates were unhappy with the idea of Congress regulating relations with
the Natives within state boundaries. On October 28, the delegates hit
upon a formula the majority could agree to. It retained the "Member-
Indian" exception to federal jurisdiction, and added another: "provided,
195. Id. at 681-82.
196. ALLEN, DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (unpaginated) (providing as the second definition of
member: "a single person belonging to a society or community"); BAILEY, DICTIONARY, supra note
2 (unpaginated) (stating as one definition: "a part of a body-politic, as a Member of Parliament");
JOHNSON, DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (unpaginated) (stating as the fourth definition: "one of a com-
munity").
197. 5 J. CONT'L CONG. 672, 677-78 (Aug. 20, 1776) (reproducing ART. IX).
198. Id. at 675 (reproducing ART. 111).
199. 9 J. CONT'L CONG. 841, 844 (Oct. 27, 1777).
200. Id.
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that the legislative right of any State, within its own limits be not in-
fringed or violated.",20' This was the final change. The result was a
clause that included both a sweeping grant of power to Congress-"[t]he
United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole and exclu-
sive right and power of ... regulating the trade and managing all affairs
with the Indians" 2°-and two sweeping exceptions: "all affairs with the
Indians not members of any of the States; provided that the legislative
right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated. 2 °3
The exceptions were backed up by a strengthened reservation of
state sovereignty in Article II: "Each state retains its sovereignty... and
every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation
expressly delegated to the United States." 204 The result was a clear vic-
tory for the advocates of state power. States would retain authority over
"Member-Indians"--those who had been completely subject to state
laws. States also could continue to exercise authority over tribal Indians
within their boundaries, those whom Jefferson had described as "subject
to [state] laws in some degree." 205 Congress could negotiate with tribes
within state lines but would need to coordinate efforts with state officials
or otherwise ensure against infringing on state "legislative right."
This jurisdictional division may be summarized as follows:
* Congress was to enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over all transactions
(whether or not commercial) 20 6 with Indians located outside the organ-
ized limits of states-that is, either outside United States boundaries or
within federal territories to be formed when states ceded their western
land claims to Congress;
* The states were to retain exclusive jurisdiction over relations with
Member-Indians (those who paid taxes or were citizens) within their
boundaries; and
* Congress and the states were to exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over transactions with tribal Indians within state boundaries, but congres-
sional decisions would have to be in compliance with local law.
207
201. 9 J. CONT'L CONG. 844, 845 (Oct. 28, 1777).
202. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX; see also 9 J. CONT'L CONG. 906, 907-25 (Nov. 15, 1777)
(setting forth penultimate and final versions of the Articles of Confederation. The Indian affairs
language is located at 919).
203. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX.
204. Id. at art. II.
205. 6 J. CONT'L CONG. 1077, 1077-78 (July 26, 1776).
206. For the contemporaneous definition of "affairs," see supra notes 105-110 and accompany-
ing text.
207. Thus, there would be some congressional power within state boundaries. But see
PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 38-39 (averring that congressional laws had effect only outside state boun-
daries - an uncharacteristic understatement by this author of the scope of central authority).
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5. Life Under the Confederation
Congress approved the Articles on November 15, 1777,28 and the
final state ratification came in March 1781.209 Because of the Articles'
odd split of state and congressional authority over Indian affairs, the po-
tential for jurisdictional conflicts always loomed over congressional con-
duct in that realm. This was particularly true in western territories
claimed by states and not yet ceded to the United States. For example,
Congress wished to ensure that Indian land conveyances in territories
ceded to the United States were valid only if approved by the relevant
authority. Congress had to determine whether this meant only state au-
thority or whether congressional ratification would suffice. 21°  Eventu-
ally, Congress issued a proclamation for territory "without the limits or
jurisdiction of any particular State" that barred settlers from lands
claimed by the Indians and prohibited Indian land conveyances without
congressional permission.211
Jurisdiction over the regulation of commerce was a recurrent issue.
In 1778, Congress ratified a treaty with the Delawares that required that
the tribe "be supplied with such articles from time to time, as far as the
United States may have it in their power, by a well-regulated trade."
212
In early 1785, a treaty with the Wyandot and other northern tribes re-
served for the United States trading posts and ownership of land sur-
rounding them. 213 Later that year and in early 1786, Congress entered
into the three Hopewel1214 treaties with southern tribes-the Cherokee,
Choctaw and Chickasaw-and all three provided that Congress would
have the sole and exclusive power of regulating trade with the Indians.
215
208. 9 J. CONT'L CONG. 906, 907 (Nov. 15, 1777).
209. 19 J. CONT'L CONG. 208, 213-14 (Mar. 1, 1781).
210. 18 J. CONT'L CONG. 914, 915-16 (Oct. 10, 1780) (providing in a committee report, later
defeated, that Indian land titles to private parties in areas ceded by states to the general government
are not valid unless approved by the state legislature, which provision was altered to "ratified by
lawful authority").
211. 25 J. CONT'L CONG. 597, 602 (Sept. 22, 1783).
212. Treaty with the Delawares art. V, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra
note 2, at 4.
213. Treaty with the Wyandot art. IV, Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra
note 2, at 7:
The United States allot all the lands contained within the said lines to the Wyandot and
Delaware nations, to live and to hunt on, and to such of the Ottawa nation as now live
thereon; saving and reserving for the establishment of trading posts, six miles square [and
several other plots] ... which posts and the lands annexed to them, shall be to the use and
under the government of the United States.
214. So called because they were signed at a plantation called Hopewell in South Carolina.
215. Treaty with the Cherokee art. IX, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra
note 2, at 10:
For the benefit and comfort of the Indians, and for the prevention of injuries or oppres-
sions on the part of the citizens or Indians, the United States in Congress assembled shall
have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing
all their affairs in such manner as they think proper.
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Meanwhile, Congress was moving toward adoption of an ordinance
for the regulation of the Indian trade. In 1783, one of its committees
suggested that such regulations were necessary, 216 and a second commit-
tee was appointed to draft them.217 It was not until June 1786 that the
second committee proposed an ordinance for trade regulation.
218
By that time most of the state land claims north of the Ohio River
had been ceded to Congress, thereby minimizing jurisdictional disputes
with states over regulation of trade with the northern tribes. However,
the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek tribes lived on land still
claimed by Georgia and the Carolinas. 219  During debate on the trade
ordinance, William Few of Georgia and Timothy Bloodworth of North
Carolina sought to include in the ordinance a provision that it "shall not
be construed to operate so as that the legislative right of any state within
its own limits be infringed or violated.' '220  Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina (a state that was about to cede its small and dubious Western
claim) and William Grayson of Virginia (which already had ceded most
of its claim) managed to secure an amendment to the ordinance's pream-
ble that emphasized congressional power rather than congressional limi-
tations.22 1 A few days later-the very date of the third reading-Few,
now in team with Edward Carrington of Virginia, proposed the following
addition to the measure:
And be it further Ordained, that in all cases where transactions with
any nation or tribe of Indians, shall become necessary to the purposes
of this Ordinance, which cannot be done without interfering with the
legislative rights of a state, the Superintendant [sic] in whose district
Treaty with the Choctaw art. VIII, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 13
(similar provision); Treaty with the Chickasaw art. VIII, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24, reprinted in
KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 15-16 (similar provision).
216. 25 J. CONT'L CONG. 680, 690 (Oct. 15, 1783).
217. Id at 693.
218. 30 J. CONT'L CONG. 367, 368 (June 28, 1786).
219. See THOMAs A. BAILEY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC 138,
284 (5th ed. 1975) (showing the boundaries of land occupied by the Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaw,
Choctaw, and Seminoles, and the western land claims). The fifth edition was the last authored alone
by the great Stanford historian. As of 1783, the boundaries of Georgia proper, which were more
constricted than they are today, did not include Indian country. However, Georgia's western land
claims included territory occupied by the Cherokee, Creek, Chickasaw, and Choctaw. South Caro-
lina claimed some of Cherokee and Chickasaw lands. Within North Carolina proper and partly
within North Carolina's western land claim (later Tennessee) lay the remaining Cherokee lands.
North Carolina's western land claim also included a sliver of Chickasaw land.
220. 30 J. CONT. CONG. 423,424 (July 24, 1786).
221. Id. at 424-25:
And whereas the United States in Congress assembled, under the 9th of the Articles of
Confederation and perpetual Union, have the sole and exclusive right and power of regu-
lating the trade, and managing all affairs with the Indians not members of any of the
States, provided that the legislative right of any State, within its own limits, be not in-
fringed or violated.
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the same shall happen, shall act in conjunction with the Authority of
such State.
222
This amendment passed, nine states to two, and the main motion
was carried.22 3
The resulting congressional trade ordinance featured terms typical
of previous colonial and state schemes: it authorized appointment of su-
perintendents for the northern and southern districts; it specified that
those who wished to reside among or trade with the Indians had to re-
ceive a license and post a bond; and it required passports for travel in
Indian country. 224 In February 1787, Congress approved detailed in-
structions for the Superintendents of Indian Affairs, outlining their re-
sponsibilities both for Indian commerce and for other matters.
225
North Carolina officials were unhappy with the congressional trea-
ties with Indian tribes located within its claimed territory. A 1787 set of
instructions from that state's house of commons to its congressional del-
egation complained that the Hopewell treaties had "allotted to the [Che-
rokees and Chickasaws] certain Lands as their hunting Grounds which
are obviously within the Jurisdiction of this State ... and a great part of
which is for a valuable Consideration sold to our Citizens, some of
whom are now actually living thereon." 226 The effect was to "suppose a
right in the United States to interfere with our Legislative Rights which is
inadmissible." 22 7 An effort by North Carolina delegates John Ash and
William Blount to have Congress partially repudiate the Hopewell trea-
ties apparently got nowhere.
228
Yet the local troubles did not go away. In July 1787-just as the
federal convention was holding its closed sessions-Henry Knox, the
Secretary of War, issued a thoughtful report to Congress on recurrent
Indian conflicts within the Georgia and North Carolina territorial
claims.229 Knox favored congressional intervention to prevent a general
war, but acknowledged that the Articles' limited Indian affairs power
resulted in Congress being "attended with peculiar embarrassments" (i.e.,
obstacles). 230 He added, "[t]he Creeks are an independent tribe, and can-
not with propriety be said to be members of the State of Georgia, yet the
said State exercises legislative jurisdiction over the territory in dis-
pute.'231 He proposed three separate paths by which Congress could
222. 31 J. CONT'L CONG. 488,488-89 (Aug. 7, 1786).
223. Id. at 488-93.
224. Id. at 491-92.
225. 32 J. CONT'L CONG. 66, 66-69 (Feb. 20, 1787).
226. 32 J. CONT'L CONG. 237, 237 (Apr. 25, 1787).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 238.
229. 32 J. CONT'L CONG. 365, 365-66. (July 18, 1787).
230. Id. at 366.
231. Id.
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intervene to resolve the conflict.232 The first was for Congress to reinter-
pret the Articles to permit action by the Confederation. The second was
for another state to interfere, thereby triggering congressional adjudica-'
tion power under the Articles. The third was for Georgia and North
Carolina to cede the affected territory to the United States, so as to place
it under congressional jurisdiction.233 Of the three, he recommended the
last.
234
Knox's first idea-reinterpreting the Articles-had been tried be-
fore. James Madison, an advocate of broad federal authority over Indian
relations, 235 thought (as he later said) that the Articles' exceptions to
congressional jurisdiction were "obscure and contradictory.' 236  In 1784
he had suggested interpreting those exceptions to reserve to the states
only the power to make pre-emptive land purchases within state bounda-
ries. 2 3 7  Madison's narrow construction was not really tenable, for the
exceptions in the final version of the Articles reserved more to the states
than would have been reserved by the Franklin and Dickinson drafts.
238
Further, narrow interpretation of state power clashed with the powerful
"state sovereignty" rule of Article 11.239
Few and Blount responded to Knox's report by putting forward
their own plan for dealing with unrest in Georgia. This was a proposal
for a meeting of Creek and state officials, together with the Confedera-
tion Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern Department, to try
to resolve the dispute. 240  Nathan Dane of Massachusetts and Richard
Henry Lee of Virginia clearly thought this idea inadequate, and moved to
postpone the Few-Blount motion in favor of a hearing on a pending
committee report that argued, not very convincingly, for a broader rein-
232. Id
233. Id.
234. Id. at 366-67.
235. Madison apparently favored lodging all power over Indian trade in the central govern-
ment, and seems even to have claimed at the federal convention that the confederation Congress's
jurisdiction over Indian affairs was exclusive. 1 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 313, 316 (Madison)
(June 19, 1787) ("By the federal articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to Congs. Yet in
several instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars with them."); see also James Madison,
Vices of the Political System of the United States, Apr. 1787, reprinted in I THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 167 (listing as "Encroachments by the States on the federal author-
ity," "the wars and treaties of Georgia with the Indians").
236. THE FEDERALIST (No. 42, James Madison), supra note 2, at 219.
237. At one point, Madison argued that the state legislative rights protected in the proviso were
no more than pre-emptive rights to buy land from the Indians. Letter from James Madison to James
Monroe, Nov. 27, 1784, reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 529. Mod-
em writers of the same predisposition have tended to imitate him. See I PRUCHA, supra note 2, at
38, 49 (citing Madison and characterizing the proviso as "cast[ing] a heavy blur over the article" and
"hazy"); see also Clinton, Review, supra note 2, at 855 (citing Madison's comment).
238. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. Moreover, a proposal from Jefferson to give
Congress more specific authority over land purchases apparently had been rejected. 6 J. CONT'L
CONG. 1076, 1076-77 (July 25, 1776).
239. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. II ("Each state retains its sovereignty.., and every power, juris-
diction, and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States.").
240. 33 J. CONT'L CONG. 454, 454 (Aug. 3, 1787).
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terpretation of the Articles, 24 1 and was highly critical of the policies of
North Carolina and Georgia. 24 2 Perhaps recognizing that its interpretive
position was weak, the committee had followed Knox's advice and rec-
ommended that Georgia and North Carolina cede their western territories
to the United States.243 Congress voted seven states to two for the Dane-
Lee motion to postpone the Georgia-North Carolina proposal, but the
committee report does not seem to have been taken up.
244
On October 26, 1787, the Confederation Congress appointed com-
missioners for signing another treaty with the southern Indians, but it
finally surrendered completely on the interpretive question. Its resolu-
tion appointed as one of three treaty commissioners the Superintendent
of Indian Affairs for the Southern Department, but handed over the other
two positions to North Carolina and Georgia authorities. 245  Signifi-
cantly, the resolution provided that in the Superintendent's absence, the
state appointees could conclude the treaty themselves.
246
I have recited this detailed history to show that the state-
congressional jurisdictional conflict during the Confederation period was
very much a back-and-forth affair. There was no clear trend in the direc-
tion of either local or central control. As far as the delegates to the fed-
eral convention were concerned, there was no obvious precedent for
them to follow.
C. The Constitutional Convention
The Constitutional Convention convened in May 1787. The dele-
gates, like others before them, would have to grapple with the twin juris-
dictional issues of (1) which levels of government regulated which sub-
stantive areas and (2) which level of government should treat with which
categories of Indians.2 47
During the first two months of the proceedings, however, the con-
vention approved no provision directed specifically toward management
of Indian affairs. On July 24, the convention elected a drafting commit-
tee-the "Committee of Detail"-laden with legal talent.248 The chair-
241. Id. at 455, 458-59. The committee's argument was obscure, but apparently it was that the
state's "legislative right" would not be infringed if Congress treated with Indians within state lines,
because non-Indians in the region would still be subject to state law.
242. Id. at 455-62.
243. Id. at 459-60 ("But whatever may be the true construction of the recited clause, the com-
mittee are [sic] persuaded that it must be impracticable to manage Affairs with the Indians within the
limits of the two States, so long as they adhere to the opinions and measures they seem to have
adopted.").
244. Id. at 463.
245. 33 J. CONT'L CONG. 707, 708 (Oct. 26, 1787).
246. Id.
247. See supra Part II.B. 1.
248. The members were John Rutledge, Edmund Randolph, Nathaniel Gorham, Oliver Ells-
worth, and James Wilson. 2 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 106 (Madison) (July 24, 1787). Each of
2007]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
man was John Rutledge of South Carolina.249 The convention charged
this committee to consider the proceedings already had and "to report a
Constitution conformable to the Resolutions passed by the Conven-
tion., 250  In addition to its prior resolutions, the convention sent to the
Committee of Detail the New Jersey Plan251 and a proposal prepared by
Charles Pinckney. 252  The Committee likely also had access to a plan
drafted by John Dickinson.
253
The New Jersey and Dickinson plans included commerce powers
but no specific mention of Indian affairs. 254 The Pinckney Plan would
have granted Congress "exclusive Power ... of regulating the Trade of
the several States as well with foreign Nations" and "exclusive Power...
of regulating Indian Affairs." 255  During committee deliberations, Rut-
ledge suggested incorporating an Indian affairs power.
6
On August 6, Rutledge announced to the full convention that the
Committee of Detail was ready to report its draft constitution.257 On the
subjects of commerce and Indian affairs, the draft followed the New Jer-
sey and Dickinson, rather than the Pinckney, approach. In its list of
enumerated federal powers, 258 the document provided authority for the
Senate "to make Treaties" and for Congress "[t]o regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States." 259 But there was no
specific Indian affairs clause. The panel's failure to include one may
have been an oversight, although this seems unlikely because of the Rut-
ledge proposal. Perhaps the committee thought Indian affairs were best
handled at the state level unless the federal government saw a need to act
through diplomatic channels-i.e., through the treaty power.
them (other than Gorham, who was a merchant) had good claim to be the leading lawyer in his
respective state.
249. Thus, Rutledge made the reports on behalf of the committee. E.g., id. at 176 (Journal),
177 (Madison) (Aug. 6, 1787).
250. Id. at 106 (Madison) (July 24, 1787).
251. Id. at 98 (Journal) (reporting the referral of the Paterson [New Jersey] Plan to the conven-
tion).
252. Id. at 98 (Journal), 106 (Madison) (reporting the referral of the Pinckney Plan to the
committee). Excerpts from the Pinckney Plan are in two locations: id. at 134-37, 157-59 (Commit-
tee of Detail, II1, VII).
253. See HtUTSoN, supra note 2, at 84-91 (reproducing two versions of the plan).
254. 1 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 242-45 (Madison) (June 15, 1787) (reproducing the New
Jersey Plan); HUTSON, supra note 2, at 84-91 (reproducing Dickinson's plans).
255. 2 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 157 n.15, 158-59 (Committee of Detail, VII) (reproducing an
extract in James Wilson's handwriting that was apparently copied from the Pinckney Plan, reading
in part, "The Legislature of U.S. shall have the exclusive Power... of regulating the Trade of the
several States as well with foreign Nations as with each other... of regulating Indian Affairs.").
256. Id. at 143 (Committee of Detail, IV) (setting forth a marginal note in Rutledge's handwrit-
ing to Edmund Randolph's first draft that would have added words "Indian Affairs" to the enumer-
ated power, "[t]o provide tribunals and punishment for mere offences [sic] against the law of na-
tions").
257. Id. at 176 (Journal), 177 (Madison) (Aug. 6, 1787).
258. Id. at 163-75 (Committee of Detail, IX), 167-69 (enumerating congressional powers).
259. Id. at 181, 183 (Madison) (Aug. 6, 1787).
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During the weeks after August 6, the full convention intensively
discussed and amended the recommendations of the Committee of De-
tail. Several delegates proposed adding more congressional powers. On
August 18, Madison-then firmly of a "nationalist" turn of mind-
moved to include nine additional ones.260  One item was "[t]o regulate
affairs with the Indians as well within as without the limits of the U.
States.,,16 1 Unlike the next power on his list-granting Congress author-
ity to establish a capital district262-Madison did not designate his sug-
gested Indian affairs power as exclusive.263 This was a notable omission,
since he thereby departed from the language both of the Articles of Con-
federation 264 and of the Pinckney Plan. 265  The convention submitted
Madison's suggestions, along with some from other delegates, 266 back to
the Committee of Detail.267
On August 22, Rutledge announced the Committee of Detail's sec-
ond report. 268 The panel had rejected some of the suggested powers and
accepted others, with or without modification. Madison's Indian affairs
clause was among those adopted, but in radically-altered form. The
Committee proposed to add to Congress' power "[t]o regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States" the words, "and with
Indians, within the Limits of any State, not subject to the laws
thereof., 269 As was true of both Madison's proposal and the commerce
260. Id. at 324-25 (Madison) (Aug. 18, 1787):
To dispose of the unappropriated lands of the U. States
To institute temporary Governments for New States arising therein
To regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as without the limits of the U. States
To exercise exclusively Legislative authority at the seat of the General Government, and
over a district around the same not, exceeding _ square miles; the Consent of the Leg-
islature of the State or States comprising the same, being first obtained
To grant charters of incorporation in cases where the Public good may require them, and
the authority of a single State may be incompetent
To secure to literary authors their copyrights for a limited time
To establish an University
To encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and dis-
coveries
To authorize the Executive to procure and hold for the use of the U - S. landed property
for the erection of Forts, Magazines, and other necessary buildings
(blank space in original).
261. Id. at 324.
262. Id. at 325 (setting forth a proposed power of exclusive legislative jurisdiction over a
capital district).
263. Id. at 324 (setting forth Madison's proposed Indian affairs power).
264. See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
265. 2 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 158-59 (Committee of Detail, VII) (copying from the Pinck-
ney Plan the wording, "[t]he Legislature of the U.S. shall have the exclusive Power... of regulating
Indian Affairs").
266. See, e.g., id. at 325-26 (Madison) (Aug. 18, 1787) (reporting on the referral of additional
proposals by Charles Pinckney to the committee); see also id. at 326-27 (reporting that a Rutledge
proposal to ban diversion of funds appropriated to public creditors was referred to the committee);
id at 328 (reporting the referral of other proposals by Rutledge and Elbridge Gerry).
267. Id. at 325-28.
268. Id. at 366 (Journal) (Aug. 22, 1787).
269. Id. at 367.
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power in the Committee's original draft, this new version contained no
language of exclusivity.
While the language from the Committee of Detail would add
somewhat to congressional authority over relationships with the Natives,
it was far narrower than Madison's suggestion. The committee version
would have limited congressional power to relations only with those In-
dians not subject to state laws.2 70 The congressional power would not
extend to certain--or perhaps any-Indians living within state bounda-
ries. Furthermore, a congressional power "[t]o regulate commerce" was
much narrower than a power "[t]o regulate affairs." 271 As we have seen,
the two words carried very different meanings, both in general and spe-
cifically in an Indian context. 272 An "affair" could include a commercial
transaction, but it also could include a war, a treaty, or a family picnic.
Thus, the committee's change would deny Congress competence over
diplomacy, boundary adjustment, and other forms of intercourse, all of
273which would be handled by treaty instead. A fortiori, the new lan-
guage denied Congress any form of police power over the tribes. In-
stead, Congress would receive only a portion of a single Indian affairs
power that, in the days before Independence, the British had set aside for
the colonial assemblies.
On August 3 1, the revised draft was submitted to a Committee of
Eleven (one delegate from each of the states then in attendance) for fur-
ther action. 274 This panel was chaired by Judge David Brearley of New
275 276Jersey.275 It issued its report over several days. The Brearley com-
mittee recommended the addition to the Commerce Clause of the phrase,
"and with the Indian tribes." 277 This latest version increased federal au-
thority by granting to Congress the ability to regulate commerce with
tribes over which states might claim police power jurisdiction.
The convention records show clearly that in the delegates' view the
states would enjoy concurrent, although subordinate, jurisdiction with
270. Id.
271. Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1090 ("In other words, though asked to approve
broad authority, the Convention chose to grant Congress power only over commerce with Indian
tribes"); accord Savage, supra note 2, at 74 (pointing out that the new provision was limited by the
fact that "it extended only to 'commerce,' not to all 'affairs'). Savage also argues that the net result
was a reduction of federal power over the Indians from what it had been under the Articles, but by
overlooking the significant proviso in favor of the states in the Indian affairs powers of the Articles,
he overestimates congressional power under the Articles. See id at 80-81.
272. See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
273. See Law to Regulate Indian Affairs, N.J. (1757), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 707-09 (including within the heading of "affairs" such items
as attachment for debt and methods of land conveyancing).
274. 2 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 473 (Journal), 481 (Madison) (Aug. 31, 1787). This was the
second "Committee of Eleven" appointed.
275. Id. at 483 (Journal) (Sept. 1, 1787) (stating that Brearley gave the committee report).
276. Id. at 483-84, 493-96, 505-06 (setting forth reports of September 1 st, 4th, and 5th).
277. Id. at 493.
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Congress over Indian commerce. We have seen that the congressional
Indian powers recommended by Madison, by the Committee of Detail,
and by the Brearley Committee of Eleven all omitted earlier-suggested
language of exclusivity. Indeed, in their discussions of the commerce
power in general, delegates repeatedly acknowledged that, subject to
some exceptions, states would retain the ability to enact regulatory laws
of their own.
To understand this, a good place to begin is with the Committee of
Detail's August 6 draft. Article VII, Section 1 of that draft granted the
"Legislature of the United States" power to regulate "commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States." 278 Section 4 of the same
article prohibited Congress from taxing or interfering with state decisions
on one particular branch of foreign commerce, the slave trade.279 The
document also included several absolute and conditional bans on state
actions of the sort associated with commercial regulation: Article XII
barred states from coining money or entering into treaties,280 and Article
XIII required congressional consent for states to emit bills of credit,
adopt certain legal tender laws, tax imports, or enter into compacts with
other states or with foreign powers.281 These exceptions by no means
covered the field; on the contrary, they implicitly acknowledged that
there were commercial regulations states could adopt, even without prior
congressional consent.
The concurrent nature of commercial jurisdiction became explicit in
the ensuing colloquy. The entire discussion over the extent to which
Congress could regulate the slave trade presupposed that, in the absence
of constitutionally authorized congressional action to the contrary, the
states would continue to have plenary power over that subject.282 Simi-
larly, on August 21, John Langdon of New Hampshire noted that, while
the committee draft banned federal taxation of exports, 283 "the States are
left at liberty to tax exports." 284 He objected to this because New Hamp-
shire relied on harbors in other states and therefore "will be subject to be
taxed by the States exporting its produce."285 Oliver Ellsworth of Con-
necticut, who represented another state that relied mostly on other states'
harbors, was more sanguine. He observed that the federal legislature
278. Id. at 181 (Madison) (Aug. 6, 1787).
279. See id. at 183.
280. Id. at 187.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 370-74. This discussion occurred principally on August 22, and resulted in the
Committee of Detail's ban on federal interference being submitted to a Committee of Eleven headed
by William Livingston of New Jersey. Id. at 374 (Madison), 396 (Journal) (Aug. 24, 1787). The
resultant compromise was amended further on the floor. Id. at 409 (Journal) (Aug. 25, 1787).
283. Id. at 183 (Madison) (Aug. 6, 1787) (reproducing Article VII, Section 4 of the committee
draft).
284. Id. at 359 (Aug. 21, 1787).
285. Id.
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could curb any abuses that might arise.286 Unpersuaded, Langdon pro-
posed a specific ban on "the States from taxing the produce of other
States exported from their harbours."
287
Siding with his Connecticut colleague, Roger Sherman countered
that "[t]he States will never give up all power over trade." 288 Ultimately,
though, the convention agreed with Langdon, voting a week later to per-
mit the states to tax exports only with prior congressional approval. The
convention also specified that any revenue arising from state duties be
dedicated to the national treasury.
289
On August 28-the same day Langdon won his vote-Madison of-
fered two more of his nationalist proposals. One would have prohibited
states from using their commercial powers to impose embargoes.
290
Sherman opposed this, arguing that "the States ought to retain this power
in order to prevent suffering & injury to their poor."291 Presumably
Sherman wanted state legislatures to be able to proscribe local exports so
goods would be sold cheaply at home rather than seeking higher prices
abroad. George Mason of Virginia defended state embargoes because a
state might need to declare an embargo if hostilities arose suddenly and
the national legislature were not in session.292 Gouverneur Morris, a
nationalist normally allied with Madison, argued that Madison's motion
was unnecessary, for the overall supervisory power of Congress was
sufficient. 293  Madison's motion garnered the votes of only three
states,294 thereby leaving states with the ability to impose embargoes.
Madison's other nationalist motion-to strip completely from the states
any power to impose import duties-also was defeated, seven states to
four.
295
In September, the delegates adopted motions that both increased
and decreased state reserved power over commerce. On September 13,
George Mason convinced the delegates to ease the conditional ban on
state export duties used to finance state inspection laws. 2 9 6 Two days
later, Gouverneur Morris pointed out that the states remained free to im-
pose tonnage duties for financing harbor improvements, 297 and Madison
suggested that this might be inconsistent with the federal commerce
power. Sherman responded that because of the supremacy of federal
286. Id. at 359-60.
287. Id. at 361.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 437 (Journal) (Aug. 28, 1787); see also id. at 442 (Madison).
290. Id. at 440 (Madison).
291. Id.




296. Id. at 607 (Sept. 13, 1787).
297. Id. at 625 (Sept. 15, 1787).
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laws "there is no danger to be apprehended from a concurrent jurisdic-
tion. 298 Ultimately, Langdon convinced the delegates to insert another
specific exclusion from state commercial regulation.
299
In sum, the convention's deliberations show that states would retain
concurrent, although subordinate, authority in the realms of Indian, for-
eign, and interstate commerce. States could restrict or ban imports and
exports over their borders, including but not limited to imports of slaves.
They could require inspections of goods in commerce. They could regu-
late merchants and prices. They could exercise the entire panoply of
traditional commercial regulation, subject to some enumerated excep-
tions and subject to congressional power, to the extent congressional
power was constitutionally authorized.
D. The Resulting Constitutional Text
The preceding historical review provides the background for con-
struction of the constitutional text: "The Congress shall have Power...
To regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes." 300  When the con-
temporaneous meaning of "commerce" is applied to that Clause, it meant
that Congress received power to govern in detail the trade carried on
between citizens and tribal Natives and those persons involved in that
trade. The term "commerce" did not include authority over the tribes'
internal affairs.
30 1
We have seen that the history of the Clause strongly suggests that
this congressional power was not exclusive, 30 2 and this understanding
was represented in the text. Whenever the Constitution granted the fed-
eral government exclusive powers, it did so in one of two ways. The first
was to employ the word "exclusive," as when the Constitution granted
Congress "exclusive Legislation" over the capital district and federal
enclaves. 30 3 Of course, the Commerce Clause did not include the word
298. Id
299. Id. at 625-26.
300. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
301. Id. at 1084; see supra notes 196-211 and accompanying text. Accord Clinton, Review,
supra note 2, at 851 (holding that power over "commerce" did not give the federal government
jurisdiction over the internal governance of tribes); Savage, supra note 2, at 74; Prakash, Fungibility,
supra note 2, at 1081 ("One cannot read the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes as a
power to regulate the Indian tribes themselves.").
302. See supra Part II.C.
303. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17 ("The Congress shall have Power... To exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by
Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of
the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings .... "); cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress
shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries...
.") (emphasis added).
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''exclusive." The other way was to prohibit states from a like exercise.
For example, the Constitution bestowed on Congress power to issue let-
ters of marque and reprisal,
30 4 and forbade the states from doing so.
3 5
Although the Constitution granted the federal government power to regu-
late foreign, interstate, and Indian commerce by legislation (the Com-
306merce Clause) and some power to regulate all commerce (by treaty),
the instrument banned only some commercial regulations by states.
States could not enter into commercial treaties 30 7 and they could not coin
money30 8 or impair "the Obligation of Contracts." 30 9 But, in absence of
congressional or treaty direction to the contrary,310 states otherwise re-
tained broad authority to regulate foreign, interstate, and Indian com-
merce.
State concurrent jurisdiction over foreign, interstate, and Indian
commerce was not left to mere inference. The text took notice of con-
tinuing state jurisdiction over the slave trade.3 11  It acknowledged the
continuing authority of states to impose tariffs on imports and exports,
although it added congressional consent as a precondition.312 It treated
in like manner the pre-existing state power to impose tonnage duties
313
and enter into compacts with other states and with foreign nations. 314 It
further acknowledged that states could adopt, even without prior con-
gressional consent, laws governing the inspection of imports and exports,
although such laws were subject to congressional revision. 31 5 The text
contained no suggestion that this list of state commercial regulations was
complete. We know from the history of the drafting convention that it
was not.
3 16
304. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ("The Congress shall have Power... To declare War,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water ... ").
305. See id. at §10, cl. I ("No State shall... grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal ... .
306. See id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .... ");
see also KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 3-18 (setting forth the text of treaties entered into between the
United States and various Indian tribes before 1789, almost all of which included terms of com-
merce).
307. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty ... .
308. Id. ("No State shall.., coin money .... ).
309. Id. ("No State shall. . . pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .....
310. See id. at art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.").
311. Seeid. atart. l,§9, cl.l.
312. Id. at § 10, cl. 2.
313. Id. at cl. 3.
314. Id.
315. Id. at cl. 2.
316. See, e.g., supra notes 290-294 and accompanying text (detailing the convention's decision
not to prohibit states from imposing embargoes).
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E. Summary: The Original Public Meaning
The "original public meaning" of the Indian Commerce Clause was
a power both narrower and broader than that enjoyed by the Confedera-
tion Congress. It was narrower in that it did not purport to be exclusive,
and it covered only commercial transactions with Indian tribes rather
than all affairs with all Indians. It was broader in that this commercial
regulation was not subject to state obstruction, even when it infringed the
state's police power over persons within state boundaries. The Tenth
Amendment clarified that the states retained whatever was not granted.
Among the authority retained was police power over all persons within
state boundaries, subject to being overridden by constitutional federal
laws and treaties.
3 17
If we include the rest of the Constitution in the mix, the original
public meaning of the federal government's Indian affairs powers was as
follows:
* The government would be able to treat with the Indians through
the Commerce Clause, the Treaty Clause, or the Property Clause.
* If Indians were living in a federal territory or on federal land,
Congress could govern them through the Property Clause. Federal pow-
ers would be very near plenary, especially in the territories.
* If the Indians were located within a state and not on~federal land,
then federal power depended on whether those Indians were members of
tribes. If so, then Congress could regulate trade with them (but only
trade) through the Commerce Clause. Or the President and Senate, with
approval of the tribe, could authorize broad federal jurisdiction through
the Treaty Power. The Treaty Power was broader than the Commerce
Clause, but the mechanism for adopting treaties protected states through
the requirement that two-thirds of the Senate concur,3 18 and it protected
the tribes by the requirement that the tribes concur. The states could not
interfere with the exercise of any of these powers.
317. Even during the early days of the republic, the United States made treaties with the Indi-
ans that purported to allow the government to manage all their affairs, to the exclusion of other
sovereignties. See, e.g., Treaty with the Chickasaws art. VIII, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24, reprinted in
KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 15-16 ("United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and
exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such manner
as they think proper."); see also id. at art. II, at 14 ("Article I1. The Commissioners Plenipotentiary
of the Chickasaws, do hereby acknowledge the tribes and the towns of the Chickasaw nation, to be
under the protection of the United States of America, and of no other sovereign whosoever."); see
also Treaty with the Shawnee art. I1, Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26, reprinted in id. at 17 ("The Shawanoe
nation do acknowledge the United States to be the sole and absolute sovereigns of all the territory
ceded to them by a treaty of peace, made between them and the King of Great Britain, the fourteenth
day of January, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-four.").
318. See Roger Sherman, A Citizen of New-Haven I, THE NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 1788,
reprinted in FORD, supra note 2, at 233, 235 (averring that the requirement of two-thirds senatorial
consent to a treaty protects the rights of states).
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* If the Indians were located within a state, on non-federal land,
and were not members of tribes, then federal power applied to them in
the same way it applied to other persons.
* If the Indians were located within a state-irrespective of whether
they were tribal-they were subject to the state police power (if it could
be enforced). They were not subject to any federal police power. If the
Indians were tribal, federal actions taken within the scope of constitu-
tional authority could limit the exercise of state police power.
III. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
A. The Founders' Touchstone for Constitutional Interpretation
When one seeks the original force of a constitutional provision, it
makes sense to interpret the document by the same principles the Foun-
ders themselves would have applied. The touchstone of documentary
interpretation was, as it was called before and during the Founding Era,
the "intent of the makers." 319 This principle applied to documents of
both private and public law. 320 English courts had refined it over a pe-
riod of more than two centuries, and American courts and jurists had
adopted it.
321
The principal determinant of the "intent of the makers" was not the
intent of the drafters nor even, as some legal writers have claimed, the
objective public meaning of the document. 322 It was the subjective un-
derstanding of those who had converted the measure into law. This was
the legislature in the case of a statute and the ratifiers in the case of a
constitution. 323 When (as was very often the case in England), the origi-
nal subjective intent was not available, the "intent of the makers" had to
be deduced from the public meaning of the instrument at the time it be-
came law, based solely on its language and such contemporaneous mate-
rials, legal or non-legal, as were available. 324 When the historical record
did show a particular subjective understanding, that understanding pre-
vailed.325 Fortunately, in most instruments the public meaning and the
intended meaning are much the same.
Ascertaining, as Part II did, the original public meaning of the In-
dian Commerce Clause does not therefore end our inquiry. We must
now turn to the ratification record to determine if the ratifiers refined or
319. See generally Natelson, Founders, supra note 2 (forthcoming) and sources collected
therein.
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contradicted the public meaning of this Clause with a particular under-
standing, as they did with respect to a few other provisions of the Consti-
tution. 326
B. The Ratification Process in General
327
The federal constitutional convention met in Philadelphia from May
until September, 1787. Upon adjourning, the convention sent its pro-
posed Constitution to Congress for transmittal to state legislatures and,
ultimately, to popularly-elected state ratifying conventions.
328
In an early propaganda victory, proponents of the Constitution con-
vinced the public to label them "Federalists" and their adversaries "Anti-
Federalists." 329 By early January 1788, Federalists had convinced con-
ventions in five states-Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia,
and Connecticut-to ratify by substantial margins. 330  Thereafter, the
opposition stiffened. Anti-Federalists interposed many objections, most
derived ultimately from the belief that the Constitution would give far
too much power to the central government. Anti-Federalists predicted
that the central government would abuse that power and effectively obli-
terate the states and oppress the people. They argued against approval of
the Constitution until a new national convention had met and adopted
substantial changes. Federalists recognized that such a course involved
great practical difficulties for the Constitution.331  Faced with the un-
pleasant alternatives of quick defeat or protracted defeat, they made a
pact with political moderates - the fence-straddlers and tepid Anti-
Federalists.
Under the terms of this pact, the Federalists made important conces-
sions, and in exchange, the moderates agreed to support the Constitution.
These concessions were of three principal kinds. First, the Federalists
326. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, 39 IDAHO L.
REv. 489, 493-94 (2003) (describing how the ambiguous term ex post facto was defined during the
ratification to apply only to retroactive criminal, rather than civil, laws).
327. This section is excerpted in large part from Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of
the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 73, 81-83 (2005).
328. See 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xl-xli.
329. Naturally, Anti-Federalists were piqued at this labeling. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 759 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (quoting Representative Elbridge Gerry, a former anti-
federalist, who complained of this labeling and stated that "[t]heir names then ought not to have been
distinguished by federalists and antifederalists, but rats and antirats").
330. See 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xli (providing the chronology and
votes).
331. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 618 (recording the following comments
made by Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention: "Suppose eight states only should ratify, and
Virginia should propose certain alterations, as the previous condition of her accession. If they [i.e.,
other states] should be disposed to accede to her proposition, which is the most favorable conclusion,
the difficulty attending it will be immense. Every state which has decided it, must take up the subject
again. They must not only have the mortification of acknowledging that they had done wrong, but
the difficulty of having a reconsideration of it among the people, and appointing new conventions to
deliberate upon it.").
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offered authoritative and reassuring interpretations of worrisome parts of
the document. For example, the Anti-Federalists had been arguing that
once the Constitution was in place, the General Welfare Clause 332 might
be construed as an independent and indefinite grant of national power.
Federalists represented that, on the contrary, the General Welfare Clause
was a limitation rather than a grant of power.
333
Second, the Federalists reassured moderates that the states would
retain wide jurisdiction exclusive of the central government. Anti-
Federalists had been arguing that the Constitution would sweep all but
the most trivial concerns into the national sphere. Federalist speakers
and authors, therefore, issued lists enumerating specific functions that
would remain the exclusive province of state governments. To the extent
we know their identity, these Federalist speakers and authors were lead-
ing rather than peripheral figures in the Constitution's cause: James
Madison; Alexander Hamilton; James Wilson; Edmund Pendleton, chan-
cellor of Virginia; James Iredell, North Carolina attorney general and
judge and later United States Supreme Court Justice; John Marshall; Al-
exander Contee Hanson, a Congressman from Maryland; Nathaniel Peas-
lee Sargeant, a Justice (and shortly thereafter, Chief Justice) of the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; Alexander White, a distinguished
Virginia lawyer, delegate to his state's ratifying convention, and later a
United States Senator; and Tench Coxe, later our first Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury.
334
Third, insofar as the foregoing representations were deemed insuffi-
cient, the parties agreed that the Constitution, once ratified, would be
amended. At ratifying conventions in Massachusetts, South Carolina,
New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York, moderates voted for ratifica-
tion, and Federalists voted to recommend amendments. After ratifica-
tion, both sides would work together to secure the needed changes. Two
states-North Carolina and Rhode Island-actually postponed ratifica-
tion until Congress had approved amendments.
335
Without this political pact, the Constitution probably would not
have come into effect.336  Even with it, the convention majorities for
ratification in Massachusetts, Virginia, New Hampshire, and New York
332. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States .... ).
333. See generally Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An
Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2003).
334. See Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 479-89 (identifying the contributions of each
of these individuals).
335. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xlii.
336. See supra note 330 and infra notes 337-338 and accompanying text.
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were quite narrow. 337 North Carolina and Rhode Island did not ratify
until the promises in the pact had been honored.338
The surviving records of the ratification process and the public bar-
gain that led to ratification are sufficient to enable us to discern, as to
many constitutional provisions, the subjective "intent of the makers."
C. The Indian Commerce Clause in the Ratification Process
Commerce with the Indians was a matter of considerable interest
during the ratification controversy. Participants in the debates discussed
how important it was and how adoption of the Constitution would affect
it.3 39 Yet there is little, if any, evidence that the ratifiers understood the
Indian Commerce Clause differently from the objective public meaning
outlined in Part II. On the contrary, surviving records depict ratification
figures identifying "Commerce ... with the Indian tribes" simply with
Indian trade and acknowledging that states would retain concurrent, al-
though subordinate, regulation of commerce.
Accordingly, even though James Madison had favored a very broad
congressional power over Indian affairs at the federal convention,
340
when arguing for ratification he referred to the new congressional power
in a way that equated it to trade regulation only:
[Under the Constitution] [t]he regulation of commerce with the In-
dian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the ar-
ticles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and con-
tradictory.... [H]ow the trade with Indians, though not members of
a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regu-
lated by an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal
rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible.
341
Robert Yates, a New York Anti-Federalist who had served as a del-
egate to the federal convention, argued against ratification. He opposed
the Indian Commerce Clause in particular, so if there had been any rea-
337. The Constitution was approved in Massachusetts by a vote of 187-168, in Virginia by 89-
79, in New York by 30-27, and in New Hampshire by 57-47. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at xli-xlii.
338. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., An American, PA. GAZETTE, May 28, 1788, reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 889-90; 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 580 (Adam Stephen, at the
Virginia ratifying convention) (reporting that Stephen "then went into a description of the Missis-
sippi and its waters, Cook's River, the Indian tribes residing in that country, and the variety of arti-
cles which might be obtained to advantage by trading with these people"); see, e.g., Brutus, LetterX,
N.Y.J., Jan. 24, 1788, reprinted in 25 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 462, 465 (admit-
ting, against inclination, that there must be a sufficient standing army for some purposes, including
"trade with the Indians"); see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 121 (No. 24, Alexander Ham-
ilton) ("[W]e should find it expedient to increase our frontier garrisons .... It may be added that
some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian nations.").
340. Supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text.
341. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 219 (No. 42, James Madison) (emphasis added).
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sonable interpretation of that provision that included plenary authority
over Indian affairs, he certainly would have pointed it out. Yet he also
equated the Indian commerce power to no more than a power over trade.
If New York were to ratify the Constitution, Yates wrote that New York
would thereby totally surrender into the hands of Congress the manage-
ment and regulation of the Indian trade to an improper government, and
the traders to be fleeced by iniquitous impositions, operating at one and
the same time as a monopoly and a poll tax:
The deputy by the above [Confederation] ordinance, has a right to
exact yearly fifty dollars from every trader, which Congress may in-
crease to any amount, and give it all the operation of a monopoly; fif-
ty dollars on a cargo of 10,000 dollars' value will be inconsiderable,
on a cargo of 1000 dollars burthensome [sic], but on a cargo of 100
dollars will be intolerable, and amount to a total prohibition, as to
small adventurers.
342
Anti-Federalists spent a great deal of time and ink objecting to con-
stitutional provisions, such as the General Welfare and Necessary and
Proper Clauses, that they thought would give Congress too much power.
Amid all this fervor, Yates was almost the only writer who objected to
any part the Commerce Clause 343_a clear indication that its scope was
understood to be fairly narrow. Moreover, the Federalist representations
listed above34 4 were inconsistent with a broad construction of that
Clause. Among the matters they defined as outside the scope of congres-
sional regulation were crimes malum in se (except treason, piracy, and
counterfeiting), family law, real property titles and conveyances, inheri-
tance, promotion of useful arts in ways other than granting patents and
copyrights, control of personal property outside of commerce, torts and
342. Address by Sydney, N.Y.J., Jun. 13-14, 1788, reprinted in 6 STORING, supra note 2, at
112. Compare Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican, Letter I, Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 14, 24 (arguing that a central government should have
control over "Indian affairs," without necessarily saying the proposed Constitution provided for
that); see also id, Letter III, October 10, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
2, at 30, 35 (claiming that among external objects of government under the Constitution would be
"Indian affairs," but clearly including the treaty power and other powers, not merely the Commerce
Clause).
343. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 124 (reporting Sam Adams, then an Anti-
Federalist, praising the Commerce Clause at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); see, e.g.,
RICHARD HENRY LEE, LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, reprinted in EMPIRE AND NATION 117
(2d ed. 1999) (stating that the commerce power and the power to regulate imposts together would
give the union sufficient power); see, e.g., Albany Anti-Federal Committee Circular, April 10, 1788,
reprinted in 21 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1379, 1383 (listing numerous objections
to the proposed Constitution, but stating that "[w]ith respect to the Regulation of Trade, this may be
vested in Congress under the present Confederation") (emphasis in original). See generally 21
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2 (revealing lack of controversy over the Commerce Clause).
Besides Yates, the only other critic of the Commerce Clause I have found was John Winthrop of
Massachusetts, writing as "Agrippa," and his argument was merely that Congress should not have so
much power over commerce. Letters of Agrippa, Letter XII, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 14, 1788, re-
printed in 4 STORING, supra note 2, at 97 (objecting to plenary commerce power).
344. Supra note 334 and accompanying text.
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contracts among citizens of the same state, education, services for the
poor and unfortunate, licensing of public houses, roads other than post
roads, ferries and bridges, and fisheries, farms, and other business enter-
prises.345  The placement of land titles on this list 346 is particularly in-
compatible with a plenary congressional Indian affairs power. Yet inso-
far as the record shows, no one suggested that Congress was barred from
exercising such powers "except in the case of the Indians." Some did
concede that the treaty power might affect land titles, but they affirmed
that any treaties would be subject to general limitations of public trust.
347
The moderates who provided the Constitution's margin of victory in
the ratification conventions of several key states were not satisfied solely
with Federalist representations of meaning. The moderates also sought,
and obtained, a gentlemen's agreement from the Federalists whereby
after the Constitution was approved, both sides would work together to
obtain a bill of rights. A common proposal for that Bill of Rights was a
provision specifying that the states retained any powers not delegated by
the Constitution to the central government 348-the eventual Tenth
Amendment. 349 Its purpose was to reassure Anti-Federalists that the new
government really would be limited to enumerated powers, without addi-
tional authority arising from notions of "sovereignty" 350 or from any
other source. By its terms, the Tenth Amendment preserved to the states
much of the competence they enjoyed under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, including any powers that might have been ceded to Congress under
345. See Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 481-88. See also Letter from Roger Sherman
to Unknown Recipient (Dec. 8, 1787) reprinted in HUTSON, supra note 2, at 288 (stating that state
courts will have exclusive jurisdiction over "all causes between citizens of the same State, except
where they claim lands under grants of different states").
346. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 40 (reporting Edmund Pendleton, a leading
federalist spokesman at the Virginia ratifying convention, asking rhetorically: "Can Congress legis-
late for the state of Virginia? Can they make a law altering the form of transferring property, or the
rule of descents, in Virginia?").
347. Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 2, at 1151-52.
348. Prototypes for the Tenth Amendment were proposed by the ratifying conventions of seven
states: Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and
Rhode Island. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 177; Ratification of the Constitution by the
State of South Carolina, THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratsc.htm (last visited October 31, 2007); Ratification of
the Constitution by the State of New Hampshire, THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratnh.htm (last visited October 31, 2007); Ratification of
the Constitution by the State of Virginia, THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratva.htm (last visited October 31, 2007); Ratification of
the Constitution by the State of New York, THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratny.htm (last visited October 31, 2007); Ratification of
the Constitution by the State of North Carolina, THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratnc.htm (last visited October 31, 2007); Ratification of
the Constitution by the State of Rhode Island, THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratri.htm (last visited October 31, 2007).
349. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
350. See supra note 36.
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the Articles but that, for one reason or another, were not included in the
Constitution's enumeration.
351
Finally, there appears to be no suggestion in the ratification record
that anyone thought any part of the Commerce Clause to be exclusive of
concurrent state jurisdiction. On the contrary, during his discussion of
foreign commerce in The Federalist, Madison acknowledged that, in the
absence of congressional action after 1808, states could opt either to
permit or ban the slave trade.352 In another paper he asserted that, out-
side the restraints of Article I, Section 10, the states would enjoy "a rea-
sonable discretion in providing for the conveniency of their imports and
exports" while the federal government would hold "a reasonable check
against the abuse of this discretion.
'" 353
IV. DEALING WITH HISTORICAL ERROR
A. Introduction
This Part examines some of the more important historical mistakes
and defects in historical method that characterize the legal commentary
on the Indian Commerce Clause. This examination has been deferred
until now so as to prevent interruptions in the foregoing narrative.
B. The Indian Intercourse Act of1790
In contending for an expansive view of the commerce power, some
have argued that a portion of the Indian Intercourse Act of 1790354 shows
351. Savage, supra note 2, at 85 (noting that "[t]he [T]enth [A]mendment, of course, does not
vest new powers in the states; the reservoir of authority in the states cannot exceed its original
bounds"). However, the constitutional text does not suggest, as Mr. Savage did, that the scope of
state powers is limited entirely to those retained under the Articles. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
352. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2 (No. 42, James Madison):
The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within several views which have been
taken of this subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its be-
ing properly submitted to the federal administration.
It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves
had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have
immediate operation .... [W]ithin that period, it will receive a considerable discourage-
ment from the federal government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the
few states which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has
been given by so great a majority of the union.
Id. at 217.
353. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 233 (No. 44, James Madison). In a comment earlier in
The Federalist, Madison seems to contradict his later statement by saying that under the Constitution
states would not be "at liberty to regulate the trade between state and state." THE FEDERALIST, supra
note 2, at 218 (No. 42, James Madison). However, it is clear from the context that in No. 42 he was
speaking only of state imposition of import and export duties, forbidden without congressional
consent by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 218-19 (No. 42, James
Madison).
354. 1 Stat. 137-38 (1790).
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an intended meaning for Indian "commerce" that goes beyond mere
trade.
355
As an initial matter, however, the date of the law gives pause. The
best evidence of the content of the ratification bargain is matter arising
previous to or contemporaneously with that bargain. Later material-if
probative at all-is subject to a discount. When the Indian Intercourse
Act became law in mid-1790, the Constitution already had been ap-
proved by all thirteen states, and the Bill of Rights ratified by nine of the
necessary ten. 356 In fact, the Constitution had been approved by the nec-
essary nine states for over two years and the government had been in
operation for over a year. More than a year had elapsed since New York
and Virginia formally applied for a new federal convention, and no other
state had followed suit.357 By this time, constitutional interpretation had
become vulnerable to political "spin" without regard to whether that
"spin" actually reflected the ratifiers' understanding, because it was un-
likely the Constitution was going to be repealed or massively overhauled.
By this time also, the political alignment that had characterized the Rati-
fication Era and the first session of the First Congress had shifted mark-
edly.358 Adding to those considerations is the obvious fact that "legisla-
tors [here, Congress] have very different incentives and operate under
355. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional
Interpretation, 115 YALE L.J. 1997, 2004 n.25 (2006):
It also bears note that none of the leading clausebound advocates of a narrow economic
reading of 'commerce' has come to grips with the basic inadequacy of their reading as
applied to Indian tribes, or has squarely confronted the originalist implications of the In-
dian Intercourse Act of 1790, in which the First Congress plainly regulated noneconomic
intercourse with Indian tribes.
id.
See also Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra note 2, at 137 (implying that early Trade and
Intercourse Acts were enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause). Cf AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW DESKBOOK 13, 15 (Julie Wrend & Clay Smith eds., 2d ed. 1998) (claiming that the Act re-
flected congressional "intent, which has never changed, to occupy the area of Indian affairs with
federal law" as seen by the early "Trade and Intercourse Acts" which revealed "Congress's unmis-
takable objective of exercising plenary control over Indian affairs").
To be sure, congressional intent, even the intent of the First Congress, should not be confused
with ratifier understanding.
356. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xl-xlii (outlining chronology for adoption of
Constitution); 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1193-
1201 (1971) (showing ratification of the Bill of Rights by nine states before adoption of the Indian
Intercourse Act on July 22, 1790). In theory, the Indian Intercourse Act could be used as evidence
of how the Virginia or Vermont legislature interpreted the Bill of Rights, since neither state ratified
until late 1791.
357. For the Virginia and New York applications, see 1 HOUSE J. 28-30 (May 5-6, 1789); see
also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the
Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 764-89 (1993) (listing all convention calls from the
Founding until 1993).
358. CHARLES C. THATCH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 125-26, 150 (2007 reprint) (1923) (discussing why the First congres-
sional session only should be considered part of the constitution-making process).
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very different institutional restraints than do constitutional drafters or
ratifiers." 359
Thus, uncorroborated inferences deduced from the Indian Inter-
course Act about what the ratifiers understood two or three years earlier
would be uncertain evidence as to the meaning of the Commerce Clause
even if Congress had adopted the measure pursuant to that Clause. As
explained below, however, Congress actually adopted the Indian Inter-
course Act pursuant to the Treaty Power.
The full title of the law in question was an "Act to Regulate Trade
and Intercourse With the Indian Tribes." The first three sections pro-
vided for federal licenses for trading among Native Americans, for recall
of licenses for violation of federal trade restrictions, and for prohibition
of trading without a license 36°-all standard regulations of commerce
with the Indians.361 Section 4 banned Native land conveyances, unless
"made and duly executed at some public treaty."362  Section 5 provided
that if a citizen or inhabitant of the United States committed a crime in
Indian country, that citizen would be tried and punished according to the
law of his home state or territory in the same manner as if he had com-
mitted the crime against a non-Indian.363 On its face, therefore, Section 5
was a criminal rather than a commercial regulation, and it is this feature
359. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and
the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1045
(2007).
For an example of how constitutional interpretations before and after ratification can change, see,
e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS 123, 136 (interpreting the Constitution to justify federal interference in manufacturing). But
see THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 165 (No. 34, Alexander Hamilton) (claiming the federal
government would have no role in manufacturing and agriculture); see also THE FEDERALIST, supra
note 2, at 81 (No. 17, Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that "the supervision of agriculture, and of other
concerns of a similar nature... can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction").
360. 1 Stat. 137-38, §§ 1-3 (1790).
361. Supra notes 126-150 and accompanying text (detailing typical Indian trade regulations of
the time).
362. 1 Stat. 138, § 4 (1790) ("[N]o sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of
Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether
having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly exe-
cuted at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States.").
363.
[I]f any citizen or inhabitant of the United States or of either of the territorial districts of
the United States, shall go into any town, settlement or territory belonging to any nation
or tribe of Indians, and shall there commit any crime upon, or trespass against, the person
or property of any peaceable and friendly Indian or Indians, which, if committed within
the jurisdiction of any state, or within the jurisdiction of either of the said districts,
against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof, would be punishable by the laws of such
state or district, such offender or offenders shall be subject to the same punishment, and
shall be proceeded against in the same manner as if the offence [sic] had been committed
within the jurisdiction of the state or district to which he or they may belong, against a
citizen or white inhabitant thereof.
Id. at § 5.
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that is cited as evidence that the Founders intended the Commerce
Clause to encompass more than mere trade.
364
As least one Supreme Court Justice has addressed the question of
whether this sort of regulation can be characterized as a regulation of
commerce. In his concurring opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,365 Justice
McLean contended that this section's successor366 was, despite its crimi-
nal content, a merely routine trade regulation. 367 He emphasized that the
law regulated the conduct of United States citizens and residents only. It
did not regulate the conduct of Indians and certainly was not an assertion
of "political jurisdiction" over Indian country. 368  Measures such as
these, he said, were typical of those requiring a nation's own citizens to
honor the terms of embargos and other trade restrictions.
369
To be sure, McLean's unsupported statement is not really probative
of original understanding, for he was writing long after the Founding Era
and did not cite sources from that time. Wyndham Beaves' leading 1771
364. Supra notes 91, 355 and accompanying text.
365. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
366. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to Preserve Peace
on the Frontiers § 6, 2 Stat. 142 (1802) (providing for the death penalty for citizens and residents
who commit murder in Indian country).
367. Justice McLean noted:
Under this clause of the constitution [the Indian Commerce Clause], no political jurisdic-
tion over the Indians, has been claimed or exercised. The restrictions imposed by the law
of 1802, come strictly within the power to regulate trade; not as an incident, but as a part
of the principal power. It is the same power, and is conferred in the same words, that has
often been exercised in regulating trade with foreign countries. Embargoes have been
imposed, laws of non-intercourse have been passed, and numerous acts, restrictive of
trade, under the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.
In the regulation of commerce with the Indians, congress have [sic] exercised a more lim-
ited power than has been exercised in reference to foreign countries. The law acts upon
our own citizens, and not upon the Indians, the same as the laws referred to act upon our
own citizens in their foreign commercial intercourse.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 592 (McLean, J., concurring).
368. McLean also observed: "[N]o political jurisdiction over the Indians, has been claimed or
exercised .... The law acts upon our own citizens, and not upon the Indians, the same as the laws
referred to act upon our own citizens in their foreign commercial intercourse." Id. See also Clinton,
Supremacy, supra note 2, at 134 (pointing out that restrictions on persons in early treatises generally
were "aimed at non-Indians who dealt with Indians").
McLean added that such laws were "not as an incident [to the commerce power], but as a part of
the principal power." Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 592 (McLean, J., concurring). This is certainly
an overstatement, since a law creating non-commercial crimes is not a law regulating "commerce."
But it certainly could have served as a law incidental to the regulation of commerce - that is, a law
authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause, pursuant to the Founding Era incidental powers
doctrine. See Natelson, Tempering, supra note 2, at 102-13 (outlining that doctrine). Under the
incidental powers doctrine, a power was incidental to a principal power if it was less "worthy" than
the principal power and either (1) a customary means of exercising it (as McLean indicated this was)
or (2) reasonably necessary for exercising it. Id. at 110. Here, it could be argued that crimes com-
mitted by whites in Indian country raised resentments that rendered federal-tribal commercial rela-
tionships difficult and that the provision's limited scope rendered it less "worthy" than the principal
power. Nonetheless, a general federal control over crimes in Indian country would be disqualified as
an incident because it is a distinct subject matter and rivals the purported principal in importance.
Id. at 106.
369. See supra note 367.
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navigation law treatise does confirm, though, that during the Founding
Era governments commonly exerted extra-territorial jurisdiction to en-
force trade embargos.
370
Whatever the merits of Justice McLean's conclusion, the fundamen-
tal problem with arguing that the Indian Intercourse Act sheds light on
the Commerce Clause is this: the Indian Intercourse Act was not adopted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. It was adopted pursuant to the Treaty
Power.
371
In 1785 and 1786 Congress entered into the three "Hopewell" trea-
ties with the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws. 372 By the terms of
all these treaties, the United States had promised to regulate trade be-
tween the United States and the Natives "[f]or the benefit and comfort of
the Indians, and for the prevention of injuries or oppressions on the part
of the citizens or Indians. 373  The tribes, President Washington, and
Secretary of War Henry Knox all were unhappy over white abuses that
continued in defiance of the treaties, and became convinced that en-
forcement legislation was needed.374
On August 22, 1789, the President entered the chamber of the Sen-
ate and consulted its members on Indian affairs. 375  After reciting the
tribes' dissatisfaction, he noted that the Cherokees lived primarily in
North Carolina, which had not yet joined the union, and added:
The commissioners for negotiating with the Southern Indians may be
instructed to transmit a message to the Cherokees, stating to them, as
far as may be proper, the difficulties arising from the local claims of
North Carolina, and to assure them that the United States are not un-
mindful of the treaty at Hopewell ....
The Commissioners may be instructed to transmit messages to the
said tribes, containing our assurances of the continuance of the
friendship of the United States, and that measures will soon by taken
370. WYNDHAM BEAWES, LEX MERCATORIA REDIVIVA OR, THE MERCHANT'S DIRECTORY 242
(London 3d ed. 1771) (describing the actions that governments could take during embargoes).
371. PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 89-90 (stating that the various Indian intercourse laws were
"originally designed to implement the treaties and enforce them against obstreperous whites").
372. Treaty With the Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note
2, at 8; Treaty With the Choctaw, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 2, at
11; Treaty With the Chickasaw, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 14.
373. See, e.g., Treaty with the Chickasaw art. VIII, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24, reprinted in 2
KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 15-16 ("ARTICLE 8. For the benefit and comfort of the Indians, and for
the prevention of injuries or oppressions on the part of the citizens or Indians, the United States in
Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians,
and managing all their affairs in such manner as they think proper.").
374. PRUCHA, supra note 2, at 89.
375. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 66 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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for extending a trade to them agreeably to the treaties of Hope-
well.
376
The President then proceeded to impress upon his listeners the im-
portance of an early agreement with the Creeks. 377 He returned two days
later for further consultation. 378 Congress responded the following sum-
mer by enacting the Indian Intercourse Act.
Hence, the first three sections of the Act were designed to fulfill the
promise of the United States to regulate trade for the benefit of the Indi-
ans. Section 4 was, by its terms, designed to effectuate Indian treaties.
379
Section 5-the substantive criminal provision-loosely tracked the lan-
guage in another provision of the Hopewell pacts, which required that
United States citizens who committed crimes in Indian country be tried
and punished as if they had committed those crimes against fellow citi-
zens. 38  Provisions in treaties that defined and provided for punishment
of crimes were well precedented.38 1
The trade and criminal portions of the Indian Intercourse Act ap-
plied to all Native Americans, not merely the Hopewell tribes. But that
was because none of the treaties limited their primary benefits to mem-
bers of the signatory tribes. The trade provisions in the treaties referred
generally to "the Indians," 382 and the criminal sections referred to "any
Indian. ' 383  Further, the broad statutory language was appropriate be-
376. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 69-70.
379. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
380. For example, the 1786 Treaty With the Choctaw provided:
If any citizen of the United States of America, or person under their protection, shall
commit a robbery or murder, or other capital crime, on any Indian, such offender or of-
fenders shall be punished in the same manner as if the robbery or murder, or other capital
crime, had been committed on a citizen of the United States of America; and the punish-
ment shall be in presence of some of the Choctaws, if any will attend at the time and
place; and that they may have an opportunity so to do, due notice, if practicable, of the
time of such intended punishment, shall be sent to some one of the tribes.
Treaty with the Choctaw art. VI, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 2, at
13. It is likely that the substantive criminal provision of the treaties, and therefore the analogous
provision in the Indian Intercourse Act, were suggested by existing statutes in Virginia and South
Carolina. The Virginia enactment was not a trade measure at all. Law to Punish Crimes Committed
in Indian Territory, VA. (1784), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note
2, at 241-42 (reproducing a criminal and extradition statute). The South Carolina law was a mixed
statute, containing both trade and non-trade features. Law to Preserve Peace and Promote Trade
with Indians arts. I, IX, S.C. (1739), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra
note 2, at 287, 290.
381. E.g., A Treaty Marine, Neth.-U.K., Dec. 1, 1674, reprinted in GILES JACOB, LEX
MERCATORIA OR, THE MERCHANT'S COMPANION 203, 212 (London 2d ed. 1729) (providing for
punishment for torture).
382. See, e.g., supra note 373 (reproducing Article VIII of the Chickasaw treaty).
383. E.g., Treaty with the Choctaw arts. V-VI, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER,
supra note 2, at 12-13 ("If any Indian or Indians, or persons, residing among them, or who shall take
refuge in their nation, shall commit a robbery or murder or other capital crime on any citizen of the
United States of America, or person under their protection, the tribe to which such offender may
belong, or the nation, shall be bound to deliver him or them up to be punished according to the
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cause the government apparently planned to apply the Hopewell lan-
guage as a template for future agreements: very similar terms were con-
tained in a fourth treaty, signed only a few days later with the Creeks,
384
and in a fifth, concluded the following year with the Cherokees.
385
A law enacted to execute the Treaty Power cannot be said to repre-
sent an interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
C. Unfamiliarity With the Record of the Federal Convention
Another sort of mistake in the commentary arises from insufficient
knowledge of proceedings at the federal constitutional convention. Jus-
tice Johnson's famous concurring opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 386 in
which he argued that the Commerce Clause was inherently exclusive of
state jurisdiction, was an error of this kind.38 7 We have seen that most of
the convention delegates would have disagreed with Justice Johnson, for
they voted specifically to leave substantial commercial powers, including
the power to impose trade embargoes, with the states.388 Although the
structure of the constitutional text leaves little excuse for Johnson's er-
ror,389 he can be forgiven his ignorance of the convention proceedings.
He wrote sixteen years before publication of Madison's notes; 390 and
while there are alternative sources of information for much of the con-
vention, Madison's record is virtually the only detailed exposition for the
time during which the convention discussed state commerce powers.
ordinances of the United States in Congress assembled .. . .If any citizen of the United States of
America, or person under their protection, shall commit a robbery or murder, or other capital crime,
on any Indian, such offender or offenders shall be punished in the same manner as if the robbery or
murder, or other capital crime, had been committed on a citizen of the United States of America...
.") (emphasis added).
384. Treaty With the Creeks art. IX, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra
note 2, at 27.
385. Treaty With the Cherokee art. XI, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra
note 2, at 31.
386. 22 U.S. (Wheat.) 1 (1824).
387. Id. at 89-90 (Johnson, J., concurring).
388. Supra note 294 and accompanying text.
389. See supra Part lI.D.
390. The notes were first published in 1840. 1 FARRAND, supra note 2, at xv (editor's note).
This lack of availability may also explain the dicta in the same case by Chief Justice Marshall
suggesting that congressional power over commerce might be exclusive of the states. Marshall
contended that the powers excepted from state jurisdiction in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 did not demon-
strate that states had concurrent jurisdiction outside the exceptions because the activities denomi-
nated in the exceptions were not really commerce. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (Wheat.) at 200-03.
Even without the notes, Marshall's error is surprising. The question of when duties are regula-
tions of commerce and when they were primarily taxes was a major point of contention during the
pre-Revolutionary era - most eloquently argued by John Dickinson in his Farmer Letters of 1767-
1768. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Constitutional Contributions of John Dickinson, 108 PENN
ST. L. REV. 415, 436-38 (2003). Had Marshall forgotten in the intervening decades? Perhaps he
remembered at some point, because later in his opinion he conceded that "duties may often be, and
in fact often are, imposed on tonnage, with a view to the regulation of commerce... " Gibbons, 22
U.S. (Wheat.) at 202.
The episode illustrates for judges the perils of random dicta and for all lawyers and historians the
risks of relying on nineteenth century material as evidence of original understanding.
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More recently, it has been asserted that the "spirit of the [conven-
tion] proceedings" 391 showed that the finished Indian Commerce Clause
was to be a very broad federal power.392 In fact, the "spirit" of the con-
vention in August 1787-when the Clause was proposed, mooted,
amended, and inserted-was very different from the mood of nationalism
that had reigned there during the convention's initial period. Earlier, the
delegates seemed ready to propose a government in which the states
would survive only as subordinate entities. After July 17, the "spirit of
the proceedings" shifted markedly in the direction of decentralization.
393
A majority of the delegates-and in particular the Committee of Detail-
began reining in nationalist aspirations. 394  Previously-adopted resolu-
tions authorizing broad and indefinite federal powers were jettisoned in
favor of relatively precise enumeration. 395  The changes in Madison's
Indian affairs proposal are indicative of what happened to many national-
ist amendments introduced during the last two months.396 So also is the
defeat of his motions to circumscribe state commercial powers. 397  We
do not know the reason for the convention's change in attitude. It may
have been the realization that a strongly nationalist plan would never win
public approval.
A related mistake has been to identify James Madison's preferred
constitutional arrangement with what the convention actually pro-
duced.3 98 This is an error because, as we have seen, Madison was some-
what more nationalist than most of the other delegates, especially during
the convention's final two months; 399 and he was far more nationalist
391. Stem, supra note 2, at 1342.
392. E.g., id. (claiming that the "whole spirit of the proceedings" supports a very broad power).
393. Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 472-73.
394. John C. Hueston, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention. The Role of the
Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and Federal Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765,
766 (1990) (focusing on, and arguably over-emphasizing, the committee's role in altering the con-
vention's nationalist course).
395. Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 2, at 472-73.
396. For example, several of Madison's other enumerations had even less success than his
Indian affairs clause, including his proposed powers "[t]o grant charters of incorporation;" "[t]o
establish an University;" and "[t]o encourage, by proper premiums & provisions, the advancement of
useful knowledge and discoveries." 2 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 325 (Aug. 18, 1787) (Madison).
397. See supra text accompanying notes 290-295.
398. E.g., Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 2, at 132-33 (inferring the meaning of the Indian
Commerce Clause from Madison's views); WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 12 n.27 (relying on a loose
paraphrase of Madison's views).
399. See supra Part II.C. (discussing the Convention and Madison's role). Misunderstanding
this, one writer has claimed that "the debates do not show that the Convention regarded the change
from [Madison's proposed language of] 'affairs' to 'commerce' as in any way narrowing the pro-
posed power to deal with the Indians." Stem, supra note 2, at 1342. This, of course, is incorrect,
given the very different eighteenth-century meanings of "commerce" and "affairs." See supra notes
105-110 and accompanying text. Another objection to Stem's comment is that it places the burden
of proof on the wrong party, for a change in wording generally denotes a change in intent. E.g.,
Cazzanigi v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 938 P.2d 819, 825 (Wash. 1997) ("[A] difference in language
indicates a difference in legislative intent."); see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. County of San Mateo,
912 P.2d 1198, 1217 (Cal. 1996) (declining to import same meaning to different terms).
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than the ratifying public. The convention's final draft granted the new
federal government less authority than Madison had desired.4"' The rati-
fication bargain granted still less. And, of course, not even Madison
suggested granting Congress plenary dominion over the Indians. His
proposal was for Congress to "regulate affairs with the Indians"-to gov-
ern transactions between tribes and citizens. Yet this still was more than
the convention or the public was willing to accept.
A more accurate bellwether of convention sentiment was a delegate
such as John Rutledge of South Carolina. A leading moderate, Rutledge
had enjoyed a distinguished career as South Carolina's premier lawyer,
then as governor and chancellor. 40 1 He served on the Committee of De-
tail that altered the convention's resolutions of broad federal power into
402an enumeration. He represented a state that had been the leader in
developing Indian trade laws.403 It was Rutledge who initially suggested
within the Committee of Detail a federal power regarding the Indians.
404
While serving as committee spokesman, it was he who delivered the re-
port to the convention that stripped down Madison's proposal to a mere
commerce power.405 He likely favored Madison's motion to ban state
embargoes, but probably voted against Madison's effort to absolutely
prohibit state import duties.
40 6
D. Errors of Historical Anachronism
1. Errors of Language
Constitutional scholars must be careful not to equate eighteenth-
century English with modern English. Eighteenth-century English dif-
fered in various ways, particularly in its closer affinity to Latin roots and
407usages. Before one relies on the presumed meaning of an eighteenth-
Stem's article, like so much else written in this area, was agenda-driven. He was writing in 1934,
and his goal was to justify an expanded construction of the Commerce Clause that would facilitate
the New Deal economic program. See Stem, supra note 2, at 1335 (suggesting that only federal
action could cure the Depression).
400. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 205-09 (showing that the finished Constitution was far
different from, and less nationalist than, Madison's proposals).
401. For Rutledge's career, see JAMES HAW, JOHN AND EDWARD RUTLEDGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA (1997). The only full-length biography devoted exclusively to John Rutledge, RICHARD
BARRY, MR. RUTLEDGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1942), is unreliable.
402. 2 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 97 (Jul. 24, 1787) (Journal).
403. See supra text accompanying notes 268-269.
404. 2 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 143 (Jun. 19 - Jul. 23, 1787) (Committee of Detail).
405. Id. at 366-67 (Aug. 22, 1787) (Journal).
406. This is an inference based on how the South Carolina delegation, of which he was the
leader, voted on these issues. Id. at 441 (Aug. 28, 1787) (Madison) (showing a positive vote on
Madison's embargo proposal and negative vote on his impost motion).
407. GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 93
(1979) (discussing the Latinate English of the founding generation); MCDONALD, supra note 2, at xi
(stating that in understanding the Founding Era, "a rudimentary knowledge of Latin is highly useful;
after all, every educated Englishman and American knew Latin, English words were generally closer
[Vol. 85:2
THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLA USE
century usage, it is advisable to consult contemporaneous dictionaries
and literary sources.
40 8
The fact that members of the founding generation often spoke of the
tribes as "nations" has induced some to conclude that the Founders "re-
garded Indian tribes as sovereign nations, with the ability to make war,
treaties, and laws for their own people. ' 4°9 From this it has been inferred
that American governments had no political jurisdiction over tribes with-
in their borders.410 Yet as noted earlier, colonial and state governments
did exercise police powers over Indians within their borders, including
tribal Indians.
Referring to tribes as "nations" was consistent with exercising po-
litical jurisdiction over them because at the time the word "nation" did
not necessarily evoke the association with political sovereignty it evokes
today. The more common meaning of "nation" followed its Latin root,
natio, in referring merely to a people or ethnic group or the inhabitants of
a general territory. 411 In his famous Dictionary of 1756, Samuel Johnson
defined "nation" as, "[a] people distinguished from another people.
' 4 12
Similarly, Nicholas Bailey's 1783 Dictionary defined "nation" as "[t]he
people of any particular country" and only secondarily as "the country
itself. '413 Hence, a North Carolina legislator might simultaneously think
of the Cherokees as a "nation" yet vote to apply North Carolina law to
Cherokees living within state borders.
To be sure, the contemporaneous definition of "nation" did not ex-
clude the possibility that some tribes were thought of as sovereign. A
member of the founding generation might well think of some tribes as
sovereign entities. But one cannot generalize from the use of the word
"nation" to a conclusion that the Founders thought all tribes were sover-
eign.
in meaning to their Latin originals than they are today, and sometimes ... it is apparent than an
author is accustomed to formulating his thoughts in Latin").
408. Cf supra text accompanying notes 105-110 (comparing the contemporaneous meanings
of "commerce" and "affairs").
409. Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at 1082.
410. Id. at 1082-86 (arguing that the Founders saw the Indian tribes as sovereign nations,
outside governmental jurisdiction in the United States).
411. In prior writings, e.g., Natelson, Commerce, supra note 2, at 830-31, I have mentioned
that knowledge of Latin may be a prerequisite to competent constitutional scholarship, in part be-
cause of such linguistic considerations as those mentioned in the text and in part because contempo-
raneous education consisted largely of Latin and other classical studies. The instance in the text is a
good example: I might not have thought to check the eighteenth-century definition of "nation" had I
not known that its Latin equivalent, natio, means a race or people, and has little or nothing to do with
sovereignty.
412. 1 JOHNSON, DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (unpaginated) (defining "nation").
413. BAILEY, DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (unpaginated) (defining "nation"). But see ALLEN,
DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (unpaginated) (defining "nation" as "a number of people inhabiting a
certain extent of ground, and under the same government; a government or kingdom").
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2. Unfamiliarity with Founding-Era Values
The Constitution excludes "Indians not taxed" from representation
of states in the House of Representatives.414 This has led some writers to
assume that all Indians not taxed were necessarily outside state or federal
political jurisdiction.415 The error lies in overlooking the fact that during
the Founding Era, representation was not nearly as congruent with politi-
cal jurisdiction as it is today.
An important reason for excluding a group from representation was
the perception that members of the excluded group were too dependent
on others to exercise independent political judgment-that giving them
the power to elect representatives would have the mere effect of granting
extra votes to those upon whom they depended. This was a principal
justification for excluding paupers, children, slaves, and (in most
states416) women from the franchise.a17
By the time the Constitution was drafted, some tribes already had
entered into dependent relationships with the state or national govern-
ment.418 Irrespective of whether those tribes were within the political
jurisdiction of the federal or state governments, the Founders would not
have thought tribal members sufficiently independent to make political
decisions in a free republic. But paying taxes was an obvious sign of
independence. Hence the Constitution requires representation in a state's
congressional delegation for Indians who do pay taxes.
3. Employment of Sources Out-of-Time: Worcester v. Georgia
Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Worcester v. Georgia419 is
sometimes cited for the proposition that federal jurisdiction over Indian
affairs is exclusive.420  Worcester might have had some probative value
414. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to' their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including
those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other
Persons.") (emphasis added).
415. See, e.g., DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 2, at 3 (claiming that "Indians not taxed" were
"outside the reach of American sovereignty and its taxing power). Unfortunately, Professor Prakash,
in an otherwise excellent article, falls into the same error. See Prakash, Fungibility, supra note 2, at
1083 (relying on Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884), a case obviously arising long after the
Founding).
416. Women who were freeholders and heads of families could vote in New Jersey. Judith
Apter Klinghoffer & Lois Elks, "The Petticoat Electors ": Women's Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-
1807, 12 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 159, 164 (1992).
417. See generally Robert G. Natelson, A Reminder: The Constitutional Values of Sympathy
and Independence, 91 KY. L.J. 353, 382-90 (2003) (discussing the Founders' view of the role of
citizen independence in a republic).
418. For example, by the Hopewell treaties. See supra text accompanying notes 372-374.
419. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
420. E.g., Clinton, Review, supra note 2, at 858 (stating of Worcester that "Chief Justice Mar-
shall correctly reflected the decision of the framers of the Constitution to vest sole and exclusive
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of the original understanding if Marshall (a leading ratifier himself) had
discussed what that understanding was. But he did not. The decision
tells us nothing about what the ratifiers understood forty-three years ear-
lier.
This is hardly surprising, since there was no need to investigate the
constitutional question: the Court's holding was mandated by two trea-
ties governing the case, treaties Marshall recited at length.421 They pro-
vided that (1) Congress would "have the sole and exclusive right of regu-
lating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such
manner as they think proper, ' 422 while (2) the Cherokees would deal
only with the federal government, and not with any other sovereigns.
423
Marshall thus justified his conclusion primarily by reciting applica-
ble "laws and treaties" as well as the Constitution. 424 Only at one point
did he seem to indicate that the exclusive power of Congress arose from
the Constitution alone;425 but that statement was dictum, and unsup-
ported by citation or argument.
power of managing the bilateral relations with the Indians - 'Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes'
- in the federal government").
421. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551-56.
422. See Treaty with the Cherokee art. III, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, reprinted in KAPPLER,
supra note 2, at 9 ("The said Indians for themselves and their respective tribes and towns do ac-
knowledge all the Cherokees to be under the protection of the United States of America, and of no
other sovereign whosoever."); id at art. IX, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 10 ("Article IX..
. the United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the
trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such manner as they think proper."). See
also Treaty with the Cherokee art. I1, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 2, at
29 ("The undersigned Chiefs and Warriors ... do acknowledge themselves and the said Cherokee
nation, to be under the protection of the said United States of America, and of no other sovereign
whosoever; and they also stipulate that the said Cherokee nation will not hold any treaty with any
foreign power, individual state, or with individuals of any state."); see also id. at art. VI, reprinted in
KAPPLER, supra note 2, at 30 ("It is agreed on the part of the Cherokees, that the United States shall
have the sole and exclusive right of regulating their trade.").
423. Treaty with the Cherokee art. III, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra
note 2, at 9; Treaty with the Cherokee art. II, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39, reprinted in id. at 29 (agreeing
that the Cherokees would be "under the protection of the said United States of America, and of no
other sovereign whosoever").
424. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562-63 (holding the Georgia law to be "repugnant to the
constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States") (emphasis added). See also id. at 557 (refer-
ring to exclusivity created "by treaties and laws") (emphasis added). Marshall's opinion also re-
ferred to the rule of international law that gave Americans the rights to negotiate with local Indians
exclusive of the rights of foreign powers. Id at 543-44.
425. Id. at 561 (stating that the Georgia statutes "interfere forcibly with the relations estab-
lished between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the
settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the govermnent of the union").
Justice McLean's concurring opinion is clearer:
By the constitution, the regulation of commerce among the Indian tribes is given to con-
gress. This power must be considered as exclusively vested in congress, as the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, to coin money, to establish post offices, and to
declare war. It is enumerated in the same section, and belongs to the same class of pow-
ers.
Id. at 580-81 (McLean, J., concurring).
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E. Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut
Most of the Founders were lawyers, 4 26 and even among non-lawyers
legal knowledge was widespread.427 Some understanding of eighteenth-
century jurisprudence is therefore useful in constitutional interpretation.
For example, I previously have referenced the case of Blankard v. Gal-
y,428 which defined when a conquered people was, and was not, subject
to English law.
429
It has been argued that an interlocutory jurisdictional ruling in Mo-
hegan Indians v. Connecticut430 "represented the start of increased cen-
tralization of oversight and control of colonial Indian regulation by the
British government.' 431 That ruling is offered as one piece of evidence
the framers intended federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs to be exclu-
sive.432
Mohegan was a very long-running controversy over land titles be-
tween Connecticut, the Mohegan Indian tribe, and individual claimants.
The Privy Council appointed a series of commissions to resolve the dis-
pute, directing them to judge "according to justice and equity" rather
than according to the common law. 433 This raised consternation in Con-
necticut, because the prescribed procedure would result in litigation of
land titles without the right to trial by jury.4 34
In 1743, private title holders demurred to the jurisdiction of the
then-sitting commission. They contended that the commission's authori-
zation did not include the power to "call tenants of any lands within this
colony into question in a course of equity... concerning the right or title
The defendants also had argued that congressional jurisdiction was exclusive by reason of the
Constitution alone. Id. at 540 (reporting the Chief Justice as summarizing the defendant's argu-
ment).
426. CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 79-137 (Eric F. Goldman ed., The
Macmillan Company 1966) (providing short biographies of the delegates to the federal convention).
427. DANIEL J. BOORSTE1N, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 110-36 (Vintage
Books 1958) (describing various indicia of the prevalence of legal activity among laymen). Id. at
197-202, 205. See also Louis B. WRIGHT, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES 1607-
1763, at 15 (Harper & Brothers 1957) ("The Maryland planters prided themselves on their familiar-
ity with the principles and practice of law, for legal knowledge was regarded as a necessary accom-
plishment of a gentleman."). See also id. at 128 (stating that "every man had to be his own lawyer").
428. (K.B. 1693) 2 Salk. 411, 91 Eng. Rep. 356.
429. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
430. The case is unreported. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 422-42 (containing an extensive
summary).
431. Clinton, Dormant, supra note 2, at 1068.
432. Id. at 1058. Stating as to the part of his article in which his discussion of Mohegan ap-
pears:
Part III will discuss the colonial and confederation period history surrounding the adop-
tion of the Indian Commerce Clause to demonstrate that ... the primary purpose of that
clause was to assure that the federal government had exclusive power to deal with Indian
tribes and that states could no longer pretend to exercise any authority in Indian country.
Id.
433. SMITH, supra note 2, at 425.
434. Id. at 427.
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of the said tenants to any lands" or to determine their legal rights.435
They further contended that if the authorization did include equitable
power to adjudicate land titles, then it was illegal, for it violated both the
laws of England and the Connecticut charter. Both English and Con-
necticut authority required that land titles and possession be adjudicated
according to the common law, with its guarantee of trial by jury. 436 This
the landholders claimed as their "undoubted birthright and inheri-
tance."
437
In their ruling on the demurrer, the three commissioners split. Two
ruled for the Mohegans on the ground that "[t]he Indians, though living
amongst the king's subjects ... are a separate and distinct people from
them, and they are treated as such, they have a polity of their own, they
make peace and war with any nation of Indians when they think fit, with-
out controul [sic] from the English. 438 Thus, any dispute between them
and English subjects "cannot be determined by the laws of our land, but
by a law equal to both parties, which is the law of nature and na-
tions."439 The commissioners might have noted, although they did not,
that Connecticut itself had treated the Mohegans as sovereign insofar as
the colony had concluded treaties with the tribe.44°
There was a sharp dissent from the president of the commission. "I
can in no matter consider the Mohegan Indians as a separate or sover-
eign state," he wrote.441 "[S]uch a position in this country, where the
state and condition of Indians are known to every body, would be expos-
ing majesty and sovereignty to ridicule. ... 442 The Mohegans before
the court were but British subjects, "enjoying both the benefit and protec-
tion of the English law, and all the privileges of British subjects ...
When special powers out of the course of the common law are given to
commissioners for particular purposes, those powers are strictly to be
pursued, and can in no manner be inlarged [sic] by implication... 443
It is difficult to find evidence that the ruling in Mohegan repre-
sented any sort of shift from local to central control over Indian affairs.
As noted earlier, the individual colonies retained substantial jurisdiction
over local Indian affairs, especially over Indian commerce, throughout
the entire period of British rule.444 Moreover, while the ruling had inci-
dental consequences for the jurisdiction of one commission, it was not
435. MOHEGAN PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 124.
436. SMITH, supra note 2, at 434.
437. MOHEGAN PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 124.
438. Id. at 126.
439. Id. at 127; SMITH, supra note 2, at 434. Smith's quotations from the commission's pro-
ceedings are more in the nature of paraphrase than quotation.
440. SMITH, supra note 2, at 424, 427-28.
441. MOHEGAN PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 128.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. See supra Parts 1I.B.2-3.
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really about which level of government should control Indian affairs. It
was about what body of jurisprudence-law or equity-any tribunal ad-
judicating Indian title claims should employ. Such disputes had been
common throughout the history of the English court system." 5 How-
ever, individual colonies could and often did deal with the tribes under
international law, as Connecticut itself had done by signing treaties with
this very tribe.
446
As a purely legal matter, the jurisdictional ruling had little signifi-
cance. The Mohegan commission was not a court, nor was it staffed by
judges. It was an ad hoc colonial commission appointed by the Privy
Council. Joseph Henry Smith, the most thorough historian of the contro-
versy, has pointed out that the Privy Council (and afortiori its subordi-
nate commissions) lay outside the regularly-constituted court system, and
most of its decisions had only limited precedential force.447 Even the
Council never reviewed the ruling on appeal, for the Indians lost on the
448merits.
No court reporter found Mohegan worthy of reproduction. It was
an unreported decision in a legal environment in which "lawyers habitu-
ally clung to English printed precedents. ' 4 9 My own survey of English
and American legal databases confirms that Mohegan remained not only
unreported, but was utterly unreferenced in any case reports before or
during the Founding Era.450
If the Mohegan ruling has any probative force on the constitutional
scope of federal Indian powers, that force arises from the influence of the
case, if any, on the outlook of those who approved the Constitution. At
least one significant Founder, William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut,
had formed an opinion on the ruling, and that opinion was a negative
one. During the 1760s, Johnson represented his colony in later Mohe-
gan proceedings, and while not involved in the jurisdictional issue as an
advocate, he let it be known he found the jurisdictional ruling ludicrous.
He wrote that "the Mohegans were neither free, Independent, nor numer-
ous" 4 51 and that Connecticut had for some time governed them with laws
"which subject them to Punishment for Immoralities and crimes, and
445. E.g., PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 193-98 (describing the conflict under the Stuart kings).
446. See supra note 440 and accompanying text.
447. SMITH, supra note 2, at 464. One might argue that the decision was "constitutional" and
therefore should have had some force, but there is no particular evidence that it did. See also
PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 206 (stating that the Council "was constantly reduced to impotence by
the sturdy provincialism of courts which declined to recognise [sic] its authority").
448. SMITH, supra note 2, at 435-36.
449. Id. at 464. Professor Clinton, who relies on the case, duly acknowledges that it was un-
published. Clinton, Dormant, supra note 2, at 1067 n.23.
450. A search in HeinOnline for "ENGLISH REPORTS (FULL REPRINT (1220-1865))" reveals no
report of or reference to the case before 1800. A search in Westlaw of the "ALLSTATES-OLD" and
"ALLFEDS-OLD" databases yielded the same result.
451. SMITH, supra note 2, at 434 n. 109.
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enact various regulations with respect to them. ' ,452 "This Notion of their
being free States," he said, "is perfectly ridiculous and absurd.
' 453
Thus, it can be inferred that Johnson would not have wanted such a
ruling enshrined in the Constitution. As evidence of constitutional mean-
ing, his views are entitled to at least some weight. A widely-respected
figure, he served in the Stamp Act Congress and the Confederation Con-
gress, and was a key delegate both to the 1787 federal convention 454 and
to the Connecticut ratifying convention.455 That there were others who
thought like him can be deduced indirectly from the esteem in which he
was held and directly from the wording of the Declaration of Independ-
ence. For the Declaration lists as a principal grievance against the
Crown precisely the ground for landholders' challenge to the Mohegan
commission: deprivation "of the benefits of trial by jury.,
4 56
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the original meaning and original under-
standing of the Indian Commerce Clause, employing the best historical
tools available for that purpose. In this instance, the original meaning
and original understanding were identical. The Indian Commerce Clause
was adopted to grant Congress power to regulate Indian trade between
people under state or federal jurisdiction and the tribes, whether or not
under state or federal jurisdiction. Within its sphere, the Clause provided
Congress with authority to override state laws. It did not otherwise abol-
ish or alter the pre-existing state commercial and police power over Indi-
ans within state borders. It did not grant to Congress a police power over
the Indians, nor a general power to otherwise intervene in tribal affairs.
Other provisions in the Constitution granted the federal government
considerable competence in the field of Indian affairs. The Article IV
Territories and Property Clause conferred on Congress significant power
452. Id.
453. Id. at 435 n. 109.
454. Dr. Johnson was one of three in the pivotal Connecticut delegation, and played a moder-
ate, constructive part throughout the convention. He also was one of five on the Committee of Style,
which put the document in final form. The respect with which he was held can be gauged by the
copious talent of those elected to serve with him on that committee: Madison, Hamilton, Rufus
King, and Gouverneur Morris. 2 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 553 (Sept. 8, 1787) (Madison).
455. 1 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 76 (Jun. 2, 1787) (Journal) (noting Johnson's attendance at
the federal convention); Connecticut 's Ratification, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ONLINE,
http://www.usconstitution.net/ratct.html (last visited November 3, 2007) (listing Johnson as a
ratification convention delegate). Subsequently, he served in the United States Senate, and as presi-
dent of Columbia University. For general biographies, see Robert M. Calhoon, Johnson, William
Samuel, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (2004-07); ELIZABETH P.
MCCAUGHEY, FROM LOYALIST TO FOUNDING FATHER: THE POLITICAL ODYSSEY OF WILLIAM
SAMUEL JOHNSON (1980); GEORGE C. GROCE, JR., WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON: A MAKER OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1937).
456. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (1776) ("For depriving us, in many cases,
of the benefit of Trial by Jury.").
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over Indians residing in a federal territory or on federal land within state
boundaries. Under the Treaty Power, agencies of the federal government
could exercise authority over a tribe if the tribe so agreed. By treaty,
states could be entirely or partially divested of their jurisdiction over a
tribe. The treaty mechanism protected tribes from arbitrary assumption
of federal power, for a tribe had to agree to a treaty. The treaty mecha-
nism also protected the states from inappropriate divesting of their au-
thority, for two-thirds of their delegates in the United States Senate had
to concur. Finally, the results of textual and historical analysis militate
overwhelmingly against the federal government having any "inherent
sovereign power" over Indians or their tribes.
No doubt people who work in the area of Indian law will have
mixed feelings about these conclusions. Some will embrace my conclu-
sion that the tribes are entitled to a wide scope of autonomy from federal
control, while others may fear that I have put federal Indian welfare pro-
grams under a constitutional cloud.457 Few will be pleased with the find-
ing that the Founders intended the states to retain their broad residual
police power, although there are reasons for re-thinking that position.
458
Some may, or may not, appreciate the implied suggestion that federal
Indian policy should be made less through congressional legislation and
more through tribe-by-tribe treaty negotiations.
Scholarly investigations should not be held hostage to political
views, and I have not allowed them to skew the findings of this investi-
gation. If the investigation be factually sound, then I hope readers will
acknowledge that, and pursue their goals within that context.
457. Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra note 2, at 165 ("The plenary power of Congress in
Indian affairs has generated an enormous amount of vociferous scholarly debate in the federal Indian
law academic community, with the argument that Congress has no business regulating at least the
internal affairs of Indian tribes being most popular.").
458. Strategically, Indian activists might be better positioned to achieve their goals after a
devolution of power over Native affairs to the states. As of 1990, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts
together comprised only 0.8 percent of the national population subject to congressional jurisdiction.
But the states in which most Indians live, and the states with significant reservations, have popula-
tions in which Native representation is far higher. Chart 129, Population, by State, Geographic
Region, and Race/Ethnicity, 1990, in STATISTICAL RECORD OF NATIVE NORTH AMERICANS, supra
note 2, at 224-25 (showing that in 1990, only 0.8 percent of the national population was Indian,
Eskimo, or Aleut, but that in significant reservation states, the percentages were higher - e.g., 6.0
percent in Montana, 8.9 percent in New Mexico, and 8.0 percent in Oklahoma). Whatever the his-
tory of state legislatures when Indians were substantially without representation, today the incentives
for favorable treatment of such large in-state minorities are likely to be significant.
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In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the courts
must exercise judgment to effect the constitutional intentions of the legis-
lature and must not exercise will to substitute their preferences for those
of the legislative body.' Since Hamilton first expressed this principle,
scholars and jurists have written countless books, articles, and opinions
about the separation of powers and how courts should go about exercis-
ing their judgment to effect legislative intent. Less has been written
about how legislatures and courts can work together to the same end.
This article calls for increased efforts to re-evaluate and re-vitalize exist-
ing avenues of communication between the legislature and courts in
Colorado and other states, and to develop new ones, both formal and
informal, to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of state govern-
ments.
I. THE NEED FOR INTERBRANCH COMMUNICATION
The Colorado Constitution prohibits any person or persons charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one governmental
branch from exercising any power properly belonging to either of the
others.' However, as Benjamin Cardozo wrote, it is not necessary that
the "[l]egislature and courts move on in proud and silent isolation."' 3 Not
only is such isolation unnecessary, but, as Robert A. Katzmann has
noted, governance "is premised on each institution's respect for and
knowledge of the others and on a continuing dialogue that produces
shared understanding and comity. ' ' The three branches of government
cannot govern without understanding and respecting the others' powers,
t "Separate Powers-Shared Responsibility" was derived from remarks by Joseph R. Quinn,
Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, in 1989. See infra note 17.
tt Judge, Colorado Court of Appeals. I thank my summer intern Matt Dardenne for his
research, communication and coordination with other government entities, and drafting; and the
Court of Appeals editor Wendy Busch for contributing her extraordinary editing skill.
I. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. COLO. CONST. art. III.
3. Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113, 114(1921).
4. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 1 (1997).
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constraints, and methods. 5 The premise here is that effective formal and
informal interbranch communication helps each branch better understand
the workings of others, promotes respect for the separation of powers,
can help manage the tensions inherent in our checks and balances sys-
6tem, and improves government.
The factors that tend to discourage communications between courts
and legislatures have been thoroughly described by Katzmann, Shirley
Abrahamson, Deanell Reece Tacha, and others, and need not be repeated
here.7 However, the need to construct additional avenues of interbranch
communication remains and has been increased by recent legislative
challenges, efforts to modify statutes through litigation, the accelerated
transmission of information, and political rancor.
A. Challenges of Governing
State governments continue to face challenges that include popula-
tion growth, changing demographics, security concerns, persistent and
emerging public health issues, infrastructure demands, budget limita-
tions, the need for economic growth, and public debate regarding funda-
mental values. In many states, legislative term limits cap the experience
level of legislative bodies, yet legislators must effectively address the
concerns of their constituents and of the general public. Because term
limits increase the turnover rate in the legislature, "institutional memory"
is shorter, and programs to provide legislators with necessary informa-
tion must be repeated more frequently and more efficiently. Tight budg-
ets reduce legislative staff resources and increase the need to rely on pri-
vate resources that can be accessed by lobbyists.
B. Litigation
When legislatures draft statutes, to what extent do they endeavor to
limit or leave open the potential for litigation by the same special inter-
ests that were involved in the legislative drafting process? Although
legislatures and the judiciary are aware of the effects of the adversarial
process and communicate about possible substantive and procedural re-
forms, legislative discontent with the courts might be assuaged by
5. Peter M. Shane, Policy at the Intersection of Law and Politics: Panel One: When Inter-
Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-For-Hostages, "Orderly Shutdowns, " Presidential Impeach-
ments, and Judicial "Coups," 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 503, 506-08 (2003).
6. Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD
INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 10 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
7. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson Before the
American Bar Association Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, 12 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 69, 80-91 (1996); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall
We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1045,
1046-47 (1991); Katzmann, supra note 4, at 4-7; Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf
Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge of Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 655-56
(1992); Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
279, 281 (1991).
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broader recognition that the general public, corporations, and organized
advocacy groups often continue their efforts to obtain laws favorable to
them by filing lawsuits that seek to narrow or broaden the statutes'
scope. Thus, like lobbyists, litigants and their advocates are active par-
ticipants in the lawmaking process.
8
And, although legislators are aware that, regardless of litigants'
goals, the courts will interpret and apply the laws they draft, how many
know or are attentive to the canons the courts will use to interpret those
laws?9 As Professor Kagan has observed, after losing in the courts, some
litigants again lobby legislatures to revisit the statutes to undo the courts'
interpretations.10 After the legislature revises a statute, the policy debate
can again return to the courts.
C. Information Highway
Although state legislatures have faced demanding challenges
throughout American history, since the creation of the World Wide Web
in 1991 and the proliferation of dial-up and high speed Internet service
since 1995,11 our governments face these challenges in the fastest com-
munications environment in history and, in turn, under increased public
scrutiny and involvement. The decisions and actions of all branches of
government are disseminated at lightning speed and are swiftly analyzed
and debated in the traditional media and rapidly growing cyber-media.
12
D. Political Rancor
There are, have always been, and always will be, groups, citizens,
and legislators who believe court decisions are frequently based on po-
litical views, rather than legal principles. Recent criticism of controver-
sial court decisions has been vociferous.'3 Reflecting anger, distrust, and
8. ROBERT A. KAGAN, MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 14
(Jeb Barnes & Mark C. Miller, eds., 2004).
9. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806 (1983). Posner has also observed that:
[T]he [basic] reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is not that
they are poorly drafted-though many are-and not that the legislators failed to agree on
just what they wanted to accomplish in the statute-though often they do fail-but that a
statute necessarily is drafted in advance of, and with imperfect appreciation for the prob-
lems that will be encountered in, its application.
Id. at 811.
10. KAGAN, supra note 8, at 14.
11. Robert Hobbes Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Timeline v8.2 (2006),
http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/# 1990s.
12. At the same time, public confidence in the United States Congress and the United States
Supreme Court has fallen dramatically. Frank Newport, Americans' Confidence in Congress at All-
Time Low, THE GALLUP POLL, June 21, 2007, available at
http://www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=27946 (Americans with a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of
confidence in Congress at 14%, down from 22% in 1997 and one of the lowest ratings for any insti-
tution tested in 30 years; ratings for the U.S. Supreme Court were 34%, down from 50% in 1997; for
the President 25%, down from 52% in 2004).
13. In April 2005, U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay of Texas caused the U.S. Con-
gress and federal courts to become involved in the case of Terri Schiavo. After the federal courts
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misunderstanding of the judicial process, rhetoric of this sort tends to
increase the politicization of the judicial system, rather than reduce it. It
also promotes public disrespect for the rule of law and a co-equal branch
of government. That is not to say that courts do not err, or that decisions
should not be subject to public debate. Rather, it is to say that the vehe-
mence of current debate regarding the role of the courts increases the
need for legislatures and courts to build more avenues of communication
and to ensure that they are well used.
In this environment, the public would not be well served by three
branches of government moving in proud isolation. To the contrary, our
rapidly changing, rapidly communicating world makes interbranch
communication more necessary than ever before. Each member of each
branch needs to have a sound understanding of how the others function
and are evolving in response to new challenges and new perspectives
within their branches and in the electorate. Although courts regularly
interpret and apply the laws passed by legislatures, do judges know
enough about the formal and informal political dynamics of legislative
processes? 14
II. "SEEKING A NEW PARTNERSHIP," CONFERENCES AND A GUIDEBOOK
In 1989, seven organizations sponsored a national conference in
Denver, Colorado, entitled "Legislative-Judicial Relationships: Seeking
a New Partnership."' 5 The conference sought to provide a foundation for
more substantial working relationships between state legislatures and the
courts. The Honorable Robert F. Stephens, Chief Justice of the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, commented that the conference was a historic first
attempt to discuss openly and candidly the problem that exists between
the two branches of government, and that it was an opportunity to create
mutual understanding of the problems and attitudes underlying inter-
declined to exceed their jurisdiction and a special grant of authority from Congress, DeLay said,
"The time will come for the men responsible for this to answer for their behavior," and noted that he
wanted to "look at an arrogant, out-of-control, unaccountable judiciary that thumbed their nose at
Congress and the president." Mike Allen, DeLay Wants Panel to Review Role of Courts: Democ-
rats Criticize His Attack on Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2005, at A09. That same month, Senator
John Comyn spoke to a nearly empty chamber, criticized a Supreme Court ruling on the death pen-
alty, and said that he wondered whether political decisions by the courts without accountability to
the public had resulted in violence against judges. Charles Babington, Senator Links Violence to
"Political" Decisions, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2005, at A07.
14. Posner, supra note 9, at 809.
15. The conference was held in Denver, Colorado, on October 1-3, 1989, and was sponsored
by the National Center for State Courts, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices, the Conference of State Court Administrators, the Council of State Govern-
ments, and the American Bar Association Judicial Administration Division-Lawyer's Conference.
See NANCY C. MARON, LINDA K. RIDGE, JOHN MARTIN & CAROL FRIESEN, LEGISLATIVE-JUDICIAL
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branch friction and to help both branches work together effectively to
better serve the public, "which we all serve."' 6
Given the location of the 1989 conference, it is no surprise that
Colorado's legislative, judicial, and legal education communities were
well represented. 17 Chief Justice Joseph R. Quinn and Colorado Senate
President Ted Strickland made welcoming remarks. Chief Justice Quinn
stressed that the separation of powers should be viewed as "shared re-
sponsibility."' 18 Participants were encouraged "to think less in terms of
'separation' and 'power' and more in terms of common goals and com-
munications."' 19 Chief Justice Quinn commented that because the courts'
interpretation of statutes is based on the words in the statute, it is impor-
tant that the legislature express its intent as clearly as possible.20 Edward
A. Dauer, a professor at University of Denver College of Law, sounded a
similar theme when he said that "despite, or maybe because of, [the]
principle of separation of powers, there are numerous needs and oppor-
tunities for the legislative and judicial branches nonetheless to interact,"
but that "in all those interactions, the two branches do not always fully
appreciate the constraints, limits, incentives, motivations, and attributes
of the other branch."'
Among the eight recommendations that emerged from the confer-
ence was a recommendation to hold regional and state conferences, simi-
lar in format to the national one, to focus on the relationships between
individual state legislatures and courts.2 2
In 1991, regional conferences were conducted in Helena, Mon-
tana,23 and Boston, Massachusetts.24 The project staff conducted follow-
16. LINDA K. RIDGE, DONNA HUNZEKER, ANTOINETTE BONNACI-MILLER & MARY
FAIRCHILD, LEGISLATIVE-JUDICIAL RELATIONS: "SEEKING A NEW PARTNERSHIP:" A GUIDEBOOK
FOR LEGISLATIVE-JUDICIAL RELATIONS 8 (1992), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org[WC/Publications/KIS-lntRelPartnership.pdf [hereinafter RIDGE,
GUIDEBOOK].
17. State Senator Dottie Wham and University of Denver College of Law Professor Robert B.
Yegge were on the advisory planning committee. MARON, CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at
app. C. The faculty included Professor Edward A. Dauer of the University of Denver College of
Law; Honorable Jean E. Dubofsky, former associate justice of the Supreme Court of Colorado;
Honorable Richard D. Lamm, Director of the University of Denver Center for Pub. Policy and
Contemporary Issues; and former Govemor of Colorado; Gene Murrett, Circuit Executive for the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals; Honorable Joseph R. Quinn, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Colorado; and Honorable Ted Strickland, President of the Colorado State Senate. Id. Attendees
included State Representative Marleen Fish and Chief Judge Aurel M. Kelly of the Colorado Court
of Appeals. Id.
18. MARON, CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 38.
21. RIDGE, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 16, at 1-2.
22. MARON, CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 21-22.
23. RDGE, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 16, at 33. Participants were from Montana, North Da-
kota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Idaho. Id.
24. Id. Participants were from Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Ver-
mont. Id.
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up interviews of regional conference participants and reported that par-
ticipants frequently mentioned "the need to spread knowledge and under-
standing of the issues critical to interbranch relations 'through the
ranks."'' 25 According to the conference report, "[t]here was considerable
disagreement between legislators and judicial officials about how much
communication exist[ed] between the branches [at that time], and what
the inducements and impediments to more effective communication
might be.",
26
And in 1992, Linda K. Ridge, with others at the National Center for
State Courts, prepared "A Guidebook for Legislative-Judicial Relations,"
which, among other things, provides guidance about how to organize a
conference on legislative-judicial relations.27
II1. WISCONSIN'S COMMISSION ON THE JUDICIARY AS A Co-EQUAL
BRANCH
In 1995, Wisconsin State Bar President David Saichek created a
Commission on the Judiciary as a Co-Equal Branch of Government.28
The commission sought to address, among other questions, whether the
judicial branch was working well with the other two branches of gov-
ernment. 29 The commission was divided into five committees, one of
which addressed interbranch relations.3 °
The commission reported concerns about the relationship among the
three branches, including "the need for better understanding by members
of the executive and legislative branches of what the courts can and can-
not do, as well as what must be done to help the judiciary function more
effectively., 31 It also reported concerns that the judiciary needed to be
more assertive in understanding the process of legislating. 32 The com-
mission recognized that the legislative and executive branches can be
influenced by misconceptions among the public about the judicial
branch, and that education about the judiciary's role and independence is
vital to all branches.33 In my view, however, there is an even greater
danger that members of the legislative and executive branches who lack
accurate understanding about the courts can, and do, negatively influence
public confidence in their government and, in particular, in the fairness
and impartiality of our courts.
25. RIDGE, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 16, at 34.
26. MARON, CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 7.
27. See generally RIDGE, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 16.
28. COMMISSION ON THE JUDICIARY AS A CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, STATE BAR
OF WISCONSIN, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (1997), a'ailable at
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Research-and-Reports&Template=/CM/Content
Disp1ay.cfm&ContentID=17447 [hereinafter COMMISSION ON THE JUDICIARY].
29. Id.
30. Id. at 13.
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IV. AVENUES OF COMMUNICATION IN COLORADO
In October 1990, the State Justice Institute awarded a grant34 and
the Colorado General Assembly appropriated funds to the Colorado Ju-
dicial Branch to conduct Project Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the
Future. 35 Eighty Coloradans spent more than a year considering various
issues, including the relationship between the courts, the General As-
sembly, and the executive branch.36
One Project Vision 2020 task force that considered the structure of
the state courts included professors, state representatives, state senators,
judges, and court administrators.37 The task force envisioned better rela-
tionships between the General Assembly and the courts, and also rec-
ommended inviting the executive branch into discussions.38 It called for
the creation of an Interbranch Commission consisting of the Governor
(or a designee or alternate), the Chief of Staff of the Governor, the ma-
jority and minority leaders of the state senate and house, the Chief Jus-
tice (or a designee or alternate), the State Court Administrator, one pri-
vate citizen appointed by each of the three branches, and two private
citizens to be chosen by the three appointed citizens members.39 One of
the five appointed private citizens would be elected by the entire com-
mission to serve as Chair.40 The task force envisioned that the commis-
sion could be established by constitutional amendment, statutory action,
voluntary action by each branch, or another informal, voluntary
method.41
The task force acknowledged that the principles of separation of
powers and checks and balances must continue, and emphasized that the
purpose of "an Interbranch Commission would not be to reduce the inde-
pendence, autonomy, and customary responsibilities of each of the
branches of government. ',42  The task force concluded that the state
should follow the principle that the three branches are "separate but not
separated., 43 However, such a commission does not currently exist.
Since then there have been other task forces and formal avenues of
communication. The General Assembly has a tradition of inviting the
34. STEERING COMMITTEE, PROJECT VISION 2020: COLORADO COURTS OF THE FUTURE,
REPORT TO THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT 1 (1992) [hereinafter VISION 2020]. The grant was
awarded shortly after Chief Justice Joseph R. Quinn stepped down as Chief Justice (though he re-
mained an associate justice until 1993) and Chief Justice Luis Rovira assumed those duties.
35. Id.
36. Letter from Laurence W. DeMuth, Jr., Chair of Steering Committee, Vision 2020: Colo-
rado Courts of the Future, to Hon. Luis D. Rovira, Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court (Mar. 25,
1992) (on file with Westminster Law Library, University of Denver Sturm College of Law).
37. VISION 2020, supra note 34, at 62.
38. Id. at 77.
39. Id. at 79-80.
40. Id. at 80.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at 79 (quotation omitted).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Chief Justice to address the Assembly regarding the state of the judiciary
at the beginning of each legislative session.44 These addresses typically
include information about the structure of the judicial branch, caseloads
of its several components, the challenges it faces and anticipates, the
initiatives it has undertaken, and legislation it intends to request. 45 The
Office of the State Court Administrator maintains communication with
the General Assembly throughout the year, especially with regard to the
administration of the courts and proposed legislation.46
In 2001, the courts, the legislature, and the executive branch partici-
pated in the Governor's Task Force on Civil Justice Reform,47 which
resulted in legislation that added twenty-four new district court judge-
ships.48
From 2005 to 2007, at least two legislators participated in the Re-
spondent Parents' Counsel Task Force Colorado, which Chief Justice
Mary Mullarkey created. The task force reviewed issues facing respon-
dent parents' counsel, and made recommendations to the Supreme Court
and the Colorado General Assembly.49
In 2006, a legislative audit report was highly critical of fees charged
by guardians and conservators. 50 As a result of the report, the Chief Jus-
tice established the Protective Proceedings Task Force, and charged it
with the task of establishing effective procedures and controls for admin-
istering and monitoring conservatorships. 51 The task force issued a draft
report in September 2007.52
In addition to these efforts by the government branches themselves,
the Colorado Bar Association has sponsored a half-day program at the
beginning of some legislative sessions to provide new legislators with a
primer regarding the structure and role of the courts.53 The Colorado
44. See, e.g., Mary Mullarkey, Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court, State of the Judiciary
Address to the General Assembly of Colorado (Jan. 12, 2007).
45. See id. at 1.
46. See Office of State Court Administrator, Colorado Judicial Branch,
http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/scaoindex.htm.
47. See GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, FINAL REPORT (July 2000),
available at http://www.state.co.us/cjrtf/report/report.htm.
48. See Laird T. Milburn, CBA President's Message to Members: Citizen's Justice Confer-
ence, 30 Colo. Lawyer 45 (Aug. 2001).
49. RESPONDENT PARENTS' COUNSEL TASK FORCE COLORADO, FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF
JUSTICE OF THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT 10-35 (2007), available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/committees/courtimprovementdocs/FinalReport_9_24 07.pdf.
50. PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE AND STATE COURT




52. See PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS TASK FORCE, DRAFT REPORT (2007), available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/Probate/SunmnaryReportDRAFTSept 122007.doc.
53. Colorado Bar Association, 3d Annual Legislative Symposium: Colorado's Justice System
(Oct. 20, 2005). The last program was conducted at the beginning of the legislative session in Janu-
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Supreme Court and the Colorado Bar Association have also supported
the formation of the Colorado Access to Justice Commission, which de-
velops, coordinates, and implements policy initiatives to expand access
to and enhance the quality of justice in civil legal matters for those who
encounter barriers in accessing Colorado's civil justice system. 54 The
Access to Justice Commission includes representatives from all three
branches of government."
Each of these communications has proved its value. And more can
be done, both formally and informally.
V. POSSIBILITIES
The national, regional, and state programs, as well as the authors
mentioned earlier, have provided exceptional guidance about ways to
increase productive communications among the branches of government.
There has been increased communication at the federal and state levels.
Colorado has done well. Project Vision 2020, the State of the Judiciary
addresses to the General Assembly, the legislative communications work
of the Office of the State Court Administrator, and joint task forces have
laid a path. Some judicial districts have also found ways to meet with
state legislators and local officials. 56 Yet, more can be done and the citi-
zens will benefit when more is done.
2008 is an election year. In 2009 there will be a new president, a
new U.S. Congress, a new Colorado General Assembly, and new legisla-
tures in most states. And 2009 will be the twentieth anniversary of the
1989 "Seeking a New Partnership" national conference. We do not need
new conferences to design new avenues of communication; rather, we
need national, state, and regional conferences that bring participants to-
gether to set in motion activities that will maximize the benefits of exist-
ing avenues of communication and to establish those that have already
been designed but not yet built. Such conferences could also create in-
terstate collaborations that enable state governments to benefit from the
experiences of other states. What follows is a summary of some of the
work from earlier conferences.
ary 2005; there was no program at the beginning of the legislative session in 2007. Id. The format
of the program is educational, but its brevity limits the amount and scope of information that can be
presented. In addition, attendance by legislators is voluntary, and, as a result, it is often limited. The
program should be resumed and expanded in 2009, and returning incumbent legislators should urge
better attendance by all legislators. Attendance by judges other than the speakers would also help to
foster continuing informal communication between judges and legislators.
54. See Access to Justice Commission, Colorado Bar Association,
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/20129/DPWAJ/Access-to-Justice-Commission.
55. Id.
56. RIDGE, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 16, at 22-24.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
A. Education
Our executive, legislative, and judicial officials are all busy carrying
out the work of the people. Although the majority of officials come to
their positions with significant knowledge, there is no assurance that they
know how each branch operates or how the work of each branch relates
to that of the others.
As in most efforts to achieve excellence, education and training are
essential foundations. And, indeed, all the conferences discussed here
have called for more interbranch education.5 7 They have called for edu-
cational programs that orient branch officials and staff to the procedures,
perspectives, and problems of the other branches.58 The public would
benefit if judges knew more about the formal and informal political dy-
namics involved in the initiation, drafting, consideration, and passage of
statutes. The public would also benefit if legislators knew more about
the courts and how they interpret statutes and constitutions.
Educational efforts could also facilitate formal and informal inter-
branch communication by including information about the separation of
powers, ways to engage in productive communications without under-
mining the separation of powers, and the political and ethical constraints
of officials in the other branches. Joint educational conferences would
promote a better understanding about how each branch is approaching
new challenges. Practical education could be achieved through "ride-
along" programs where judges invite state legislators, as well as local
elected and appointed officials, to observe court proceedings, and where
state legislators invite judges to observe public meetings with constitu-
ents, as well as legislative committee meetings and hearings.
And as part of the Courts in the Community program,59 Colorado's
appellate courts hear oral arguments in all parts of the state. Local bar
associations often host small social functions in conjunction with these
events. The courts and bar associations could use these and other oppor-
tunities to bring together state and local members of all the branches.
Such education is likely to promote new ideas for formal avenues of
communication to augment the State of the Judiciary addresses and
communications through the Office of the State Court Administrator.
57. See, e.g., MARON, CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 8-9; RIDGE, GUIDEBOOK,
supra note 16, at app. B, app. C.
58. See, e.g., MARON, CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 26; RIDGE, GUIDEBOOK, supra
note 16, at app. B, app. C.
59. Colorado Judicial Branch, Courts in the Community,
http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/pubed/courtsinthecommunity.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
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B. Formal Avenues
New formal avenues should seek to promote efficiency and effec-
tiveness in governmental processes. For example, can legislators draft
statutes that are less vulnerable to the risks of modification through liti-
gation and are more likely to be read and understood consistently with
legislative intentions and purposes? Are judicial impact statements being
used effectively? Are joint committees and task forces being utilized
effectively? Might joint conferences be held regarding interbranch rela-
tions and emerging public issues? Could legislators be invited to attend
or make presentations at annual judicial education conferences? Are
there effective means for the courts to draw the legislature's attention to
statutory provisions that could be made more clear and, thus, reduce or
avoid litigation and the need for judicial interpretation? Are existing
avenues of communication primarily at the highest levels of each institu-
tion? Are there ways to bring more judges and legislators together
throughout each branch? How can the leadership of the legislature and
judiciary increase attendance at bar association programs that inform
legislators about the courts and the way courts interpret statutes? How
can such programs facilitate continuing communications between legisla-
tors and judges?
C. Informal and Social Contacts
Increased education and formal communications may well result in
increased personal contacts and informal communications between offi-
cials of different branches. Such communications would increase the
potential for new ideas, and perhaps more important, for mutual under-
standing and respect. In addition, although officials from each of the
branches often attend the same community events, how much more
might the public benefit if all three branches gathered at the beginning of
each legislative session for a luncheon that celebrated the founders' de-
sign of three branches forming one government?
CONCLUSION
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judici-
ary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether he-
reditary, self[-]appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny. ' 60 The task of public officials is to preserve the
separation of powers and also to govern effectively and efficiently. We
cannot do this without knowing the powers, dynamics, and constraints of
the other branches with which we share that responsibility. We could do
it better if the avenues of communication, formal and informal, are avail-
able, known, and used by each branch and by individual legislators and
judges. Avenues that currently address changes in substantive and pro-
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
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cedural laws could be supplemented with avenues that increase mutual
understanding and respect for the unique dynamics of the legislative and
judicial processes, and the commitment of those in each branch to serve
the public in accordance with their sworn duties.
The national, regional, and state conferences in 1989 and the early
1990s designed ways to increase interbranch communications. As we
approach the twentieth anniversary of the 1989 conference, perhaps it is
time for a series of smaller regional and state interbranch conferences,
not to design avenues of communication, but to begin the work of broad-
ening existing avenues of communication, augmenting them with others
that have been designed but not yet built, and promoting increased use by
individual legislators and judges. It is absurd to think that we could gov-
ern effectively and efficiently without them. Yet, too often, it seems we
"move on in proud and silent isolation."
ENACTING LIBERTARIAN PROPERTY: OREGON'S MEASURE
37 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
MICHAEL C. BLUMMt & ERIK GRAFE t t
In November 2004, for the second time in four years, Oregon voters
opted for a radical initiative that is transforming development rights in
the state. The implications of this substantial change in property rights
have yet to be fully realized, but it is clear that the post-2004 land use
world in Oregon will be dramatically different than the previous thirty
years.
Land development rights in the state were significantly curtailed by
a landmark law the Oregon legislature, encouraged by pioneering Gov-
ernor Tom McCall, enacted in 1973. Implementation of that law sur-
vived three separate initiatives that sought to rescind it in the 1970s and
1980s. But after a hiatus of a decade and a half, land planning oppo-
nents put on the ballot a scheme that promised landowners either com-
pensation or a regulatory waiver from land use requirements imposed
after they--or a family member-acquired the land in question. That
2000 measure, which the voters approved as an amendment to the Ore-
gon Constitution, was struck down by the Oregon Supreme Court for
violating the state constitutional requirement that initiatives be limited to
only a single subject.
Undaunted, the opponents of Oregon land use planning put another
initiative on the ballot in 2004 quite similar to the 2000 initiative, except
that this initiative was a statutory amendment, not a constitutional
amendment. Thus, it was not burdened by the concerns that led to the
2000 measure's judicial rejection. This measure, known as Measure 37,
promises to transform land use regulation in Oregon and the Oregon
landscape in the process.
This article explains the background, politics, and implementation
of Oregon's experiment in creating what is the leading example of liber-
tarian property in the world. The article examines early judicial and
attorney general interpretations of the measure and its predecessor and
focuses attention on the many ambiguities in the measure's language,
particularly the uncertain scope of its express exceptions from compen-
sation. Measure 37's proponents have attempted to export its principles
to other states and, in 2006, Arizona joined Oregon as another labora-
t Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
t$ Staff Attorney, Earthjustice (Juneau, AK); LL.M. 2007, Lewis and Clark Law School;
J.D. 2000 University of Virginia; B.A. 1996 Yale University. The views expressed in this article are
those of the authors, and no endorsement by Earthjustice, its staff, or its clients is intended.
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tory for libertarian property. Finally, as this article was in press, the
Oregon electorate approved a referendum aimed at clarifying some of
Measure 37's ambiguities, expediting regulatory waivers for small resi-
dential developments, and making them transferable, but making com-
mericial, industrial, and large residential developments ineligible for
regulatory waivers or compensation.
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2004, Oregon voters adopted Measure 37, an initiative
revolutionizing property rights in the state.1 The initiative was actually
the second time in four years the Oregon electorate opted for radical
property rights change; an earlier version, passed in 2000, was struck
down by the Oregon Supreme Court for violating the state constitution. z
Despite the radical nature of the initiative-which promised landowners
complete compensation for any regulation reducing any value of land
imposed after acquisition by the owner or her family-the measure
passed easily, with a majority of over 60 percent.3 It was later upheld by
the state supreme court, which overturned a lower court decision,4 so the
measure is now in the process of transforming the Oregon landscape.
Oregon might seem an unlikely place for a property rights revolu-
tion to take hold. For over thirty years, the state pursued statewide land
use planning on a scale not witnessed in any other American state.5 This
commitment to rational, areawide planning channeled development with-
in urban growth boundaries, preserved rural forest and farmlands, and
encouraged efficient infrastructure and transportation planning, of no
small significance in a world increasingly concerned with reducing car-
bon emissions.6 The Oregon system also interjected the state into a host
1. Oregon Governments Must Pay Owners or Forgo Enforcement When Certain Land Use
Restrictions Reduce Property Value, ch. 197 Ballot Measure 37 (Measure 37) (2004) (codified at
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005)).
2. Amends Oregon Constitution: Requires Payment to Landowner if Government Regula-
tion Reduces Property Value (Measure 7) (2000), available at
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72000/guide/mea/m7/m7.htmf (struck down as unconstitu-
tional in League of Or. Cities v. State, 56 P.3d 892, 896 (Or. 2002)).
3. Or. Secretary of State, General Election Abstract of Votes on State Measure No. 37 (Nov.
2, 2004), http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/abstract/m37.pdf.
4. MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 312 (Or. 2006), overturning the
circuit court decision, MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., No. 05C10444, slip op. at 23 (Marion
County Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/
Measure37.pdf; see infra notes 172-213 and accompanying text.
5. GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE REGULATED LANDSCAPE: LESSONS ON
STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON 227 (1992) (describing Oregon's land use planning
system and noting that it has served as a model to other states); H. JEFFREY LEONARD, MANAGING
OREGON'S GROWTH: THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 134-37 (1983) (describing Ore-
gon's land use planning system and noting that it has served as a model to other states). See gener-
ally PLANNING THE OREGON WAY: A TWENTY YEAR EVALUATION (Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe &
Sy Adler eds., 1994).
6. LEONARD, supra note 5, at 33 (noting that protection of farm and forest land, and channel-
ing development within urban growth boundaries, are central tenets of Oregon's land use planning
system); Edward J. Sullivan, Remarks to University of Oregon Symposium Marking the Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary of S.B. 100, 77 OR. L. REV. 813, 817-24 (1998) (describing Oregon land use planning
system); Matthew A. Light, Note, Different Ideas of the City: Origins of Metropolitan Land-Use
Regimes in the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 577, 582 n.19 (1999)
(noting that Oregon's comprehensive state law finds no parallel in the United States, although it
resembles German and Swiss land use policies); Jason A. Robison, Note and Comment, Shaping
Oregon Climate Policy in Light of the Kyoto Protocol 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 207, 228 (2006)
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of land development decisions that in other jurisdictions are typically
made by local officials. 7 Although the ensuing land use restrictions gen-
erated opposition, Oregon voters ratified the land use planning system
three times during its first ten years of existence.8
But the situation changed in the 1990s, when a libertarian property
rights group began to challenge what it considered to be Oregon's land
use overregulation. This group, Oregonians In Action, assisted Florence
Dolan in her successful 1994 appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, claiming
development conditions imposed by the city of Tigard unconstitutionally
took her property rights. 9 Moving to more wholesale reform, the group
spearheaded the effort that put Measure 37 and its 2000 predecessor on
the ballot and later defended the constitutionality of each. Although the
2007 Oregon Legislature has asked the voters whether to amend Measure
37,10 there is no doubt that the rise of libertarian property has forever
altered the landscape of property rights in the state, and that of Arizona
as well, where voters approved a Measure 37-like initiative in 2006."
(discussing how Oregon's land use planning program addresses climate change by, for example,
preserving forests and agricultural land). See also infra Part I.
7. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 197.646 (2005) (requiring local government to amend the
state's comprehensive plan and land use regulations to implement new land use statutes and LCDC
land use goals and rules); James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The
Emerging New Model for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 489, 529-
35 (1994) (discussing interaction between state and local government under statewide land use
planning systems); cf. 4 ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 24.01 (Kenneth H. Young ed.,
4th ed. 1996) ("[T]he legislation of most states continues to reflect an underlying assumption that the
control of land use is basically a local problem.").
8. Citizen initiatives which would have repealed or severely curtailed statewide land use
planning appeared on the 1976, 1978 and 1982 ballots. Voters rejected these measures overwhelm-
ingly-by a margin of 57 to 43 percent in 1976, 61 to 39 percent in 1978, and 55 to 45 percent in
1982. See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, MEASURE 7 AND COMPENSATION FOR THE IMPACTS OF
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 19-20 (2002), available at http://www.pdxcityclub.orglpdf/
Measure7_2002.pdf (discussing ballot measures); Oregon Blue Book, Initiative, Referendum and
Recall, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/electionsl9.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (giving
election results for 1976 and 1978 ballot measures); Oregon Blue Book, Initiative, Referendum and
Recall, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections20.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (giving
results for 1982 ballot measure).
9. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 374-95 (1994). See generally Colloquy, Dolan v.
City of Tigard: The Takings Clause Doctrine of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 25 ENVTL. L. 111 (1995).
10. See infra Part VI.
11. Private Property Rights Protection Act, Ariz. Prop. 207 § 12-1134 (Proposition 207)
(2006) (codified at ARiz. REV. STAT. § 12-1134 (2007)). Arizona's Proposition 207 was adopted by
a landslide margin of 64.8 to 35.2 percent. Ariz. Secretary of State, 2006 General Election Results,
http://www.azsos.gov/results/2006/general/BM207.htm. Voters in California, Washington and
Idaho rejected Measure 37-type ballot initiatives in the 2006 elections, however. California's Propo-
sition 90 failed by a margin of 47.6 to 52.4 percent; Washington's Initiative 933 failed by a margin
of 41 to 59 percent; and Idaho's Proposition 2 failed by a margin of 24 to 76 percent. See Cal.
Secretary of State, Statement of Vote, 2006 General Election, http://www.ss.ca.gov/
elections/sov/ 2 006_general/measures.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007); Wash. Secretary of State, 2006
Election Results, http://vote.wa.gov/Elections/general/Measures.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2007);
Idaho Secretary of State, November 7, 2006 General Election Results, Statewide Totals,
http://www.idsos.state.id.us/ELECT/RESULTS/2006/general/totstwd.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2007).
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It is worth pausing to consider why libertarian property would ap-
peal to the voters of the early twenty-first century. One reason may be
that its message is deceptively simple: to allegedly restore individual
property rights, which the federal and most state constitutions protect
against "takings" for public use without payment of "just compensa-
tion."02  What is meant by property rights, however, is hardly ever ex-
plained. There seems to be a subliminal libertarian message that prop-
erty rights equate to development rights, and that regulation---or at least
some kinds of regulation-limiting a landowner's right to develop is
impermissible without constitutionally required compensation. This ver-
sion of libertarian thought was not part of the intent of the either the U.S.
or Oregon constitutional framers.' 3 Moreover, the Supreme Court found
no regulatory takings until 1922,14 and both that Court and the Oregon
Supreme Court have largely rejected regulatory takings allegations ever
since. 15 In short, libertarian property has never dominated judicial think-
ing, although it has a few adherents in the legal academy.1
6
Libertarian property has been out of the mainstream because it is
based on several flawed assumptions. Libertarians see property in static
terms, with fixed boundaries and clearly defined rights.1 7  But, in fact,
property rights are created and evolve over time to meet a society's felt
necessities; one's development rights are less dependent on landowner
12. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19;
IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 14; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 18; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
13. See generally John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Mean-
ing of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law
and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996); William Mi-
chael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995); Derek 0. Teaney, Comment, Originalism as a Shot in the Arm for
Land-Use Regulation: Regulatory "Takings " Are Not Compensable Under a Traditional Originalist
View ofArticle 1, Section 18 of the Oregon Constitution, 40 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 529 (2004).
14. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-16 (1922) (concluding that a state
subsidence control statute took a coal company's reserved mining rights by forbidding mining under
homes and other specified places).
15. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306-43
(2002) (development moratorium imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use
plan not a taking); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1987)
(state subsidence control statute--quite similar to that in Pennsylvania Coal requiring a coal com-
pany to keep 50 percent of its coal in place and to repair any subsidence-caused damage not a taking,
see case cited supra note 14); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122-38
(1978) (New York's landmark preservation ordinance, which prevented the owner of Grand Central
Station from constructing a development over the station not a taking); Coast Range Conifers, LLC
v. State ex rel. Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 117 P.3d 990, 991 (Or. 2005) (prohibiting logging of nine
acres of a forty-acre parcel by regulation not a taking because thirty-one acres of the parcel were
unaffected); Dodd v. Hood River County, 855 P.2d 608, 610-16 (Or. 1993) (zoning law preventing
siting of a dwelling on parcel ruled not a taking because some economic benefit from harvesting the
parcel's timber remained).
16. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 349 (1985); James L. Huffman, A Coherent Takings Theory At Last: Comments
On Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 17 ENVTL. L.
158-76 (1986) (favorably reviewing book). Professor Huffman successfully argued the case defend-
ing Measure 37 before the Oregon Supreme Court.
17. See ERIC T. FREYFOGEL, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
GOOD 7, 175 (2003).
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boundaries than the character of the neighborhood. 18  For libertarians,
property rights are individualistic bulwarks against the Leviathan state; 19
some even maintain that property rights are pre-political in nature.2 ° Yet
property rights are created by the state, to serve community ends, and
depend upon state enforcement.2'
Libertarians view property value as landowner created, whereas that
value is usually due more to the character of the neighborhood, surround-
ing improvements, the health of the land itself, and tax policy. 22  For
libertarians, liberty is the paramount value, but there are other competing
and cherished values like conservation and ecosystem health. Libertarian
property undermines conservation and ecosystems by fragmenting land-
scapes, increasing transboundary problems, and inhibiting protection of
resources like wildlife that require landscape-scale coordination.23 Liber-
tarian property's equation of property with development rights also ig-
nores the fact that development often interferes with neighbors' quiet
enjoyment rights.24
The flawed assumptions underlying libertarian property explain
why it has never been broadly accepted by the courts. Consequently,
takings claimants have seldom succeeded in obtaining judicially ordered
18. See id. at 16-18, 27-28 (discussing the contextual nature of property rights); id. at 65-99
(providing examples of how property rights evolve over time).
19. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, The Role of Courts in the Implementation and Administra-
tion of Environmental Legislation, THE ADVOCATE, Spring 1984, at 9, 13 ("The American Leviathan
state is ample evidence that democracy provides little protection from state intrusion into private
decision making.").
20. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 5, 230-31 (embracing natural rights theory, which
"asserts that the end of the state is to protect liberty and property, as these conceptions are under-
stood independent of and prior to the formation of the state;" asserting that the proposition which the
eminent domain clause asserts is that "there is some natural and unique set of entitlements that are
protected under a system of private property").
21. See FREYFOGEL, supra note 17, at 208-09 ("Property draws its philosophic justification
from the common good .... Landowner liberty, accordingly, should be recognized in property law
only when it helps promote the common good .... [P]roperty law is a creation of the majority...
and should respond to its needs."); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross
Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1668-71 (1988) (criticizing
natural rights view of property).
22. See FREYFOGEL, supra note 17, at 129 ("The value of land today results not just from
labors expended on it. Value also comes from what other people have done to surrounding lands;
from neighborhoods, communities, and vast cities that have arisen over time. Value comes to a
parcel from its proximity to those surrounding improvements, as well as from local scarcities of land
generally. Value also comes from nature itself .... "). A 2007 study done by the Georgetown
Environmental Law & Policy Institute found no systematic negative effective of Oregon's land use
regulation on the land value of restricted parcels within urban growth boundaries or agricultural
lands. GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POLICY INST., PROPERTY VALUES AND OREGON'S MEASURE
37: EXPOSING THE FALSE PREMISE OF REGULATION'S HARM TO LANDOWNERS 2 (2007), available
at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/GELPIMeasure37Report.pdf (finding no significant differ-
ence between land values in Oregon and in neighboring states and noting that "as much as 14% of
current agricultural land values in Oregon represents the capitalized value of the state policy of
taxing agricultural subsidies at a much lower effective rate than other lands," and that federal agri-
cultural subsidies have also positively affected Oregon agricultural land value).
23. See FREYFOGEL, supra note 17, at 177-78 (discussing the "tragedy of fragmentation").
24. See id. at 56, 218-19 (discussing property's positive component of protecting landowners'
liberty to enjoy healthy landscapes).
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compensation due to alleged overregulation.25 Disappointment with the
both the federal and state courts' interpretation of takings cases encour-
aged Oregonians In Action to shift the focus of its attention from the
courts to the initiative process. The group's ensuing success not only
means dramatic changes in the nature of property rights in Oregon, but
elsewhere in states like Arizona that are following the Oregon example.
26
This article examines the forces that led to Oregon's Measure 37,
analyzes its text, explains its implementation, and considers its underly-
ing libertarian philosophy. Section I begins by describing the history and
structure of Oregon's comprehensive land use planning system and pre-
Measure 37 citizen initiative challenges to the system. Section II re-
counts the background of Oregon voters' adoption of Measure 37 as well
as its survival in the constitutional challenge that followed. Section III
discusses the scope of the measure and early administrative and judicial
interpretations of its muddled language. Section IV examines the meas-
ure's exceptions and explains how they may affect its scope. Section V
surveys the exportation of Measure 37 to other states. Section VI dis-
cusses the current state of Measure 37 claims in Oregon and the recent
referendum Oregon voters approved as Measure 49, in an effort to mini-
mize those effects. The article concludes that the abstractions and abso-
lutism central to libertarian property make it unsuited to become the
dominant property philosophy in the twenty-first century, where context
and connection are increasingly paramount considerations in a carbon-
limited world that is becoming more obviously interconnected all the
time. Viewed in this light, Measure 37 is an unfortunate experiment that
ought not to enjoy widespread replication and about which the Oregon
electorate has already expressed second thoughts.
I. BACKGROUND: THE OREGON LAND USE PROGRAM
Oregon's comprehensive statewide land use planning system, de-
signed to foster citizen involvement,27 manage population growth,28 pre-
25. One exception is Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071-73 (1992), which
equated complete economic wipeouts due to regulations with permanent governmental physical
occupations. But there are few such wipeouts, and the Lucas Court's exemption for regulations that
merely replicate "background principles" of property or nuisance law, has provided government
defendants with a significant new defense in takings cases, effectively swallowing the Lucas wipeout
rule. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005).
26. See Private Property Rights Protection Act, Ariz. Prop. 207 § 12-1134 (Proposition 207)
(2006) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1134 (2007)); Ariz. Secretary of State, 2006 General
Election Results, http://www.azsos.gov/results/2006/general/BM207.htm.
27. The tenets of Oregon's land use planning system are contained in statewide land use
planning goals, the first of which requires public bodies "to develop a citizen involvement program
that insures the opportunity for citizens to be involved in all phases of the planning process." Goal
1, Statewide Planning Goals, Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development,
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/goall.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007); see infra note 53
(describing where statewide goals are published).
28. Statewide planning goal 14 requires local governments to establish urban growth bounda-
ries to avoid sprawl, provide for orderly development, and encourage the efficient use of land. Goal
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serve agricultural and forest resources,29 and promote economic
growth,30 is well known. Since its inception in 1973, the system has en-
gendered both strong praise and strong criticism. 31 Measure 37 is best
understood in the context of this tumultuous history. This section de-
scribes the history and structure of Oregon's statewide land use planning
system and several pre-Measure 37 citizen initiative attempts to repeal
the system.
A. The Structure of Oregon's Land Use Planning System
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, reacting both to concerns about
the effects of unregulated growth in Oregon3 2 and an emerging national
interest in land use planning,33 the Oregon legislature enacted a number
of land use and preservation statutes, 34 culminating in Senate Bill (S.B.)
14, Statewide Planning Goals, Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development,
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/goall4.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). Goal 14 is discussed
in greater detail infra at notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
29. Statewide planning goals 3 and 4 require the preservation of agricultural and forest land,
respectively. Goals 3 and 4, Statewide Planning Goals, Oregon Department of Land Conservation
and Development, http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/goal3.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007),
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/goal4.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). The preservation of
agricultural and forest land is discussed in detail infra at notes 69-91 and accompanying text.
30. Statewide planning goal 9 requires land use plans to "to provide adequate opportunities
throughout the state for a variety of economic activities vital to the health, welfare, and prosperity of
Oregon's citizens." Goal 9, Statewide Planning Goals, Oregon Department of Land Conservation
and Development, http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/goal9.pdf (last visisted Nov. 4, 2007). A
persistent criticism levied against Oregon's land use planning system is that it stifles economic
development through its emphasis on resource preservation. See, e.g., Steven Geoffrey Gieseler,
Leslie Marshall Lewallen & Timothy Sandefur, Measure 37: Paying People For What We Take, 36
ENVTL. L. 79, 93 (2006) (arguing that Oregon's land use planning system stifles economic growth);
James L. Huffman & Elizabeth Howard, The Impact of Land Use Regulations On Small and Emerg-
ing Businesses, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 49 (2001) (discussing Oregon land use program's
effect on small business development). But see Henry R. Richmond, Does Oregon s Land Use
Program Provide Enough Desirable Land to Attract Needed Industry to Oregon?, 14 ENVTL. L. 693,
694 (1984) (arguing that land use program accommodates development).
31. See, e.g., LEONARD, supra note 5, at 64-66 (discussing early opposition to passage of S.B.
100 and Goal 3); Gordon Oliver & R. Gregory Nokes, Land-Use Law Showing Its Age, OREGONIAN,
May 31, 1998, at BO1 (discussing tumultuous history of Oregon land use law). See generally Con-
ference, Federal Land Use Planning Conference (March 20-22, 1975), 5 ENVTL. L. 369, 369-761
(1975) (discussing state and proposed national comprehensive land use planning statutes and pre-
senting a spectrum of contemporary views on the topic).
32. Growth was a pressing issue in Oregon in the late 1960s and 1970s. Rapid, and some-
times feckless, development in three areas of the state-the Willamette Valley, the coast near Lin-
coin City, and eastern Oregon rangeland-gamered much political and media attention. CHARLES E.
LITTLE, THE NEW OREGON TRAIL: AN ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND PASSAGE OF STATE
LAND-USE LEGISLATION IN OREGON 18-20 (1974); LEONARD, supra note 5, at 4-7, 64. A study
commissioned by Governor Tom McCall predicted that, without government intervention, urban
land in the Willamette Valley would increase by 75 percent or 340,000 acres between 1972 and
2020. KNAPP & NELSON, supra note 5, at 18-19. For a list of land use related legislation passed by
the 1973 legislature see Sarah Elizabeth Fussner & William S. Wiley, Comment, Oregon's State
Land Use Planning Act - Two Views, 54 OR. L. REV. 203,203-04 n.4 (1975).
33. See, e.g., Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act, S. 632, 92d Cong. (1972); S. 268,
93d Cong. (1973); Sullivan, supra note 6, at 815 (discussing the national interest in land use plan-
ning in the early 1970s).
34. These statutes included S.B. 10, 1969 Leg. Assem. (Or. 1969); 1969 Or. Laws 324 (Or.
1969). S.B. 10 was a precursor to Oregon's comprehensive, statewide land use bill. It encouraged
comprehensive land use planning by requiring the Governor to impose a comprehensive land use
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100, which passed in 1973.31 S.B. 100 became the foundation for Ore-
gon's present statewide comprehensive land use planning regime.
S.B. 100 created a new state agency, the Department of Land Con-
servation and Development ("DLCD"), directed by a Land Conservation
and Development Commission ("LCDC"). 36  The statute empowered
LCDC to create a statewide land use policy and required local govern-
ments37 to adopt their own comprehensive land use plans that would im-
plan upon local governments which failed to adopt their own. S.B. 10, 1969 Leg. Assem., § I (Or.
1969). The bill required land use plans to incorporate nine goals, including conserving farm land for
the production of crops, preserving open space, air, and water quality, and diversifying the economy
of the state. S.B. 10, 1969 Leg. Assem., § 3 (Or. 1969). S.B. 10 ultimately failed to achieve its
goals, however, due to a lack of standards for evaluating the local governments' comprehensive
plans, a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the plans complied with S.B. 10's
goals, a lack of coordination of plans between contiguous local governments, and a lack of state
funding to local governments to implement the statute. See KNAPP & NELSON, supra note 5, at 20-
21; LEONARD, supra note 5, at 6-7; LITTLE, supra note 32, at 10; Sullivan, supra note 6, at 814.
35. 1973 Or. Laws 80 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 197 (2005)). The legisla-
ture's concern about the effects of uncoordinated land use was codified in findings and a policy
statement in the statute itself. Id. § 197.0 10; see also 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation
& Dev. Comm'n, 642 P.2d 1158, 1164-65 (Or. 1982) (discussing S.B. 100's legislative history).
36. LCDC is comprised of seven members appointed by the governor, confirmed by the state
Senate, and serving staggered four-year terms. Its members are drawn from geographically diverse
regions of the state. 1973 Or. Laws 80, § 5 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.030
(2005)).
Bill 100 also created a Joint Legislative Committee on Land Use, tasked with overseeing DLCD,
keeping the legislature informed of the development of land use goals and guidelines, and making
legislative recommendations. 1973 Or. Laws 80, §§ 22-24 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 197.125-.135 (2005)). The bill directed the Joint Committee to make recommendations on the
"implementation of a program for the compensation by the public to owners of lands ... for the
value of any loss of use of such lands resulting directly from the imposition of any zoning, subdivi-
sion or other ordinance or regulation regulating or restricting the use of such lands." 1973 Or. Laws
80, § 24(4). In 1981, this requirement was deleted from the statute. 1981 Or. Laws 748,
§ 24 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.135 (2005)); see CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 8, at
18 (discussing the Joint Committee's efforts); Rebekah R. Cook, Sustainable Land Use and Measure
37, Incomprehensible, Uncompensable, Unconstitutional: The Fatal Flaws of Measure 37, 20 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 245, 248-49 (2005) (discussing S.B 849, a failed proposal by the 1973 legisla-
ture to compensate property owners whose use of their property was curtailed by government regula-
tion); David J. Hunnicutt, Oregon Land-Use Regulation and Ballot Measure 37: Newton s Third
Law at Work, 36 ENVTL. L. 25, 28 (2006) (discussing the Joint Committee's efforts).
37. "Local governments" are cities, counties, state agencies, special districts or other govern-
ing bodies that make land use decisions. 1973 Or. Laws 80, § 3 (codified as amended at OR. REV.
STAT. § 197.015(14) (2005)).
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plement the statewide policy. 38  LCDC established the state's land use
policy in the form of 19 "goals. 39
Local governments had to adopt comprehensive land use plans con-
sistent with the statewide goals within one year of LCDC's promulgation
of the goals. 40  LCDC monitored local governments' comprehensive
plans. Initially, local governments were to submit their local plans to the
LCDC, which could amend any comprehensive plan not in conformance
with the goals, impose its own plan at the local government's expense, or
enjoin construction not in conformance with an amended or imposed
comprehensive plan.4' LCDC also had authority to hear petitions by
individuals and county governments challenging local land use decisions
as inconsistent with the goals, and the agency could issue administrative
orders enjoining local government land use decisions which it deter-
mined violated the goals.
42
In 1977, the legislature established an "acknowledgment" process,
under which a local government could petition LCDC to review its land
use plan and certify the plan's consistency with the statewide goals.43
Once LCDC acknowledged a local plan, a local government could meas-
ure most of its land use decisions against the plan rather than the state-
38. Bill 100 defined comprehensive plan as:
[A] generalized, coordinated land use map and policy statement ... that interrelates all
functional and natural system and activities relating to the use of lands, including but not
limited to sewer and water systems, transportation systems, educational systems, recrea-
tional facilities, and natural resources and air and water quality management programs.
"Comprehensive" means all-inclusive, both in terms of the geographic area covered and
functional and natural activities and systems occurring in the area covered by the plan.
"General nature" means a summary of policies and proposals in broad categories and
does not necessarily indicate specific locations of any area, activity or use. A plan is "co-
ordinated" when the needs of all levels of governments, semipublic and private agencies
and the citizens of Oregon have been considered and accommodated as much as possible.
"Land" includes water, both surface and subsurface, and the air.
1973 Or. Laws 80, § 2 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.015(6) (2005)).
39. 1973 Or. Laws 80, § 11 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.040 (2005)). The
bill required LCDC and DLCD to hold public hearings and appoint a state Citizen Involvement
Advisory Committee to insure public participation in the formulation of its land use planning goals.
Id. §§ 35, 36 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.235 (2005)). The bill also directed
LCDC to "give priority consideration" to eleven areas and activities, mostly focused on preservation
of resources like lakes, rivers, estuarine resources, wetlands, floodplains, unique wilderness habitats,
coastal headlands and beaches and agricultural land. The 19 goals LCDC promulgated are discussed
below. See infra notes 53-91 and accompanying text.
40. 1973 Or. Laws 80, §§ 18, 32 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.250 (2005)).
The bill required local plans already in existence to comply with the goals sct forth in S.B. 10. Id.
§ 41. As discussed below, local governments took considerably longer than one year to enact their
comprehensive land use plans. See infra note 44.
41. 1973 Or. Laws 80, §§ 44,47.
42. 1973 Or. Laws 80, §§ 44, 47, 50-53. The goals provided an independent basis to chal-
lenge local governments' land use decisions, giving county governing bodies standing to petition
LCDC to challenge local land use plan provisions, ordinances or particular actions. It also author-
ized individuals with affected interests to petition LCDC to challenge land use plan provisions and
ordinances, but not particular land use actions. 1973 Or. Laws 80, § 51. This avenue of review was
repealed in 1979 when the legislature enacted the Land Use Board of Appeals, described further
infra at note 48. See generally Sullivan, supra note 6, at 817.
43. 1977 Or. Laws 766, § 18 (codified as amended at OR. REv. STAT. § 197.251 (2005)).
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wide goals. 44 To ensure acknowledged plans remained consistent with
the statewide goals, the legislature required local governments to submit
proposed plan amendments to DLCD and required DLCD to disseminate
the proposals to interested parties and advise local governments of con-
cerns about the amendments. 45  The legislature also required local gov-
ernments to conduct periodic reviews of their comprehensive plans to
ensure that they remained consistent with the goals.46 In addition, the
statute required LCDC to approve localities' periodic plan review and
any amendments needed to bring local plans into compliance with the
goals.47 To encourage consistent adjudication of disputed land use deci-
sions, the legislature in 1979 created a Land Use Board of Appeals
("LUBA"), a three-member panel appointed by the governor, with juris-
diction to hear virtually all appeals of local land use decisions.48
Although nearly every ensuing legislative session has amended the
land use planning statute, the basic structure of the system established by
44. See 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 724 P.2d 268, 274-75
(Or. 1986) (describing the process and effect of acknowledgment); KNAPP & NELSON, supra note 5,
at 34. Prior to state acknowledgment, local governments had to review each local land use action
(such as a zoning change) for compliance with the goals and that interpretation was subject to chal-
lenge. See, e.g., South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Clackamas
County, 569 P.2d 1063, 1073 (Or. 1977).
Despite S.B. 100's initial requirement that local governments adopt compliant comprehensive
plans within one year of LCDC's promulgation of the statewide goals, the last local comprehensive
plan did not receive state acknowledgment until August 7, 1986, some 11 years after goal promulga-
tion. OREGON LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV. COMM'N, 1985-87 BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF OREGON 1 (1987). In all, by 1986, LCDC acknowledged
some 277 local comprehensive plans: 241 city plans and 36 county plans. Id; see also LEONARD,
supra note 5, at 34 (describing the reasons for delay in plan acknowledgment, which included the
complexity of developing local comprehensive plans, and some local governments' "wait and see"
attitude toward implementing comprehensive plans); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation
& Dev. Comm'n, 724 P.2d 268, 274 n.5 (Or. 1986) (noting acknowledgment of last plan, but also
the continued litigation about acknowledgment of various other local plans).
45. 1981 Or. Laws 748 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.610-197.625 (2005)).
Unlike LCDC's adjudicative role in periodically reviewing comprehensive plans, DLCD assumes
only an advisory role when reviewing amendments to plans between review periods. The statute
authorizes DLCD to comment on, but not approve or reject, proposed plan changes. To challenge
amendments, DLCD must appeal the amendment to the Land Use Board of Appeals, discussed infra
at note 48. See Volny v. City of Bend, 523 P.3d 768, 773 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (characterizing
DLCD's role as "that of a party in the local government proceedings").
46. 1991 Or. Laws 612 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.628 - 197.646 (2005)).
47. Id; see City of West Linn v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 119 P.3d 283, 287-88
(Or. App. 2005) (describing periodic review process in the context of Portland's urban growth boun-
dary).
48. 1979 Or. Laws 772 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.805-197.810 (2005)).
Before the creation of LUBA, parties could seek review of local land use decisions, such as zoning
changes, by petitioning for a writ of review or initiating a declaratory judgment action in a circuit
court, or by petitioning the LCDC to review the decision and issue an administrative order. 1973 Or.
Laws 80, § 51. Now, LUBA has "exclusive jurisdiction to review any land use decision or limited
land use decision," a broad grant of jurisdiction which encompasses land use decisions ranging from
plan amendments to individual zoning approvals. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.825 (2005). LCDC retains
jurisdiction over acknowledgment, periodic review, and approval of exceptions to comprehensive
plans. § 825(c). The Court of Appeals hears appeals of LCDC orders and LUBA decisions. OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 197.650, 197.850(3)(a) (2005). See generally, Edward J. Sullivan, Reviewing the
Reviewer: The Impact of the Land Use Board of Appeals on the Oregon Land Use Program, 1979-
1999, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 441, 446-49 (2000) (describing the origins of LUBA).
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S.B. 100 has endured. Over thirty years later, local governments con-
tinue to promulgate comprehensive plans and make day-to-day land use
decisions. The state continues to oversee local government land use de-
cisions by (1) certifying local plans' consistency with the goals;49 (2)
conducting ongoing review of plans; 50 (3) advising local governments on
and challenging plan amendments; l and (4) hearing appeals of most
types of disputed local land use actions.52
B. Statewide Land Use Goals
A fundamental goal of the Oregon system is the infusion of state-
wide goals into local decisionmaking. 53 After a series of statewide pub-
lic hearings, 54 LCDC initially approved fourteen goals in 1974. Over the
next two years, the agency adopted five additional goals.55
The goals are in four broad categories: two address the planning
process;56 seven address conservation; 57 six address development; 58 and
four address coastal resources.5 9 Although the goals have been periodi-
cally amended,60 no new goals have been added or deleted since the
adoption of Goal 19 in late 1976. LCDC promulgates "guidelines" for
each rule, suggesting how local governments may carry out the goals, but
the guidelines are not themselves binding.
61
49. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.251 (2005).
50. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.629 (2005).
51. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.615 (2005).
52. § 197.825.
53. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.015(9) (2005). Statewide goals are rules under the state's Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Although the Oregon Administrative Rules contain a list of the goals, the full
text of each goal is available only from the LCDC in paper format or at its website. See Statewide
Planning Goals, Oregon Dep't of Land Conservation & Dev., available at
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/goals.html [hereinafter Goals]; see also 1000 Friends of Oregon v.
Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 724 P.2d 268, 274 n.4 (Or. 1986) (noting that full text of the
goals and guidelines are not in the Oregon Administrative Rules and appear to be available only
from LCDC).
54. The goals addressed: (1) citizen involvement; (2) land use planning processes; (3) agri-
cultural lands; (4) forest lands; (5) open spaces, scenic and historic areas and natural resources; (6)
air, water and land resources quality; (7) natural hazards and disasters; (8) recreation; (9) economic
development; (10) housing; (11) public facilities and services; (12) transportation; (13) energy
conservation; and (14) containment of urban growth. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-000 (2006).
55. These five goals addressed: (15) the Willamette River greenway; (16) estuarine re-
sources; (17) coastal shorelands; (18) beaches and dunes; and (19) ocean resources. Id.
56. Goals I and 2, Goals, supra note 53.
57. Goals 3-7, 13, 15, Goals, supra note 53.
58. Goals 8-12, 14, Goals, supra note 53.
59. Goals 16-19, Goals, supra note 53.
60. Each time LCDC amends a goal, local governments must bring their plans into compli-
ance with the new goal within one year of its effective date. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.245 (2005).
61. Goal 2, which defines "guidelines," provides that "[a]bove all, guidelines are not intended
to be a grant of power to the state to carry out zoning from the state level under the guise of guide-
lines." Goal 2, Goals, supra note 53. LCDC also promulgates administrative rules pursuant to the
state's Administrative Procedure Act to implement the goals. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.040(l)(b)
(2005).
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The preservation of agricultural land and natural resources through
the containment of growth in urban areas under Goal 14 and the restric-
tion of land uses outside those areas, particularly through Goals 3 and 4,
lie at the heart of Oregon's land use system. 62 They also serve as the
focus of critics' objections to the system.
63
1. Urban Growth Boundaries
Goal 14 requires each local government "to provide for an orderly
and efficient transition from rural to urban land use" by establishing ur-
ban growth boundaries. 64 An urban growth boundary defines the limits
of forseeable urban development. 65  Land inside the boundary may be
developed for urban use;66 land outside the boundary must remain rural.6 7
62. LEONARD, supra note 5, at 33 (noting that protection of farm and forest land, drawing
urban growth boundaries and facilitating development within the urban growth boundaries was at the
heart of the land use planning system).
63. See Hunnicutt, supra note 36, at 28 (criticizing the comprehensive land use planning and
characterizing the system put in place by S.B. 100 as undemocratic because it "stripped local com-
munities of final authority over planning and zoning decisions in their jurisdiction, and transferred
that authority to an unelected commission of political appointees of the Oregon governor"). See
discussion infra notes 92-135 and accompanying text.
64. Goal 14, Goals, supra note 53. LCDC substantively amended Goal 14 in 1988, 2000, and
twice in 2005. See Or. Dep't of Land Conservation and Dev., History of Statutes, Goals & Rules,
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/historystatutesgoals-rules.shtm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). The
1988 amendment simply included reference to the fact that local governments could now refer to
their acknowledged comprehensive plans, rather than to the goals, when making land use decisions.
Id. The 2000 amendment allowed LCDC to promulgate rules, which it did, providing that Goal 14
does not prevent the sitting of single family dwellings on certain land outside of urban growth
boundaries zoned primarily for residential use and in an area for which an exception to Goals 3 and 4
has been acknowledged. Id.; OR. ADMIN. R. 660-004-0040 (2007). The December 2005 amendment
brought the goal in line with legislation allowing certain industrial developments to be sited on rural
land, notwithstanding Goal 14. Id. The April 2005 amendments substantially reorganized the goal
to streamline and clarify the requirements for local governments to amend their urban growth
boundaries. See New Goal 14, 2005-2007 Rulemaking, Or. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n,
available at http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/rulemaking_2005-07.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
Goal 14 outlines six criteria that local governments must take into account in establishing,
amending, and determining their urban growth boundaries. Local governments must base their
urban growth boundary on two demonstrated needs, the need "to accommodate long range urban
growth, consistent with a 20-year population forecast" and the need "for housing, employment
opportunities, livability or uses such as public facilities, streets and roads, schools, parks or open
space." Goal 14, Goals, supra note 53. Local governments must base the location of the boundary
on a consideration of: (i) "[e]fficient accommodation of identified land needs"; (ii) "[o]rderly and
economic provision of public facilities and services"; (iii) "[c]omparative environmental energy,
economic and social consequences"; and (iv) "[c]ompatibility of the proposed urban uses with
nearby agricultural and forest activities occurring on farm and forest land outside the [urban growth
boundary]." Id.
65. Urban growth boundaries must encompass sufficient land to meet the projected residen-
tial, industrial, commercial, and recreational needs of the community for the next 20 years. Goal 14,
Goals, supra note 53.
66. Goal 14 establishes four factors that local governments must consider when developing
land within their urban growth boundary: (i) orderly, economic provision for public facilities and
services; (ii) availability of sufficient land for the various uses to insure choices in the market place;
(iii) LCDC goals or the acknowledged comprehensive plan; and (iv) encouragement of development
within urban areas before conversion of urbanizable areas. Goal 14, Goals, supra note 53.
67. See KNAPP & NELSON, supra note 5, at 39-42; Wickersham, supra note 7, at 529-32. For
a description of the history of urban growth boundaries in Oregon, see LEONARD, supra note 5, at
91-124.
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Under Goals 3 and 4, local governments classify the great majority of the
land outside urban growth boundaries as agricultural or forest land.68
2. Agricultural Land
Goal 3 stipulates that "agricultural lands shall be preserved and
maintained for farm use., 6 9 The goal defines agricultural land broadly,
including all land outside of urban growth boundaries exhibiting certain
soil characteristics, 70 all "other land" suitable for farming, 71 and land not
suitable for agriculture but "necessary to permit farm practices to be un-
dertaken on adjacent or nearby lands. 72 As originally promulgated in
1974, Goal 3 recognized only a single class of agricultural land, requir-
ing local governments to regulate all agricultural land through exclusive
73farm use zoning.
Proponents of urban growth boundaries contend that geographically limiting development not
only protects surrounding agricultural and farm land, but also saves significant infrastructure costs.
See, e.g. 1000 Friends of Oregon, Questions and Answers About Oregon's Land Use Program,
Section B: Urban Planning (2006), http://gw.friends.org/resources/qanda2.htmi (last visited Nov. 9,
2007). Opponents of urban growth boundaries argue that the boundaries raise the price of housing,
encourage overly dense housing patterns, increase traffic congestion, and prevent investment in road
and infrastructure expansion. See, e.g., LEONARD, supra note 5, at 105; Oregonians In Action, Land
Use/Property Rights Concerns of the Oregonians In Action Organizations,
http://oia.org/overview.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
68. As of 1995, local governments had classified approximately 96 percent of privately
owned land outside urban growth boundaries as either agricultural or forest land. Hunnicutt, supra
note 36, at 33. The 2002 U.S. Department of Agriculture Census of Agriculture for Oregon reported
that over 17 million acres were devoted to farming, of which 54 percent were operated by full-time
farmers. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OREGON STATE AND COUNTY DATA, GEOGRAPHIC AREA SERIES,
VOL. 1, PT. 37 6 (June 2004).
69. Goal 3, Goals, supra note 53.
70. Id. Goal 3 defines agricultural by reference to the widely used Soil Capability Classifica-
tion System of the United States Soil Conservation Service. In western Oregon, land of predomi-
nantly Class I, II, III, and IV soils is agricultural land. In eastern Oregon, agricultural land also
includes land of predominantly Class V and VI. Id.
71. Id. Goal 3 defines these "other lands" as "lands which are suitable for farm use taking
into consideration soil fertility, suitability for grazing, climactic conditions, existing and future
availability of water for farm irrigation purposes, existing land use patterns, technological and en-
ergy inputs required, or accepted farming practices." Id
72. Id. Goal 3 defines these lands as "lands in other classes which are necessary to permit
farm practices to be undertaken on adjacent or nearby lands." Id. In addition to the inclusion of
adjacent and other lands as agricultural land, property rights advocates bemoan Goal 3's strict geol-
ogy-based definition of agricultural land, arguing that it does not adequately take into account the
economic viability of farming the land and prohibits alternate uses of nonproductive or marginal
farm lands. See, e.g., Hunnicutt, supra note 36, at 33; Oregonians In Action, supra note 67.
73. Prior farm land preservation legislation sought to protect farmland through tax incentives
and by permitting, but not requiring, local governments to create exclusive farm use zones. See
Caroline E.K. MacLaren, Oregon at a Crossroads: Where Do We Gofrom Here?, 36 ENVTL. L. 53,
59 n.29 (2006) (discussing 1963 Or. Laws 577, which authorized counties to assess a special farm
use tax on farmers who used their land exclusively for farming). Goal 3 integrated prior farmland
preservation legislation into the statewide comprehensive land use system by requiring exclusive
farm use zoning of land classified as agricultural. LEONARD, supra note 5, at 66-67; Edward J.
Sullivan, The Greening of the Taxpayer: The Relationship of Farm Zone Taxation in Oregon to
Land Use, 9 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 3 (1973) (critiquing farmland protection prior to comprehen-
sive land use planning).
S.B. 101, passed in conjunction with S.B. 100 during the 1973 state legislative session, reaf-
firmed and amended the use of exclusive farm use zoning as a means of preserving agricultural land,
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By requiring all agricultural land to be zoned for exclusive farm
use, Goal 3 severely restricted the siting of dwellings on agricultural land
and development of the land for any purpose other than farming.74 Al-
most from its inception, the agricultural land use system generated con-
troversy, drawing criticism for allegedly designating too much land as
agricultural land,75 for failing to recognize regional differences in land
use, for impeding economic development, and for preventing individual
landowners from realizing the full value of their property.76 In response,
LCDC and the legislature amended the agricultural land use system sev-
eral times. 77 The number of allowable non-farm uses on agricultural land
announcing a policy that "exclusive farm use zoning... substantially limits alternatives to the use of
rural land and, with the importance of rural lands to the public, justifies incentives and privileges
offered to encourage owners of rural lands to hold such lands in exclusive farm use zones." 1973
Or. Laws 503, § I (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 215.243 (2006)); LEONARD, supra note 5, at 67
(noting that S.B. 101 "unequivocal" expression of the legislature's commitment to preserve farm
land). Goal 3 implemented the policy articulated in S.B. 101 by making exclusive farm use zoning
mandatory. For a description of the interaction between the comprehensive land use statute, OR.
REV. STAT. § 197, and the farm land preservation provisions of the county planning and zoning
statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 215, see Lane County v. Land Conserv. and Dev. Comm 'n, 942 P.2d 278,
286 (Or. 1997).
74. Goal 3 originally allowed agricultural land to be used for farm uses and a limited number
of non-farm uses defined in the exclusive farm zoning statute (e.g. schools, churches, golf courses,
commercial power generating facilities, utility facilities, forestry). OR. REV. STAT. § 215.203,
215.213. Originally, only five non-farm uses (schools, churches, public parks, golf courses and
utility facilities) were allowed in exclusive farm use zones; however, the legislature has steadily
expanded the number of non-farm uses allowed on land in exclusive farm use zones. See Oregon
Department of Land Conservation and Development, DLCD Farmland Protection Program,
www.oregon.gov./LCD/farmprotprog.shtm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Farmland Protec-
tion Program] (listing chronology of legislation expanding non-farm uses allowed in exclusive farm
use zones). To use land for anything other than the uses permitted by the statute, local governments
had to go though the exceptions process created by Goal 2, which limited the situations in which an
exception would be granted (e.g., land already "physically developed to an extent that it is no longer
available for uses allowed by the applicable goal" qualified for an exception) and required local
governments to justify the necessity of the alternative use. Goal 2, Goals, supra note 53. Many
comprehensive plans failed LCDC acknowledgment because they contained improper exceptions to
Goal 3. See LEONARD, supra note 5, at 70 (stating that improper exceptions to Goal 3 were fre-
quently the grounds upon which LCDC denied acknowledgment).
75. In 1998, some 16 million acres, about 25 percent of the state's land, was zoned for exclu-
sive farm use. Robin Franzen & Brent Hunsberger, Finding Cures for Growing Pains, OREGONIAN,
Dec. 17, 1998, at COI. A 2002 estimate by the U.S. Department of Agriculture put the number of
acres at 17 million. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 68 at 6.
76. LEONARD, supra note 5, at 64-66 (discussing early opposition to passage of S.B. 100 and
Goal 3); Gordon Oliver & R. Gregory Nokes, Land-Use Law Showing Its Age, OREGONIAN, May 31,
1998, at BO (discussing tumultuous history of Oregon land use law); Robin Franzen, Farmland
Laws Sowing A Bitter Debate Around Oregon: A Crop of Controversy, OREGONIAN, Oct. 19, 1998,
at Al (discussing various sides of the debate over the agricultural land system); Robin Franzen &
Brent Hunsberger, Finding Cures for Growing Pains, OREGONIAN, Dec. 17, 1998, at COI (discuss-
ing various proposals for amending the state land use system to better take into account regional
differences and to channel development away from the fertile Willamette valley by easing restric-
tions on less productive farmland, primarily in eastern part of the state). Others have argued that,
because agriculture is one of the top industries in Oregon, preserving agricultural land is vital to the
state's economy. See, e.g., Tim Bernasek, Oregon Agriculture and Land-Use Planning, 36 ENVTL.
L. 165, 166 (2006).
77. LCDC first amended Goal 3 in 1983 to conform with legislation passed that year that
instituted a marginal land classification program, whereby local governments were allowed to desig-
nate certain lands located in exclusive farm use zones as marginal land and relax the zoning criteria
for those lands. See Lane County, 942 P.2d at 281 n.3; 1983 Or. Laws 826, § 2.
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has steadily increased,78 as the legislature and LCDC have developed
sub-categories of agricultural land to permit more varied uses of less
productive farmland, while restricting uses on the most productive
lands.79 Despite these added nuances, Goal 3 and the exclusive farm use
zone statute continued to generate controversy.8 °
LCDC next amended Goal 3 in 1992 to establish new agricultural land subcategories, including a
category of "high-value farmland," for which LCDC established use standards more strict than those
under the exclusive farm use zoning statute. History of Statutes, Goals & Rules, Department of
Land Conservation and Development, http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/historystatutesgoals_
rules.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). These amendments were prompted by a LCDC-
commissioned study which concluded that exclusive farm use zoning was failing to adequately
protect commercial farmland. DEPARTMENT OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE FARM AND FOREST
RESEARCH PROJECT 1 (1991). The study showed that 75 percent of farms on which new dwellings
had been approved had annual farm revenues under $10,000, suggesting that they were not being
used for commercial farming. 1d; see also RICHARD BRENNER, FARMLANDS IN 12 OREGON
COUNTIES: A STUDY OF COUNTY APPLICATION OF STATE STANDARDS TO PROTECT OREGON
FARMLAND (1980) (finding widespread local government approval of land division proposals in
violation of Goal 3 and concluding that the land use planning system was not adequately protecting
farmland).
In 1993, the legislature entered the fray and enacted House Bill 3661, legislation that replaced
LCDC's previous attempts to balance agriculture and development. 1993 Or. Laws 792. The bill
expressly rejected and overturned the LCDC amendments to Goal 3. 1993 Or. Laws 792, § 28
(certified as amended at Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.304 (2006)) (providing that any rules inconsistent with
the House Bill 3661 to have no legal effect). It sought to balance the protection of the most produc-
tive farm- and forest land with the development of less productive land by "providing certain owners
of less productive land an opportunity to build a dwelling on their land ... and limiting the future
division of and the siting of dwellings upon the state's more productive resource land." 1993 Or.
Laws 792, § 10 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 215.700 (2006)). The bill established a
"lot of record" provision which allowed local governments to permit dwellings on certain agricul-
tural or forest land that met certain conditions, including that it was acquired by the present owner
prior to January 1, 1985. 1993 Or. Laws 792, § 2 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. §
215.705). It also adopted a "high value farmland" category subject to stricter use restrictions. 1993
Or. Laws 792, § 3 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 215.710). In response to these legisla-
tive enactments, LCDC amended Goal 3 to its present form in 1993.
For a detailed descriptions of the history of agricultural land use amendments, see Lane County,
942 P.2d at 281-282; DLCD Farmland Protection Program, supra note 74; Sullivan, supra note 48,
at 456-59; Edward Sullivan, The Evolving Role of the Comprehensive Plan, 30 URB. LAW 699, 705-
06 (1998); Jeanne S. White, Beating Plowshares Into Townhomes: The Loss of Farmland and
Strategies For Slowing Its Conversion to Nonagricultural Uses, 28 ENVTL. L. 113, 121 (1998).
78. Permitted non-farm uses now include schools, churches, nonprofit group parks, commu-
nity centers and also golf courses, personal use airports, wineries, cemeteries and guest ranches. See
DLCD Farmland Protection Program, supra note 74 (listing the approximately 48 non-farm uses
currently permitted on land zoned for exclusive farm use).
79. For example, a "lot of record" provision allowed local governments to permit dwellings
on certain agricultural or forest land continuously owned since January 1, 1985. 1993 Or Laws 792,
§ 2 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 215.705 (2005)); OR. ADMIN. R. 660-006-0027(l)(a)-
(d) (2007). A "high-value farmland" provision, based on soil classification and existing use, such as
the cultivation of certain perennials, limits allowable uses on the most productive farmland. OR.
REV. STAT. § 215.710 (2005); OR. ADMIN. R. 660-033-020(8) (2007). In response to a 1983 legisla-
tive amendment, the LCDC also enacted a "marginal farmland" provision, allowing local govern-
ments to relax zoning criteria on certain less productive farmland. See Lane County, 942 P.2d at
281, 281 n.3; 1983 Or. Laws 826, § 2. Only two counties, Lane County and Washington County,
elected to participate in the marginal lands program, however, and in 1993, the legislature discontin-
ued the program. LCDC subsequently amended its Goal 3 to reflect this change. See OR. REV.
STAT. § 215.213 (2007) (providing that those counties which elected to participate in the marginal
lands program, however, were allowed to continue regulating their land under that program); Lane
County, 942 P.2d at 281-82 (describing legislative history); supra note 77. These amendments and
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3. Forest Land
Goal 4's purpose is to preserve the state's forest resources by re-
quiring local governments to inventory, designate, and restrictively zone
forest lands.81 The goal defines forest land as "lands which are suitable
for commercial forest uses including adjacent or nearby lands which are
necessary to permit forest operations or practices and other forested land
that maintain soil, air, water and fish and wildlife resources." 2  Goal 4
limits uses of forest land to (1) uses related to forest operations; (2) con-
servation of soil, water and air quality, fish and wildlife resources, and
appropriate agriculture and recreation; (3) locationally dependent uses,
83such as communication towers; and (4) dwellings authorized by law.
DLCD has promulgated regulations implementing the goal that, in con-
junction with the state's zoning and forest management statutes, 84 create
a detailed and comprehensive forest land use system with which local
governments' plans must comply.
85
Regulation of forest land, like regulation of agricultural land, has
undergone a number of amendments since the initial promulgation of
counter-amendments to the agricultural land management program reflect a sometimes bitter lack of
consensus regarding development and use of agricultural land.
80. One particularly controversial regulation criticized by those seeking to use rural land for
non-farm uses requires an owner of "high-value farmland" to demonstrate that she generated at least
$80,000 in gross annual farm income from the parcel for two consecutive years, or three of the last
five years, before she may site a dwelling on her land. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-033-0135(7) (2007). An
owner of other agricultural land must have a parcel of at least 160 acres or must demonstrate that she
has generated $40,000 per year in farm income over the same period before she may build a dwell-
ing on her land. Id. 660-033-0135(l)(5). But see 1000 FRIENDS OF OREGON, THE TOP TEN THINGS
You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE INCOME TEST FOR FARM DWELLINGS 1,
http://gw.friends.org/issues/downloads/farmincometopten.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (noting that
the regulation's $80,000 gross income requirement translates into approximately $12,000-$16,000 in
net income, and that the average Oregon farm has gross income of approximately $224,000).
On the other side, observers have criticized the agricultural land system for failing to adequately
protect farmland from development. The Oregon Progress Board, an independent state oversight
board which monitors the progress of Oregon's 20-year state vision, awarded the state's protection
of agricultural land an "F" in 2001, the last year in which it graded the system. See OREGON
PROGRESS BOARD, ACHIEVING OREGON THE OREGON SHINES VISION: THE 2001 BENCHMARK
PERFORMANCE REPORT 65 (2001); OREGON PROGRESS BOARD, ACHIEVING OREGON THE OREGON
SHINES VISION: THE 2005 BENCHMARK PERFORMANCE REPORT 58 (2005), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/OPB/docs/2005report/05BPR.pdf (noting a 1.4 percent increase be-
tween 1992 and 2005 in agricultural land converted for development, and rating the state's progress
in protecting agricultural lands as "unknown"); Nyran Rasehe, Protecting Agricultural Lands in
Oregon. An Assessment of the Exclusive Farm Use Zone System, 77 OR. L. REV. 993, 1004 (1998)
(arguing that the legislature needs to strengthen protection of agricultural land in Oregon). Accord-
ing to the Farmland Information Center, between 1992 and 1997, nearly 60,000 acres of agricultural
land were converted to development uses in Oregon. Farmland Information Center, Oregon Statis-
tics, www.farmlandinfo.org/agriculturalstatistics (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
81. Goal 4, Goals, supra note 53; John Shurts, Goal 4 and Nonforest Uses on Forest Lands,
19 ENVTL. L. 59 (1988) (describing and critiquing Goal 4).
82. Goal 4, Goals, supra note 53.
83. See OR. ADMIN. R. 660-006-0025 (2007) for a more detailed list of allowable uses on
forest land.
84. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 215.700-215.750 (2005).
85. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-006-0000-0060 (2007).
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Goal 4.86 Perhaps the most significant of these amendments was House
Bill 3661, passed in 1993,87 which contained clear criteria for the siting
of dwellings on forest land.88 The 1993 amendment allowed new single-
family dwellings on only three types of forest land: (1) "lots-of-record,"
(2) large tracts, and (3) "template" tracts. 89 Although the forest land use,
building, and lot size restrictions have drawn less criticism from property
rights advocates than the agricultural land use system, 90 owners of forest
land appear to account for many of the early Measure 37 claims. 91
C. Initial Attempts to Repeal the Land Use System
Since its inception, statewide land use planning in Oregon has gen-
erated controversy and faced heated opposition.92 Support by a majority
of the state legislature and the governor's office, however, prevented any
major legislative overhaul of the land use planning system; therefore,
citizen initiatives assumed the forefront.93 In 1976, just three years after
enactment of S.B. 100, a citizen initiative sought to repeal statewide land
86. The goal was amended in 1983, 1990, 1993 and 1994. History of Statutes, supra note 77.
87. 1993 Or. Laws 792 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 215.740 (2005)).
88. Prior to the passage of House Bill 3661, LCDC employed a case-by-case approach of
defining allowable dwellings on forest land, an approach that some criticized for creating uncertainty
and frustrating reasonable investment expectations of landowners. See OREGON DEPARTMENT OF
FORESTRY, LAND USE PLANNING HANDBOOK 20-21 [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (2003); Shurts, supra
note 81, at 59-64 (describing ad hoc approach of LCDC, LUBA, and the courts in determining
allowable nonforest uses of forest lands).
89. "Lot of record" dwellings are the same as those permitted on agricultural land. See supra
note 79. "Large tract" dwellings are permitted on tracts of land of at least 160 acres in western
Oregon and at least 240 acres in eastern Oregon. 1973 Or. Laws 792, § 4(2), (3), (5) (codified as
amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 215.740 (2005)); OR. ADMIN. R. 660-006-0027(l)(e) (2007). "Tem-
plate" tracts are small forest land parcels in areas already divided into relatively small parcels and
developed with dwellings. 1973 Or. Laws 792, § 4(6), (7), (8) (codified as amended at OR. REV.
STAT. § 215.750 (2005)); OR. ADMIN. R. 660-006-0027(l)(f) (2007); see also HANDBOOK, supra
note 88, at 20-23.
90. But see LEONARD, supra note 5, at 83-84 (discussing early opposition to forest land pres-
ervation, especially from counties and landowners on the forested fringes of the Willamette Valley,
where growth pressures were intense and the allure of profit from the subdivision of forest land
great); Shurts, supra note 81, at 59-64 (criticizing LCDC, LUBA, and the courts' failure to establish
consistent standards for nonforest uses in forest lands prior to House Bill 3661).
91. Hunnicutt, supra note 36, at 29-30 n. 17 (stating that vast majority of Measure 37 claims
are the result of farm or forest zoning under Goals 3 and 4). One reason the regulation of forest land
received less criticism than the regulation of agricultural land may stem from the economic clout of
the timber industry in Oregon, which has historically supported forest land use protections. See
LEONARD, supra note 5, at 83-84. Timber companies, however, were major financial supporters of
Measure 37, reportedly to slow future land use restrictions of forest practices. See Michael Milstein,
Forest Owners See Fairer Future in Measure 37, OREGONIAN, Dec. 22, 2004, at AO1.
92. Opposition to land use planning predated S.B. 100. See LEONARD, supra note 5, at 35-36
(describing early opposition to land use planning, which sought to restrict the power of county
planning authorities and to limit the power of local and state government to interfere in the use of
rural lands). Initial opposition to land use planning came from many quarters: people philosophi-
cally opposed to land use planning, local officials who objected to state oversight, and individual
landowners. Id; see also Gordon Oliver & R. Gregory Nokes, Land-Use Law Showing Its Age,
OREGONIAN, May 31, 1998, at BO1 (discussing tumultuous history of land use law).
93. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 819 (discussing legislative amendments to land use laws); ED-
WARD J. SULLIVAN, OREGON'S MEASURE 37-RuSS AND OPPORTUNITY FOR PLANNING 3 (2005),
available at http://www.planning.org/PEL/commentary/pdf/Mar05.pdf.
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use planning.94 That ballot measure failed by a margin of 57 percent to
43 percent.
95
Two years later, another citizen initiative would have rescinded
LCDC goals, required legislative approval of any newly promulgated
goals, and required compensation of private property owners whose
property values decreased as a result of regulation.96  That measure lost
by a margin of 61 percent to 39 percent, losing in thirty-one of thirty-six
Oregon counties. 97  Four years later, in 1982, spurred by a deep eco-
nomic recession, another citizens' initiative would have repealed state-
wide land use planning.98 That measure lost by a margin of 55 percent to
45 percent, but it passed in twenty-one of thirty-six counties.
99
94. Oregon Repeals Land Use Planning Coordination Statutes, Ballot Measure 10, (1976),
available at http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/electionsl9.htn (last visited November 5,
2007); LEONARD, supra note 5, at 35-36; CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 8, at 19.
95. See Ballot Measure 10, supra note 94.
96. Measure 10 of the 1978 ballot proposed a constitutional amendment that purported to
keep in place comprehensive land use planning, while abolishing the LCDC and the goals it promul-
gated. Id Local governments would have still been required to adopt comprehensive land use plans
in conformance with the statewide goals. Id. However, the legislature, not LCDC, would have to
adopt these goals. Id. In addition, the measure would have required the legislature to adopt zoning,
planning, and notice procedures to be followed by local governments, and required the state to
compensate landowners in areas of statewide significance, where the state could regulate land use
directly, if the state imposed land use restrictions that adversely affected the value of their land. Id.
Proponents of the measure argued that it would restore accountability to the land use planning
system by taking statewide planning out of the jurisdiction of an executive agency and placing it in
the legislature. Id. Opponents argued that the measure was a veiled attempt by real estate interests
to abolish statewide comprehensive land use planning by assigning the legislature the impossible
task of quickly promulgating land use goals as well as the local notice, zoning and planning proce-
dures that local governments would have to follow. See Office of the Oregon Secretary of State,
Election Div., Measure 10, Statements in Opposition, in VOTERS' PAMPHLET 57-65 (1978); see also
LEONARD, supra note 5, at 35-36; CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 8, at 19.
97. Oregon Blue Book: Initiative, Referendum and Recall: 1972-1978,
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/electionsl9.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007); LEONARD,
supra note 5, at 36.
98. Measure 6 of the 1982 ballot proposed a statutory amendment abolishing LUBA, LCDC,
and DLCD, changing statewide goals from mandatory requirements to merely advisory statements,
and completely repealing Oregon Revised Statutes § 197, the land use planning statute. ENDS
STATE'S LAND USE PLANNING POWERS IN OREGON, RETAINS LOCAL PLANNING, BALLOT MEASURE
6 (1982). The measure required local governments to establish and maintain master land use plans,
but these plans did not have to conform to the statewide goals. In effect, land use planning was to be
left entirely to local governments, with the state assuming a purely advisory role. Id
Unlike sponsors of earlier-and later-ballot initiatives to repeal statewide land use planning,
Measure 6 supporters did not emphasize private property rights. Instead, they argued that statewide
land use created too many bureaucratic hurdles for business, thereby impeding economic develop-
ment. See Office of the Oregon Secretary of State, Election Div., Measure 6, Arguments in Favor, in
VOTERS' PAMPHLET 15-16 (1982). Opponents of the measure, including former Governor McCall,
also focused their arguments on economic development. They argued that the measure's loose
language would create uncertainty and confusion, which would be even worse for economic devel-
opment than incremental legislative reform of the system to better accommodate economic devel-
opment. See Office of the Oregon Secretary of State, Election Div., Measure 6, Arguments in Oppo-
sition, in VOTERS' PAMPHLET 17-18 (1982); see also LEONARD, supra note 5, at 36-37.
99. Oregon Blue Book: Initiative, Referendum and Recall 1980-1987,
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections20.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007); CITY CLUB OF
PORTLAND, supra note 8, at 19-20; KNAAP & NELSON, supra note 5, at 191.
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Nearly a decade and a half later, the 1998 ballot contained two citi-
zen initiatives aimed at curtailing, although not completely repealing, the
statewide land use planning system. 00 The first, Measure 56, required
the state and local governments to mail notices describing proposed
changes to land use laws or regulations to landowners. 10 1 That measure
passed by an overwhelming margin of 80 percent to 20 percent. 10 2 The
second initiative, Measure 65, would have amended the state constitution
to allow citizens to petition the legislature to review administrative rules
with which they disagreed.l0 3 Although the scope of Measure 65 encom-
passed more than just land use regulation, and the measure received sup-
port from a variety of interest groups, °4 its drafters designed the measure
as a means of challenging LCDC land use regulations that restricted the
siting of dwellings on high-value farmland. 10 5 The measure failed by a
narrow margin, 52 percent to 48 percent. 1
06
A driving force behind both of the 1998 measures was Oregonians
In Action, a private property rights and land-use reform advocacy
group. 10 7  The organization presented itself as a counterbalance to pro-
100. Land use was a major issue in the 1998 gubernatorial race. Bill Sizemore, the Republican
candidate, campaigned on a platform which emphasized overturning the statewide land use planning
system and "returning" land use planning to local communities. Jeff Mapes, Sizemore Finds Prop-
erty Owners Open to Message, OREGONIAN, Apr. 5, 1998, at C12. Sizemore led a ballot initiative
which would have repealed the statewide planning system through constitutional amendment, but
withdrew the initiative after it had been certified but before it made it onto the ballot. See Oregon
Secretary of State, Elections Division, Initiative, Referendum and Referral Search,
http://egov.sos.state.or.us/elec/web irr-search.record-detail?preference=20000004..LSCYYY (last
visited Nov. 6, 2007); Robin Franzen, Farmland Law Sowing a Bitter Debate Around Oregon: A
Crop of Controversy: Legacy on the Line, OREGONIAN, Oct. 19, 1998, at AO1.
101. Expands Notice to Landowners Regarding Changes to Oregon Land Use Laws, Ballot
Measure 56 (1998) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 215.503 (1999)).
102. Official Results, 1998 General Election, State Measure 56,
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov398/other.info/m56.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). Al-
though it passed overwhelmingly, some criticized the measure as undermining support for land use
planning because of the high cost of sending out the notices-estimated at $3.5 million per year-
that would be borne by LCDC and local governments, and because of the wording of the notices,
mandated by the measure, emphasized the potential diminution in property value caused by the
proposed land use measure. Editorial, Let Landowners Know, OREGONIAN, Oct. 7, 1998, at C12; R.
Gregory Nokes, Ballot Measure Calls for Direct Notification of Land-Use Changes, OREGONIAN,
Sept. 30, 1998, at A14.
103. Amends Oregon Constitution: Creates Process for Requiring Legislature to Review
Administrative Rules (Measure 65) (1998), available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/
nov398/guide/measure/m65.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). The measure would have enabled
citizens to challenge any administrative rule issued by a state agency by collecting a requisite num-
ber of signatures and petitioning the legislature to approve or disapprove the rule. Under the meas-
ure, if the legislature did not act upon receiving such petition during the legislative session following
the submission of the petition, the administrative rule would be deemed to have been repealed. Id. §
34(3)(a)-(b).
104. R. Gregory Nokes, Private Property Group Wants Ways to Challenge Administrative
Rules, OREGONIAN, Oct. 13, 1998, at A09 (noting that Oregon Right to Life supported the measure,
vowing to petition the legislature to overturn administrative rules supporting doctor-assisted suicide).
105. Id. (discussing campaign for the measure).
106. Oregon Blue Book: Initiative, Referendum and Recall 1996-1999,
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections22.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
107. Oregonians In Action was founded in the early 1980s by Frank Nims, a former farmer
from eastern Oregon. Before transforming itself into a single-issue private property rights organiza-
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land use planning groups such as 1000 Friends of Oregon, a watchdog
organization formed by former Governor Tom McCall in 1975.'08
Throughout the 1990s, Oregonians In Action gained influence, scoring a
major victory representing John and Florence Dolan in their successful
challenge to a conditional building permit in Dolan v. City of Tigard
before the U.S. Supreme Court. 0 9 The group met with further success in
2000, when it sponsored a citizen initiative amending the state's constitu-
tional takings provision, and the voters approved the measure. 10
D. Ballot Measure 7 (2000)
The 2000 initiative-Ballot Measure 7-attempted to amend the Ore-
gon Constitution's takings clause"' to require the state or a local gov-
ernment to compensate a landowner for any law or regulation that re-
stricted the use of the owner's land and "ha[d] the effect of reducing the
value of a property upon which the restriction is imposed." ' 12  The meas-
ure would have required the state or local government to compensate a
landowner for any restrictive regulation that was "adopted, first enforced
or applied" after the current landowner purchased the property, and that
continued to apply 90 days after the owner's application for compensa-
tion." 3  The compensation due was 100 percent of the difference be-
tion in 1989, the group championed smaller government, introducing ballot initiatives to reduce pay
for legislators, introduce constitutional limits on government spending, disallow voter registration
within twenty days of an election and, somewhat bizarrely, prevent teachers from serving in the state
legislature. David Hogan, Land Use Wins Buoy Oregonians In Action, OREGONIAN, Dec. 25, 2000,
at AOl; see also Patty Wentz, This Land is Their Land, WILLAMETTE WEEK, Nov. 28, 2000, at 21
(discussing origins of Oregonians In Action).
108. Governor McCall founded 1000 Friends of Oregon as a statewide land use planning
watchdog group to oversee the implementation of S.B. 100. The group has played a major oversight
role in the institution of the statewide land use planning system, reviewing local government com-
prehensive plans for consistency with statewide goals, working with local governments to improve
their land use planning, and challenging planning decisions inconsistent with the goals before LUBA
and the state courts. See 1000 Friends of Oregon: History, http://www.friends.org/about/
history.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
109. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). See generally Colloquium, Dolan: The Takings Clause Doctrine of
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. III (1995). In 1991, Oregonians In
Action established a legal center to represent landowners in test cases at no charge. The group was
also successful in lobbying for legislative changes to Oregon's land use. See Hogan, supra note 107
(reporting that the state's Republican-controlled legislature enacted 13 pieces of legislation authored
by Oregonians In Action into law in 1999).
110. The measure was originally proposed by Bill Sizemore and his Oregon Taxpayers United
organization, but Oregonians In Action took over the process of getting the measure approved and
campaigning for its adoption by the voters. CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 8, at 22-23 (de-
scribing origin of Measure 7); Hogan, supra note 107. Oregonians In Action's political action
committees reportedly spent about $880,000 on Measure 7. Id. During its Measure 7 campaign,
Oregonians In Action highlighted the stories of sympathetic landowners whose property had alleg-
edly lost value due to land use planning, including Dorothy English, an elderly widow living in north
Portland whose story would be used to great effect again in the 2004 Measure 37 campaign. See R.
Gregory Nokes, Scott Learn & Harry Esteve, Property Measure Battles Lie Ahead, OREGONIAN,
Nov. 9, 2000, at COI.
111. OR. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
112. Measure 7, supra note 2.
113. Id. § (d). The "first enforced or applied" language implied that the measure might have
retroactive effect. For instance, a landowner whose land was already subject to a land use restriction
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tween the fair market value of the land before and after the application of
the regulation, which expressly included "net cost to the landowner of an
affirmative obligation to protect, provide, or preserve wildlife habitat,
natural areas, wetlands, ecosystems, scenery, open space, historical, ar-
cheological or cultural resources, or low income housing."
'" 14
Measure 7 would not have required the state or local governments
to compensate landowners for (1) "historically and commonly recog-
nized nuisance laws,"" 5 (2) regulations "to implement a requirement of
federal law," '" 6 or (3) "regulations prohibiting the use of a property for
the purpose of selling pornography, performing nude dancing, selling
alcoholic beverages or other controlled substances, or operating a casino
or gaming parlor." ' 1 7 These exceptions would reappear in Measure 37.
Unlike Measure 37, Measure 7 contained no express provision al-
lowing government to waive a land use regulation rather than pay com-
pensation to a claimant, prompting controversy over whether, and under
what circumstances, governments could avoid compensating claimants.
The Attorney General interpreted the measure's requirement of compen-
sation only when a land use regulation "continues to apply to the prop-
erty ninety days after the owner applies for compensation" to permit gov-
at the time she purchased it might nonetheless be entitled to compensation if neither she nor a previ-
ous landowner had ever applied to use the land in a manner prohibited by the land use regulation.
See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 8, at 26 (noting that land use lawyers interviewed by the
City Club expressed their opinion that the measure might have this sort of retroactive effect). But
see R. Gregory Nokes, Judge Blocks Property Measure, OREGONIAN, Dec. 7, 2000, at A01 (citing
an Oregonians In Action lawyer asserting that he did not believe the measure had retroactive effect).
The Oregon Attorney General, in an opinion interpreting Measure 7's provisions, also concluded
that "first enforced or applied" might have retroactive effect. 49 Or. Op. Att'y. Gen. 284 (2001),
2001 Ore. AG LEXIS 3. He stated: "[T]he the right to compensation created by Measure 7 applies
prospectively, i.e., where the government passes or enforces a regulation after the effective date of
Measure 7. Measure 7 does not create a right to compensation if both of those government actions
were taken before the Measure's effective date." Id. at *99. But, "the voters intended the Measure to
require compensation for the future (post-Measure 7) enforcement of existing (pre-Measure 7)
regulations, where the regulation was 'adopted, first enforced or applied' after the owner in question
became the owner." Id. at *112.
114. Measure 7, supra note 2, at § (e). Other states, notably Florida and Texas, adopted land-
owner compensation statutes that compensate landowners for loss to property value caused by gov-
ernment action. Florida's "Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act" measures
compensation due landowners as "compensation for the actual loss to the fair market value of the
real property caused by the action of government." FLA. STAT. § 70.001(2) (2007). Texas' statute
provides for compensation in the amount of "damages suffered by the private real property owner as
a result of the [government action]," to be determined by a state court hearing the action. TEX.
Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2007.024(b) (2007). However, both of these states' statutes are triggered only
when the decrease in value due to government regulation is substantial (25 percent in Texas, "inor-
dinately burden[some]" in Florida). FLA. STAT. §§ 70.001(2), (3)(e); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
2007.002(5)(B)(ii). These and other states' compensation statutes are discussed in more detail infra
at notes 226, 229.
115. Measure 7, supra note 2, at § (b). The measure would have required that these laws "shall
be narrowly construed in favor of a finding that just compensation is required under this section."
Id
116. Id. § (c). The measure would have required that the state or local government impose
these regulations "to the minimum extent required." Id.
117. Id.
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emments in some circumstances to waive land use regulations rather than
pay compensation.' 8 He opined that state agencies could waive land use
regulations rather than pay compensation when (1) their rules and ena-
bling statutes gave them discretion to do so,"1 9 or (2) they did not have
sufficient funds allotted or appropriated to cover the compensation
cost.' 20 A number of local governments adopted ordinances in response
to Measure 7 which allowed them to waive offending land use laws ra-
ther than compensate claimants, although considerable controversy sur-
rounded their authority to do So.1
21
118. Id § (d). The Attorney General issued a detailed opinion interpreting Measure 7's provi-
sions, including whether the measure allowed for state agencies to waive rather than compensate.
Or. Op. Atny. Gen., supra note 113, at *318; see also David Steves, Oregon Attorney General Cites
Impact of New Land-Rights Law, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Feb. 14, 2001, available at 2001
WLNR 7663828 (citing Attorney General Hardy Myers stating that the opinion was produced by 20
lawyers at the Department of Justice over three months in an attempt to objectively interpret the
measure).
119. According to the Attorney General, the measure's 90-day language allowed "[a] state
agency [to] forego enforcement of regulations restricting the use of private real property if the agen-
cy's rules and enabling statutes give it discretion to do so." Or. Op. Atty. Gen., supra note 113, at
* 11. The Attorney General explained further that:
Because Measure 7 provides that compensation is due only where the regulation 'contin-
ues to apply' 90 days after the claim is made, it may be suggested that Measure 7 itself
authorizes state agencies to forego enforcement of regulations. However, Measure 7 it-
self provides no express powers to state agencies and does not authorize agencies to
forego enforcement of regulations restricting the use of private real property. Conse-
quently, we must look to existing law to determine whether the agency has the discretion
to choose whether or not to enforce the regulation.
Id. at "155.
120. The Attorney General stated:
If a state agency's enabling statutes or rules do not give the agency discretion to forego
enforcement of a regulation restricting the use of private real property, the agency must
enforce that regulation as long as it has money within its appropriation and allotments to
pay valid Measure 7 claims. An agency must include in its allotment estimate an amount
for valid Measure 7 claims that will be due in the upcoming allotment period, and DAS
must approve an allotment sufficient to pay such claims as long as the agency has appro-
priated funds available to pay the claims and to carry out the agency's mandatory duties
for the remainder of the biennium, even if doing so will require the agency to discontinue
or cut back on other statutory, but nonmandatory, activities. If, before the end of the bi-
ennium, the agency no longer has sufficient funds to perform all of its mandatory activi-
ties, the agency must determine which of its conflicting statutory mandates are primary.
In no event, however, may the agency incur obligations in excess of its allotment or ap-
propriation; at that point, the agency would no longer be required to perform its manda-
tory statutory duties. If the obligation to pay a Measure 7 claim would result in a debt
limit violation, not only may the agency no longer enforce the regulation giving rise to
the claim, but the statute requiring such regulation would no longer apply; at that point,
the statute would cease to have legal force or effect.
Id. at *1 1- 12; see also id. at *162-*172 (discussing in greater detail the Attorney General's opinion
as to how agencies must budget for Measure 7 claims and under what circumstances agencies could
waive regulations because they lacked funds to cover the compensation costs).
121. See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 8, at 27 (stating that the intent of the grace
period was to allow local government to waive the regulation rather than pay compensation, but
noting "significant debate" regarding this point "since the measure does not specifically authorize
waiver"); Jeff Barnard, Oregon Girds for Measure 7 Fallout, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, WA), Jan.
28, 2001, at C2 (reporting that numerous cities and counties enacted ordinances allowing them to
waive enforcement of regulation rather than compensate Measure 7 claimants); R. Gregory Nokes,
1000 Friends Sues 23 Cities, OREGONIAN, Dec. 22, 2000, at BOI (discussing an action filed with
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
Voters adopted Measure 7 in November 2000 by an unofficial mar-
gin of 54 percent to 46 percent, approving it in thirty of thirty-six coun-
ties.122 Led by Oregonians In Action, proponents argued that the meas-
ure restored "balance" to the system by "forc[ing] regulators to consider
the impacts on property owners of imposing restrictions on the use of
property before doing so,' 1 23 and by remedying what they viewed as ju-
dicial erosion of the takings clause by the Oregon Supreme Court.
1 24
Opponents, including 1000 Friends of Oregon, then-governor John Kitz-
haber, and the state treasurer, maintained that the measure would cost the
state as much as $5.4 billion annually and make statewide land use plan-
ning impossible. 125 Despite its potentially high cost and broad fiscal im-
plications, Measure 7 garnered little public attention or debate during the
2000 election. 
126
LUBA by 1000 Friends of Oregon, a group opposed to Measure 7, challenging local governments'
authority to waive state land use laws in response to Measure 7 claims).
122. As discussed below, because of the legal challenge to the measure, the election results
were never officially certified. Unofficial County Results on Measure 7 as of November 14, 2000,
http://www.orcities.org/Portals/ 7/A-Z/m7ns022.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
123. See Measure 7, Arguments in Favor, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72000/
guide/mea/m7/7fa.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). Oregonians In Action and its directors accounted
for half of the "Arguments in Favor" included in the Measure 7 pamphlet received by voters. There
were two filings by Bill Moshofsky, full-time volunteer at Oregonians In Action, on behalf of the
Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings Committee, two filings by Larry George, then executive
director of Oregonians In Action, on behalf of the Oregon Family Farm PAC, and one filing by
Frank Nims, then president of the group, on behalf of Oregonians In Action. Id.
Other supporters of the measure included United Oregon Taxpayers, which argued that Measure
7 would more widely spread the property taxes burden and lessen the pressure to increase property
taxes on current taxpayers; the Oregon Cattlemen's Association; the Oregon State Grange; and Dan
Dolan, of Dolan v. City of Tigard fame, who argued that the measure would have saved taxpayers
the $1.5 million for which the City of Tigard ended up settling the Dolans' regulatory takings claim
for land valued at $14,000. Id.
124. Hunnicutt, supra note 36, at 34-35 (arguing that the Oregon Supreme Court's regulatory
takings decisions failed to coherently define factors that should be considered in analyzing a takings
claim under the state constitution); see Dodd v. Hood River County, 855 P.2d 608, 615 (Or. 1993)
(holding that zoning law preventing siting of a dwelling on land purchased for $33,000 was not a
taking because $10,000 worth of timber was left on the property, since that constituted some sub-
stantial beneficial use); Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Washington County, 581 P.2d 50, 60 (Or. 1978) (decid-
ing that no taking occurs under the Oregon constitution if the owner retains some substantial use of
the property); see also Cope v. City of Cannon Beach, 855 P.2d 1083, 1084-86 (Or. 1993) (finding a
municipal ordinance prohibiting rental of dwellings in residential areas for less than 14 days at a
time not to be a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because the ordinance
advanced a legitimate municipal interest and left other economically viable uses of the property);
CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 8, at 16.
125. Measure 7, Arguments in Opposition, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72000/
guide/mea/m7/7op.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). The voters pamphlet included 30 Arguments in
Opposition to Measure 7, most emphasizing the measure's vague wording, high cost, and undermin-
ing effects on health and safety regulations governing property. Id; see also Editorial, Vote No on
Measure 7, OREGONIAN, Oct. 9, 2000, at B08.
126. CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 8, at 23 (noting that Measure 7 did not become a
focal issue in the campaign, and that most commentators thought it had little chance of approval);
Carl Abbott, Sy Adler & Deborah Howe, A Quiet Counteroffensive in Land Use Regulation, The
Origins and Impact of Oregon's Measure 7, 14 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 383, 389 (2003), available
at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1403 abbott.pdf (discussing politics
of Measure 7 and its aftermath); Editorial, The Sleeper, OREGONIAN, Nov. 2, 2000, at D14; Wentz,
supra note 107 (commenting on Measure 7's unlikely passage).
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After the election, many local governments passed ordinances to
implement Measure 7.l27 But before the measure went into effect, a
group of local governments, land use organizations, and individuals chal-
lenged its constitutionality in Marion County Circuit Court on a number
of grounds, 28 including the claim that Measure 7 violated the state con-
stitution's "separate vote" provision, which requires that each constitu-
tional amendment be voted on individually. 29  In December 2000, the
plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction, effectively freezing the imple-
mentation of Measure 7. 13 In February 2001, the circuit court granted
the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, declaring Measure 7 invalid
because it violated both the state Constitution's "separate vote" and "full
text" clauses.13
The state appealed this decision to the court of appeals, which certi-
fied the appeal to the state supreme court, which in turn upheld the cir-
cuit court's invalidation of the measure, agreeing that it violated the state
constitution's "separate vote" provision.' 32 The supreme court concluded
that Measure 7 actually contained two constitutional amendments. The
first was an explicit amendment of the state's takings clause. 133 The sec-
127. See Nokes, supra note 121.
128. Plaintiffs brought their challenge before the Secretary of State had finished the constitu-
tionally required canvassing of the Measure 7 votes, and before the Governor had certified the out-
come. OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; League of Or. Cities v. Oregon, No. 00-C-20156 1, 2 (Marion
County Cir. Ct., Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.orcities.org/AZlndex/tabid/810/
ctl/ItemView/mid/1421/categoryid/37/itemtitleid/358/type/a/Default.aspx. The plaintiffs alleged that
Measure 7 had been unconstitutionally enacted in violation of the constitution's "one subject" re-
quirement (OR. CONST. art. IV, § l(2)(d)), the constitutional prohibition on "revisions" through the
initiative process (OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 2), "full text" requirement (OR. CONST. art. IV, § l(2)(d))
and the "separate vote" requirement (OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1).
129. OR. CONST. art. XVII, § I ("When two or more amendments shall be submitted... to the
voters of this state at the same election, they shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be
voted on separately."). Amendments are separate if they are "substantive" and not "closely related."
League of Or. Cities v. Oregon, 56 P.3d 892, 904 (Or. 2002) (citing Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d
49 (Or. 1998)).
130. League of Or. Cities, No. 00-C-20156, at 2.
131. Id. at 21. The "full text" clause of the Oregon constitution requires that an initiative
petition include the full text of the proposed law or amendment to the constitution. OR. CONST., art.
IV, § 1(2)(d). The circuit court concluded that Measure 7 violated the provision because, despite
containing the full text of the provisions it proposed to add to the constitution, it did not give notice
of the other constitutional and statutory provisions it would substantively modify. League of Or.
Cities, No. 00-C-20156, at 10-13. For example, the measure changed the definition of "just compen-
sation" to include reasonable attorneys fees and expenses necessary to collect compensation when
compensation is not paid within 90 days. The court determined that the new definition significantly
affected existing condemnation provisions, and both local ordinances and state statutes which set
forth the time frames and processes for condemnation actions would have to be amended. Id. at 10.
Since "nothing in the text of the measure gives notice to the voters of this direct and substantial
change to the constitution," the circuit court concluded that the measure violated the full text clause.
Id.
132. League of Or. Cities, 56 P.3d at 896-97, 911. Because the court found the measure vio-
lated the separate vote clause, it did not address whether the measure also violated the full text
clause. Id. at 897 n.5.
133. Prior to the adoption of Measure 7, the takings provision, OR. CONST. art. I, § 18, required
compensation only when a property owner demonstrated that the government regulation deprived the
owner of all economically viable use of the property. See Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Wash. County, 581
P.2d 50, 60, 63 (Or. 1978); Dodd v. Hood River County, 855 P.2d 608, 614-15 (Or. 1993). Measure
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ond was an implicit amendment to the Constitution's free speech
clause. 134  The court determined that the amendment of the free speech
clause was not "closely related" to the amendment of the takings clause,
and therefore Measure 7 violated the separate vote provision of the Ore-
gon Constitution and was invalid.1
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II. BACKGROUND OF MEASURE 37
Following the Oregon Supreme Court's invalidation of Measure 7
on state constitutional grounds in October 2002, Oregonians In Action
repackaged the measure as a proposed statutory amendment and success-
fully petitioned for its inclusion as Ballot Measure 37 on the 2004 bal-
lot. 136 The 2004 campaign was even more successful than the Measure 7
campaign had been four years earlier. Voters adopted Measure 37 by a
margin of approximately 61 percent to 39 percent, approving it in all but
one of Oregon's thirty-six counties.' 
37
A. The Measure 3 7 Campaign
Unlike Measure 7, Measure 37 attracted considerable publicity prior
to the 2004 election. 138 Both proponents and opponents of the measure
7 explicitly amended the takings clause by requiring just compensation for any reduction in the value
of private real property resulting from the enforcement of a restrictive regulation enacted or first
enforced before a landowner acquired a tract. The measure thus substantively amended the takings
clause. League of Or. Cities, 56 P.3d at 905-06.
134. The measure implicitly amended the free speech clause, OR. CONST. art. I, § 8, by allow-
ing the state or local governments to deny Measure 37 benefits to landowners engaged in the sale of
pornographic material. Measure 7, supra note 2, at § (c) ("Nothing in this 2000 Amendment shall
require compensation due to a government regulation prohibiting the use of a property for the pur-
pose of selling pornography, performing nude dancing, selling alcoholic beverages or other con-
trolled substances, or operating a casino or gaming parlor."). Id. The free speech clause provides
that "no law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever[.]" OR. CONST. art. I, § 8. The court explained
that the constitution's free speech clause not only guarantees that the state will not explicitly target
expression, but also that "the state or a local government may not treat those who sell expressive
material 'more restrictively' than those who sell other merchandise." League of Or. Cities, 56 P.3d
at 908 (citing City of Eugene v. Miller, 871 P.2d 454 (1994)). Thus, by requiring state and local
governments to confer benefits on some landowners whose land they restrictively regulate, but not
on other landowners because they are engaged in a constitutionally protected expressive activity,
Measure 7 violated the constitution's free speech guarantee. Because Measure 7 required this dispa-
rate treatment, it changed the scope of the rights guaranteed under the free speech clause, thus con-
stituting an amendment of Article I, § 8. League of Or. Cities, 56 P.3d at 892, 908.
135. League of Or. Cities, 56 P.3d at 910-11.
136. Measure 37, supra note 1; see Hunnicutt, supra note 36, at 41 (stating that drafters of
Measure 37 took their cue from the Oregon Supreme Court's invalidation of Measure 7 to draft
Measure 37 as a statute rather than a constitutional amendment).
137. Hunnicutt, supra note 36, at 41; see also Oregon Secretary of State, General Election
Abstract of Votes on State Measure No. 37 (Nov. 2, 2004), http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/
nov22004/abstract/m37.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
138. Unlike the 2000 ballot, in which Measure 7 was among a total of 26 citizen measures, the
2004 ballot included only eight citizen measures. Compare Official 2000 General Election Online
Voters' Guide, Measures, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72000/meas.htm (last visited Nov.
6, 2007) with Official 2004 General Election Online Voters' Guide, Measures,
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/g04abstract.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). But
other controversial ballot measures, such as a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage,
vied with Measure 37 for voter attention. In fact, after the election, the Oregonian ran an editorial by
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raised large amounts of funding and waged expensive publicity cam-
paigns in support of their positions.1
39
The Oregon timber industry, which viewed the measure as a means
of curbing future state regulation of timber land, was the biggest funder
of the campaign in support of Measure 37. 140 Individual landowners and
1000 Friends of Oregon provided the bulk of funding for the campaign
against Measure 37. 141 The campaign in support raised approximately
$1.2 million, 142 expending approximately $1 million on media adver-
tisements. 143  The campaign in opposition raised over twice as much,
approximately $2.7 million,144 spending approximately $2 million on
media advertisements. 1
45
its public editor criticizing the paper for failing to adequately focus on Measure 37 in the midst of
competing initiatives. See Michael Arrietta-Walden, The Public Editor, Measure 37 Coverage Was
Too Limited, Late, OREGONIAN, Nov. 14, 2004, at BO I (noting that the paper devoted more coverage
to several other measures, including one to ban same-sex marriage and one attempting to dismantle
the state accident insurance fund, than it did to Measure 37).
139. Proponents of Measure 37 raised money and campaigned primarily through an organiza-
tion called the "Family Farm Preservation PAC" (although Oregonians In Action PAC also received
contributions, mainly from individuals). See Alex Pulaski, Election 2004: Measure 37: Property
Compensation: Land's Uses, Limits at Stake, OREGONIAN, Oct. 24, 2004, at DOI. Opponents of the
measure acted through the "No on 37 Take A Closer Look Committee." See Takings Initiatives,
Oregon Opponent Reports, http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=
view&id=78&ltemid = (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
140. See Family Farm Preservation PAC, Electronic Filing Report, Cash Contributions, Loans
Received and In-Kind, 3-10 (Sept. 23, 2004); Family Farm Preservation PAC, Electronic Filing
Report, Cash Contributions, Loans Received and In-Kind, 3-8 (Dec. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=69&Itemid
= (last
visited Nov. 6, 2007); Michael Milstein, Forest Owners See Fairer Future in Measure 37,
OREGONIAN, Dec. 22. 2004, at AOl (stating that the timber industry "supplied almost $3 of every $4
that buoyed the ballot initiative to an easy victory"). The Family Farm Preservation PAC also re-
ceived substantial funding from real estate and development interests. See Pulaski, supra note 139,
at DOI (noting that contributions from identifiable real estate and development companies accounted
for 10 percent of all contributions to the Family Farm Preservation PAC).
141. See No on 37 Take A Closer Look Committee, Electronic Filing Report, Cash Contribu-
tions, Loans Received and In-Kind, 3-129 (Sept. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=78&ltemid
= (last
visited Nov. 6, 2007). 1000 Friends of Oregon contributed approximately $100,000 to the cam-
paign. Id. A single winemaker, Eric D. Lemelson, contributed $500,500 to the campaign, and his
mother contributed another $85,000. See Janie Har, Voters Back Beliefs With Bucks, OREGONIAN,
Oct. 23, 2004, at BO1.
142. Hunnicut, supra note 36, at 39 n.93.
143. George Advertising Inc., was the campaign's media agent. Family Farm Preservation
PAC, Electronic Filing Report, Cash Expenditures and Loan Payments, 7- 10 (Oct. 21, 2004); Fam-
ily Farm Preservation PAC, Electronic Filing Report, Supplement to Second Pre-election - Expendi-
tures, 1 (Oct. 29, 2004); Family Farm Preservation PAC, Electronic Filing Report, Cash Expendi-
tures and Loan Payments, 9-11 (Dec. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=69&Itemid
= (last
visited Nov. 6, 2007); see also Pulaski, supra note 139, at DOI (noting that George Advertising,
Inc., was run by Larry George, former executive director of Oregonians In Action).
144. See No to 37 Take A Closer Look Committee, Electronic Filing Report, Summary State-
ment of Contributions and Expenditures, 1 (June 24, 2005), available at
http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/storage/tmap/documents/Finance%2Filings%202004/Take%20a
%20Closer/o2OLook%2OCommittee%202005%20Supplemental%20Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 6,
2007).
145. MacWilliams and Robinson was "Take Closer Look's" media agent. See No on 37 Take
A Closer Look Committee, Electronic Filing Report, Cash Expenditures and Loan Payments, 130-41
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Despite having more money, opponents of Measure 37 were unable
to successfully counter the media message of Measure 37 proponents.
The pro-Measure 37 campaign focused its argument on fairness and sim-
plicity, concentrating on the theme that government should pay for what
it takes. 146 The simplicity of the campaign's message was encapsulated
in the measure's ballot title, which proponents succeeded in having the
secretary of state approve without opposition: "Government must pay
owners, or forgo enforcement, when certain land use restrictions reduce
property value."' 147 The proponents of Measure 37 were also extremely
successful in their radio and television campaign, which spotlighted
sympathetic individual land owners, including the elderly and the dis-
abled, whose dreams of developing their land were allegedly thwarted by
seemingly extreme or arbitrary government action.
48
(Sept. 23, 2004); No on 37 Take A Closer Look Committee, Electronic Filing Report, Cash Expendi-
tures and Loan Payments, 7 (Oct. 18, 2004); No on 37 Take A Closer Look Committee, Electronic
Filing Report, Cash Expenditures and Loan Payments, 96-100 (Oct. 21, 2004); No on 37 Take A
Closer Look Committee, Electronic Filing Report, Supplement to Second Pre-Election - Expendi-
tures, 4 (Oct. 25, 2004); No on 37 Take A Closer Look Committee, Electronic Filing Report, Cash
Expenditures and Loan Payments, 43-46 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/index.php?option=com-cntent&task-view&id=78&Itemid= (last
visited Nov. 6, 2007).
146. Its proponents argued that Measure 37 would provide a simple system for landowners to
recover lost property value caused by land use regulation. Instead of having to undertake allegedly
costly, time-consuming, and often futile compensation litigation in state courts to seek compensation
when government action devalued their land, Measure 37 would allow landowners to simply file a
compensation claim with the state or local government, forcing the government to either compensate
or waive regulation within a relatively short time. See Official 2004 General Election Online Vot-
ers' Guide, Measure 37, Arguments in Favor, http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/storage/tmap/
documents/Measure%2037%20-%20Arguments%20in%2OFavor.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2007)
[hereinafter 2004 Voters' Pamphlet]; Sullivan, supra note 93, at 5-6.
147. Under Oregon law, ballot titles must be filed with the secretary of state and certified by
the Attorney General, OR. REV. STAT. § 250.067 (2005), or, if challenged, by the state Supreme
Court. § 250.085. Getting a favorable ballot title certified is perhaps the most important element of
a citizen initiative campaign, because the title is the only thing that appears on the ballot itself. See
Sullivan, supra note 93, at 6 (discussing importance of ballot title); Hunnicutt, supra note 36, at 41
(same); see also Press Release, Bill Bradbury, Oregon Secretary of State, Certified Ballot Title for
Measure 37 (Apr. 22, 2003), http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/irr/2004/036cbt.pdf. In the case of
Measure 37, the ballot title was not challenged by opponents. See Sullivan, supra note 93, at 6.
148. Sullivan, supra note 93, at 6 (pointing out that these images were ones that voters could
take with them to the ballot box). One commentator has also argued that, since most voters in 2004
were not Oregon residents when the land use planning system was originally enacted, they had no
visceral sense of the state's land use program to counterbalance the pro-Measure 37 campaign's
heart-string individual pleas. Id.; see also Josh Israel, Takings Initiatives Accountability Project, Ad
Wars 2004 (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Ad Wars 2004], http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/
index.phpoption-com content&task-view&id=87&Itemid=54 (explaining the media campaign and
providing links to the actual television and radio commercials).
The campaign advertisements focused on anecdotal evidence of seemingly arbitrary restrictions
placed upon individual landowners (e.g. a $15,000 citation of a Portland homeowner for cutting
down blackberry bushes in her backyard, and ranchers who were allowed to build on their ranch but
were required to "move out for four months of the year, so as not to disturb the wildlife"), arguing
that government had "found a loophole in the law" and was now "taking private property from
Oregonians without compensation." See Ad Wars 2004 ("Yes on 37" Television Ads 1-3).
A majority of the 42 "Arguments in Favor" accompanying Measure 37 in the Voters' Pamphlet
were signed by individuals relating their own personal stories, asserting that Measure 37 would
restore to them what the government had taken away. See Argument in Favor of Barbara and
Eugene Prete, 2004 Voters' Pamphlet, supra note 146, at 16-17 (veteran could not build on property
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Opponents of Measure 37 stressed a number of arguments, but they
failed to settle on a clear, simple message to counterbalance the message
of the measure's proponents. The opponents argued that the measure
would cost too much to implement,' 49 would damage farming in Oregon
and the state's quality of life, was poorly drafted and would create uncer-
tainty, and was unfair, treating neighboring property owners disparately,
depending on when they had purchased their land. The opponents
adopted "Take a Closer Look" as their slogan, and their media campaign
focused on drawing voters' attention to the details of the bill in which,
they argued, lay dangerous flaws. Television and radio commercials
proclaimed, without much explanation, that the measure would "let gov-
ernment change the rules as they went along," which sounded remarka-
bly similar to what proponents of Measure 37 said the measure would
remedy. 150
bought for retirement); Argument in Favor of Tim and Casey Heuker, 2004 Voters' Pamphlet, supra
note 146, at 13-14 (couple unable to rebuild home after fire destroyed it); Argument in Favor of
Matt Roloff, 2004 Voters' Pamphlet, supra note 146, at 10-11 (former president of Little People of
America, unable to run farm as tourist attraction because of competitor's complaints); Argument in
Favor of Dorothy English, 2004 Voters' Pamphlet, supra note 146, at 3-4 (elderly woman unable to
subdivide her property for children and for sale to support retirement).
The 2004 Voters' Pamphlet also included several entries from the chief petitioners for the meas-
ure correcting allegedly false statements by the measure's opponents and attempting to explain the
intentions behind certain Measure 37 provisions "so to avoid [sic] the courts from misinterpreting
our intent behind this measure, as the Oregon courts have a habit of doing." Argument in Favor of
Dorothy English, Barbara Prete and Eugene Prete, 2004 Voters' Pamphlet, supra note 146, at 29.
The pamphlet also included two presumably satirical entries lampooning wildcat developers from
southern California and seeking property owners who want to "$$$ Make Money Fast With Measure
37! $$$." Argument in Favor of Peter Bray, 2004 Voters' Pamphlet, supra note 146, at 33-35.
149. The estimate of financial impact statement accompanying Measure 37 on the ballot was
that the measure would cost between $64 and $344 million per year in state and local government
administrative expenditures. Official 2004 General Election Online Voters' Guide, Measure 37,
Ballot Title, 1, http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/storage/tmap/documents/Measure%2037%20-
%20Ballot%20Title.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). The financial impact statement stated that the
amount of expenditures needed to pay for compensation claims under the measure could not be
determined. Id.
150. Ad Wars 2004, supra note 148 ("No on 37" Television Ad 1: "Take a Closer Look").
The campaign in opposition to Measure 37 ran ads featuring farmers and scenes of farmland. They
stressed that the measure would be costly, unfair, and arbitrary. Nearly every add emphasized the
measure's large administrative costs, used catch-phrases such as "higher taxes" and "red tape," and
ended by imploring voters to "take a closer look" at the measure, and vote no. The ads lacked the
emotional appeal of the proponents ads, in part because the thrust of their message was that when
voters more closely and rationally examined the measure, its faults would become apparent. Id.; see
also Laura Oppenheimer, Breaking Ground Landowners Who Fought for Measure 37 Ready the
First Case, OREGONIAN, Nov. 22, 2004, at AOl (discussing some of the individuals whose personal
stories figured prominently in the Measure 37 campaign). This message was cumbersome in com-
parison to the proponents' simple invocation of fairness to individual landowners.
The Voters' Pamphlet included 41 "Arguments in Opposition," including submissions by Gover-
nor Ted Kulongoski, Oregon's Secretary of State and the state treasurer, former governors Victor
Ateyeh and John Kitzhaber, several former Oregon judges, and a number of mayors, as well as
conservation groups and agricultural associations. 2004 Voters' Pamphlet, Arguments in Opposi-
tion, supra note 146, at 1-34. The submissions highlighted the high cost of the measure and the
increased tax burdens it would impose, the administrative red tape the measure would create, the
poor drafting of the measure, and the importance of protecting farmland. Noticeably absent from the
Arguments in Opposition were the human-interest stories employed by the proponents of the meas-
ure. See id.
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B. Measure 3 7's Provisions
Measure 37 promises to compensate a landowner for any value lost
due to regulatory restrictions imposed upon her land after she or a family
member acquired the land.' 5' Like Measure 7, Measure 37 operates ret-
roactively, offering compensation to landowners for past'5 2 as well as
future land use regulations. 53  In a significant departure from Measure
7, Measure 37 explicitly allows the governing body "responsible for en-
acting" 154 the regulation to "modify, remove, or not apply" the regulation
with respect to a claimant instead of compensating her.155
An aggrieved landowner must make her claim under Measure 37 by
providing written notice to the governing body "enacting or enforcing"
the land use regulation.156 The governing body then has 180 days within
which to determine whether the applicant is entitled to compensation or
to waive or modify the regulation as applied to the applicant.5 7  If the
offending regulation continues to apply to the applicant's property 180
days after her application, the applicant has a cause of action for com-
pensation under the measure against the government in the circuit court
151. Section 1 provides, "If a public entity enacts or enforces a new land use regulation or
enforces a land use regulation enacted prior to the effective date of [Measure 37] that restricts the
use of private real property or any interest therein and has the effect of reducing the fair market value
of the property, or any interest therein, then the owner of the property shall be paid just compensa-
tion." Measure 37, supra note 1. Sections 1 and 8, which allow waiver of the regulation in lieu of
compensation, are at the heart of Measure 37's promise to landowners. See Hunnicutt, supra note
36, at 42.
152. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 1. When government "enforces a land use regulation
enacted prior to the effective date of' the measure. Id.
153. When government "enacts or enforces a new land use regulation." Id. In addition, the
measure gives a current owner who acquired property from a member of her family a right to com-
pensation for value lost due to land use restrictions enacted during the tenure of her family's previ-
ous ownership of the property. Id. § 3(E). Measure 37's retrospective reach far surpasses its prede-
cessor's. Measure 7 provided a right to compensation for value lost to land use laws enacted or
enforced after the date of the measure's enactment or land use laws "first enforced or applied" after
the measure's passage. Measure 7, supra note 2, at § (d). However, the measure contained no
provision requiring compensation to current landowners for land use laws enacted during the tenure
of their family member's ownership of the property. See id. (stating "[c]ompensation shall be due
the property owner if the regulation was adopted, first enforced or applied after the current owner of
the property became the owner .. "). Interpreting Measure 7, the Oregon Attorney General further
limited the scope of the measure's compensation requirement, concluding "that the voters intended
the phrase 'was first ... enforced or applied after the current owner ... became the owner' to mean
that any action by any government entity as to any property subject to the regulation to carry the
regulation into force or effect precludes owners who acquired their property after that action from
qualifying for compensation." Or. Op. Att'y. Gen. supra note 113, at * 1, * 118 (emphasis added).
154. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § (8).
155. Id. § (8), (10). Measure 7 had no express provision allowing government to waive land
use restrictions instead of compensating landowners. See League of Or. Cities v. Oregon, 56 P.3d
892 (Or. 2002); see also Barnard, supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing lack of a
waiver provision in Measure 7); see also supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
156. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § (4), (10) (providing in § 10 that if a claimant does not
receive compensation within two years of the date upon which her right to compensation accrued,
she shall be entitled to use her property as permitted at the time she (or a family member) acquired
it).
157. Id. § (4) (intending to provide time for the governing body to evaluate the claim, hold
public hearings, and decide upon an appropriate course of action); see also Hunnicutt, supra note 36,
at 43.
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where the property is located. 58 The measure gives a claimant two years
from the time an offending land use regulation is passed or is applied to
her land to apply for compensation from the regulating entity.
5 9
The right to compensation created by Measure 37 is extraordinarily
broad. First, the measure requires compensation for any regulation that
in any way diminishes the value of a particular property. On its face, no
alleged diminution in value is too small to support a claim. Second, the
measure has potentially far-reaching retroactive effect. A present land-
owner is potentially entitled to compensation for any regulation imposed
upon her land after the time she or a family member acquired the prop-
erty.' 60 A landowner therefore may reach back generations to determine
the date upon which she acquired her property for purposes of asserting a
Measure 37 claim. This "inheritance right" could certainly reach back to
a time prior to the enactment of Oregon's statewide comprehensive land
use planning system, or indeed to any applicable zoning.1 61 Third, the
158. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § (6) (explicitly providing that an applicant need only file a
written application for payment with the relevant governing body and wait 180 days for her cause of
action in circuit court to accrue). Although the governing body is free to enact procedures for proc-
essing Measure 37 claims, an applicant need not exhaust those procedures, other then by filing a
written application for compensation, prior to seeking redress in the circuit courts. Id. § (7); see also
Steven Amick, Molalla Spells Out Approach to Measure 37, OREGONIAN, Dec. 10, 2004, at B02
(discussing local Measure 37 ordinance); David R. Anderson, Council Refines Measure 37 Process,
OREGONIAN, Nov. 24, 2004, at C01 (discussing local Measure 37, including criticism of an ordi-
nance of the city of Beaverton by Measure 37 drafter, David Hunnicutt, because it set a fee of$1000
for filing Measure 37 claims, which he thought would simply lead claimants to take their claims to
court rather than pursue them through the city's administrative process); Dennis McCarthy, Happy
Valley Sets Flat Fee for Measure 37, OREGONIAN, Dec. 9, 2004, at D02 (discussing local Measure
37 ordinance); Edward J. Sullivan, Year Zero: The Aftermath of Measure 37, 36 ENVTL. L. 131,
143-44 (2006) (discussing § 7).
The measure also entitles a successful claimant to attorneys' fees reasonably incurred to collect
compensation. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § (6).
159. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § (5) (setting a two-year statute of limitation for claims based
on regulations existing prior to its enactment, but that time does not begin to run until the later of the
date of Measure 37's passage, or the date a governing body applies the regulation as approval crite-
ria to an application submitted by the owner of the property. Under this statute of limitation, Meas-
ure 37 claims are virtually immortal. For example, a property owner who purchased property in
2005, and who applies for the first time to subdivide her land in 2020, and is denied permission to do
so based on a land use ordinance passed in 2006, preventing subdivision, would be entitled to com-
pensation).
160. Id § (3)(E) (exempting from compensation only those regulations "enacted prior to the
date of acquisition of the property by the owner or a family member of the owner who owned the
subject property prior to acquisition or inheritance by the owner, whichever occurred first."); Id. §
(I 1)(A) (defining family member to "include the wife, husband, son, daughter, mother, father,
brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-
law, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, stepparent, stepchild, grandparent, or grandchild of the owner of the
property, an estate of any of the foregoing members, or a legal entity owned by any one or combina-
tion of these family members or the owner of the property."). Measure 37's definition of family
member is far more expansive than, for instance, Oregon's intestacy statute, which does not include
in-laws or step-children. See OR. REV. STAT. § 112.045 (2005) (establishing inheritance priorities of
surviving family); In re Estate of Reinbrecht, 240 P. 223, 224 (Or. 1925) (stepchildren not included
in inheritance of estate). For a discussion of Measure 37 § 3(E), see infra notes 388-400 and accom-
panying text.
161. A present landowner who bought the property from her stepfather, who had himself
purchased it from his father-in-law would presumably be treated as having owned the property from
the date her stepgrandfather-in-law purchased the property. See MacLaren, supra note 73, at 58-59
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measure calculates the amount of compensation that is due in a highly
speculative manner, which several commentators have criticized for po-
tentially creating large windfall gains for individual claimants. 1
62
Measure 37 exempts five categories of land use regulations from its
compensation requirement. 163  First, land use regulations passed before
the present owner, or her family, as defined in the measure, acquired the
property are exempt from compensation. 164 Second, land use regulations
"[r]estricting and prohibiting activities commonly and historically recog-
nized as public nuisances under common law" are exempt. 165 The meas-
ure further directs that this exemption "shall be construed narrowly in
favor of a finding of compensation under this act."'166  Third, land use
regulations "[r]estricting or prohibiting activities for the protection of
public health and safety, such as fire and building codes, health and sani-
tation regulations, solid or hazardous waste regulations, and pollution
control regulations" are exempt from compensation. 167  Fourth, "to the
extent land use regulation is required to comply with federal law," it is
exempt. 168 Fifth, regulations "[r]estricting or prohibiting the use of the
property for the purpose of selling pornography or performing nude
dancing," are also exempt from compensation, provided that the provi-
sion is not "intended to affect or alter rights provided by the Oregon or
United States Constitutions."' 169 We consider each of these exemptions
in section V below.
(noting the high number of potential compensation claims because of the measure's intergenerational
reach).
162. Measure 37 entitles landowners to compensation of 100 percent of the reduction in the fair
market value of the affected property interest resulting from the regulation as of the date of the
owner's compensation demand. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § (2) ("Just compensation shall be
equal to the reduction in the fair market value of the affected property interest resulting from enact-
ment or enforcement of the land use regulation as of the date the owner makes written demand for
compensation under this section."). In addition, the measure does not provide any source of funding
from which the state or local governments might pay Measure 37 claims. Id.
Several commentators have complained about the difficulty of quantifying the effect of land use
regulation on a parcel's value and have argued that the valuation is susceptible to windfall gains for
claimants. See Sullivan, supra note 158, at 141-42 (discussing the practical difficulties of valuation,
and noting the difference between a loss in value caused by land use regulation and a windfall gain
that would obtain through a sudden waiver of land use regulation as to a claimant's parcel while still
applying it to neighboring parcels; also citing other critics of the measure's valuation method);
Lauren Sommers, Symposium, Sustainable Land Use and Measure 37: A Practical Guide to Meas-
ure 37, 20 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 213, 226-28 (2005) (discussing debate over different valuation
strategies); see also GEORGETOWN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 22, at 1.
2, 35 (noting value created by tax and other incentives for restricted agricultural land; concluding
that the establishment in Oregon of comprehensive land use regulation did not systematically de-
value restricted parcels in the state).
163. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § (3). Each of these categories is discussed in further detail
infra Section IV.
164. Id. § (3)(E).
165. Id. § (3)(A).
166. Id.
167. Id. § (3)(B).
168. Id. § (3)(C).
169. Id. § (3)(D).
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C. Challenges to Measure 37
Adoption of Measure 37 prompted both court challenges and legis-
lative reaction. In the courts, 1000 Friends of Oregon, several farm bu-
reaus, and individual landowners challenged the measure facially on state
and federal constitutional grounds. 170 In 2005, the legislature considered
a number of bills, the most significant of which was Senate Bill 1037,
which would have substantially amended and clarified the measure. 171
Ultimately, as discussed below, both the court challenge and the initial
legislative attempts to amend Measure 37 failed.
1. The Oregon Circuit Court Decision
In January 2005, a group of individual landowners, farm bureaus,
and 1000 Friends of Oregon challenged Measure 37 on state and federal
constitutional grounds in the Marion County Circuit Court against the
state Department of Administrative Services, LCDC, the state Depart-
ment of Justice, Clackamas County, Marion County, and Washington
County. 172  Several parties intervened in support of the state, including
the chief Measure 37 petitioners, represented by Oregonians In Action.1
73
In October 2005, the circuit court, per Judge Mary Mertens James, ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs on grounds that Measure 37 (1) impermissibly
intruded on the plenary power of the legislature; 74 (2) violated several
170. See generally MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Serv., No. 05C 10444 (Marion County Cir.
Ct. Oct. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/Measure37.pdf; MacPher-
son v. Dep't of Admin. Serv., 130 P.3d 308 (Or. 2006). Hector McPherson, the first individual
named plaintiff in the challenge to Measure 37, was instrumental in the passage of S.B. 100. A dairy
farmer turned state senator, McPherson introduced the bill in the Oregon Senate. See Sullivan, supra
note 6, at 814-15 (discussing McPherson's central role in the passage of S.B. 100). McPherson
framed land use planning in the language of individual rights-planning was needed to protect
farmers' rights to farm their land, free from encroaching suburbanites' complaints that the smells
and sounds of actual farming were incompatible with their enjoyment of a bucolic life outside the
cities in which they worked. See Daniel Brook, How the West Was Lost, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr.
2005, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2005/featurebrook_marapr5.
msp (discussing McPherson's ability to frame land use planning in terms of personal rights and
quoting him as saying, "There are all sorts of things that dairy farmers live with that city folks don't
like, namely the odor from the cattle."). Ironically, some thirty years later, Measure 37's proponents
would owe much of the success of their campaign to their ability to frame compensation for land use
regulation in individual rights terms. See id. (discussing the individual rights theme sounded by
Measure 37's media campaign).
171. S.B. 1037, 73d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); H.B. 3474, 73d Legis. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005).
172. MacPherson (No. 05C10444), at 1 (Marion County Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2005). As discussed
below, the plaintiffs claimed Measure 37: (i) impermissibly impaired the legislature's plenary
power; (ii) violated the Oregon Constitution's equal privileges and immunities clause; (iii) suspen-
sion of laws clause; (iv) sovereign immunity clause; (v) freedom of speech clause; (vi) compensation
of religions clause; (vii) separation of powers clause; and (viii) violated the Federal Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Id. at 10-22.
173. See id. at 1; Ballot Measure 37 Chief Petitioners' Voter Pamphlet Statements,
http://www.measure37.com/why.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
174. MacPherson (No. 05C10444), at 10-12 (concluding that Measure 37 impermissibly lim-
ited the plenary power of the Oregon legislature, citing the generic rule that a legislature's power to
legislate is unfettered unless specifically constrained by the constitution, and determining that the
Oregon Constitution contained no provisions permitting either the legislature or the initiative process
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provisions of the Oregon Constitution, 175 including equal privileges and
immunities, 176 suspension of laws, 177 and separation of powers; 178 and (3)
violated both procedural 179 and substantive due process'80 under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.' 8'
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the circuit court's decision
was Judge James's determination that Measure 37 violated the equal
to limit the legislature's plenary power to regulate). The court concluded that Measure 37's re-
quirement that the government pay landowners if it wanted to enforce valid, previously enacted, land
use regulations amounted to an impermissible limitation of the legislature's plenary power, since the
measure forced the government to "pay to govern." Id. at 11.
175. Id. at 13-16. However, Judge James rejected the plaintiffs' claim that Measure 37 vio-
lated the sovereign immunities clause of the Oregon Constitution by making the state liable for the
economic consequences of regulation, as she concluded that the state's power to waive its sovereign
immunity through legislation is broad enough under article IV, section 24 of the Oregon Constitution
to encompass the waiver worked by Measure 37. Id. at 16-17. She also determined that that the
Plaintiffs' state constitution freedom of speech claim was not justiciable because none of the plain-
tiffs asserted that they wished to use their property to allow nude dancing or sell pornography, so the
provisions of Measure 37 exempting regulations restricting those activities from compensation were
not implicated. Id. at 17. Even if she were to find that this clause of Measure 37 violated the free
speech clause of the Oregon Constitution, Judge James concluded that the only available remedy
would be to sever that clause, due to Measure 37's severability provision. Id. Finally, the court also
concluded that the measure did not violate the compensation to religious institutions clause of the
Oregon Constitution because the measure applied to religious institutions as property owners, not in
their function as religious institutions. Id. at 18.
176. Id. at 13 (interpreting article 1, § 20 of the Oregon Constitution-which stipulates that
"[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens"-and deciding Measure 37 irrationally
distinguished between landowners who acquired their land prior to the enactment of a particular
land use regulation (pre-owners), and landowners who acquired their land after its enactment (post-
owners), entitling pre-owners, but not post-owners, to compensation for any diminution in the value
of their land caused by a land use regulation). The court found that this disparate treatment of pre-
and post-owners failed to survive even deferential, rational-basis review. Id.
177. Id. at 15 (interpreting article 1, § 22 of the Oregon Constitution-which stipulates that
"[t]he operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by the Authority of the Legislative
Assembly" -and reasoning that, although suspending a law by ballot initiative is not itself imper-
missible-because the authority of the legislative assembly encompasses citizen initiatives-laws
may not be suspended in violation of other constitutional provisions). Since Measure 37 violated the
equal privileges and immunities clause by irrationally suspending land use regulations for some
property owners but not for others, the court concluded that it also violated the suspension of laws
clause, and thus could not delegate that authority to local governments. Id at 16.
178. Id. at 18-19 (determining that Measure 37 violated the separation of powers clause be-
cause the measure permitted the legislature to delegate to local governments powers that the legisla-
ture itself did not have, such as the power to: (1) limit its plenary power; (2) distinguish unequally
between two classes in conferring benefits; and (3) suspend the laws).
179. Id. at 20 (concluding that Measure 37 violated procedural due process by failing to pro-
vide landowners affected by a neighbor's successful Measure 37 claim with a meaningful right to be
heard in the process of considering a claim, since such a challenge would be heard only after the
state made a determination, which was-according to the court-"too little, too late" because if the
state granted a waiver, development of the neighbor's property could begin immediately, and the
aggrieved owner would suffer irreparable harm).
180. Id. at 22 (deciding that Measure 37 violated affected landowners' substantive due process
rights by arbitrarily depriving them of a property interest-which Judge James defined as the loss in
value to their property if development is permitted on Measure 37 claimants' property neighboring
theirs). Although the affected owners' right to maintain their property value was not a fundamental
right requiring heightened judicial scrutiny, the court nonetheless concluded that, since the measure
violated equal privileges and immunities, it served no legitimate state ends, thus failing even ra-
tional-basis review. Id.
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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privileges and immunities clause by affording disparate treatment to lan-
downers acquiring land prior to enactment of a land use regulation (pre-
owners) and those acquiring afterward (post-owners). 82 She thought that
these disparities violated the equal privileges and immunities clause be-
cause Measure 37's ends were illegitimate and its means were irra-
tional. 183  According to the court, the measure's purported end-
compensating pre-owners for the reduction in the fair market value of
their property due to regulation-was illegitimate because it impermissi-
bly limited the legislature's plenary power.' 84 Even if the measure's end
of compensating landowners for devaluation due to land use regulations
was legitimate, however, Judge James concluded that the manner in
which the measure awarded compensation did not rationally relate to this
end. 85 The court also rejected the state's argument that the distinction
between pre- and post-owners was rational because it took into account
the fact that post-owners had notice of existing land use restrictions on
their land when they purchased it. Judge James considered the allegation
that some post-owners received a discount on their property to be "tenu-
ous at best," because, among other things, the distinction failed to ac-
count for those who were willing to pay more for the land precisely be-
cause it, and surrounding parcels, were subject to land use restrictions,
and because the measure gave no relief to those whose land value would
be adversely affected by the deregulation of neighboring land through
Measure 37 waivers.'
86
182. MacPherson (No. 05C10444), at 13. The court decided that the pre and post owner cate-
gories were "true classes" for equal privileges and immunities clause analysis, since they were
defined by characteristics that are shared and have significance apart from the challenged law, a
conclusion with which the Oregon Supreme Court would disagree. See infra notes 193-97 and
accompanying text.
183. MacPherson (No. 05C10444), 13.
184. Id. at 11.
185. The court rejected the rationality of the compensation scheme outright, determining that
"permitting pre-owners to recover based on what their properties are worth today, instead of at the
time the land use regulations were enacted and the injury to the owners was thus incurred, has no
rational relation to the aim of Measure 37 of compensating property owners for the reduced fair
market value of their property interest." Id. at 14.
The court also concluded that the manner in which the measure disparately compensates differ-
ently situated pre-owners was irrational, since it compensates pre-owners who have owned their
property for many years more lavishly than it does pre-owners who have owned for a shorter period
of time, as the more recent pre-owner will likely have paid more for the property than the older pre-
owner. The court thought this bore no rational relationship to the measure's purported ends. Id.
186. Id.; see also GEORGETOWN ENVTL. L. & POLY INST., supra note 22, at 1, 35 (concluding
that the establishment in Oregon of urban growth boundaries, and the adoption of restrictions on
development in rural areas, did not have a systematically negative influence on the market values of
restricted parcels in the state); William K. Jaeger, The Effects of Land-use Regulations on Property
Values, 36 ENVTL. L. 105, 115 (2006) (discussing empirical studies linking land use regulation to
increased property values and explaining in economic terms how the effect of a land-use regulation
on property values can be positive or negative, whereas removing a land-use regulation from just one
property usually has a positive effect for that one property only).
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2. The Oregon Supreme Court Decision
Both the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the circuit court's
order to the Oregon Supreme Court. 87 In a February 2006 decision, the
court unanimously reversed the judgment of the circuit court, in a sur-
prisingly unreflective opinion by Chief Justice Paul J. De Muniz. 8 8 The
court concluded that Measure 37 violated no provisions of the Oregon or
federal constitutions, and therefore reinstated the measure.
89
Justice De Muniz first rejected the circuit court's conclusion that
Measure 37 impermissibly impaired the legislature's plenary power, de-
ciding that Measure 37 was an exercise, rather than a limitation, of that
plenary power.' 90 Whereas the circuit court thought that Measure 37
placed limits on the legislature's power to regulate, and that such action
was impermissible because the constitution authorized no limitation of
this plenary power, the supreme court interpreted the measure quite dif-
ferently: under its reading, Measure 37 authorized state or local entities
to decide, in accordance with the measure's provisions, whether to pay
just compensation or to modify, remove, or not apply certain land use
regulations, which was "an exercise of the plenary power, not a limita-
tion on it."' 19  The court concluded that nothing in the state or federal
constitutions limited the legislature from exercising its power in this
manner; thus, the measure was constitutional.'92
Justice De Muniz rejected out of hand the circuit court's equal privi-
leges and immunities analysis, maintaining that pre- and post-owners are
not "true classes" for purposes of the clause because they do not share
characteristics separate from those the challenged law creates. 193  Ac-
cording to the court, the protections afforded by the equal privileges and
immunities clause are available only to "those individuals or groups
whom the law classifies according to characteristics that exist apart from
the enactment of that challenge."'194 Since the "distinction between pre-
187. Under Oregon's declaratory judgment statute, a judgment holding a ballot measure invalid
is appealed directly to the Oregon Supreme Court. OR. REV. STAT. § 250.044(5) (2007); MacPher-
son v. Dep't of Admin. Serv., 130 P.3d 308, 311 n.3 (Or. 2006). The county defendants did not join
the appeal. Id. at 312 n.4.
188. MacPherson, 130 P.3d 308.
189. Id. at 322.
190. Id. at 315. Justice De Muniz agreed with the lower court that the legislature, and the
people through the initiative process, share the exercise of legislative power, and that power is unfet-
tered unless expressly or implicitly limited by the constitution. Id. at 314.
191. ld. at 315.
192. Id. By defining the measure as an exercise of plenary power, the Oregon Supreme Court
essentially concluded that a legislature's plenary power includes the power to impose limits on its
ability to control land use to the full extent constitutionally permissible. See id. The court also
rejected, without analysis, the Plaintiffs' argument that Measure 37 constituted an impermissible
contracting away of legislative power. id. at 315 n.8.
193. Id. at 316.
194. Id. This is so because "every law itself can be said to 'classify' what it covers [as distinct]
from what it excludes." Id. (quoting State v. Clark, 630 P.2d 810, 816 (Or. 1981)). The Oregon
Supreme Court cited a number of its precedents that have rejected equal privileges and immunities
[Vol. 85:2
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owners and postowners ... is significant only by virtue of Measure 37
itself. . . the date that an owner acquired property has no significance
apart from Measure 37." 195 Measure 37 thus did not classify landowners
according to characteristics that existed apart from those it created, so the
distinctions that the law itself created were not proper classes for pur-
poses of the equal privileges and immunities clause.1 96  With this legal
legerdemain, Justice De Muniz concluded that Measure 37 did not vio-
late equal privileges and immunities. 1
97
The supreme court also rejected the circuit court's conclusion that
Measure 37 worked as a suspension of laws. 198 Relying on the under-
standing of the word "suspension" contemporaneous with the adoption of
the suspension clause in the Oregon Constitution, the court opined that
Measure 37 did not "'cause to cease for a time,' 'delay' or 'interrupt' any
land use regulation."' 99 Instead, the measure's authorization to govern-
ing bodies to grant waivers of land use regulations under certain condi-
tions simply effectuated "an amendment of the land use regulations in
those particulars., 20 0  Justice De Muniz then pronounced that "no laws
challenges to laws that themselves created the classification. One case rejected a challenge to an
Oregon statute capping non-economic damages in wrongful death actions at $500,000 because "the
challenged law itself created the distinction between persons who could receive more than $500,000
and persons who could not," and the equal privileges and immunities clause did not bar the legisla-
ture from making such distinctions. Id. (citing Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789 (Or. 1995)). Simi-
larly, a challenge to the Oregon Tort Claims Act failed because "the alleged disfavored class (vic-
tims of government torts) existed as a class only by virtue of the statutory scheme." Id. (citing Hale
v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506 (Or. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Smothers v.
Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333 (Or. 2001)). Ultimately, the court noted that if the equal privi-
leges and immunities clause were to reach as far as the circuit court decision suggested, laws confer-
ring benefits to Gulf War veterans, for instance, would be subject to challenge by those non-veterans
whom the law disfavors. Smothers, 23 P.3d at 317. The court thought this to be a nonsensical result.
Id.
195. Id. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that, even if the class of landowners
was not a class independent of Measure 37, the measure still violated the equal privileges and im-
munities clause because it created a closed or fixed class, pre-owners, who received benefits over all
others. Relying on precedent in which the court stated that laws allowing individuals to bring them-
selves within a favored class do not violate the equal privileges and immunities clause, plaintiffs had
argued that the converse must also be true: laws that did not allow for such movement violated the
clause. See id. at 316. However, the court rejected this argument on the basis that it had previously
upheld closed classes as constitutional and claimed that plaintiffs' argument proved too much-
otherwise, the legislature could not establish benefits for, say, veterans of specific wars because non-
beneficiaries were precluded from joining that class. Id. at 316-17.
196. Id.
197. Id. The court's reasoning could produce some absurd conclusions. For instance, this test
would uphold against an equal privileges and immunities challenge, a law that prohibits women over
30 from drinking from public water fountains. The characteristic-age-used to distinguish the
groups has no significance but for that imbued in it by the statute. Under the court's reasoning, the
classes at issue-women over or under 30-are a creation of the statute itself, have no significance
outside the statute, and thus are not a "true class" for equal privileges and immunities purposes. See
id at 316.
198. Id. at 317.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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are 'suspended;' all laws not amended remain in effect," on the theory
that an "amendment" does not amount to a "suspension. ' 0 '
The court found no separation of powers problems with Measure
37, rejecting the circuit court's determination that the measure permitted
the legislature to delegate to local governments powers that the legisla-
ture itself did not possess. 20 2 Since the court had determined that Meas-
ure 37 did not violate the equal privileges and immunities and the sus-
pension of the laws clauses, it also concluded that powers delegated by
the measure were powers the legislature possessed.2 °3
The supreme court also reversed the circuit court's conclusion that
Measure 37 violated the federal Constitution's procedural due process
requirements. 2°  Without deciding whether due process required pre-
deprivation hearings for landowners adversely affected by Measure 37
205regulatory waivers, the court concluded that there were circumstances
in which Measure 37 could be applied constitutionally, and that the
206plaintiffs had thus failed to meet their burden on a facial challenge.
The court noted that the measure did not prevent pre-deprivation hear-
ings and explicitly authorized local governments to establish procedures
207to administer the measure.
Finally, the supreme court rejected the lower court's conclusion that
Measure 37 violated substantive due process, basing its analysis on its
201. Id.
202. Id. at 318-19.
203. Id. at 318. Justice De Muniz also rejected the Plaintiffs' argument that Measure 37 in-
truded on the executive power by delegating the enforcement of land use regulations, an executive
authority, to legislative bodies, concluding that the waiver of land use regulations was not always an
executive action and that, even if it were, Measure 37 vested the power to waive land use laws, in
some instances, with the LCDC, an executive agency, and in other instances, with local govern-
ments, which are empowered to exercise both executive and legislative functions. Id. at 318-19. In
addition, the court rejected the Plaintiffs' argument that Measure 37 failed to provide adequate
safeguards to prevent improper use of the power conferred to local governments, concluding that the
measure's grant of a cause of action to claimants seeking compensation was an adequate safeguard
against the arbitrary exercise of power by the implementing body. Id. at 319.
Like the circuit court, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that because
Measure 37 made the state liable for purely consequential economic harm caused by past or prospec-
tive legislation, it was an improper waiver of state sovereign immunity. Id. at 320 ("Nothing in
Article IV, section 24, or, so far as we are aware, in any other state constitutional provision, forbids
the state from deciding that it will compensate property owners for the economic consequences of
the state's land use regulations, including waiving the state's sovereign immunity to permit those
owners to assert their claims in court.")
204. Id. at 321.
205. The circuit court had concluded that the measure's failure to provide pre-deprivation
hearings for neighboring landowners adversely affected by the government's grant of a waiver under
the measure to a nearby landowner violated procedural due process. MacPherson v. Dep't of Ad-
min. Serv., No. 05C104444, at 21 (Marion County Cir. Ct. Oct. 14 2005); see also supra note 179.
206. MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 321. Because Plaintiffs were facially challenging Measure 37,
they bore the burden of showing that the measure could not be constitutionally applied under any
circumstances. Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
207. Id. The court seemed to leave open the possibility of an as-applied substantive due proc-
ess challenge by a proximate landowner, where a local government adopted an ordinance that did not
provide the proximate landowner with a hearing prior to the grant of a Measure 37 waiver.
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earlier conclusion that Measure 37 violated no other provisions of the
state constitution; thus, the circuit court's premise in deciding that the
measure violated substantive due process was erroneous.20 8 Justice De
Muniz also found no merit in the plaintiffs' argument that Measure 37
violated substantive due process by furthering only a private interest-
that of the Measure 37 claimant-instead of a government interest.
209
The plaintiffs argued that since Measure 37 granted individuals compen-
sation for economic effects of a regulation that did not amount to a Fifth
Amendment taking, the measure amounted a kind of "reverse extor-
tion., 210  Justice De Muniz rejected that argument on the ground that,
although neither the state nor the federal constitution requires compensa-
tion of land use regulations that fall short of takings, neither do they for-
bid such compensation. Applying the same rational basis review as the
circuit court, Justice De Muniz concluded that compensating landowners
for losses in property value as a consequence of land use regulation is not
irrational. 211  Further, he thought that the means employed by Measure
37 were reasonably related to those rational policy objectives, and thus
the measure did not violate substantive due process.212
3. Legislative Amendments
During the 2005 legislative session, both houses of the legislature
introduced bills designed to clarify and amend Measure 37.213 The most
significant of these proposals was S.B. 1037, the product of months of
deliberation within the Senate land-use committee.214 S.B. 1037, as
amended by the House of Representatives, eventually passed in the Re-
208. Id.
209. Id. at 321-22.
210. Id. at 322.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. In addition to S.B. 1037, 73d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005), discussed below, the
legislature introduced bills outlining the procedures to be followed by local governments processing
Measure 37 claims. See H.B. 3246, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); H.B. 3247, 73rd
Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005) (setting forth application requirements); H.B. 3249, 73rd
Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005) (requiring local governments to hold public hearings when
deciding claims) (allowing local governments to deny a Measure 37 claim where the value lost by
the claimant due to the application of a land use rule is less than the value that would be lost by
neighbors if that land use rule was waived with respect to the claimant); H.B. 3130, 73rd Legis.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); H.B. 3285, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005) (prohibiting
property owners from suing local governments for losses incurred as a result of the government's
waiver of the land use regulation (ie., H.B. 3120, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005)).
One early bill, S.B. 406, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005), would have significantly
reworked Measure 37 by providing only prospective, but not retrospective, relief to property owners
and would have required a land use rule to diminish property value by at least 25 percent (or a com-
bination of land use rules to diminish value by 45 percent) before a compensation claim could ac-
crue. S.B. 406, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Or. 2005). The bill would have established
detailed procedures for processing claims, including various means of funding compensation pay-
ments such as through tax relief and the sale of government bonds, and would have established a
framework for transferable development credits. S.B. 406 §§ 5, 18.
None of these proposals took flight, however, and each remained in its respective land use com-
mittee upon the adjournment of the 2005 legislative session.
214. See Laura Oppenheimer, Mild Measure 37 Bill Passes, OREGONIAN, Jul. 8, 2005, at COI.
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publican-controlled House but failed in the Democratic-controlled Sen-
ate.21 5 S.B. 1037 would have established uniform application and judi-
cial appeals procedures for Measure 37 claims216 and clarified which
governing bodies had the authority to waive land use rules in response to
Measure 37 claims.217
S.B. 1037 also would have allowed Measure 37 claimants who ob-
tained waivers of land use rules to transfer those waivers with their prop-
erty when they sold it.218 The waiver transfer provision deeply polarized
the legislature and accounted for the party-line voting that ultimately
defeated the bill.219 Although the 2005 legislature failed to pass legisla-
tion clarifying Measure 37, it did pass S.B. 82, which created a ten-
member task force charged with evaluating Oregon's land use planning
system and issuing an initial report (referred to as the "Big Look") to the
legislature in 2007 and a final report in 2009.220
215. S.B. 1037, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); Laura Oppenheimer & Michelle
Cole, Political Notebook: Senate Rejects Effort to Revise Measure 37, OREGONIAN, Aug. 4, 2005, at
D04.
216. See C-Engrossed S.B. 1037, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Or. 2005) (claims
procedure section).
217. See C-Engrossed S.B. 1037, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1.8. The bill authorized
state agencies to grant waivers for claims based on state statutes administered by the particular state
agency and the Oregon Department of Administrative Services to grant waivers for claims based on
all other statutes not administered by a state agency. Id.
Earlier versions of the bill included some noteworthy provisions. One provision would have
required claimants who received permission to develop their land to reimburse the government for
certain tax breaks they had received in the past for maintaining their property as forest, farming or
agricultural land. See A-Engrossed S.B. 1037, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 28 (Or. 2005).
These back-tax assessments could have provided funding enabling local governments to compensate
claimants, rather then waive the land use regulations at issue. Earlier versions of the bill also in-
cluded provisions that would have specified land use rules exempt from Measure 37 claims. See As-
introduced S.B. 1037, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Or. 2005) (referring to specific provi-
sions of the land use statutes to which Measure 37 did not apply); Laura Oppenheimer, Blueprint
Drawn for Land-Use Overhaul, OREGONIAN, May 11, 2005, at AOl (describing original S.B. 1037
proposal).
218. C-Engrossed S.B. 1037, 73rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2.12 (Or. 2005) (waivers
granted pursuant to Measure 37 "(a) are uses allowed outright; (b) run with the land; and (c) may be
transferred freely by the owner to the owner's successors in interest"). Earlier versions of the bill
provided that if successful claimants or their successors in interest did not act pursuant to the waiver
within ten years after it was granted, the waiver expired. See A-Engrossed S.B. 1037, 73rd Legis.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 6.12 (Or. 2005) ("[I]f a public entity decides to waive one or more land use
regulations in lieu of paying compensation, the waiver expires 10 years after the date of the final
decision, unless the proposed use identified in the demand is substantially implemented within the
10-year period.").
219. See Oppenheimer, supra note 215, at D04 (noting that the vote on S.B. 1037 fell along
party lines, with Republicans voting for, and Democrats voting against, and citing Democrats as
saying that the bill's mechanical improvements to the Measure 37 claims process were not worth
opening the door to widespread development); Laura Oppenheimer, Property Rights Compromise
Bill is Expected to Die in the State Senate, OREGONIAN, Aug. 3, 2005, at B09 (stating that "ayes and
nays rode largely on one provision: allowing successful claimants to pass on new building opportu-
nities for as long as 10 years when they sell their land."); Laura Oppenheimer, Kulongoski Deals on
Property Rights, OREGONIAN, July 30, 2005, at DOI (discussing the polarized fighting over the issue
of allowing building opportunities to be transferred without also limiting the scope of construction or
creating a way to compensate adversely affected property owners).
220. S.B. 82, 73rd Legis, Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); see also Press Release, State of
Oregon Governor's Office, State Appoints Oregon Task Force on Land Use Planning (Jan. 26,
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More substantive legislative amendments occurred in the 2007 leg-
islature. One measure extended the time during which governments
must process Measure 37 claims. 221  Another referred a comprehensive
set of amendments to the Oregon voters that would offer greater certainty
to claimants while imposing limits on the number of claims.222 These
developments are discussed in section VI.
III. INTERPRETING AND IMPLEMENTING MEASURE 37
Because the 2005 legislature was unable to pass legislation address-
ing the many questions raised by the measure, and because court chal-
lenges delayed its implementation, Measure 37's scope remains largely
undefined.223 Oregon courts and the state Attorney General have ad-
dressed some questions, such as the transferability of waivers granted
pursuant to the measure. However, these and many other issues have not
yet been fully resolved. This section addresses questions surrounding the
interpretation and implementation of the measure, focusing on (1) the
scope of the measure, (2) how to value claims under the measure, and (3)
the nature, transferability, and source of land use waivers granted under
the measure.
A. The Scope of the Measure
Measure 37 creates a radically far-reaching right to compensation,
subject to potentially broad exceptions.224 At its core, the measure prom-
ises compensation for any land use regulation passed after a landowner,
or a member of the landowner's family, acquires property that in any
way diminishes the value of the property. 225 This right to compensation
is broader than that in any other state, except Arizona, that has adopted a
statute compensating landowners who suffer financial losses due to land
use regulation.226
2006), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/30_yearreview/land-use task force press release_
012606.pdf (describing members jointly appointed to the task force by the Governor, Senate Presi-
dent and Speaker of the House). See generally MacLaren, supra note 161, at 64-65, 76-77 (lament-
ing the lack of funding for the task force and recommending how task force should focus its assess-
ment of the land use system).
221. See infra notes 460-65 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 468-94 and accompanying text.
223. Unlike the 2005 legislative session, in which the House was controlled by Republicans
and the Senate and Governorship by Democrats, the 2007 Senate, House and Governorship were all
Democratic controlled. The 2007 legislature's attempts to address Measure 37 are addressed infra
Part VI.
224. Measure 37's exceptions are discussed infra Part IV.
225. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 1.
226. Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Arizona and Florida have adopted landowner compensation
laws-Mississippi in 1994, Louisiana, Texas and Florida in 1995, and Arizona in 2006. The Louisi-
ana and Mississippi compensation laws apply only to regulations of agricultural and forest land and
were passed to protect farming and forestry. See MISSISSIPPI PRACTICE ENCYCLOPEDIA § 63:43
(noting that the purpose of the Mississippi legislation was to protect landowners from government
regulation impeding their ability to forest and farm). In Louisiana, the government must compensate
landowners if the loss in property value due to regulation is 20 percent or more. LA. REV. STAT.
2007]
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Measure 37 is not simply prospective-it compensates owners for
regulations passed prior to the effective date of the measure but after the
owner, or a member of her family, acquired her property.227 This retro-
activity is also far out of line with other states' compensation provi-
sions.228 Although Measure 37 promises to grant landowners an expan-
sive new property right, its language is rife with ambiguity, and the land
use laws expressly exempted from its compensation requirement are po-
tentially far-reaching. Ultimately, the scope of the measure will hinge on
how courts and the legislature interpret or amend these ambiguities, and
how expansively they read its exceptions.
B. Measure 3 7's Ambiguous Compensation Provisions
Measure 37 provides little guidance as to how state and local gov-
ernments are to implement its compensation mandate. In Oregon, the
state, through LCDC, promulgates land use goals.2 29 Local governments
implement and enforce these goals by adopting comprehensive land use
plans and ordinances in conformance with the statewide goals. Under
this system, many local land use limitations are the result of state statutes
and regulations; in many cases, local governments are merely enforcing
state requirements.231
ANN. §§ 3:3602(11), 3:3610, 3:3622(6), 3:3623 (2007). In Mississippi, government must compen-
sate for a 40 percent or greater loss of value. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-3, 49-33-13 (2007).
Texas requires compensation for regulations that devalue land by 25 percent or more, generally does
not apply to municipal actions, and excludes a number of government actions, including actions
taken to fulfill obligations mandated by state or federal law and actions taken to protect public health
and safety. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.002(5), 2007.003; 2007.022-024 (2007); see also
McMillan v. Northwest Harris County Mun. Utility Dist. No. 24, 988 S.W.2d 337, 339-42 (Tex.
App. 1999) (interpreting the compensation exception for government actions mandated by state law).
Florida's law compensates landowners when a land use regulation "inordinately burden[s] an exist-
ing use of real property." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(2) (2007). Only Arizona's newly adopted
ballot measure, Proposition 207, mirrors Measure 37 in compensating landowners for any reduction
in property value due to regulation without a minimum threshold. See Ariz. Prop. 207 § 12-1134
(Ariz. 2006). See generally George Charles Homsy, The Land Use Planning Impacts of Moving
"Partial Takings "from Political Theory to Legal Reality, 37 URB. LAW. 269, 278-81, 285-97 (2005)
(discussing state compensation laws generally, focusing specifically on the effects of Florida's law).
227. See Measure 37, supra note 1, § 3(E); supra note 160.
228. For example, both Arizona's Proposition 207 and Florida's compensation law expressly
exclude land use laws enacted prior to the adoption of those measures. Prop. 207 § 12-1134(B)(7)
(Az. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(12) (West 2007). The compensation laws of Texas, Louisi-
ana and Mississippi have no such exclusion, and may apply retroactively when a government body
enforces previously unenforced law enacted prior to the measure. See, e.g., TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN.
§§ 2007.003(a)(4) (Vernon 2007) (providing that the compensation statute is triggered by enforce-
ment of regulations). None of these statutes, however, back-dates a landowner's acquisition of her
property to the time when a family member acquired the parcel. Unlike Measure 37, then, these
states' provisions do not appear to require compensation for laws passed generations before the
present landowner acquired her property.
229. See generally supra notes 32-52 and accompanying text (describing structure of Oregon
land use system).
230. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 197.646 (2005) (requiring local government to amend its
comprehensive plan and land use regulations to implement new land use statutes and LCDC land use
goals and rules).
231. See supra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
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In the face of this multi-tiered system, Measure 37 leaves ambigu-
ous just which entity must compensate landowners for land use regula-
tions that devalue their property. Section 1 of the measure provides that
"a public entity that enacts or enforces" a land use regulation that reduces
land value must compensate landowners for the reduction in the value of
their land.232 This language implies that claimants can seek compensa-
tion from either the government entity enforcing the measure or the gov-
ernment entity enacting the measure. In many instances, then, an ag-
grieved landowner may be entitled to compensation from either the state,
which enacted the requirement, or the local government, which enforced
it.
233
How to administer a system in which claimants can seek compensa-
tion for the same regulation from either the state or the local government
has led to vigorous debate but no clear answers. Oregonians In Action,
for instance, recommends that Measure 37 claimants, "to be safe," file
their claims with both the local government responsible for enacting or
enforcing the land use regulation and the state because "most county land
use regulations are the result of statutes and administrative rules passed
by the state legislature and state agencies.' 234 The state, on the other
hand, maintains that the entity enforcing the land use regulation (usually
the local government) is liable for any compensation payments, and that
enforcement of a land use regulation by a local government, even if that
regulation is one enacted by the state rather than the local government,
does not give rise to state liability for compensation.235 In the failed S.B.
232. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 1.
233. According to Oregonians In Action, for example,
[I]t is not always clear who is responsible for the land use regulations that have taken
away your property rights. Sometimes the local government is enforcing its own law that
is not required by the state. Sometimes the local government has adopted an ordinance
because it was ordered to do so by the state. Sometime both state and local government
laws operate independently of each other, and both reduce the use and enjoyment of your
property.
Oregonians In Action, Ballot Measure 37, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://measure37.com/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
234. Id. Implied in this recommendation is the position that both state and local governments
may be liable to pay compensation for laws they enact and for laws they simply enforce and, pre-
sumably, for laws enacted by the state and enforced by the local government. Ultimately, Orego-
nians In Actions' point is that some entity is liable, so claimants should make their compensation
applications to all that might possible be involved in the land use regulation for which they seek
compensation. It is then the government's task to sort out which entity must pay. See id.
235. According to the state, "[g]enerally, the public entity enforcing the law is responsible for
paying compensation regardless of whether the law is state or local." Governor Theodore R. Kulon-
goski, 2004 Oregon Ballot Measure 37, Initial Questions and Answers 2 (2005), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/measure37/m37qanda.pdf. Where a local government enforces a
state law enacted prior to the effective date of Measure 37 (December 2, 2004), the local government
has no right of indemnity from the state for any Measure 37 liability it incurs. Id While the same is
true when a local government enforces a state law passed after the effective date of Measure 37,
Article XI, § 15 of the Oregon Constitution, which obligates the state government to compensate
local governments for the costs of implementing programs the state imposes upon them, may require
to the state to indemnify local governments for usual and reasonable costs of enforcing newly prom-
ulgated state land use laws. Id.
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1037, the 2005 legislature attempted to address which government enti-
ties were empowered to grant land use waivers, but it steered clear of
defining which entity was responsible for paying compensation for par-
ticular land use regulations.236
In addition to its ambiguity about which entity has jurisdiction to
grant compensation or waivers, Measure 37 provides no instruction as to
how government bodies are to calculate the diminishment in property
value caused by a land use regulation. Section 2 of the measure defines
the "just compensation" due a landowner as that which is "equal to the
reduction in the fair market value of the affected property interest result-
ing from the enactment or enforcement of the land use regulation as of
the date the owner makes written demand for compensation." 237 Of
course, there are many possible ways to measure a reduction in fair mar-
ket value;238 however, neither the courts nor the legislature has addressed
The state also contends that enforcement of state statutes by local governments triggers no Meas-
ure 37 liability for the state. Id. The state reaches this conclusion by interpreting § 1 of Measure 37,
which provides that relief is available when a "public entity enacts or enforces a new land use regu-
lation or enforces a land use regulation enacted prior to the effective date" of Measure 37. Id. For
existing laws, only the public entity enforcing the regulation is liable under Measure 37, according to
the state. For new laws, the state is liable only for the enactment of the law, not for its enforcement.
Thus, local government enforcement of the law does not give rise to state liability, since all the state
has done is enact the law, and enforcement and enactment are different, separately enumerated
actions in Measure 37. Id. ("If the state enacted the new law, it may be liable for its act of having
enacted the law, but not as a result of the action of the local government to enforce it.")
236. See S.B. 1037, 73d Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 5.1 (Or. 2005). As described above at note
217, § 1.8 of the bill would have clarified which government entities could grant waivers. But the
bill's only clue as to which entities were responsible for compensation payments was in section 5.1 's
instruction that claimants file compensation claims against the state with the Oregon Department of
Administrative Services and claims against local government with the chief administrative officer of
the local government. Id.
237. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 2.
238. See, e.g., Jaeger, supra note 186, at 126-27 (discussing valuation methodologies); Som-
mers, supra note 162, at 225-28.
One method of compensating landowners would be to pay them the difference between what their
land is worth on the market without the land use regulation in question, and what the land is worth
with the regulation still in place, measured at the time the landowner makes her Measure 37 claim.
However, as William Jaeger points out, this method may create a windfall for the claimant by over-
valuing the land at issue by including in the calculation the value created by one landowner's right to
use her land in a manner unavailable to other landowners. According to Jaeger, "the reduction in
market value resulting from a land-use regulation is a fundamentally different concept than the value
of an individual exemption to the regulation," and any attempt at determining the true value of the
former must correctly distinguish "the dollar amount attributable to the reduction in value for the
land subject to the regulation ... from the increase in value for non-regulated lands." Jaeger, supra
note 186, at 121.
Another method of valuation would calculate compensation as the value lost at the time the land
use regulation came into effect, and then provide a rate of return on that amount up to the date upon
which the claimant made her Measure 37 claim. Memorandum from Timothy J. Sercombe on the
Meaning of "Just Compensation" under ORS 197.352(2) and Modification to Robert E. Stacey, Jr.
18-19 (June 15, 2006) (on file with authors). Under this method, a landowner whose land was
down-zoned in, say 1990, would be entitled to the difference between the fair market value of the
land prior to the zoning change and the fair market value of the land after the zoning restriction, both
measured at the time the land use regulation was passed, here 1990. That amount would then be
multiplied by a reasonable rate of return, say five percent, up to the time at which the landowner
made her Measure 37 claim, and the landowner would be due the aggregate of the return on invest-
ment and the amount of devaluation at the time the land use regulation was passed. Id.
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the issue. 239 Finally, the measure creates no mechanism for funding the
compensation payments it authorizes, effectively guaranteeing that the
applicable government will choose to "modify, remove, or not to apply
the land use regulation" in lieu of compensating a successful claimant.24 °
C. Ambiguities in Measure 37's Waiver Provisions
Unlike Measure 7, which did not include an express waiver provi-
sion, Measure 37 explicitly allows governments to waive offending land
use laws in lieu of compensating claimants.24' Measure 37's waiver242
provision raises a host of uncertainties, most of them due to the meas-
ure's ambiguous language. An initial uncertainty concerns which entity
has the authority to waive a land use regulation. As discussed above,
section 1 of the measure requires any public entity that "enacts or en-
forces" a land use regulation to compensate the landowner for the dimin-
ishment in property value caused by the regulation.243 In lieu of compen-
sation, however, the measure allows the governing body to waive the
regulation. Confusingly, this waiver option appears in two separate pro-
visions of the measure, in both sections 8 and 10.244 Section 8 states that
the waiver must be obtained from the government body enacting the
239. A recent study spotlights the complexity of and controversy surrounding determinations
of whether, and how, land use restrictions influence property values. GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW &
POLICY INST., supra note 22, at I ("[T]he establishment [in Oregon] of... urban growth boun-
dar[ies], and the adoption of. . .restrictions on development in rural areas, [had no) systematic
negative influence on the market values of restricted parcels [in the state].").
240. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 8. Indeed, as of July 18, 2007 the press had only reported
one instance in which government proposed compensating a Measure 37 claimant rather than waiv-
ing the land use regulation with respect to her property. See Matthew Preusch, Prineville Offers
Measure 37 Pay, OREGONIAN, Oct. 26, 2006, at AOl (reporting that Prineville was the first city "to
decide to pay cash to offset the devaluation of private property because of development restrictions"
rather than waive the restrictions in response to a Measure 37 claim); Measure 37, OREGONIAN, Dec.
3, 2006, at A 15 (noting that Prineville offer was "Oregon's only compensation offer" for a Measure
37 claim).
241. Measure 37, supra note 1, at §§ 8, 10. For a discussion of the uncertainty created by
Measure 7's lack of a waiver provision, see supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
242. Oregonians In Action objects to the term "waiver" to describe Measure 37's provision
allowing governments to "modify, remove, or not to apply a land use regulation." Measure 37,
supra note 1, at § 8. In a question and answer publication on its website, the group stated that "gov-
ernment officials, government lawyers, and anti-property rights advocates immediately began using
the term 'waiver,' as a derogatory reference to the action taken by the state or local government to
restore [a landowner's] rights." Oregonians In Action, Ballot Measure 37 Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, Question No. 6, http://measure37.com/measure%2037/faq.htm#5 (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
The term has, however, gained common currency as a shorthand description of the non-
compensation options under Measure 37.
243. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 1.
244. Id. §§ 8, 10. Section 8 provides:
[l]n lieu of payment of just compensation under this section, the governing body respon-
sible for enacting the land use regulation may modify, remove, or not to [sic] apply the
land use regulation or land use regulations to allow the owner to use the property for a
use permitted at the time the owner acquired the property (emphasis added).
Id. § 8.
Section 10 provides: "Notwithstanding the availability of funds under this subsection, a
metropolitan service district, city, county, or state agency shall have discretion to use avail-
able funds to pay claims or to modify, remove, or not apply a land use regulation ..... Id. §
10.
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legislation or regulation, while section 10 provides that land use regula-
tions can be waived by a list of specific government entities, some of
which may simply enforce land use regulations enacted by other gov-
ernment entities, such as state agencies.245
The interaction between sections 8 and 10 is hardly clear. Do all
government bodies responding to Measure 37 claims have the option to
pay compensation or waive the regulation, as section 10 suggests? Or
are there some government bodies (like those that enforce but did not
enact the land use regulation in question) whose only option is to com-
pensate claimants? Although some commentators have pointed to this
potential ambiguity, neither the state nor the courts have addressed the
issue.246 Some local governments that have adopted ordinances creating
procedures for processing Measure 37 claims have also tried to address
potentially overlapping state and county enforcement or enactment of
land use regulations, but the early results were haphazard.247
Perhaps the most pressing uncertainty surrounding Measure 37
waiver provisions is whether these waivers are transferable; that is,
245. Id.
246. See Cook, supra note 36, at 263-64 (arguing that because it may allow enforcers of land
use measures (local governments), rather than those government bodies which enacted them (state
agencies), to waive land use regulations, Measure 37 disrupts the statewide planning system and
"local governments are forced to illegally waive state laws"); Sommers, supra note 162, at 232-33
(describing murkiness of the measure's waiver provisions).
The state has not directly addressed the tension between sections 8 and 10. Instead, the state
Attorney General's office has analyzed the two sections to determine whether waivers are transfer-
able without expressing any apparent concern about the tension between the sections. See Letter
Regarding Ballot Measure 37 from Stephanie Striffler, Special Counsel to the Attorney Gen., to
Lane Shetterly, Or. Dep't of Land Conservation and Dev. (Feb. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/
measure37/m37dojadvice.pdf [hereinafter AG Letter] (discussing whether waivers granted pursuant
to sections 8 and 10 are transferable and whether those sections permit "blanket" waivers).
247. See, e.g., Yamhill County Oregon, Ordinance 749, § 6(l)(c) (Dec. 1, 2004) (providing
that, where the county has decided to waive a challenged county land use regulation, but the use
remains prohibited by a state land use regulation, the county will notify DLCD of its waiver decision
and may not permit the waived use until DLCD notifies the Yamhill County Board of Commission-
ers that it concurs with the county's decision or fails to respond within 180 days); MULTNOMAH
COUNTY, OR., CODE § 27.530(K) (2004) ("Waiver of a county land use regulation does not consti-
tute a waiver of any corresponding state statutes.") and § 27.530(H)(g) ("The land use regulation in
question is not an enactment of the county [and thus the Board can deny a claim]."); LINN COUNTY,
CODE § 225.570(C) (2005) ("The County is not responsible for any law, rule, ordinance, resolution,
goal or other enactment if the law, rule, ordinance, resolution, goal or other enactment was not
enacted by the County."). But see, e.g., LANE COUNTY, OR., CODE §§ 2.700-.770 (2004) (setting
forth Measure 37 claim procedures without addressing potentially overlapping state and county land
use regulations); COOS COUNTY, OR., CODE §§ 11.04.010-.080 (2005).
Section 7 of Measure 37 provides that, although a local government may enact administrative
procedures for processing Measure 37 claims:
in no event shall these procedures act as a prerequisite to the filing of a compensation
claim [in state court] ... nor shall the failure of an owner of property to file an applica-
tion for a land use permit with the local government serve as grounds for dismissal, ab-
atement, or delay of a compensation claim.
Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 7. This provision casts some doubt on the legal effect of local
governments' ordinances. See Susan Marmaduke, The Effect of Administrative Decisions on
Claims for Compensation in Circuit Court Under Measure 37, 20 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 329,
334-38 (2005) (discussing issues raised by Measure 37 § 7).
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whether they are personal to the claimant or run with the land and can be
used by future purchasers of a successful Measure 37 claimant's prop-
erty. Since much of a waiver's economic value inheres in the ability of a
landowner to transfer the rights conferred by the waiver to a purchaser of
her property (for example, a developer), this question has attracted con-
siderable attention. 248  Aside from generating a lively debate among
commentators and interest groups, however, only the Oregon State At-
torney General and one circuit court have thus far addressed the issue.
1. The State Attorney General's Opinion
In February 2005, the state Attorney General's office addressed the
transferability issue in an opinion letter to the Director of the DLCD.249
The letter concluded that Measure 37 waivers are personal to the land-
owner to whom they are granted and cannot be transferred with the
land.250 The Attorney General reached this conclusion by analyzing the
text of the measure as well as the voters' intent, as gleaned from the ar-
guments in favor of the measure appearing in the voters' pamphlet,
newspapers, and television adds.251
Sections 8 and 10 of the measure allow the government entity, in
lieu of paying compensation, to (1) modify, (2) remove, or (3) not apply
a land use regulation "to allow the owner to use the property for a use
permitted at the time the owner acquired the property. 252 The Attorney
General concluded that this language "only provides authority for a pub-
lic entity to waive a law to the extent necessary to allow an otherwise
prohibited use by the 'present' owner, i.e., the owner at the time the ex-
emption is granted., 253 Under this interpretation, Measure 37 authorizes
248. See, e.g., Jona Maukonen, Transferring Measure 37 Waivers, 36 ENVTL. L. 177, 184
(2006) (concluding that waivers are not transferable but suggesting that a landowner who obtains a
Measure 37 waiver may gain a vested property right in the waiver, and thus be able to transfer it, if
she meets Oregon's multi-factor test for determining vested property rights); Sommers, supra note
162, at 238-39 (discussing waiver transferability); Oregonians In Action, Ballot Measure 37 Fre-
quently Asked Questions, Question No. 7, http://measure37.com/measure%2037/faq.htm#6 (last
visited Nov. 8, 2007) (arguing that waivers are transferable); 1000 FRIENDS OF OR., MEASURE 37:
SUMMARY AND QUESTIONS, Question No. 6 (2005) (arguing that waivers are not transferable).
249. AG Letter, supra note 246. The letter was a response to two questions posed by the
DLCD director: (i) are Measure 37 waivers transferable?; and (ii) can a public entity grant "blanket"
or categorical Measure 37 waivers, rather than granting them on a case-by-case basis? Id. at 1. The
answer to the first question is discussed above. As to the second question, the Attorney General
concluded that public entities may not waive land use laws on a "blanket" basis, but must respond to
each Measure 37 claim individually, waiving land use regulations or paying compensation only if
the claim meets the criteria under the measure. Local governments "may not decide in advance that
all claims that involve a particular law, or that involve owners who acquired their property after a
particular date, or some other subset of the potential universe of claimants, will be granted relief."
Id. at 1, 7-8.
250. Id. at 7.
251. Id. at 2.
252. Id. at 3 (quoting Measure 37, supra note 1, at §§ 8, 10 (emphasis omitted)).
253. Id. at 4.
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government entities to make exemptions that are only personal to the
landowner to whom they were granted.254
The Attorney General reasoned that the plain meaning of the text
was bolstered by. its "immediate context"; namely, the types of non-
monetary relief authorized by the measure. 255  The first two means of
providing non-monetary relief to claimants-"modifying" or "removing"
the regulation-could be accomplished by actions that were either per-
sonal to the current landowner or by actions that run with the land, and
256thus shed no light on the voters' intent. But the third means of non-
monetary relief-to "not apply" the regulation-did reflect the voters'
intent, because, in the opinion of the Attorney General, it could be ac-
complished only by government actions that are personal to the owner. 7
The provision authorized government bodies to discontinue enforcing an
existing regulation against a particular landowner, but the regulation
would otherwise remain in force. 258 Thus, a decision by a government
entity not to apply a law "would necessarily be personal to the owner
submitting the claim," according to the Attorney General.259
The history of the measure supports the Attorney General's conclu-
sion. In particular, the measure's chief petitioners submitted to the vot-
ers' pamphlet an argument in favor or Measure 37 that was consistent
with the interpretation that waivers are not transferable. 260 The argument
stated that if an owner entitled to Measure 37 compensation conveys her
property, the transfer establishes a new date of acquisition for purposes
of determining what laws give rise to a claim.2 61 The Attorney General
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. According to the Attorney General, a land use regulation could be modified or re-
moved in two ways. The normal way for a government body to modify a law would be to amend it;
the normal way for it to remove a law would be to repeal it. A government body could "modify the
law to provide that 'this law shall not affect the real property at Ill Maple Drive, Anytown, Ore-
gon,"' thus making a modification that runs with the land. It could equally as well modify a law "to
provide that 'this law shall not affect any real property at 111 Maple Drive, Anytown, Oregon that is
owned by John Doe,"' thus making a modification that is personal to the owner. Id. (emphasis
omitted). "The fact that either [option] is technically possible means that this context does not shed
any light one way or the other on whether the voters intended non-monetary relief to be personal to
the present owner or to run with the land." Id.
257. Id. at 4-5.
258. Id. at 5 (noting that, except for the particular Measure 37 claimant, the regulation would
otherwise continue unaltered, and if the present owner conveys the property to a new owner the
public entity would have no lawful basis for not enforcing it if the conditions that create the right to
relief under Measure 37 ceased to exist (e.g. if the property were acquired by someone who was not
entitled to an exemption in his own right)).
259. Id.
260. See id. at 6.
261. See id at n.5. The Voters' Pamphlet argument in support of the measure to which the
Attorney General referred was submitted by Dorothy English, Barbara Prete and Eugene Prete. The
argument is somewhat less clear than the Attorney General made it out to be, and was actually
intended to clarify the measure's definition of "owner" in order "to instruct and aid the Oregon
courts in determining the legislative intent behind Ballot Measure 37." Voters' Pamphlet, supra note
146, at 113. The argument explained that, when an original owner transfers less than the entire
interest in her property to another, she is still the "owner" for purposes of Measure 37, and her
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thought that this was "a clear statement that the chief petitioners ex-
pected that the relief available under the measure depends on when the
current owner acquired the property-that the relief is personal to the
current owner., 262  It followed that if the current owner is eligible for
relief, then sells the property, the new owner is eligible for relief only
from laws adopted after she acquired the property.263
Based on this analysis of the text, context, and history of the meas-
ure, the Attorney General concluded that Measure 37 authorizes govern-
mental bodies to waive land use laws only to allow the present owner to
use the property in a manner permitted at the time the present owner ac-
quired the property. 264 This waiver was not only the minimum that a
government body was required to do to avoid compensating a landowner
with a valid claim, but since there was no authority independent of
Measure 37 authorizing government bodies to waive land use regula-
tions, it was also the maximum it could do.265
2. The Crook County Circuit Court Decision
In August 2006, an Oregon trial court, the Crook County Circuit
Court, addressed the transferability of Measure 37 waivers in the context
of a special proceeding brought by Crook County under a statutory pro-
vision allowing a local government entity, such as a county governing
body, to initiate a proceeding in circuit court to determine the legality of
an enacted ordinance. 266  Crook County passed Ordinance 153, which
provided in relevant part that a Measure 37 waiver "properly recorded in
the deed records of the county survives the sale or transfer of a property
to new ownership. 267 In its suit, the county asked the circuit court to
acquisition date is the relevant date for purposes of determining what laws give rise to a Measure 37
claim. The relevant language provides:
If the current owner sells an interest in her property, so long as the current owner still has
a current possessory interest, or a reversionary interest in the property, the provisions of
Ballot Measure 37 apply using the date the current owner acquired the property. Only if
the current owner sells all of her interest in a piece of property does the date of acquisi-
tion change for purposes of determining what regulations are subject to Ballot Measure
37 protections.
Id.
262. AG letter, supra note 246, at 6.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 7.
265. Id. The Attorney General noted that where a local government has discretion in imple-
menting a land use ordinance (that is, the ordinance is not required by state law or regulation), the
local government might have the authority to waive the ordinance with respect to both present and
future landowners. Where a local government adopts an ordinance to implement a requirement of
state or federal law, however, Measure 37 only authorizes the government to waive the law with
respect to the present owner of the property. Id.
266. Crook County v. All Electors, No. 05CV0015 (Crook County Cir. Ct.), at 2, available at
http://www.doj.state.or.us/hot-topics/pdf/measure37/crook co decision.pdf [hereinafter Crook
County (No. 05CV0015)]. The special proceeding statute is codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
33.710-.720 (West 2007)).
267. CROOK COUNTY, OR., ORDINANCE 153, § 12 (2004), available at
http://co.crook.or.us/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=FLtnKMfQUmc%3D&tabid=78&mid=552 (last
visited Nov. 8, 2007).
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determine the legality of the ordinance's transfer provision. The state
intervened in the case, as did a landowner who had been granted a waiver
under Measure 37 and who wanted to sell the land-along with the
waiver-to a developer.268 Both the successful Measure 37 claimant and
Crook County argued that under the language of Ordinance 153, the
landowner should be able to transfer his waiver to subsequent owners,
while the state argued that Measure 37 allowed no such transferability
and, to the extent the ordinance conflicted with the measure, it was pre-
empted.269
The circuit court, per Judge George W. Neilson, sided with the
state, concluding that the waiver transferability provision of Crook Coun-
ty's Ordinance 153 "can not operate concurrently with [Measure 37] and
the related context of Oregon's planning and land use regulation struc-
ture." 270  Consequently, Measure 37 preempted the ordinance's waiver
transfer provision.27' In reaching this conclusion, Judge Neilson noted
that the ordinance and Measure 37 seemed to facially conflict, so he set
out to "discern the intent of the voters to clarify the relationship of the
enactments."
272
Analyzing Ordinance 153, Judge Neilson determined that it was
"clear from the text and context of Ordinance 153 that the Crook County
Court
2 73 intended to allow the land use regulation waivers granted in lieu
of compensation to survive the sale or transfer of the subject property to
any new owner if the sale or transfer is made after the 'waiver' is re-
corded., 274  Since the text of Measure 37 neither expressly prohibits nor
permits the transfer of land use waivers, 275 Judge Neilson turned to the
268. See generally Crook County (No. 05CV0015), supra note 266. OR. REV. STAT. §
33.720(2) provides that the entity initiating a proceeding under OR. REV. STAT. § 33.710 must pub-
lish notice of the proceeding. OR. REV. STAT. § 33.720(2) (2005). Any person interested in the
matter may appear before the court and "contest the validity of the proceeding, or any of the acts or
things therein enumerated." OR. REV. STAT. § 33.720(3). In addition, OR. REV. STAT. § 33.710(4)
provides that the court cannot conduct a judicial examination or render a judgment under the statute
absent a justiciable controversy. OR. REV. STAT. § 33.710(4) (2005).
A second landowner, whose Measure 37 claim had been denied by the county, also intervened.
This landowner challenged the claims procedures established by Ordinance 153. The court deemed
his claim not to be justiciable, however, because the county had adjudicated the landowner's claim
despite his failure to fully comply with the claims process. Crook County (No. 05CV0015), supra
note 266, at 5.
269. Crook County (No. 05CVOO 15), supra note 266, at 6.
270. Id. at 12 (referring to the statutory codification of Measure 37, OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352
(2006)).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 6.
273. The Crook County Court is the governing body of Crook County. Id. at 8.
274. Id.
275. Id. Judge Neilson drew support for this conclusion by noting that the measure "acknowl-
edges land use regulations may continue to change and develop because the text distinguishes be-
tween land use regulations adopted prior to December 2, 2004 [the date Measure 37 became effec-
tive] and regulations adopted thereafter." Id. He also observed that the measure limits governing
bodies' authority to grant waivers to the present owner, limits the extent of the waiver to those uses
permitted when the owner acquired the property, and expressly bars claims based upon land use
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measure's context. He emphasized that the measure, by its own terms,
became a part of Oregon's comprehensive land use planning statute.276
The primary benefit of Measure 37 waivers, according to Judge Neilson,
is the landowner's opportunity to exercise land uses, even though those
uses would have been prohibited under existing land use regulations. 277
But "while the waived owner's right to use the property is protected un-
der [Measure 37], no statutory exception exists which would allow the
owner to transfer all interest in the property and preserve for the new
owner the right to use the property under the waiver.',
278
Judge Neilson proceeded to state, however, that Measure 37 did not
repeal the historic doctrine that owners acquire a vested, and transferable,
right to a permitted use if they make a substantial investment or engage
in substantial effort in exercising that use.279 He concluded that Measure
37 and "the historic doctrine of vested rights complement one another";
thus, "[t]he waived owner that exercises a permitted use and makes a
substantial effort or substantial investment in the use may continue and
convey the use to a new owner even though the land use regulations
change., 280  But absent such a vesting, waivers were not transferable
under Measure 37, which preempted the contradictory local ordinance.
By interpreting Measure 37 in the context of, rather than as a reac-
tion to, Oregon's comprehensive land use system, the Crook County Cir-
cuit Court may signal a way in which other courts may interpret the
measure's scope. Both the circuit court's decision and the Attorney
General's opinion suggest that the reach of Measure 37 may be inter-
preted narrowly, relying on expressions of voter intent to integrate the
measure into Oregon's land use planning system. Such a narrow, con-
textual interpretation of the measure is supported by well-established
principles of statutory construction for citizen initiatives.281 Courts are
regulations enacted prior to the date the owner acquired the property, concluding that "voters in-
tended the date of acquisition to be a significant date." Id. at 9.
Judge Neilson also found support for the notion that Measure 37 should be interpreted as part of
the state's comprehensive land planning program in statements in the voter's pamphlet, citing an
argument submitted by Dorothy English, Barbara Prete, and Eugene Prete that discussed the signifi-
cant effects of a change in ownership on Measure 37 rights. He also found significant the two ex-
ceptions to the Measure 37's general rule that new owners of property acquire subject to land use
restrictions in force on the date of acquisition: 1) if the seller "retains a possessory or reversionary
interest in the property"; or 2) if the new owner "acquires the property from a family member." Id.
at 10. In both cases, the date of ownership relates back to the prior owners. Judge Neilson thought
these exceptions reinforced the importance of the date of acquisition of the property. Id.
276. Id. at 8.
277. Id. at 9.
278. ld. at 11.
279. Id.
280. Id at 12.
281. See Strahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 P.3d 228, 241 (Or. 2000) (interpreting a statutory
provision adopted through the initiative process by applying the same methodology that applies to
the construction of a legislatively enacted statute). The court seeks to determine the intent of the
voters who pass the measure. The best evidence of the voters' intent, and the first level of analysis,
is the text of the provision itself. Roseburg Sch. Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 851 P.2d 595, 597 (Or.
20071
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on solid ground if they interpret Measure 37's ambiguities in a manner
that least conflicts with provisions in Oregon's well-established land use
system.
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO MEASURE 37's COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT
Measure 37 expressly exempts five categories of land use restric-
tions from its compensation requirement: regulations that (1) restrict
activities commonly and historically recognized as public nuisances un-
der common law;282 (2) restrict activities for the protection of public
health and safety; 283 (3) are required to comply with federal law;284 (4)
restrict the use of property for the purpose of selling pornography or per-
forming nude dancing;285 or (5) are passed before the present owner or
one of her family members, as the term is defined in the measure, ac-
286quired the property. Except for the exception for land use regulations
required to comply with federal law,287 courts have yet to address these
exceptions. The exceptions are potentially far-reaching, however, and
could be interpreted to significantly limit the measure's scope. This sec-
tion examines the meaning, scope, and implications of each.
A. The Public Nuisance Exception
Section 3(A) of Measure 37 exempts from compensation those land
use regulations "[r]estricting or prohibiting activities commonly and his-
torically recognized as public nuisances under common law." 288  This
provision instructs that "[t]his subsection shall be construed narrowly in
favor of a finding of compensation under this section. ' '289 No court has
interpreted this exception, nor has the state Attorney General issued any
guidance on the state's interpretation.290
1993). The meaning of an initiative's terms is a function of the context in which the measure's
drafters used those words. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 859 P.2d 1143,
1145-46 (Or. 1993). If the meaning is not clear from the text, the next level of inquiry looks to the
history of the provision, focusing on information available to the voters at the time the measure was
adopted to determine what the voters understood the measure to mean, including the ballot title,
explanatory statement and arguments for or against the measure, and contemporaneous news reports
on the measure. Ecumenical Ministries v. Or. State Lottery Comm., 871 P.2d 106, 111 n.8 (Or.
1994); Strahan, 11 P.3d at 243.
282. Measure 37, supra note 1.
283. Id. § 3(B).
284. Id. § 3(C).
285. id. § 3(D).
286. Id. § 3(E).
287. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n v. Hood River County, 153 P.3d 997, 998 (Or. Ct. App.
2007); see infra notes 355-64 and accompanying text.
288. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 3(A).
289. Id.
290. The state Attorney General did issue an extensive opinion memorandum in 2001 inter-
preting the provisions of Measure 7. See Or. Op. Att'y. Gen. supra note 113. Like Measure 37,
Measure 7 contained a negligence exception to its compensation requirement. Measure 7's excep-
tion was more broadly worded than that of Measure 37, as it excepted from compensation the "adop-
tion or enforcement of historically and commonly recognized nuisance laws." See Measure 7, supra
note 2. The Attorney General interpreted Measure 7's exception broadly to include "statutes, rules
[Vol. 85:2
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In construing Measure 37 and its exceptions, Oregon courts will ap-
ply well-established rules of initiative construction to determine the vot-
ers' intent at the time the voters adopted the measure.29' Courts look first
to the text of the measure within its context, including its relation to other
provisions of the same and related statutes, prior enactments and prior
interpretations of those and related statutes, and the historical context of
those enactments.292 If the voters' intent is not clear from the text and
context of a measure, courts next examine the ballot title, its explanatory
statement, voters' pamphlet arguments, contemporaneous news reports,
and other information available to voters at the time of the measure's
adoption.293 If these materials still do not reveal clear voter intent, courts
interpret ambiguities by applying canons of interpretation, including the
maxim that the language of a statute should be construed in a manner
consistent with its assumed purposes.2 94
The text of the public nuisance exception, which excuses a govern-
ment from compensating landowners for any devaluation to their land
caused by laws that prohibit "activities commonly and historically rec-
ognized as public nuisances under common law," is quite ambiguous.
295
One ambiguity is that, while Measure 37 requires compensation for "land
use regulation . . . that restricts the use of private real property or any
interest therein, ' 296 the right to commit a public nuisance does not inhere
297in the use of property. Land use restrictions prohibiting common law
public nuisances would not seem to implicate any interest protected by
Measure 37, and thus the measure would not have to except them. It is
not clear, then, what this exception adds.
and local ordinances that restrict or prohibit uses of private real property that have historically and
commonly been recognized as a nuisance by the judicial, legislative or quasi-legislative branches of
government. This almost certainly includes state and local civil and criminal nuisance abatement
laws." Or. Op. Att'y. Gen. supra note 113, at *13. This perhaps also includes "other longstanding
restrictions and prohibitions or uses that operate to prevent or remedy harm or injury to public rights,
health, safety or morals." Id. at * 14. The narrower wording of Measure 37's exemption is likely a
direct reaction to the Attorney General's broad interpretation of Measure 7's language.
291. Strahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., II P.3d 228, 241 (Or. 2000); Ecumenical Ministries v. Or.
State Lottery Comm., 871 P.2d 106, 111 (Or. 1994); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor and
Indust., 859 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (Or. 1993). Courts interpret initiatives in the same manner as they
interpret statutes, except that, where it matters, voter intent substitutes for legislative intent. ld; see
also Crook County (No. 05CV0015), supra note 266, at 6-7 (describing canons of interpretation for
voter initiatives).
292. Young v. State, 983 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Or. 1999); Roseburg Sch. Dist. v. City of Roseburg,
851 P.2d 595, 597 (Or. 1993); Portland Gen. Elec. Co, 859 P.2d at 1146.
293. Ecumenical Ministries, 871 P.2d at 110-11.
294. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 859 P.2d at 1146-47.
295. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 3(A).
296. Id. § 1.
297. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 n.20
(1987) (stating that "no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or other-
wise harm others"); Smoikal v. Empire Lite-Rock, Inc., 547 P.2d 1363, 1365, 1368 (Or. 1976)
(stating that "one cannot acquire a prescriptive right to maintain a public nuisance no matter how
long it has continued," and finding that a rock-processing plant was liable to neighbors under a
public nuisance theory for damage to their property caused by emissions emanating from the plant).
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What is meant by the exception's reference to a public nuisance
"under common law" is another ambiguity. Does the exception extend to
public nuisance prohibitions created by statute, such as laws prohibiting
the siting of a nuclear facility on a fault line,298 or only to land use re-
strictions codifying historical common law public nuisances? 299  If the
latter, government would potentially have to compensate landowners for
any law seeking to abate a nuisance not previously recognized as a com-
mon law public nuisance, effectively freezing the law.
300
What is meant by the phrase "commonly and historically recog-
nized" is another ambiguity. 301 The Oregon Supreme Court has defined
common law public nuisance as "an unreasonable interference with a
right which is common to members of the public generally. 30 2  The
court historically recognized a number of activities in which private
property owners had no right to engage because they constituted public
nuisances. 30 3 In 1905, the Oregon Supreme Court articulated the catego-
298. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (illustrating the evolution
of common law nuisance with the example that no Fifth Amendment compensation would be due to
"the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to remove all improvements
from its land upon discovery that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault").
299. Defining statutes that codify common law public nuisance can be difficult. One commen-
tator noted, "the common law of nuisance has long given 'a fairly helpful clew' on the validity of
statutory land-use restrictions that augment existing common law. The common law of nuisance has
historically been consulted, however, 'not for the purpose of controlling' the question of validity, but
only 'for the helpful aid of its analogies."' John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and
the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (1993) (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)).
300. Such a restriction of public nuisance law would have far-reaching effects, and would
certainly be a radical departure from the manner in which current takings jurisprudence treats laws
that impinge on property to abate nuisances. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J. concur-
ring) (stating "the common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory
power in a complex and interdependent society"); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 25, at 333-36 (dis-
cussing the development of categorical nuisance defense to takings claims after the U.S. Supreme
Court's Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council decision, noting the court's acknowledgment "that back-
ground principles nuisances have the potential to evolve beyond their present scope," stating that
"because nuisance law is continually expanding, new knowledge conceming the value of particular
resources may ... [impose] liability for acts which have not historically been considered to be com-
mon law nuisances," and citing a number of courts that have held background principles nuisances to
include non-common law nuisances); Humbach, supra note 299, at 7 (noting the "vital legislative
function of modifying and supplementing the common law when the latter proves inadequate to meet
changing needs"); see also DOUGLAS KENDALL ET AL., TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK:
DEFENDING TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO LAND USE REGULATIONS 117, 127 (2000) (describing flexi-
bility of the nuisance defense to takings claims).
301. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 3(A).
302. See. e.g., Raymond v. S. Pac. Co., 488 P.2d 460, 462-63 (Or. 1971) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS: SCOPE AND ITRODUCTORY NOTE TO CH. 40, at 216-18 (1977)).
303. Oregon courts have identified a number of activities to constitute public nuisances. See
generally Mark v. State Dep't of Fish and Wildlife, 974 P.2d 716 (Or. 1999) (public nudity); Frady
v. Portland Gen. Elec., 637 P.2d 1345 (Or. 1981) (sound waves resulting from power generating
activities); Smejkal v. Empire Lite-Rock, Inc., 547 P.2d 1363 (Or. 1976) (air pollution from rock-
processing plant); Spencer Creek Pollution Control Assoc. v. Organic Fertilizer Co., 505 P.2d 919
(Or. 1973) (odors from feedlot); Bither v. Baker Rock Crushing Co., 438 P.2d 988 (Or. 1968) (air
pollution from rock quarrying and crushing operations); State ex rel. State Sanitary Auth. v. Pac.
Meat Co., 360 P.2d 634 (Or. 1961) (operation of meat packaging company); Wilson v. Parent, 365
P.2d 72 (Or. 1961) (shouting obscenities in the street); Keller v. Gibson Packaging Co., 257 P.2d
621 (Or. 1953) (operation of a rendering plant); Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v.
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ries of public nuisance at common law to include acts that "outraged
public decency and were against good morals," "injuriously affected the
public health," or "disturbed or injured the public peace or morals.
3 °4
A number of Oregon statutes have also codified-and criminalized
-certain common law public nuisances.3 °5  One such statute criminal-
ized "any act which grossly injures the person or property of another, or
which grossly disturbs the public peace or health, or which openly out-
rages the public decency and is injurious to public morals, ' 30 6 language
the Oregon Supreme Court has characterized as "essentially descriptive"
of common law public nuisance.30 7 Instead of attempting to distinguish
between statutorily defined public nuisances and common law public
nuisances, Oregon courts have looked to the latter to define the former.
30 8
The courts have also uniformly recognized the context-dependent nature
of public nuisance, whether codified or not.30 9 Just what Measure 37's
City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195 (Or. 1939) (pollution of river which killed fish); Wilson v. City of
Portland, 58 P.2d 257 (Or. 1936) (city dumping municipal garbage in a ravine).
304. State v. Nease, 80 P. 897, 898 (Or. 1905). The court stated in full:
Certain acts were punishable as nuisances at common law because they outraged public
decency and were against good morals, such as habitual, open, and notorious lewdness,
roaming the streets naked, the indecent exposure of the person on a highway or in a pub-
lic place, the exhibition of an unseemly or obscene sign or picture, and other similar mat-
ters. Other acts were likewise punishable because they injuriously affected the public
health, such as maintaining slaughterhouses in a populous neighborhood, or the exposing
for sale for human food of putrid or infected articles which were injurious to the health..
. and the like. Still others because they disturbed or injured the public peace or morals,
by congregating large numbers of idle and dissolute persons in one place for vicious pur-
poses ....
Id.
305. See, e.g., ORE. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-919 (codified, as amended, at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 167.105 (2005), repealed by 1971 Or. Laws 743, § 432) (keeping a bawdyhouse); ORE. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 23-929 (codified, as amended, at OR. REV. STAT. § 167.110 (2005), repealed by 1971
Or. Laws 743, § 432) (keeping a gaming house); OR. STAT. § 24-142 (codified, as amended, at OR.
REV. STAT. § 471.620 (2005)) (sale of alcohol without a license).
306. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.310 (2005), repealed by 1971 Or. Laws 743, § 432 (repealing OR.
STAT. § 14-722 (1953)).
307. Nease, 80 P. at 898; see also State v. Franzone, 415 P.2d 16, 19 (Or. 1966) ("the nuisance
statute, as this court has frequently said, was intended to cover offenses against the public peace, the
public health, and the public morals not elsewhere made punishable by the criminal statutes and
which were known at common law as indictable nuisances"). Courts have cited the statute in enjoin-
ing behavior ranging from operating a gambling house to engaging in lewd acts. See Nease, 80 P. at
897 (gambling house); Franzone, 415 P.2d at 16 (lewd behavior).
308. See, e.g., Wilson v. Parent, 365 P.2d 72, 78-79 (Or. 1961) (upholding equitable relief
enjoining defendant from obscene conduct relying on both common law nuisance and anti-obscenity
statute and noting with approval that the lower court "looked to common law for a definition of the
general words of the statute"). But see Bowden v. Davison, 289 P.2d 1100, 1111 (Or. 1955) (declar-
ing horse-round-up statute invalid as applied to privately owned horses and stating that "[a] legisla-
tive declaration that a certain thing [here unbranded horses at large on public land] constitutes a
public nuisance is not final. It has no power to declare that to be a public nuisance which in fact is
not. What constitutes a public nuisance is a judicial question.").
309. See, e.g., E. St. Johns Shingle Co. v. Portland, 246 P.2d 554, 561-62 (Or. 1952) (stating
"[t]he law of nuisance affords no rigid rule to be applied in all instances") (citing Stevens v. Rock-
port Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486 (Mass. 1914)); Raymond v. S. Pac. Co., 488 P.2d 460, 462 (Or.
1971) (stating "there is general agreement that [the law of nuisance] is incapable of any exact or
comprehensive definition") (citation omitted); see also Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Chem. Waste
Storage and Disposition, Inc., 528 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Or. App. 1974) (determining that, under the
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reference to "common law nuisance" was meant to encompass, and
whether and how it includes statutorily defined nuisances, is hardly clear
from the text of the exception.
The context of the exception is similarly unhelpful in clarifying the
voters' intent. By its terms, Measure 37 was meant to be, and has been,
"added to and made a part of ORS chapter 197," Oregon's land use plan-
ning statute. 310 So Measure 37, as part of the land use planning statute,
must be interpreted in the context of, and as consistently as possible with,
that system. 3t' This context arguably suggests that, to the extent land use
laws aim to abate public nuisances, they must qualify for the section
3(A) exemption from compensation.
The history of the exception, however, casts some doubt on the con-
textual inference that land use laws abating public nuisances qualify for
section 3(A)'s exemption. The most relevant evidence of voters' intent
is an argument in support submitted by Measure 37's chief petitioners
appearing in the voters' pamphlet, which stated:
Opponents of Ballot Measure 37 are trying to scare voters into think-
ing the measure will prevent the state government and local govern-
ments from enacting nuisance abatement laws. This is incorrect.
Nuisance abatement laws are exempted from Ballot Measure 37 pro-
tections, but again, a law that is currently considered a regulation of
land use law under Oregon law cannot be re-characterized as a nui-
sance abatement ordinance in order to avoid Ballot Measure 37. 312
This statement appears to contradict itself. On the one hand, excepting
"nuisance abatement laws" from Measure 37's compensation require-
ment seems to encompass a broader spectrum of laws than just public
nuisances at common law. On the other hand, the admonition that laws
now categorized as land use laws are not exempt from the measure's
compensation requirement seems to limit the scope of the exception-as
well as take it out of its context as a land use law itself.
313
facts at issue, the operation of a chemical pesticides waste site in violation of hazardous waste stat-
utes did not constitute a public nuisance). For a discussion of the difficulties of defining common
law nuisances in the context of takings claims, see Humbach, supra note 299, at 10-18 (stating
"common law nuisance has never confined courts to a reiteration of past cases declaring certain past
uses to be nuisances," "public nuisance is, if anything, even more indeterminate than private nui-
sance in the range of behavior to which it can potentially apply," and "[nuisance law] is not a flat set
of prohibitions against various deleterious activities or blameworthy conduct. It is, instead, a multi-
factored balancing process for deciding which harms to prohibit.").
310. Measure 37, supra note 1, at pmbl.
311. See Crook County (No. 05CV0015), supra note 266, at 8 (noting that Measure 37, by its
own terms, became part of the comprehensive land use planning statute and should be interpreted in
the context of comprehensive land use planning).
312. Ballot Measure 37, Chief Petitioners' Statements, http://www.measure37.com/measure
%2037/chiefpetitioners statements.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
313. Another of the chief petitioners' arguments in favor emphasized the fact that land use laws
were not exempt from the measure's compensation requirement, stating "there currently exists a
body of law in Oregon which defines what constitutes regulation of land use. It is those regulations
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The ambiguity of the text and context of the measure's nuisance ex-
ception arguably broaden its potential reach. Given the courts' use of
common law public nuisance to interpret nuisance statutes,3t 4 the contex-
tual nature of public nuisance, and the placement of Measure 37 within
the comprehensive land use planning statute, the language of this excep-
tion may afford courts considerable latitude in determining which laws
qualify for the exception.
315
Although not directly relevant to interpreting the provision's ambi-
guity,316 the historical context of Measure 37's nuisance exception sheds
some light on the extreme libertarian philosophy underlying the measure.
Measure 37's precursor, Measure 7, also contained an exception for pub-
lic nuisance laws, which excepted from its compensation requirement the
"adoption or enforcement of historically and commonly recognized nui-
sance laws. 3 17 Measure 7's language was broader than Measure 37's,
including the word "adoption" and a reference to plural "laws. ''3t 8 In a
2001 opinion interpreting Measure 7, state Attorney General Hardy
Myers emphasized the exception's broad language and interpreted it to
include restrictions of activities "that have historically and commonly
been recognized as a nuisance by the judicial, legislative or quasi-
legislative branches of government., 319 According to the Attorney Gen-
eral, the Measure 7 exception was not limited to common law public
nuisances, 320 but rather was broad enough to include statutorily defined
that are subject to the provisions of Ballot Measure 37. The state government and/or local govern-
ment should not be allowed to rename a land use regulation simply to avoid the protections of Ballot
Measure 37." Id.
314. Humbach, supra note 299, at 7 (noting courts' use of common law of nuisance in inter-
preting validity of nuisance statutes); Bowden v. Davison, 289 P.2d 1100, 1111 (Or. 1955) (using
common law nuisance to determine the validity of nuisance provisions of a horse-round-up statute).
315. Modem statutes embodying common law public nuisance principles might well qualify
for the measure's exception. For instance, since pollution has long been considered a common law
public nuisance, state pollution control statutes might fall within the measure's public nuisance
exception. See, e.g., I STATE ENVTL. L. § 3:1 (2006) (noting that most states consider pollution a
classic public nuisance).
316. See supra notes 281, 291-94 and accompanying text, discussing court's focus on voter-
not drafter-intent in interpreting ambiguous terms in ballot initiatives.
317. Measure 7, supra note 2, at § (b).
318. Id. Measure 7 provided:
For purposes of this section, adoption or enforcement of historically and commonly rec-
ognized nuisance laws shall not be deemed to have caused a reduction in the value of a
property. The phrase 'historically and commonly recognized nuisance laws' shall be nar-
rowly construed in favor of a finding that just compensation is required under this sec-
tion.
Id.
319. Or. Op. Att'y. Gen., supra note 113 at * 13.
320. The opinion is somewhat contradictory in its treatment of laws that codify common law
public nuisance. In the opinion's summary, the Attorney General concluded that
[t]he prohibition of certain uses of property as a common law nuisance is not within this
exception because there is no property right to maintain a nuisance and therefore the pro-
hibition does not constitute a regulation restricting a use that is part of the owner's prop-
erty right to begin with.
Id. at * 14. However, later in the opinion, the Attorney General stated:
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public nuisances32 as well as "local enactments that function to prevent
harm or injury to the rights of the public or to public health, safety or
morals... if they govern a type of use of private property that has been
historically and commonly recognized as a nuisance by judicial or legis-
lative bodies in Oregon. 322 The breadth of the Attorney General's inter-
pretation of Measure 7's exception prompted some observers to suggest
that Measure 7's compensation requirement might be quite limited.323
Unlike Measure 7, Measure 37 limited its exception to "public nui-
sances under common law," as distinguished from statutory public nui-
sances in the context of defining background principles restricting the
use of property.324 Attempting to draw this distinction, the measure's
drafters appeared to have seized upon short-lived United States Supreme
Court dicta that tried to distinguish between common law and statutory
public nuisance. 325  The Supreme Court never fully embraced this dis-
The text of Measure 7 also indicates that the voters intended to exempt more than com-
mon law nuisance. The voters excepted from the right to compensation, the "adoption or
enforcement" of certain "nuisance laws." The voters' use of the plural "nuisance laws" is
revealing. If the voters had intended to exempt only the abatement of common law nui-
sance, they would have used the singular "law." Similarly, the fact that the voters also
exempted the "adoption" of laws demonstrates that this set of laws includes more than the
enforcement of existing rights to abate a common law nuisance, but rather includes laws
that are enacted after the effective date of the Measure. As a result, we believe that the
exception for "nuisance laws" in subsection (b) of Measure 7 applies to a set of "laws"
that goes beyond common law public nuisance law.
Id. at * 185-86. What is clear from the opinion is that the Attorney General thought that government
had no obligation to compensate landowners under Measure 7 for restrictions based on either tradi-
tionally recognized statutory public nuisances or common law public nuisances. Id. at *202 (noting
that the exception includes "at least the nuisance laws found today at [OR. REV. STAT. §] 105.550 to
105.600 and [OR. REV. STAT.] chapter 167, and their counterparts in local government ordinances").
321. The opinion stated that Measure 7 excepted nuisance laws codified at chapter 167 and
sections 105.550 through 105.600 of the Oregon Revised Statutes. Id. at *202-03. These statutory
nuisances are quite broad, including actions newly identified as nuisances, such as improperly in-
stalling airbags in cars. Chapter 167 of the Oregon Revised Statutes concerns prostitution, obscen-
ity, gambling, offenses involving controlled substances, offenses against animals, offenses involving
tobacco, and various miscellaneous crimes such as creating a hazard, improper repair of vehicle
airbags, and concealing the birth of an infant. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.022-167.055 (2005). Sections
105.550 through 105.600 declare use of property for prostitution, illegal drug activity, and unlawful
gambling to be nuisances and authorize citizens as well as the Attorney General to bring abatement
actions. OR. REV. STAT. § 105.550-105.600 (2005).
322. Or. Op. Att'y. Gen., supra note 113, at *202-03. "Historically and commonly recog-
nized" meant that there was "a substantial history of regulation of the type of use throughout a sig-
nificant part of the state." Id. at *226-27.
323. See Dave Hogan, Measure 7 Not Retroactive, Myers Says, OREGONIAN, Feb. 14, 2001, at
A01 (noting the reaction to Attorney General's opinion and quoting one of the bill's proponents
stating that the interpretation limited the amount of compensation for which the government would
be liable).
324. See Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 3(A). Measure 37's exception excuses from compen-
sation only restrictions "recognized as public nuisances under common law." The provision omits
Measure 7's "adopted" and plural "laws," perhaps suggesting that Measure 37's drafters meant to
exclude the statutorily created nuisances that the Attorney General included in his interpretation of
Measure 7's exception. See supra notes 320-2 1.
325. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (majority opinion stating
that background principles "cannot be newly legislated or decreed.").
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tinction, however,326 and it was subsequently abandoned by a Court ma-
jority.327  Nevertheless, Measure 37's drafters appear to have been influ-
enced by the Court's short-lived effort to require compensation for
"newly legislated or decreed" public nuisances, but not public nuisances
recognized at common law.328 But limiting Measure 37's nuisance ex-
ception to common law nuisances would sever common law nuisance
from statutory nuisance in a manner before now unrecognized by the
courts, drastically curtailing the legislature's ability to enact new regula-
tory initiatives in response to changed conditions.
B. The Exception for Public Health and Safety Measures
Section 3(B) exempts from Measure 37's compensation requirement
land use regulations "restricting or prohibiting activities for the protec-
tion of public health and safety, such as fire and building codes, health
and sanitation regulations, solid or hazardous waste regulations, and pol-
lution control regulations., 32 9 The exception pointedly omits "welfare,"
the inclusion of which would have largely eviscerated the measure's
compensation requirement by taking most land use restrictions out of its
purview. 330  Nonetheless, the health and safety exception is potentially
326. Justice Kennedy disagreed with Justice Scalia's distinction between common law and
statutory public nuisances, maintaining in his concurrence that background principles should not be
limited to the common law of nuisance but must be flexible enough to take into account legislative
responses to changing conditions. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J. concurring) ("[T]he common law of
nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and independent
society. The State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to
changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their sources.").
Moreover, Scalia's majority opinion also actually embraced the notion that background principles of
nuisance have the potential to evolve beyond their present scope. Id. at 1031 (majority opinion)
(noting that "changed circumstances may make what was previously permissible no longer so").
327. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (majority opinion) (noting
"[t]he right to improve property, of course, is subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority,
including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-use restrictions"); Tahoe-Sierra Presidential
Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 352 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Palazzolo and acknowledging that certain zoning and land-use laws may constitute back-
ground principles, because "zoning and permit regimes are a longstanding feature of state property
law"); see also Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 25, at 355-58 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court's
taking jurisprudence, which has recognized that some statutes can constitute background principles,
and concluding that there is "widespread agreement among the [Supreme] Court's members that at
least some valid zoning and land use regulations are background principles").
328. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. So, for example, where Measure 7 might exempt government
from compensating landowners for a law disallowing the use of property for pigeon racing, Measure
37 arguably would not. See supra note 318-19 (discussing the types of laws the Attorney General
considered to be included by Measure 7's exception).
329. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 3(C).
330. Had the exception included land use restrictions in furtherance of the public welfare, the
number of land use regulations for which government would have to compensate landowners would
have greatly diminished, because the state's power to regulate for the general welfare has tradition-
ally been interpreted very broadly. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (uphold-
ing against Fifth Amendment challenge government's condemnation of private property in further-
ance of a plan to eliminating slums in Washington D.C., because aesthetic values were part of legis-
lature's police power to preserve the general welfare and were thus legitimate ends for condemna-
tion, stating "[t]he concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive ... It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that a community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled"); Or. City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 (Or. 1965)
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quite sweeping. No court has yet interpreted the exception, but state-
ments in the voters' pamphlet and by the Oregon governor's office and
recent legislative proposals have addressed the scope of the exception.
The voters' pamphlet included an argument in favor by the meas-
ure's chief petitioners which sought to limit the scope of the exception. 33'
The petitioners stated that "[i]t is not our intention that Ballot Measure
37 be interpreted in such a way as to allow statutes... and other means
of regulation currently defined . . . as land use regulation to be boot-
strapped into the definition of building codes, public health and safety
codes, sanitation codes, or public welfare codes, by courts. 3 32 The peti-
tioners maintained that "there currently exists a body of law in Oregon
which defines what constitutes regulation of land use," and these were
subject to the measure's compensation requirement.333  Government, the
petitioners maintained, "should not be allowed to rename a land use
regulation simply to avoid the protections of Ballot Measure 37 .334 The
petitioners' statement, though relevant to resolving ambiguities, does
little to clarify the scope of the exception. The line between what consti-
tutes a health and safety regulation and what constitutes a land use regu-
lation is hardly as clear as the proponents suggested. For instance, Ore-
gon's land use planning law is explicitly premised on the necessity of
planning to ensure citizens' health and safety.335 The petitioners' inclu-
sion of "welfare codes" in the list of laws that qualify for the exception
further confuses matters.336
(finding it within city's police power to enact zoning laws excluding certain uses of property for
aesthetic reasons, because general welfare encompasses these values); see also Meg Stevenson,
Aesthetic Regulations: A History, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 519 (2007) (discussing the evolution of the
incorporation of land use regulation for aesthetics into the conception of general welfare police
power).
331. Chief Petitioners' Statements, supra note 312. The petitioners stated that they were pro-
viding their statement "in order to instruct and aid Oregon courts, so to avoid the courts [sic] from




335. See OR. REv. STAT. § 197.005(1) (2007) (stating that "[u]ncoordinated use of lands within
this state threatens the.., health, safety... and welfare of the people of this state"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 92.046(1) (2007) (providing that counties may adopt regulations requiring the approval of pro-
posed partitions in order "to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare .... ").
336. See supra note 330 and accompanying text (discussing breadth of state's power to regu-
late for general welfare). Oregonians In Action nonetheless touts this Argument in Favor as limiting
the scope of the exception in "Frequently Asked Questions" section of its website. See Oregonians
In Action, Ballot Measure 37: Frequently Asked Questions, Question No. 6, available at
http://measure37.com/faq.htm#6 (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). Interestingly, Oregonians In Action
also lists "traffic safety regulations" as an example of the health and safety regulations exempt from
Measure 37's compensation requirement. Id.
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According to the Oregon governor's office, the exemption covers
laws "reasonably related to the achievement of' public health and safe-
ty.337 The state opined:
This exemption likely does not include laws for the protection of
economic, social or aesthetic interests (or that aspect of the tradi-
tional "police power" that may be described as "general welfare").
However, a law that is reasonably related to public health or to public
safety will come within the exception, even if it has some incidental
economic, social or aesthetic benefit.
338
The Oregon legislature also took up the health and safety exception.
During the 2007 legislative session, it voted to refer a comprehensive
revision of Measure 37, House Bill 3540, to the state's voters this up-
coming November. 339  The bill includes a definition of "protection of
public health and safety" as
a law, rule, ordinance, order, policy, permit or other governmental
authorization that restricts a use of property in order to reduce the
risk or consequence of fire, earthquake, landslide, flood, storm, pollu-
tion, disease, crime or other natural or human disaster or threat to
persons or property including, but not limited to, building and fire
codes, health and sanitation regulations, solid or hazardous waste
regulations and pollution control regulations.
340
Even this revised language, however, leaves considerable ambiguity
about what laws fall under the health and safety exception. For instance,
state laws regulating the filling of wetlands, which require landowners to
obtain permits from the Department of State Lands before removing ma-
terial from riverbanks or streambeds, or filling in wetlands, might or
might not qualify.34' The statute's policy statement invokes health and
safety, declaring that "unregulated removal of material from the beds and
banks of the waters of this state may create hazards to the health, safety
and welfare of the people of this state., 342 It also invokes recreation, the
economy, fishing, and navigation, 343 however, spotlighting the difficulty
337. Initial Questions & Answers, Governor Theodore R. Kulongoski, 2004 Oregon Ballot
Measure 37, available at http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/measure37/m37qanda.pdf ("The use of
the word 'and' does not mean that the law must apply to both 'health and safety.' Instead, compen-
sation under Measure 37 is not required as long as the law is reasonably related to one of those
purposes.").
338. Id
339. H.B. 3540, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). House Bill 3540 is discussed in
detail infra notes 464-94 and accompanying text.
340. H.B. 3540 § 2(18).
341. See OR. REv. STAT. § 196.8 10(l)(a) (2007).
342. OR. REv. STAT. § 196.805(1) (2007).
343. Id. The policy statement provides:
The protection, conservation and best use of the water resources of this state are matters
of the utmost public concern. Streams, lakes, bays, estuaries and other bodies of water in
this state, including not only water and materials for domestic, agricultural and industrial
use but also habitats and spawning areas for fish, avenues for transportation and sites for
commerce and public recreation, are vital to the economy and well-being of this state and
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of distinguishing between laws that protect health and safety and those
that protect welfare more generally.
344
C. The Exception for Compliance with Federal Law
Section 3(C) of Measure 37 excepts from its compensation require-
ment land use measures "to the extent the land use law is required to
comply with federal law. 345 The exception contains a number of ambi-
guities. What "federal law" is exempted-statutes, regulations, or court
decisions-is not clear. What state land use laws are "required" by fed-
eral law is also not obvious. This exception might or might not apply to
state statutes and local ordinances implementing federal anti-
discrimination laws,346 Endangered Species Act requirements,347 coop-
erative federalism statutes aiming to regulate activities consistent with a
federally required standard,348 statutes making a state eligible for federal
funds,349 and statutes implementing interstate agreements.35 ° Whether a
its people. Unregulated removal of material from the beds and banks of the waters of this
state may create hazards to the health, safety and welfare of the people of this state. Un-
regulated filling in the waters of this state for any purpose, may result in interfering with
or injuring public navigation, fishery and recreational uses of the waters. In order to pro-
vide for the best possible use of the water resources of this state, it is desirable to central-
ize authority in the Director of the Department of State Lands, and implement control of
the removal of material from the beds and banks or filling of the waters of this state.
Id.
344. Other sections of the wetlands fill and removal law instruct the director of the Department
of State Lands to issue permits if the proposed fill will not "unreasonably interfere with the para-
mount policy of this state to preserve the use of its waters for navigation, fishing and public recrea-
tion," and mandate that the director take into account nine factors, only one of which deals with
health and safety. OR. REV. STAT. § 196.825(2)-(3) (2005) (listing factors to be considered, includ-
ing "whether the proposed fill conforms to sound policies of conservation and would not interfere
with public health and safety"; other factors include economic impact, impact on recreation, public
benefits resulting from the fill, and compatibility with comprehensive plans).
345. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 3(C).
346. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 447.210-447.280 (making certain buildings, including private
entities such as clubs and churches, accessible to persons with disabilities, as did the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2006)).
347. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 197.460 (2005) (requiring counties to ensure that destination
resorts are compatible with the site and that habitat of threatened or endangered species is retained);
OR. REV. STAT. § 527.710 (2005) (requiring certain forest practices to protect federally-listed spe-
cies); OR. REV. STAT. § 517.956 (2005) (prohibiting the loss of threatened or endangered species'
critical habitat as a result of certain mining processes).
348. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 468B (2005) (Oregon water quality statutes adopted in compli-
ance with the federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006)); OR. REV. STAT. § 468A
(2005) (Oregon clean air statutes adopted in compliance with the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671 (2006)); OR. REV. STAT. § 654 (2005) (Oregon Safe Employment Act adopted in
compliance with the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2006));
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 459.046, 466.086 (2005) (state laws adopted in compliance with the federal
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. (2006)).
349. For example, 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(c)(3) (2006)directs the federal Secretary of Interior to
withhold funding from states which fail to submit to it comprehensive coastal nonpoint pollution
control programs under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act. The Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality reports on its website that it has promulgated a number of regulations which,
together, constitute a nonpoint pollution control program, and that it has submitted this plan to EPA
and NOAA in 1995, received conditional approval in 1998 and has "completed all but a few" of the
requested amendments. See Oregon Coastal Management Program,
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/OCMP/WatQual-lntro.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (discussing
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local government must compensate landowners for state statutes or local
ordinances that are more restrictive than required by federal law is also
unclear. 35' Neither the text nor the context of Measure 37 resolves these
ambiguities. 35 2 But an Oregon Court of Appeals decision35 3 and the state
Attorney General's 2001 interpretation of Measure 7's federal law ex-
ception provide some guidance.354
The Oregon Court of Appeals interpreted the federal law exception
in the context of land use regulations passed by three Oregon counties
located within the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area-an area
including parts of three counties in Washington and three counties in
Oregon355-- designated in 1986 by Congress as a national scenic area in
order to protect its scenic, cultural, recreational, and natural resources.35 6
In 2005, two landowners in Hood River County, one of the three Oregon
counties in the scenic area, filed Measure 37 claims, seeking compensa-
tion for land use ordinances that restricted the subdivision and develop-
ment of their property. The Columbia River Gorge Commission ("Gorge
Commission") then filed suit, claiming that Measure 37 excepted from
its compensation requirement land use ordinances that implemented the
scenic area act and the Commission's management plan, because they
Oregon's coastal nonpoint pollution control program); see also 23 U.S.C.A. § 158 (2007) (directing
Secretary of Transportation to withhold a portion of federal highway funding from states with mini-
mum drinking ages below 21 years old); OR. REV. STAT. § 471.430 (2005) (setting minimum drink-
ing age at 21).
350. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 196.150 (2005) (Columbia River Gorge Compact with Wash-
ington State).
351. For example, must a local government compensate a landowner where a county ordinance
implementing Endangered Species Act is more protective of habitat than required by the federal act?
352. Neither the voters' pamphlet nor media accounts at the time the measure was adopted
explained or discussed the federal law exception.
353. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n v. Hood River County, 152 P.3d 997, 998 (Or. Ct. App.
2007).
354. See generally Or. Op. Att'y., supra note 113.
355. The Washington counties are Clark, Klickitat and Skamania; the Oregon counties are
Hood River, Multnomah and Wasco. Columbia River Gorge Comm 'n, 152 P.3d at 1002.
356. 16 U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (2007). The act establishing the scenic area authorized Oregon and
Washington to create, through an interstate agreement, an explicitly non-federal regional land plan-
ning agency, the Columbia River Gorge Commission. § 544c(a)(1)(A) (providing that the Commis-
sion "shall not be considered an agency or instrumentality of the United States for the purpose of any
Federal law"). In 1987, Oregon and Washington entered into the Columbia River Gorge Compact,
which established the Commission. OR. REV. STAT. § 196.150 (2005); R.C.W. § 43.97.015 (2007).
The Compact tasked the Commission with developing land use designations and adopting a land use
management plan for the scenic area. § 544d(a)-(c). The scenic area act designated nine specific
standards for the management plan and county ordinances implementing the plan to preserve farm,
forest and open-space land and confine commercial and industrial development to urban areas.
§ 544d(d). The act specified that, once the Commission developed a management plan, the six
counties within the area must each adopt land use ordinances "consistent with the management plan"
or the Commission would regulate land use within the scenic area in that county. § 544e(b)(1). The
act directed the Secretary of Agriculture to review and approve the Commission's management plan,
with which the county zoning ordinances had to be consistent. § 544d(f) (approval of management
plan); § 544fj) (approval of ordinances). See generally Michael C. Blumm & Joshua D. Smith,
Protecting the Columbia River Gorge: A Twenty Year Experiment in Land-Use Federalism, 21 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 219 (2006).
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were land use regulations "required to comply with federal law. 357 The
landowners countered that the ordinances implemented the Gorge Com-
mission's management plan, not the statute authorizing the scenic area
itself, and were thus not ordinances "required to comply with federal
law., 358 They maintained that because the Gorge Commission is a state
rather than a federal agency, its management plan was state law, and
therefore the management plan and county ordinances were not specifi-
cally prescribed by the scenic area act. 359 Both the Hood River County
Circuit Court and the Oregon Court of Appeals rejected the landowners'
arguments, concluding that the ordinances were in fact "required to com-
ply with federal law.,
360
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Gorge Commission was a
regional agency and that the interstate compact that created the Commis-
sion had the force of federal law.36' The scenic area act authorized the
Gorge Commission to promulgate a management plan and to disapprove
county land use ordinances that were inconsistent with the plan.362 The
court emphasized that the act charged the federal Secretary of Agricul-
ture with approving the Gorge Commission's management plan and with
reviewing local land use ordinances to ensure compliance.363 Although
the statute did not prescribe specific county land use ordinances, instead
setting out standards similar to Oregon's comprehensive land use plan-
ning goals, the court concluded that "when correctly understood as com-
prehensive land use legislation, [the act] requires a degree of detail and
rigor in the management plan and implementing ordinances far tran-
scending the precatory standards set out" on the face of the legislation.
364
The Oregon Court of Appeals' interpretation of Measure 37's ex-
ception in the Columbia River Gorge context was quite broad. The court
relied on the comprehensive nature of the scenic area act to conclude that
county ordinances not explicitly required by the federal statute at issue
were nonetheless "required to comply with" federal law.3 65 Although the
357. Columbia River Gorge Comm 'n, 152 P.3d at 999.
358. Id. at 1002.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 1004.
361. Id. at 1003 (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981) ("[W]here Congress has
authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement and the subject matter of that agreement
is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, Congress' consent transforms the States'
agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.")).
362. Id. at 1004.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. The court did not inquire into the relationship between the ordinance and specific provi-
sions in the Commission's management plan in order to determine whether the restrictions placed on
the landowners' property were greater than required by federal law. Instead, the court emphasized
the degree of federal oversight provided by the Secretary of Agriculture's review of the management
plan and the local ordinances. Id. The court appeared to have concluded that any local ordinance
approved by the Commission and Secretary fit within Measure 37's exception, regardless of how
drastically it restricted a landowner's property. Id.
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decision may be limited to the factually unique context of the scenic area
act, it could also signal the Oregon courts' willingness to interpret Meas-
ure 37's exception broadly to include all state statutes passed to comply
with comprehensive federal schemes, such as those involving clean wa-
ter, clean air, and endangered species.
The state of Oregon will also likely interpret Measure 37's excep-
tion broadly. In his 2001 opinion, the Attorney General interpreted the
parallel exception in Measure 37's precursor, Measure 7, which provided
that a local government "may impose, to the minimum extent required, a
regulation to implement a requirement of federal law without payment of
compensation. 366  According to the Attorney General, this exception
would have applied to "regulations that give practical effect to something
that federal law calls for or demands. 367 Under the Attorney General's
analysis, state statutes "implement[ing] requirements of federal law"
included state statutes protecting endangered species, state clean water,
clean air and waste management statutes, and state statutes implementing
interstate compacts.368 Not all these state statutes avoided Measure 7's
compensation requirement, however, because of the exception's restric-
tive "to the minimum extent required" language. The Attorney General
concluded that "required" meant that a state statute was "called for" by
federal law.369 Statutes passed to regulate resources to a standard man-
dated by the federal government under its Commerce Clause or treaty
making authority were "called for" by federal law,370 as were statutes
passed by a state to comply with interstate compacts. 371 But state statutes
enacted in order to qualify for federal funds were not "called for" by
federal law, because there federal law did not preempt state law, and the
state had a choice whether to implement legislation to comply with the
federal standard.372 The Attorney General also interpreted the phrase "to
366. Measure 7, supra note 2, at § (c); Or. Op. Att'y Gen. 284, supra note 113, at * 15.
367. Id. at *276.
368. Id. at *228-38.
369. Id. at *302. Any narrower interpretation, reasoned the Attorney General, would make the
exception meaningless, because federal law cannot actually require, in the sense of directly com-
mandeering, state regulation. Id. at *245 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178
(1992)).
370. Id. at *236.
371. Id. at *237.
372. Id. The Attorney General also opined Measure 7's federal law exception covered in-
stances beyond those in which a federal statute required states to comply with federal law. Accord-
ing to the Attorney General, the exception might also exempt instances in which a state entered into
a contract or other binding commitment to act in compliance with federal law. Id at *16,* 32-*33.
The Attorney General reached this conclusion as follows:
Because the limitation "to the minimum extent required" modifies the verb "impose," we
conclude that the voters intended the exception in subsection (c) of Measure 7 to apply
only if the regulating entity is "required" to impose the regulation. The word "required"
has no obvious subject to identify who or what might be requiring the regulating entity to
impose the regulation. Intuitively, one might expect that the voters intended to refer to
federal law. We are reluctant to conclude, however, that the federal law, the require-
ments of which are being implemented, is the only source of the regulating entity's man-
date to impose the regulation because there is nothing in the actual text of subsection (c)
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the minimum extent required" to limit the exception to state laws that
were "no broader in scope, in terms of [their] restriction on the use of
private real property, than the requirement of federal law being imple-
mented," and that the restriction was the minimum required of the regu-
lating entity.
37 3
The language of Measure 37's exception is potentially narrower
than that of Measure 7's. Measure 37's provision exempts only those
regulations required to "comply with" federal law, which might exclude
many laws passed to "implement [ ] requirement[s] of' federal laws.374
It is therefore possible that state laws passed to retain regulatory control
of an area in which federal standards apply, which "implement" federal
laws, such as state clean water statutes, are not required to "comply with"
federal laws, since Oregon could comply with federal water pollution
standards by doing nothing. Given the exception's ambiguity and the
Oregon Appeals Court's Gorge Commission decision,375 however, it may
be just as likely that Oregon courts will interpret the provision to encom-
pass a broad array of state laws implementing federal standards.
D. The Pornography Exception
Section 3(D) of Measure 37 exempts land use regulations "restrict-
ing or prohibiting the use of a property for the purpose of selling pornog-
raphy or performing nude dancing," while expressly stating that the pro-
vision was not intended to "affect or alter rights provided by the Oregon
or United States Constitutions." 376 While professing to "take no position
on social issues, including pornography," Measure 37's proponents in-
cluded this provision in an effort to preempt arguments by the measure's
opponents that the measure would cause the government to support por-
nography by requiring it to compensate pornographers for land use laws
limiting their ability to do business.37 7 The baldly political nature of the
to suggest such a limited interpretation. Moreover, if that were what was intended, the
sentence could more simply have stated that "a regulating entity may impose a regulation
to implement federal law if required to do so by that law."
Id at *240-41. Measure 37's provision excepts land use regulations "to the extent the land use
regulation is required to comply with federal law." Measure 37, supra note 1, at § (3)(C). The
language, like Measure 7's, leaves open the possibility that the obligation to comply with federal law
may come from a source other than the federal law being implemented.
373. Or. Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 113, at *255-56.
374. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 3(C); Measure 7, supra note 2, at § (c).
375. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n v. Hood River County, 152 P.3d 997 (Or. Ct. App.
2007), discussed in supra notes 354-64 and accompanying text.
376. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 3(D).
377. See Oregonians In Action, Ballot Measure 37, Question & Answers, Question No. 10,
available at www.measure37. com/measure%2037/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (explaining
why Oregonians In Action included the section 3(D) exception). Opponents of a 1995 Washington
state takings initiative successfully defeated that measure by highlighting that it would require voters
to compensate pornographers. See Michael Paulson, Lawmakers Still Back Land-Use Compensa-
tion, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 9, 1995, at A l (quoting state senator as stating that those
campaigning against the initiative alleged "that there would be porno shops in your neighborhood").
Oregonians In Action stated on its website that "property rights opponents defeated a takings initia-
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exemption is underscored by the fact that regulations specifically target-
ing pornographic establishments are prohibited under the Oregon Consti-
tution.378 But on the other hand, section 3(D) may itself be unconstitu-
tional because it disadvantages certain property owners (by not requiring
compensation for regulations that restrict their use of property) based
solely on their protected speech activities.
Neither the Oregon Supreme Court nor the Marion County Circuit
Court directly addressed Measure 37's anti-pornography provision.379
However, the Oregon Supreme Court did address the implications of
similar anti-pornography provisions contained in Measure 7, which
sought to amend the Oregon Constitution.38° Interpreting Measure 7's
anti-pornography provision, the Supreme Court noted that the Oregon
Constitution prohibits not only regulations that explicitly target expres-
sion, but also regulations that treat those who sell expressive material
more restrictively than those who sell other merchandise. 381 The court
concluded that by permitting the state and local government to choose
not to pay a property owner because of the expressive activity in which
she engaged (for example, selling pornography), the measure "essentially
plac[ed] a price tag on the property owner's right of free expression"
and, consequently changed the scope of the free expression rights guar-
anteed by Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution.
382
tive in the State of Washington by... arguing that voters would be forced to compensate pomogra-
phers if the Washington law was adopted. The addition of the 'pornography' exemption was neces-
sary to stop Measure 37 opponents from making the same frivolous, baseless argument against
Measure 37." Oregonians In Action, Ballot Measure 37, Question & Answers, Question No. 10,
available at www.measure37.com/measure%2037/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
378. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("[n]o law shall be passed restraining the free expression of
opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every
person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right."); Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242, 247,
251 (Or. 1988) (finding city ordinance restricting siting of adult establishments unconstitutional
because it was "flatly directed against one disfavored type of pictorial or verbal communication,"
and because the city had failed to demonstrate that the specific type of communication in question
caused invidious effects that would justify its restriction).
379. The Marion County Circuit Court decided that, since none of the plaintiffs challenging
Measure 37 proposed to use their property to sell pornography, their free expression challenge to the
provision was not justiciable. MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., No. 05C 10444, slip op. at 17
(Marion County Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/Measure37.pdf, see also supra note 175 (discussing
court's dismissal of free expression claim). Plaintiffs do not appear to have appealed the court's
dismissal of their free expression claim. See MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308,
311 (Or. 2006).
380. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text (discussing League of Or. Cities v. Ore-
gon, 56 P.3d 892 (Or. 2002), which concluded that Measure 7 violated the separate vote provisions
of the Oregon Constitution by including two constitutional amendments on a single ballot). The
inclusion of a pornography exception to its compensation requirement ultimately led to the Oregon
Supreme Court's concluding that the measure was unconstitutional. League of Or. Cities, 56 P.3d at
910-11.
381. League of Or. Cities, 56 P.3d at 908 (citing City of Eugene v. Miller, 871 P.2d 454 (Or.
1994)).
382. Id. at 909.
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The Supreme Court left open the possibility that a "regulation os-
tensibly directed against expression might pass constitutional muster,
provided that such a regulation in fact was directed toward negative ef-
fects sought to be prevented and also specified the harm that otherwise
would arise if the regulation were not adopted., 383 Under those circum-
stances, the Supreme Court thought "it is possible that a governmental
entity, today, could craft a regulation that prohibits the use of a property
for the purpose of selling pornography without running afoul of Article I,
section 8. ' ,384
Although no court has addressed whether Measure 37's anti-
pornography provision passes constitutional muster, it seems hardly like-
ly that it would, since its language is broader than Measure 7's, including
regulations that "restrict" as well as those that "prohibit" pornography
and nude dancing. 385 Measure 37 also singles out a form of expression
for disparate treatment, is not directed at abrogating negative effects in-
cident to that form of expression, and does not articulate what the harms
that would be avoided might be. 386
The Marion County Circuit Court did address whether Measure 37's
pornography exemption is severable from the measure's other provi-
sions, concluding that the provision, even if unconstitutional, could be
severed from the measure pursuant to Measure 37's savings clause.
387
Oregon courts honor express severability provisions in "a manner that
best reflects the intentions of the voters. 388 Measure 37's legislative
history, including the ballot pamphlets and surrounding press, offers no
insight into the voters' intent with respect to the measure's savings
clause. Interpreting a similar savings clause in different ballot measure,
however, the Oregon Supreme Court indicated that it will interpret sav-
ings clauses broadly as a directive by the voters to the courts to "clean-
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Measure 7's provision exempted only those regulation that "prohibited" the use of prop-
erty for the selling of pornography or nude dancing. Measure 7, supra note 2, at § (c). Interpreting
the language of the provision, the Attorney General concluded that "only those regulations that
expressly prohibit the listed activities" were exempt from the measure's compensation requirement.
See Or. Op. Att'y. Gen., supra note 113, at *5, *87. "Regulations that merely restrict those activities
or make them impractical are not within the exception." Id. at *88.
386. See Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242, 251 (Or. 1988); Miller, 871 P.2d at 460 (setting
out parameters for constitutionally permissible statutes that target, or disparately effect, constitution-
ally protected expression).
387. See supra note 175 (discussing Marion County Circuit Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs'
claim that Measure 37 violated the Oregon Constitution's free expression provisions); Measure 37,
supra note 1, at § 13 (providing "if any portion or portions of this act are declared invalid by a court
of competent jurisdiction, the remaining portions of this act shall remain in full force and effect").
388. See, e.g., Advocates for Effective Regulation v. City of Eugene, 32 P.3d 228, 231 (Or.
App. 2001) (citing PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993), and interpreting a
severability clause of city ballot initiative regarding disclosure of information about hazardous
waste, severing several unconstitutional portions of the initiative from the remaining provisions);
Vannatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770, 789 (Or. 1997) (severing from political campaign finance initia-
tive certain provisions that violated Oregon Constitution's free expression guarantees).
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up" an initiative's unconstitutional elements. 389 On the whole, then, it
seems likely that while Measure 37's anti-pornography provision violates
the free expression clause of Oregon's Constitution, it could be severed,
saving the remaining provisions of the measure.
E. Laws Enacted Prior to the Acquisition of Property
Section 3(E) of Measure 37 exempts from its compensation re-
quirement land use regulations enacted "prior to the date of acquisition
of the property by the owner or a family member of the owner who
owned the subject property prior to acquisition or inheritance by the
owner, whichever occurred first. 3 90 The exception excuses the govern-
ment from compensating some landowners, but it also extends Measure
37's compensation requirement potentially deep into the past because it
grants to current owners the right to compensation for land use laws
passed not only during their tenure as owners but also for those passed
during the tenure of their family members. 39 1 The "inheritance right"
created by this exception has no equal in other states, or even in Ore-
gon's intestacy laws.392
The provision leaves a number of questions unanswered. Among
them are whether the exception requires a family to hold property con-
tinuously, or whether it would also apply to situations where property is
sold to a non-family member but subsequently reacquired by the family;
whether the provision applies to corporations that transfer property
among sister corporate entities; and how the exception interacts with the
measure's waiver provisions. The last uncertainty-whether owners of
property subject to a land use law enacted prior to their acquisition of the
property but during the tenure of a family member's ownership are enti-
tled to a waiver of that law if government chooses not to compensate-
has perhaps the most far-reaching implications. On the one hand, section
3(E) back-dates an owner's "acquisition" of property for purposes of the
measure's compensation requirement to the date on which a family
member acquired the property. The measure's waiver provision, how-
ever, allows governments to waive land use regulations only "to allow
the owner to use the property for a use permitted at the time the owner
389. Vannatta, 931 P.2d at 789 (interpreting a savings clause that read "[l]f any part of this Act
is held unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall remain in force unless the court specifically finds
that the remaining parts, standing alone, are incomplete and incapable of being executed" as a direc-
tive from the voters to sever those provisions that were unconstitutional and clean up the rest of the
measure in order for it to make sense without those provisions).
390. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 3(E).
391. The measure defines "family member" expansively. See id § 11(A). Present owners of
property may be entitled to compensation if the government enforces land use laws enacted at any
time before a family member-including distant family members related by marriage, such as step-
grandparents in-law-acquired the property. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing measure's retroactive reach).
392. See supra note 160 (discussing Oregon intestacy law); supra notes 114, 225, 227 (discuss-
ing other states' regulatory takings legislation); and infra notes 402-49 and accompanying text
(discussing other states' ballot measures).
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acquired the property," making no mention of an inheritance right.393 If,
for example, a property owner who acquired property in 1990 from her
father (who in turn acquired the property in 1970) filed a Measure 37
claim seeking compensation for a 1980 provision that prevented her from
subdividing her land, would a government be barred from waiving that
1980 regulation and thereby allowing the subdivisions? Or would a gov-
ernment be limited to waiving only those land use restrictions dating
back to 1990, the "time the owner acquired the property" and, if so,
would such a waiver satisfy the government's compensation requirement
under Measure 37?
At least one court has addressed these questions, answering both in
the affirmative. In Cobos v. Marion County,3 94 Judge Thomas M. Hart of
the Marion County Circuit Court concluded that Measure 37 provides for
two distinct and potentially separate dates-one for calculating compen-
sation owed for land use restrictions that devalue property, and another
for determining which land use regulations apply when a government
waives land use regulations rather than compensating an owner.39 ' The
Cobos case concerned a Measure 37 claim filed by property owners in
Marion County who had inherited two parcels of property, one in 1999
and one in 2001, from family members who had, in turn, inherited the
parcels from other family members who had purchased the properties in
1946.396 The county responded to the claims by exercising its option
under section 8 of Measure 37 to waive applicable land use restrictions
rather than compensate the landowners; however, it waived only the land
use restrictions to which the parcels became subject after 1999 and 2001,
the respective dates upon which the present owners acquired the proper-
ties, continuing to apply land use restrictions enacted prior to the present
owners' acquisition of the property.397
Judge Hart upheld the county's actions against a challenge by the
property owners, concluding that (1) section 8 authorizes governments to
waive land use restrictions in response to Measure 37 claims only to the
extent that doing so allows the owner to "use the property for a use per-
mitted at the time the owner acquired the property";398 (2) "the portion of
the statute that permits an owner to recover just compensation for land
use regulations enacted during a family member's tenure [section 3(E)] is
limited in application to section 1 [the compensation provision] of the
393. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 8 (stating that "the governing body responsible for enacting
the land use regulation may modify, remove, or not apply the land use regulation... to allow the
owner to use the property for a use permitted at the time the owner acquired the property").
394. Cobos v. Marion County, No. 05C16640 (Marion County Cir. Ct., July 11, 2006) (Letter
Opinion), available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/hot topics/measure371itigation.shtml (last visited
Nov. 8, 2007).
395. Id.
396. Id. at Ex. B, 1.
397. Id.
398. Id. at Ex. B, 2.
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statute";399 (3) the measure contains no comparable provision that
"makes the waiver provision applicable to rules that became effective
during ownership by the current owner's family member"; 400 and (4) a
government has full discretion whether or not to waive a land use law (so
that the owner may use her property as she could have on the date she
acquired it) or compensate an owner for lost value due to a land use law
(enacted after she, or one of her family members, acquired the prop-
erty). 40 1 The plaintiffs did not appeal Judge Hart's decision. Commenta-
tors, including Measure 37's drafters, seem to agree that while a current
owner's right to compensation extends to land use laws enacted during
the prior ownership tenancy of the claimant's family, a government can
waive only those land use laws enacted subsequent to the time the cur-
rent owner acquired the property, and that such a waiver completely sat-
isfies a claim under Measure 37.4 2
399. Id. ("section 3(E) limits the payment provision of section 1 to those situations in which the
current owner or a family member of the current owner acquired the property before the offending
land use regulations became effective").
400. Id. Judge Hart stated that "to the extent the exception contained in section 3(E) could
possibly have been understood to apply to section 8, the specific language in section 8 regarding
who may obtain the non-application of land use rules indicates a particular intent to limit such a
waiver to the current owner." Id. at Ex. B, 5.
401. Id at Ex. B, 3 n.4 (citing Measure 37 §§ 8, 10). According to Judge Thomas Hart's
interpretation, a government could avoid paying potentially large amount of compensation for land
use laws going back many years by waiving only those land use laws of more recent vintage that
have been enacted since the claimant acquired land. Judge Hart's responded to the landowner's
complaints that this result "deprives property owners of the 'substantive rights granted in Section 1'"
by stating that:
no substantive rights related to non-application of land use rules were granted in section 1
of the statute. That portion of the statute addresses only the monetary compensation
granted to property owners. In contrast, Sections 8 and 10 grant public entities discretion
to not apply the land use rules instead of compensating the owners. If a public entity
chooses this route, only sections 8 and 10 of the statute are relevant, and any exceptions
to section 1, including the exception that entitles a current property owner to compensa-
tion if the owner's family member owned the property at the time the land use rules be-
came effective, are inapplicable.
Id. at Ex. B, 6.
402. Oregonians In Action, the organization largely responsible for drafting and supporting
Measure 37, stated in the "Frequently Asked Questions" section of its website: "Measure 37 distin-
guishes between compensation claims and waiver claims. Compensation claims revert to the date
property was acquired by the family member. A claim for a waiver reverts to the date the present
owner acquired the property." Oregonians In Action website, Frequently Asked Question No. 23,
http://www.measure37.com/measure%2037/faq.htm#22 (last visited Nov. 9, 2007); see also Som-
mers, supra note 162, at 216-17 (same). David Hunnicutt, Oregonians In Action's executive direc-
tor, explained in a 2005 speech that this distinction had been adopted by the drafters in order to
undercut potential arguments by the measure's opponents. See David J. Hunnicutt, Executive Direc-
tor, Oregonians In Action, Oregon Law Institute Conference Speech at the "Measure 37 Summit"
(Jan. 5, 2005) (stating "at the time that the Measure was drafted we were afraid that we would face
the argument that if you go back two generations then ... counties would have to allow people to
use land in the way that grandpa could have done it when grandpa purchased the property in 1890
.... [t]hat being the case ... we thought it would make it more difficult to pass the Measure ....
[w]e wanted to take that argument away from the opponents"), available at
http://www.doj.state.or.us/hot-topics/pdf/measure37/cobos.msj.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007) (ex.
D to State of Oregon Motion for Summary Judgment in Cobos v. Marion County, No. 05C 16640
(Marion County Cir. Ct. July 11, 2006)).
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V. EXPORTING MEASURE 37
The November 2006 election cycle saw voters decide a host of
property rights ballot measures around the country. Most of these meas-
ures proposed limiting the circumstances in which state governments
could exercise their eminent domain power.40 3 These measures were a
direct response to the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of
New London,4 4 which upheld against a Fifth Amendment challenge the
city of New London's condemnation and transfer of property from one
private party to another for the "public use" of economic development.0 5
These citizen initiatives aimed at limiting state condemnation power rode
a strong current of public opposition to the perceived implications of the
Kelo decision.40 6 During the November 2006 elections, voters over-
whelmingly adopted measures restricting states' eminent domain power
in every state in which a pure-Keo
407 initiative was on the ballot.
40 8
California, Idaho, and Arizona also saw property rights reform
measures on their November 2006 ballots.40 9  The measures in these
403. See, e.g., Ballot Question No. 2 (Nev. 2006) (proposing constitutional amendment provid-
ing that transfer of property from one private property to another is not a public use); Amendment 5
(La. 2006) (same; appeared on primary ballot); Initiated Constitutional Amendment 2 (N.D. 2006)
(same); Constitutional Amendment 8 (Fla. 2006) (same); Constitutional Amendment I (Ga. 2006)
(same); Constitutional Amendment 5 (S.C. 2006) (same); Ballot Proposal 4 (Mich. 2006) (statutory
amendment); Ballot Question 1 (N.H. 2006) (same); Ballot Measure 39 (Or. 2006) (same); see also
National Conference of State Legislatures, Property Rights Issues on the 2006 Ballot,
http://www.ncsl.org/statevote/proprights_06.htm (describing measures, giving vote outcomes, and
linking to description of provisions).
404. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
405. In Kelo, the Court, in a 5-4 opinion, ruled that government may exercise its power of
eminent domain to condemn privately-owned property, even where that property will eventually be
transferred to another private entity, so long as the government's exercise of its condemnation au-
thority furthers public economic objectives. Kelo, 545 U.S at 484-86, 489-90; see Corinne Calfee,
Kelo v. City of New London: The More Things Stay The Same, The More They Change, 33
ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 579-81 (2006) (analyzing the Kelo decision and describing its aftermath);
Amanda Goodin, Rejecting the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
177, 195-96 (2007) (same); Richard Dolesh & Douglas Vaira, Property Rights and Wrongs, PARKS
& RECREATION, Mar. 1, 2007, at 58, available at http://www.nrpa.org/content/default.aspx?
documentld=6040 (describing Kelo backlash).
406. See A.L.I.-A.B.A, CONDEMNATION 101: FUNDAMENTALS OF CONDEMNATION LAW
AND LAND VALUATION: LEGISLATIVE ACTION SINCE KELO 344-57 (2006) (describing, state-by-
state, legislative measures aimed at curbing "abuse" of eminent domain for private economic use and
noting that 34 states had passed such laws by January 2007); Donald E. Sanders & Patricia Pattison,
The Aftermath of Kelo, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 157, 168-70 (2005) (describing the backlash to Kelo);
Kimberly M. Watt, Comment, Eminent Domain, Regulatory Takings, and Legislative Responses in
the Post-Kelo Northwest, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 539, 577-82 (2007) (same; focusing on Idaho's legisla-
tive responses to Kelo).
407. As opposed to a hybrid eminent domain-regulatory takings initiatives, discussed infra
notes 409-i1.
408. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 403, (providing voting results).
Nevada's measure must be approved a second time by voters, under Nevada's constitutional
requirement that initiatives proposing constitutional amendments be approved by voters in two
successive elections. See NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2(4).
409. Proposition 90 (Cal. 2006); Proposition 2 (Id. 2006); Proposition 207 (Az. 2006).
Montana's Ballot Initiative 154, another "Kelo-plus" initiative, was struck from the ballot be-
cause of irregularities in the manner out-of-state signature gatherers obtained the signatures needed
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states, so-called "Kelo-plus 41 ° initiatives, contained both eminent do-
main reform provisions as well as Measure 37-type regulatory takings
reforms.4" In addition, Washington saw an initiative that invoked Kelo
in its preamble but actually contained only Measure 3 7-type regulatory
to place the initiative on the ballot. Montanans for Justice v. State, 146 P.3d 759, 775-76 (Mont.
2006) (referring to the "bait and switch" tactics of signature gatherers).
Missouri also saw a citizen initiative to place a "Kelo-plus" measure on its ballot. That initiative
also foundered on irregularities in the manner in which signatures were submitted and in the fiscal
note summary of the initiative, and the secretary of state refused to place it on the ballot. See Crim
v. Sec'y of State, No. 06AC-CCO021 I (Mo. 19th Jud. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 2006); Kit Wagar & Steve
Kraske, State Ballot Issues Rejected, KANSAS CITY STAR, May 26, 2006.
Nevada's Ballot Question 2 initially also contained Measure 37-like provisions, but they were
struck from the ballot by the Nevada Supreme Court, which concluded that the inclusion of both
eminent domain and regulatory takings provisions in one ballot initiative violated a Nevada constitu-
tional provision that limits ballot initiatives to a single subject. The Nevada Supreme Court allowed
the eminent domain portion of the initiative to be placed on the ballot. See generally Nevadans for
the Protection of Property Rights, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235 (Nev. 2006).
In Oklahoma, the state supreme court struck a "Kelo-plus" ballot initiative completely from the
ballot for violating the Oklahoma Constitution's provision limiting ballot measures to a single sub-
ject. See In re Initiative Petition No. 382, 142 P.3d 400, 409 (Okla. 2006); John Greiner, Court
Rules Against Petition on Eminent Domain Protection, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 21, 2006, avail-
able at 2006 WLNR 10719516.
410. Combining eminent domain and regulatory takings reform in a single ballot measure was
controversial, and potentially politically risky. See, e.g., Leonard Gilroy, By a Landslide, Americans
Voted to Protect Their Property, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 19, 2006, at 12, available at 2006 WLNR
20139782 (stating that "Kelo-plus" initiatives were a more difficult political sell because, while most
people agreed with limiting state eminent domain power, regulatory takings reform had strong
opposition); Dolesh & Vaira, supra note 405, at 1 (discussing "Kelo-plus" measures).
411. California Proposition 90, §§ 3, 19(a)(1), (b)(8) (2006) available at
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/pdf/prop90_text.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). California's
Proposition 90 amended the state constitution, burying its regulatory takings clause within the emi-
nent domain reforms. It provided that "[p]roperty may not be taken or damaged for private use" and
then defined "damaged" to include "government actions that result in substantial economic loss to
private property," including "downzoning" and "limitations on the use of private air space." Id.
(emphasis added). For a detailed description of Proposition, see generally RICHARD M. FRANK,
ALI-ABA INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GOVERNMENT LIABILITY, PROPOSITION 90: AN
ANALYSIS 669-731 (2007) (describing history of Proposition 90 and analyzing its provisions).
Idaho's Proposition 2 contained eminent domain provisions that would have amended Idaho
statute to prohibited the state from using eminent domain to acquire property "if at the time of the
condemnation, the public body condemning the property, or its designee, intends to convey fee title
to all or a portion of the real property, or a lesser interest than fee title, to another private party."
Idaho Proposition 2, § 1 (2006) available at http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/06initO8.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2007). Its regulatory takings section would have amended Idaho statutes to provide:
If an owner's ability to use, possess, sell, or divide private real property is limited or pro-
hibited by the enactment or enforcement of any land use law after the date of acquisition
by the owner of the property in a manner that reduces the fair market value of the prop-
erty, the owner shall be entitled to just compensation, and shall not be required to first
submit a land use application to remove, modify, vary, or otherwise alter the application
of the land use law as a prerequisite to demanding or receiving just compensation under
subsection (9) of this section.
Id. § 4 (providing for cause of action where a "land use law continues to apply to private real prop-
erty more than 90 days after a written demand for just compensation"). Arizona's Proposition 207
amended Arizona statute to redefine "public use" for purposes of the state's exercise of eminent
domain to exclude "the public benefits of economic development, including an increase in tax base,
tax revenues, employment or general economic health." Arizona Proposition 207, sec. 3, § 12-
1136(5)(b) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1136(5)(b)) (2006) available at
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/lnfo/PubPamphlet/english/Prop207.htm. Proposition 207's
regulatory provisions are discussed further infra at notes 426-32 and accompanying text.
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reform provisions and no eminent domain reform provisions.1 2 Of these
mixed eminent domain/regulatory takings initiatives, only Arizona's
succeeded.413
A. Regulatory Takings Initiatives
The regulatory takings portions of the Washington, Idaho, Califor-
nia, and Arizona initiatives were outgrowths of Measure 37.414 Each
measure included provisions similar to Measure 37-guaranteeing just
compensation to landowners who suffered any diminution in property
value as result of government regulation.415 The campaigns in support of
each of these measures received a significant portion of their funding
from organizations affiliated with Howard Rich, a New York-based real
412. Washington Ballot Initiative 933 (2006) available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/
elections/initiatives/text/i933.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). Washington's initiative invoked Kelo
by stating that "[tihe people find that eminent domain is ... potentially subject to misuse" and that
government "should not take property which is unnecessary for public use or is primarily for private
use" but contained only regulatory takings provisions and not any provisions limiting the state's
eminent domain powers. Id. § 1.
413. Idaho voters resoundingly defeated Proposition 2 by a margin of 76 percent to 24 percent.
BEN YSURSA, 2006 GENERAL RESULTS STATEWIDE (2006), http://www.idsos.state.id.us/ELECT/
RESULTS/2006/general/tot stwd.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). Washington's voters soundly
defeated Initiative 933 by a margin of 59 percent to 41 percent. SAM REED, 2006 GENERAL
ELECTION RESULTS (2006), http://vote.wa.gov/Elections/genera/Measures.aspx (last visited Nov. 9,
2007). California voters more narrowly defeated Proposition 90 by a margin of 52.4 percent to 47.6
percent. STATE BALLOT MEASURES 76 (2006), http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2006_generalU
measures.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
414. Measure 37's drafters reportedly helped draft other state's measures. See Hannah Jacobs,
Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1526
(2007) (noting that Measure 37s' drafters aided drafters of other states' initiatives, citing personal
interview with the other states' drafters); Patty Wentz, This Landis Their Land, WILLAMETTE WK.,
Nov. 28, 2000, at 21 (describing how Measure 7's drafters, the same as Measure 37's, lectured in
other states); Laura Oppenheimer, Measure 37 Proclaims: Subdivide and Conquer, OREGONIAN,
June 12, 2005, at Al (describing how Measure 37's drafters traveled to other states, where they were
greeted as "the Madonnas and Oprahs of property rights"); see also LEONARD C. GILROY,
STATEWIDE REGULATORY TAKINGS REFORM: EXPORTING OREGON'S MEASURE 37 TO OTHER
STATES 1 (2006) (describing Measure 37 and strategies for exporting the measure to other states),
available at http://www.reason.org/ps343.pdf
415. Washington Ballot Initiative 933, §§ 2(2)(a), (b), (d) (2006) available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i933.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007); Idaho
Proposition 2, §§ 4(5), 6(e) (2006) available at http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/06init08.htm
(last visited Nov. 9, 2007); California Proposition 90, §§ 3, 19(a)(1) (2006) available at
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/pdf/prop90_text.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007); Arizona Proposi-
tion 207, sec. 3, § 12-1134(a) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1134) (2006) available at
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/PubPamphlet/english/Prop207.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2007). Idaho and California's provisions were not retroactive. Idaho Proposition 2, §§ 4(5), 6(e)
(2006) available at http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/06initO8.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007);
California Proposition 90, §§ 3, 6 (2006) available at http://www.votersguide.sos.ca.gov/pdf/
prop90_text.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). Idaho's measure applied only to land use regulations
enacted after an owner acquires the property and after the enactment of the measure--they applied
only to regulations passed after the effective date of the initiatives. Idaho Proposition 2, §§ 4(5),
6(e) (2006) available at http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/06init08.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2007). Similarly, California's measure applied only to property devalued after the measure took
effect. California Proposition 90, § 6 (2006) available at http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/pdf/
prop90 text.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). For a description of Arizona's and Washington's meas-
ures, see infra notes 418-32 and accompanying text.
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estate developer and libertarian activist. 41 6  By some estimates, Rich
spent nearly $9 million on property rights initiatives in eight states,
417
including over $1.2 million in support of the Arizona initiative, $3.3 mil-
lion in support of the California initiative, $800,000 in support of the
Idaho initiative, and $360,000 in support of the Washington initiative.418
Washington's failed Initiative 933 was the most radical of the pro-
posed ballot initiatives. Although the initiative's language was ambigu-
ous in many places, it contained a number of provisions potentially even
more sweeping in scope than Oregon's Measure 37.419 Its compensation
requirement applied to regulations limiting the value of personal as well
as real property. 420 The initiative exempted neither regulations to abate
public nuisance nor regulations to implement federal law, and its health
and safety exemption was more narrowly tailored than Measure 37S.42
1
The scope of government's authority to waive offending regulations
rather than pay compensation to owners was unclear. Unlike Measure
37,422 the initiative did not expressly vest governments with authority to
waive offending regulations, stating instead that its compensation provi-
sion was "not [to] be construed to limit agencies' ability to waive, or
issue variances from, other legal requirements. '423  The initiative also
416. See David Crary, Wealthy New Yorker's Reach Felt Here; Howard Rich Helps Fund
Campaign for Initiative 933, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), Oct. 27, 2006, at C7 (describing
Rich's involvement in campaigns); JOHN O'DONNELL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, TAKING THE PUBLIC TRUST:
HOW A NEW YORK STATE REAL ESTATE DEVELOPER IS THREATENING STATE GOVERNMENTS IN
THE WEST 7-8 (2006) (describing funding and groups affiliated with Rich, including Americans for
Limited Government, the Fund for Democracy, the Club for Growth, the Club for Growth State
Action, Colorado at its Best, U.S. Term Limits, Montanans in Action).
417. O'DONNELL, supra note 416, at 7-8 (listing Arizona, California, Idaho, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Washington).
418. Id. at 8; see also Curt Woodward, Land Use Showdown, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.),
Oct. 23, 2006, at C2 (stating that as of the date of the article, initiative 933 supporters had raised
nearly $800,000 and opponents had raised nearly $2.6 million).
419. See, e.g., Eric De Place & Val Alexander, Editorial, In My Opinion-Initiative 933-For
Washington, It's Measure 37 on Steroids, OREGONIAN, Aug. 8, 2006, at B09 (arguing that the scope
of the initiative would be broader than Measure 37).
420. Washington Ballot Initiative 933, § 2(2)(a) (2006) available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i933.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). Initiative
933 defined "private property" subject to its compensation mandate to include "all real and personal
property interests protected by the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution or Article 1,
section 16 of the state Constitution owned by a nongovernmental entity, including, but not limited to,
any interest in land, buildings, crops, livestock, and mineral and water rights." Id.
421. Compare id § 2(2)(c)(i) with OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (2005). The Washington
initiative exempted regulations "restricting the use of property when necessary to prevent an imme-
diate threat to human health and safety." Washington Ballot Initiative 933 § 2(2)(c)(i) (2006) avail-
able at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i933.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). But
it contained no express exemptions for regulations limiting public nuisance activities or implement-
ing federal law. Id. § (2)(2)(c).
422. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 8.
423. Washington Ballot Initiative 933, supra note 415, at § 3. Initiative 933's compensation
provision provided in its entirety:
An agency that decides to enforce or apply any ordinance, regulation, or rule to private
property that would result in damaging the use or value of private property shall first pay
the property owner compensation as defined in section 2 of this act. This section shall
not be construed to limit agencies' ability to waive, or issue variances from, other legal
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may have compensated owners regardless of whether they acquired their
property before or after the offending regulation was enacted.424 In one
sense, however, Initiative 933 may have been more limited than Measure
37: unlike Measure 37, which reached back to provide compensation for
any regulations passed after a landowner acquired her property, Initiative
933 might have limited its compensation requirement to restrictions
passed after 1996.425 The initiative was so ambiguously drafted, how-
ever, that it was not clear whether the 1996 cut-off applied to all offend-
ing regulations or to just certain types.426
Arizona's Proposition 207 also mirrored Measure 37. It obligated
the state or its political subdivisions427 to compensate property owners
for any land use law enacted after the date on which property was trans-
ferred to a landowner that reduces the "fair market value" of the prop-
erty. 428 Like Measure 37, the proposition explicitly allowed the state to
requirements. An agency that chooses not to take action which will damage the use or
value of private property is not liable for paying remuneration under this section.
Id.; see also Amy Rolph, Study Puts 1-933's Cost in Billions But Backers of Land-Use Measure
Deride UW Report, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 27, 2006, at B I (citing a University of
Washington study concluding, among other things, that government would not be able to waive
certain environmental laws under the initiative and would be forced to compensate landowners for
diminution in value caused by the regulations, at great financial cost to the state). See generally
Dolesh & Vaira, supra note 405, at 61 (discussing waiver of rules in place of compensation).
424. Washington Ballot Initiative 933, supra note 420, at § 3. Initiative 933 made no reference
to the time property was acquired, providing only that "[a]n agency that decides to enforce or apply
any ordinance, regulation, or rule to private property that would result in damaging the use or value
or private property shall first pay the property owner compensation..." Id.; see also Eric Pryne,
Measure 37 and 1-933: How They Stack up, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at A14 (discussing the
difference between Measure 37's compensation for regulations passed after an owner acquires
property and Initiative 933's provision).
425. Washington Ballot Initiative 933, supra note 420, at § 2(2)(b)(i).
426. id. The initiative provided that regulation for which it authorized compensation "includes,
but is not limited to," regulation "[p]rohibiting or restricting any use or size, scope, or intensity of
any use legally existing or permitted as of January 1, 1996." Id. Without including any date restric-
tions, the provision listed five other types of regulation that would require compensation including
regulations "requiring a portion of property to be left in its natural state or without beneficial use to
its owner"; "prohibiting maintenance or removal of trees or vegetation"; and maintenance of infra-
structure, such as bulkheads and tidegates, "reasonably necessary for the protection of the use or
value of private property." Id. at §§ 2(2)(b)(ii), (v), (vi). Whether government would have had to
compensate landowners for pre-1996 regulations of these types was not clear. See, e.g., Eric Pryne,
Your Guide to Initiative 933, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at A8, A14 (describing the ambiguities
in the initiative's wording and citing Richard Stephens, one of the initiative's drafters, to the effect
that the last five categories of the provision were simply examples of regulations covered by the first
category, so the 1996 date would also apply to them and noting that "most lawyers studying 1-933
said it would require compensation for at least some pre-1996 regulations").
427. Arizona Proposition 207, supra note 415, at sec. 3, § 12-1134(a). Proposition 207 obli-
gates the state or "the political subdivision of th[e] state that enacted" the offending land use law to
compensate property owners. Id. This differs from Measure 37, which imposes the obligation on
state entities that "enact[ ] or enforce[ ]" the law. Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 1.
428. Arizona Proposition 207, supra note 415, at sec. 3, § 12-1134(a). Section 3 of the propo-
sition added a "Private Property Rights Protection Act" to the Arizona statutes. Its Measure 37-like
provision provides:
If the existing rights to use, divide, sell or possess private real property are reduced by the
enactment or applicability of any land use law enacted after the date the property is trans-
ferred to the owner and such action reduces the fair market value of the property the
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429waive land use laws rather than pay compensation. Proposition 207
also excepted from its compensation requirement land use restrictions (1)
for public health and safety, (2) prohibiting public nuisances under
common law, (3) required by federal law, and (4) prohibiting use of
property for the sale of pornography and for certain other uses deemed
undesirable, such as the sale of liquor or housing of sex offenders. 430  It
also excepted land use regulations establishing locations for utility facili-
ties and regulations that "do not directly regulate an owner's land."
43 1
Unlike Measure 37, the proposition expressly provided that waivers "run
with the land," and are thus transferable to subsequent property own-
ers. 432  Perhaps most significantly, unlike Measure 37, Proposition 207
was not retroactive-it exempted from its compensation requirement any
regulations that were enacted before its effective date.433
B. The Political Landscape
Some observers attributed Arizona voters' adoption of Proposition
207 to the fact that the Arizona business community supported the meas-
ure, the measure's inclusion of eminent domain reform as well as regula-
tory takings provisions, and a successful advertising campaign which,
reminiscent of the Measure 37 campaign, adopted the theme of "Keep
What You Own" and highlighted injustices to women, the elderly, and
minority homeowners.434
Opponents challenged the Arizona measure, claiming that it vio-
lated a provision of the Arizona Constitution requiring ballot initiatives
to identify the sources of revenues that will fund the immediate and fu-
owner is entitled to just compensation from this state or the political subdivision of this
state that enacted the land use law.
Id.
429. Id. § 12-1134(E) (providing that state or local government may "amend[], repeal[], or
issue[] to the landowner a binding waiver of enforcement of the land use law on the owner's specific
parcel"). Neither the California nor Idaho initiatives would have allowed the state to waive en-
forcement of the land use law rather than waive it, although Washington's initiative would have
permitted the state to do so. California Proposition 90, supra note 415 (no waiver provision); Idaho
Proposition 2, supra note 415 (same); Washington Ballot Measure 933, supra note 415 (including
compensation provision but providing "[t]his section shall not be construed to limit agencies' ability
to waive, or issue variances, from other legal requirements. An agency that chooses not to take
action which will damage the use or value of private property is not liable for paying remuneration
under this section.").
430. Arizona Proposition 207, supra note 415, at sec. 3, § 12-1134(B)(1) to (4).
431. Id. § (B)(5) to (6).
432. Id. § (F) (providing that "any demand for landowner relief or any waiver that is granted in
lieu of compensation runs with the land").
433. Id. § (B)(7) (exempting land use regulations that "were enacted before the effective date
of this section").
434. See William Fulton, Despite Defeat of Prop 90, More Voting on Land Use Restrictions Is
Likely (CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT), Dec. 2006 at 1, available at
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi0199-6118926/Despite-defeat-of-Prop-90.html#abstract (com-
paring the California and Arizona campaigns); Dolesh & Vaira, supra note 405, at 61-62 (attributing
victory to infusion of out-of-state money and inclusion of less controversial eminent domain provi-
sions).
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ture costs of an initiative. 435  But a lower court rejected the challenge,
and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that violations of
the revenue-source provision are not subject to pre-election review and
could be maintained only after initiative adoption.436 Despite these chal-
lenges, which may be raised again now that the measure has passed, ob-
servers noted that opponents of the initiative failed to wage a strong
campaign in opposition.
437
The defeats of the ballot initiatives in Idaho, Washington, and Cali-
fornia were due to a variety of causes. In Idaho, where the initiative lost
by the largest margin of any state, observers attributed the defeat to the
opponents' effective coalition building and advertising, proponents' lack
of organization, and the fact that Idaho already had legislation limiting
the state's eminent domain powers.438 Although both sides had about the
same amount of money,439 opponents of the initiative formed a broad
coalition that included conservationists and environmentalists as well as
realtors and other business groups, such as the Idaho Association of
Commerce and Industry and the Idaho Association of Realtors. 440  This
coalition launched a successful advertising campaign, featuring ranchers,
dairy farmers, and prominent Idaho politicians from both political parties
435. League of Ariz. Cities and Towns v. Brewer, 146 P.3d 58, 59 (Ariz. 2006).
436. Id. at 59, 63 (concluding that Arizona courts may only review ballot measures prior to
their adoption for violations of ballot form and signature requirements, and may not pass on their
constitutionality until they are adopted by the voters). See generally Howard Fisher, Justices Ap-
prove 3 Ballot Measures, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Sept. 1, 2006, at B 11 (describing the case); Prop-
erty Rights Ruling Good News for State's Voters, YUMASUN.COM, Aug. 21, 2006,
http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive22864.htnd (describing the lower court's ruling).
437. See Dolesh & Vaira, supra note 405, at 62 (stating "[tihe general consensus is that Ari-
zona's environmental and land conservation community was not prepared to wage the knock-down
fight that proponents brought to the state").
438. The Idaho legislature adopted House Bill 555 in March 2006. Limitation on Eminent
Domain for Private Parties, Urban Renewal or Economic Development Purposes, 2006 Idaho Sess.
Laws 96 (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A) (announcing adoption of House Bill 555)). The
bill provided that "[e]minent domain shall not be used to acquire private property ... [flor any
alleged public use which is merely a pretext for the transfer of the condemned property to or any
interest in that property to a private party; or ... for the purpose of promoting ... economic devel-
opment." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A(2)(a)-(b) (2007). As opponents of the measure-who in-
cluded Idaho's governor-pointed out, Proposition 2's eminent domain provisions were taken nearly
verbatim from the already-enacted legislation. See Lora Volkert, Idaho Governor Against Proposi-
tion 2, IDAHO BUS. REV., Oct. 16, 2006 (citing Gov. Jim Risch's opposition to the proposition and
suggesting that its eminent domain measures were redundant).
439. Rocky Barker, Opposition Groups Close to Matching Prop 2 Support Funds, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Nov. 2, 2006, at 2 (noting that at that time proponents had raised about $810,000, the
vast majority from Howard Rich, while opponents had raised about $755,000).
440. See Ray Ring, The West: A New Center of Power, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Paonia, Colo-
rado), Nov. 27, 2006, at 10 (describing defeat of Idaho Proposition 2); Lora Volkert, Idaho Voters
Kill Proposition 2, IDAHO BUS, REV., Nov. 13, 2006 (same); Bruce Ramsey, Editorial, Despite
Losses, Property-rights Fight is Far From Over, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at B6 (noting that
the chamber of commerce and realtor groups opposed the measure, although most funding came
from environmental groups); Volkert, supra note 438 (noting that Idaho Association of Realtors
opposed the proposition). These broad coalitions may have resulted from the measures' combination
of eminent domain reform (which business organizations and developers who can profit from pri-
vate-to-private condemnations, opposed) and regulatory takings reform (which environmentalists
opposed).
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as spokespeople. 44' The coalition also managed to successfully depict
the initiative's proponents as wealthy out-of-state opportunists, funded
by a wealthy New Yorker for "greedy purposes.' 442 The initiative's pro-
ponents, led by "This House Is My Home," 443 on the other hand, never
really got a campaign going.4 "
In California and Washington, where the outcome was much clos-
er,445 observers attributed the defeat of the ballot measures to the oppo-
nents' ability to raise more money, build effective coalitions and adver-
tise effectively, as well as to voter wariness about the measures' potential
consequences. In both California and Washington, the opponents of the
initiatives raised significantly more money than the proponents and vast-
ly outspent the proponents in advertising.446 In addition to money and an
effective advertising campaign, observers attributed defeat of the meas-
ure in California, as in Idaho, to the breadth of the coalition against the
measure" 7 as well as the governor's opposition." 8  Observers attributed
the defeat of Initiative 933 in Washington to an effective advertising
441. Ring, supra note 440, at 10.
442. Ramsey, supra note 440, at B6.
443. Office of the Idaho Secretary of State, Idaho Voters' Pamphlet, November 7, 2006, Ar-
gument in Favor, available at http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/inits/06prp2yes.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2007). Interestingly, the link to "This House Is My Home" from the online voters' pamphlet
leads directly to the website of Howard Rich's national libertarian group, Americans For Limited
Government, http://getliberty.org/. Id.
444. See Ramsey, supra note 440, at B6 (noting lack of cohesive campaign to promote measure
and lack of politically well-known sponsor).
445. See California Proposition 90, supra note 415. In California, where Proposition 90 lost by
a close margin of 52.5 percent to 47.5 percent, new property rights measures closely resembling the
defeated measure have already been proposed for the 2008 ballot. See Harrison Sheppard, Taxpayer
Advocates Launch New Measure, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Nov. 25, 2006, at F4 (discussing Prop. 90-
like property rights measure proposed for 2008 ballot); Paul Shigley, Eminent Domain Reform on
Horizon: Local Government, Environmentalists Seek to Frame Issue in New Way, CA. PLANNING &
DEV. REP, Jan. 2007, at 1 (same); Property Rights Back on Radar, APPEAL-DEMOCRAT (Marysville,
CA), Mar. 24, 2007 (discussing various groups' strategies for 2008 property rights ballot initiative).
446. See William Fulton, Despite Defeat of Prop 90, More Voting On Land Use Restrictions Is
Likely (CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT), Dec. 2006, at 1 (reporting that in Cali-
fornia, proponents spent $4 million and opponents spent $11 million and that most of the opponents'
money was spent on last-minute add campaigns and attributing defeat of the measure to those largely
unanswered adds); Eric Pryne, Your Guide to Initiative 933, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at A8
(reporting that in Washington, the opponents raised three times as much money as the proponents of
Initiative 933, and that the proponents spent most of their money on the collection of signatures
necessary to get the initiative on the ballot, while the opponents spent most of their money on adver-
tising); Ramsey, supra note 440, at B6 (reporting that in both Washington and California opponents
of the ballot measures outspent the proponents "10-to-1 on ads").
447. Fulton, supra note 446, at I (observing that the coalition included the Chamber of Com-
merce, Farm Bureau and California Taxpayers Association as well as environmentalists).
448. Shigley, supra note 445, at I (noting that Gov. Schwarzenegger opposed the measure).
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campaign by the opposition 449 and to discontent with Measure 37 fromneighboring Oregonian voters.45°
VI. THE 2007 AMENDMENTS AND THE PASSAGE OF MEASURE 49
Since its passage, Measure 37 has produced thousands of claims for
compensation, hundreds of lawsuits,45' and ceaseless controversy. As of
April 2007, Oregonians had filed approximately 7,560 Measure 37
claims, covering over 750,000 acres and seeking over $10.4 billion in
compensation.452 Over 60 percent of these claims were for farm or forest
land, and about 33 percent sought subdivision of the land into four or
more home sites.453 Nearly half of all Measure 37 claims were filed dur-
449. See Sarah Mirk, Defeating 1-933, THE STRANGER, August 8, 2006, at 12 (discussing how
opponents of Initiative 933 tried "not to make the same cerebral mistake" as Measure 37's opponents
and instead focused on "easy-to-understand, practical reasons for land regulation," focusing on the
outcome of the measure, including more traffic and gravel mines in the neighborhood).
450. See Dolesh & Vaira, supra note 405, at 1 (citing discontent among Oregon voters as a
possible influence on Washington voters).
451. The press has reported that there are between 135 and 200 pending Measure 37-related
cases in Oregon courts. See Laura Oppenheimer, Bipartisan Fix Emerges to Smooth Measure 37,
OREGONIAN, Mar. 30, 2007, at C I (reporting the filing of "hundreds of lawsuits"); Legislature Must
Address Measure 37, CAPITAL PRESS (Salem, Or.), Mar. 16, 2007, available at
http://oregonpublicinvestment.com/pdfs-media/CapitalPress_3-16-07_002.pdf (reporting that cur-
rently 135 Measure 37-related cases have been filed in Oregon courts); Randi Bjornstad, Measure 37
Revisions Clear House, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), May 5, 2007, at Al I (reporting that Meas-
ure 37 "has spawned upward of 200 lawsuits"). The Oregon Department of Justice website lists over
240 Measure 37-related lawsuits in which the state is a party. Oregon Department of Justice, Pend-
ing Measure 37 Litigation list, www.doj.state.or.us/hot topics/measure371itigation.shtml.
452. See SHEILA A. MARTIN ET AL., WHAT IS DRIVING MEASURE 37 CLAIMS IN OREGON?,,
(INSTITUTE OF PORTLAND METROPOLITAN STUDIES, PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY) (2007),
http://www.pdx.edu/media/i/m/imsM37AprilO7UAAppt.pdf (presenting statistics from a Portland
State University study of Measure 37 claims in power-point); Oregon Department of Land Conser-
vation and Development, DLCD Measure 37, Summaries of Claims Filed in the State,
www.oregon.gov/lcd/measure37/summaries-of claims.shtml#summaries of claims filed in the st
ate (last visited Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Summaries] (giving statistics, stating that DLCD had
received 6,749 Measure 37 claims as of May 25, 2007 requesting over $19 billion in compensation);
Deadline for Processing M37 Claims Extended, PORTLAND Bus. J., May 10, 2007 [hereinafter
Deadline] (giving statistics, stating without attribution, that claims are for $17 billion). Measure 37
created a two year deadline for claims based on land use laws enacted prior to the measure's effec-
tive date, December 4, 2004. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(5) (2005).
453. See Martin et al., supra note 452 (presenting statistics; percentages refer to both number
of claims and acreage); Bruce Pokarney, Measure 37 & Agriculture: ODA Maps Impacts, OREGON
INSIDER, Feb. 2007, at 14 (discussing statistics of Measure 37 claims for agricultural land, stating
that in the Willamette Valley, "51.1 percent of all Measure 37 acres currently in development claims
(132,346 acres) involve land zoned for agriculture," which represents "[a]bout 8.8 percent of the
valley's agricultural-zoned, privately owned land"); Eric Mortenson, Uproar in Yamhill County,
OREGONIAN, May 31, 2007, at 10 (describing the process by which Yamhill County, one of the top
five agricultural production counties in Oregon and a county on the boundary of urban development,
processed Measure 37 claims; noting that the county commission approved claims by owners who
owned land prior to the enactment of land use law "in a rubber stamp fashion," had approved 443
claims, affecting approximately 33,000 acres, or 8% of the county's land mass, and denied only 33
claims, but also reporting that, while many claims had been approved, very few actual houses had
been built on Measure 37 land); see also SHEILA A. MARTIN & KATIE SHRIVER, DOCUMENTING THE
IMPACT OF MEASURE 37: SELECTED CASE STUDIES (INSTITUTE OF PORTLAND METROPOLITAN
STUDIES, PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY) (2006), available at
http://www.pdx.edu/media/i/m/imsM37brainerdreport.pdf (providing a detailed description of ten
individual Measure 37 claims and an analysis of their impacts on the residential neighborhoods in
2007] ENA CTING LIBERTARIAN PROPER TY
ing the month preceding December 4, 2006, the measure's deadline for
filing claims based on land use laws passed prior to the measure's effec-
tive date.454  These last-minute claims included several large claims by
timber companies. 455  Governments that have processed this deluge of
Measure 37 claims have nearly universally waived offending land use
regulations rather than pay compensation to the claimants.45 6
Anecdotal evidence4 57 and two 2007 polls indicated that a majority
of Oregon voters favored amending or revising Measure 37458 and pres-
which the claims were made, on farm and forest lands, and on state and local implementation of land
use policy).
454. See Summaries, supra note 452 (stating that 3,570 claims were received between Novem-
ber 13 and December 4, 2006); MARTIN ET AL., supra note 453 (showing that PSU survey showed
approximately 2000 claims were filed in the last month); Deadline, supra note 452 (stating that 3500
claims were filed in the final month).
455. Laura Oppenheimer & Richard Cockle, Measure 37 Claims Beat Deadline, OREGONIAN,
Dec. 2, 2006, at El (reporting that Plumb Creek Timber Co. made more than 100 claims covering
32,000 acres and demanding $94.8 million in compensation; discussing other timber company
claims). See generally Laura Oppenheimer, Buy a Slice of Oregon, Complete with Forest View,
OREGONIAN, Dec. 26, 2006 (discussing timber claims); Laura Oppenheimer, For Sale Signs Sprout-
ing Where Timber Once Stood, OREGONIAN, Dec. 26, 2006 (same); Laura Oppenheimer, Profit,
Ideology Mix For Some Measure 37 Donors, OREGONIAN, Apr. 23, 2007 (noting overlap between
Measure 37 campaign donors and Measure 37 claimants and citing as an example Portland-based
Stimson Lumber Company, which donated $30,000 to the Measure 37 campaign and now had
Measure 37 claims on 52,000 acres of its land); Laura Oppenheimer, Forests Stir Land-Use Stew,
OREGONIAN, Jan. 26, 2007, at BI (reporting that more than half of Stimson's claims ask the gov-
emnment to waive a rule requiring landowners to eam a certain forestry income to build a house and
that most remaining claims would revert to lots of 20 or 40 acres, rather than keeping land in larger
parcels); Editorial, Revisit Measure 37 (Primary Beneficiaries Aren't "Mom and Pop"), REGISTER-
GUARD (Eugene, Or), Dec. 6, 2006, at A12 (reporting on large Measure 37 claims filed by: Plum
Creek Timber Co. (22,000 acres in Lincoln County and 10,000 acres in Coos County); Lone Rock
Timberland Co. (proposal to develop 730 acres of forested land near Camp Creek in Lane County);
Wildish Land Co. (proposal to develop 1,200 acres it owns along the Willamette River near Mount
Pisgah if the county does not agree to purchase it as park land for $26 million); and Stimson Lum-
ber).
456. See, e.g., Mortenson, supra note 453, at 10 (noting that Yamhill County invariably waives
the land use law that is the subject of a successful Measure 37 claim rather than pay compensation);
Matthew Preusch, Prineville Offers Measure 37 Pay, OREGONIAN, Oct. 26, 2006, at Al (reporting
that of the 1500 claims processed as of the time of the article, all governments had waived the of-
fending land use law rather than pay compensation except the town of Prineville, which offered to
pay a landowner rather than waive the land use rule, an offer which the landowner rejected).
457. See, e.g., SIGHTLINE INSTITUTE, Two YEARS OF MEASURE 37: OREGON'S PROPERTY
WRONGS (2007), available at http://www.sightline.org/research/sprawl/res_pubs/property-
faimess/measure-37-report/two-years-m37-report (discussing individual landowners' discontent with
Measure 37 and giving anecdotes of Measure 37 claims for mining in the Newburg Crater national
monument and subdivisions on farmland); MARTIN & SHRIVER, supra note 453, at 3 (presenting case
studies of several Measure 37 claims).
458. One poll showed that 20% of Oregon voters thought the measure should be repealed and
49% thought the measure was flawed and should be fixed as soon as possible, while only 19%
approved of Measure 37 as written. Memorandum from David Metz, Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin &
Associates, to Opportunity PAC II, Regarding Summary of Key Findings from Oregon Statewide
Voter Survey (Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.friends.org/issues/M37/documents/
040307_OregonStatewideVoterSurvey.pdf (summarizing results of a telephone poll of 600 Oregon
voters). The poll results showed that large majority of voters supported strict requirements for
landowners to document the lost value of their property, allowing property owners to build up to
three houses on their land, and continuing to limit commercial development and subdivisions of farm
and forest land. Results of an earlier poll showed 61% of Oregon voters in favor of either repealing
or fixing Measure 37. See Press Release, 1000 Friends of Oregon, Oregonians Change Attitudes on
Measure 37 (Feb, 8, 2007), available at http://www.sightline.org/research/sprawlU
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
sured the legislature to consider amendments to the measure.459 In re-
sponse, the Oregon legislature made Measure 37 amendments a priority
during the 2007 legislative session. 460  As a first step, the legislature
adopted House Bill 3546,461 which the governor signed into law on May
10, 2007.462 The bill offered governments an extension for adjudicating
pending Measure 37 claims: For any claim filed after November 1,
2007, governments have 540 days from the filing date to adjudicate the
claims, rather than the 180 days allowed under the original measure.4 63
The legislature also enacted House Bill 3540, 464 which referred to
the state's voters-through Ballot Measure 49-a twenty-one page com-
prehensive revision of Measure 37.465 Adopted by the voters on Novem-
res_pubs/property-fairness/m37-report-press-release (summarizing results of a telephone poll of 500
Oregon voters); Randi Bjomstad, Poll Shows Voters Want Land Use Law Changed, REGISTER-
GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Feb. 9, 2007, at DI (discussing January poll).
Oregonians In Action, however, sites polls showing that voters remain in favor of Measure 37 as
it is written. See Oregonians In Action, Ballot Measure 37, Question & Answers, Question No. 32,
www.measure37. com/measure%2037/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007) (citing competing polls).
459. Laura Oppenheimer, Hundreds Turn Out To Give Their 2 Cents on Measure 37,
OREGONIAN, Apr. 18, 2007, at D4 (reporting large turnout for legislative hearings on Measure 37);
Laura Oppenheimer, Public Demands Land-Use Clarity, OREGONIAN, Feb. 23, 2007, at AI (report-
ing that "Oregonians are so upset about state land-use laws that they've been flooding the Capitol
this month to deliver the kind of angry, pleading and tearful speeches you'd expect on abortion and
same-sex marriage.").
460. See, e.g., Michelle Cole, For Many, 2007 Legislature is "Golden Chance, " OREGONIAN,
Jan. 7, 2007, at A10 (discussing legislature's realization that it must address Measure 37 during the
2007 session).
461. H.B. 3546, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(2)(a) (Or. 2007), available at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/measpdf/hb3500.dir/hb3546.b.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
462. See Deadline, supra 452 (noting that the bill was signed into law just days before the
deadline for adjudicating the large number of claims filed during the last month before the December
4, 2006 deadline).
463. H.B. 3546 (providing that "just compensation under [Measure 37] is due the owner of the
property from the public entity only if the land use regulation continues to be enforced against the
property 540 days after the Measure 37 claim is made to the public entity"). Measure 37 required
governments to compensate property owners for land use restrictions that continued to apply to their
property 180 days after they filed their Measure 37 claim. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.352(4) (2005).
H.B. 3546 also provided that if the claimant died before her claim was adjudicated by the gov-
ernment, anyone who acquired the subject property "by devise or by operation of law" could prose-
cute the Measure 37 claim. Or. H.B. 3546.
464. H.B. 3540, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007), available at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/measpdf/hb3500.dir/hb3540.b.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). The
Oregon House of Representatives passed an earlier version of the bill by a party-line vote of 31 to 24
on May 4, 2007. Laura Oppenheimer, Measure 37 Election: Emotions Will Flow in Battle Over
Rewrite, OREGONIAN, May 5, 2007, at BO (noting that "a fall ballot referral cleared its last major
obstacle-passing the Oregon House of Representatives in a 31-24 party-line vote"). The Senate
revised and passed the bill by a vote of 19-11 along party lines on June 5, 2007, whereupon the
House re-passed the bill, as amended, on June 6, 2007 by a party-line vote of 31-26. The bill was
filed with the Secretary of State on June 15, 2007. See Legislative History of House Bill 3540,
available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/searchmeas.html (select "house bill" option and enter "3540"
in the number field) (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
465. H.B. 3540, § 25 ("This 2007 Act shall be submitted to the people for their approval or
rejection at a special election held throughout this state ...."); see also Edward Walsh, Voters Will
Decide Hot Issues, OREGONIAN, July 2, 2007, at B I (discussing referral of Oregon House Bill 3540
to voters in a special election on November 6, 2007).
On November 6, 2007, by a vote of 61-39 percent (roughly the same margin by which the voters
approved Measure 37 three years earlier), the Oregon Electorate ratified Measure 49. Eric Morten-
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ber 6, 2007, Measure 49 will curtail some of the most extreme results of
Measure 37.466 For example, it limited Measure 37 claims to situations
in which land use laws "restrict the residential use of private real prop-
erty or a farming or forest practice and that reduce the fair market value
of the property"-no Measure 37 claim may now accrue for land use
laws limiting commercial or industrial uses. 467  Measure 49 also elimi-
nated Measure 37's inheritance right-present owners of property have
claims only for land use regulations enacted during their tenure as own-
ers, not that of their ancestors.468
Measure 49 established January 1, 2007 as a marker-providing
one process of adjudicating claims arising from land use restrictions en-
acted prior to that date and another procedure for claims based on restric-
tions enacted after that date. 469 All claims based on land use restrictions
enacted prior to January 1, 2007, must have been filed by the date on
which the 2007 legislative sessions ended.470  For these claims, which
son, Voters Keep Cigarette Tax As Is But Roll Back Property Rights, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 7,
2007.
466. Meaure 49 passed with 718,023 votes for (61.3%) and 437,351 votes against (38.7%),
roughly the same margin by which the votes approved Measure 37 three years earlier. See Office of
the Oregon Secretary of State, Elections Div., Official Results for 2007 November Special Election,
available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov62007/abstractlresults.doc.
The version of Oregon House Bill 3540 that originally passed the House would have required a
certain quantum of devaluation to trigger compensation. H.B. 3540, § 12(2). Unlike Measure 37,
which required government to compensate landowners for any reduction in value of their land due to
land use regulation, the House version of the Oregon House Bill 3540 would have prospectively
required governments to compensate landowners only if a single land use regulation diminished the
fair market value of their property by 10 percent, or if multiple land use laws diminished the value of
land by 25 percent. ld. § 12(2)(b)-(c) (the bill, however, would have required that a farming or
forest practice regulation that results in any reduction of value gives rise to a compensation claim.
Id. §§ 12(2)(a). The Senate deleted the triggering provision, and retained Measure 37's provision
that any loss in value whatsoever-as calculated according to the provisions of Oregon House Bill
3450-triggers compensation. Id. § 12(2).
467. Id. § 4(1) (emphasis added) ("If a public entity enacts one or more land use regulations
that restrict the residential use of private real property or a farming or forest practice and that re-
duces the fair market value of the property ... then the owner of the property shall be entitled to just
compensation from the public entity that enacted the land use regulation .... "); Id. § 12(l)(b) (ap-
plying to claims filed after the 2007 legislative session; providing that a landowner may apply for
compensation only if "the person's desired use of property is residential use or a farming or forest
practice").
468. Id. § 4(3) (providing that Measure 37's compensation requirement does not apply to "land
use regulations that were enacted prior to the claimant's acquisition date .... ); Id. § 21 (1) (provid-
ing that "a claimant's acquisition date is the date the claimant became the owner of the property as
shown in the deed records of the county in which the property is located"); ld § 21(2) (providing
that "[i]f the claimant is the surviving spouse of a person who was the sole owner of the property in
fee title at all times during the marriage, the claimant's acquisition date is the date the claimant was
married to the deceased spouse or the date the spouse acquired the property, whichever is later")
(emphasis added); Id. § 21(3) (providing that "[i]f a claimant conveyed the property to another
person and reacquired the property, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, the claimant's acquisition
date is the date the claimant reacquired ownership of the property") (emphasis added).
469. Id. § 2(13) (defining just compensation under the bill as one remedy for claims based on
pre-January 1, 2007 laws and as another for claims based on post-January 1, 2007 laws).
470. Id. § 5 (providing that claimants who file claims on or before the adjournment date of the
2007 legislative session are entitled to compensation pursuant to sections 6, 7 or 9 of the bill). This
provision effectively extended the original December 2006 filing deadline for claims based on land
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include previously approved Measure 37 claims, 471 Measure 49 restricted
the number of dwellings successful claimants may build. Claimants
owning high value farm- and forestland or groundwater-restricted land
are limited to three dwellings,472 while claimants owning land within
urban growth boundaries and on non-high-value land outside urban
growth boundaries may obtain waivers to build up to ten dwellings.473
To obtain waivers for up to three dwellings, claimants need not show that
a land use restriction reduced the value of their land, only that land use
regulation prohibits establishing a lot, parcel, or dwelling where none did
so at the time they acquired their property.474 To obtain waivers for up to
ten dwellings, claimants must make an additional showing of a reduction
in property value due to land use regulation using a new formula in
House Bill 3540.475 Measure 49 capped at twenty the number of home
sites any owner-whether filing a claim based on a pre- or post- January
1, 2007 land use law-may obtain through Measure 37 waivers, regard-
less of the number of properties she owns.476
use laws enacted prior to Measure 37 to June 28, 2007-the date on which the 2007 legislature
adjourned. See supra note 462 (describing effect of the original December deadline).
471. Landowners that have already obtained waivers pursuant to Measure 37 and have acted
upon that waiver such that they have a "common law vested right on the effective date of [Oregon
House Bill 3540] to complete and continue the use described in the waiver" may continue to take
advantage of this waiver, according to the terms of that waiver. H.B. 3540, § 5(3). Other landown-
ers, even those that have obtained waivers, must comply with the limitations Measure 49 places on
development. Id. §§ 6(2), 7(2), 9(2) (providing that the landowner is entitled to the lesser of the
dwellings approved under her Measure 37 waiver or the amount allowed under Oregon House Bill
3540). Oregon House Bill 3540 requires DLCD to send to Measure 37 claimants a notice describing
how the bill effects their claims. Id. § 8.
472. Id. §§ 6(l)-(2) (limiting claimants to three home site approvals). The bill further pre-
scribes lot size restrictions for development pursuant to a waiver. Id. § 11(3).
473. Id. §§ 9(l)-(2), (5)(k), (6) (limiting claimants within an urban growth boundary to ten
homesite approvals upon a showing of lost value); Id. §§ 7(1), (2), (5)(g) (providing that claimants
who own land that is not high value farm land, high value forest land, or groundwater restricted, and
who show that the value of three homesites would not recoup the lost value caused by the offending
land use regulation, could obtain a waiver for up to ten dwellings). Claimants must choose at the
time they file their claim whether to proceed with a claim for three dwellings, or to pursue a claim
for up to ten dwellings, with the required showing that three provided inadequate compensation. Id.
§ 8(3) (providing that a claimants must choose to proceed under § 6 (three home-sites) or § 7 (up to
ten home-sites)).
474. Id. § 6(6) (setting forth qualifications for three-homesite waivers; requiring showing of
"one or more land use regulations prohibit establishing the lot, parcel or dwelling" and "on the
claimant's acquisition date, the claimant lawfully was permitted to establish at least the number of
lots, parcels or dwellings on the property that arc authorized under this section [i.e. three]").
475. Id. § 7 (5)(g) (for non-high-value land outside an urban growth boundary, providing that,
in addition to the showings required to obtain a three-homesite waiver, claimants must show that
"the enactment of one or more land use regulations ... that are the basis for the claim caused a
reduction in the fair market value of the property that is equal to or greater than the fair market value
of the home site approvals that may be established under [the 10-homesite provision] .... "); Id. at §
9(5)(g) (saying same as § 7(5)(g), but for land within urban growth boundary); Id. § 7(6) (providing
formula for measuring lost value for non-high-value land outside an urban growth boundary-which
is measured as the "decrease, if any, in the fair market value of the property from the date that is one
year before the enactment of the land use regulation to the date that is one year after the enactment,
plus interest"); Id. § 9(6) (same, for land within urban growth boundary).
476. Id. § 11(5).
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For prospective claims based on land use regulations enacted after
January 1, 2007, Measure 49 is less restrictive. While claims still accrue
only when land use laws restrict residential use or farming or forestry
uses of land, there is no express limit-other than the overall twenty-
homesite cap477 -to the number of dwellings on a successful claimant's
property.478 Instead, claimants are entitled to compensation for the re-
duction in fair market value of the property, as measured according to the
formula established by the bill, 479 or a waiver to use the property "with-
out application of the land use regulation to the extent necessary to offset
the reduction in the fair market value of the property. 480 Claimants must
file their claims within five years of the offending regulation's enact-
ment.48'
Other significant changes Measure 49 made to Measure 37 include:
(1) allowing waivers to be transferred upon the sale of the property,482 (2)
477. Id.
478. Id. §§ 4(1), 12(l)(b).
479. Id. § 12(2) (setting forth methodology for determining valuation). The formula for pro-
spective claims is the same as that set out in sections 7(6) and 9(6) for the ten-homesite retrospective
claims: a claimant must show a the "decrease ... in the fair market value of the property from the
date that is one year before the enactment of the land use regulation to the date that is one year after
the enactment." Id. At least one commentator has noted that HB 3540's valuation methodology
might avoid some of the windfall gains to successful claimants created by Measure 37. See JOHN D.
ECHEVERRIA, ANALYSIS OF OREGON HOUSE BILL 3540/MEASURE 49 (GEORGETOWN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY INSTITUTE) 7-9 (2007) (on file with authors). Professor Echever-
ria argued that, "by comparing the value of property prior to the adoption of a regulation with the
value of property after the adoption of the regulation, the [House Bill 3540] calculation should
capture, at least to some degree, both the positive and negative effects of a change in regulatory
policy." Id. at 7. Measure 37's method of determining value lost as a result of land use restric-
tions-which simply compared the value of land with the land use restriction and the value of land
without such restriction-was susceptible to providing windfall gains to landowners by compensat-
ing them for the value created by freeing their land from regulation while continuing to regulate their
neighbors' land, which is not the same as value lost as a result of regulation. 1d. at 6; see also supra
note 162 (discussing criticisms of Measure 37 valuation methodology). Professor Echeverria criti-
cized HB 3540's valuation method on the grounds that it: (i) is-like Measure 37-based on the
"mistaken premise that no regulation can legitimately have an adverse effect on value, no matter
how modest"; (ii) fails to subtract out market effects on value other than those caused by land use
regulation; (iii) requires claimants to establish the reduction in value of their property caused by the
enactment, not the application, of the land use restriction, which is difficult to measure and may lead
to unreliable results; and (iv) allows for different market appraisal techniques, "notoriously subject
to manipulation," in fixing lost value. Id. at 8. Ultimately, Professor Echeverria concluded that "all
of these considerations combine to make it difficult to predict how HB 3540 would affect potential
future regulatory programs." Id. at 9.
480. H.B. 3540, §§ 12(4)(a), (b). This differs from Measure 37's provision, which allowed
government to "modify, remove, or not to [sic] apply the land use regulation or land use regulations
to allow the owner to use the property for a use permitted at the time the owner acquired the prop-
erty." Measure 37, supra note 1, at § 8. House Bill 3540 provides that government may issue a
waiver only "to the extent necessary to offset the reduction in fair market value of the property."
H.B. 3540, §§ 12(4)(b), (5)(b). As one prominent commentator has noted, HB 3540's provision may
allow government to limit the scope of waivers they grant future claimants. See ECHEVERRIA, supra
note 479, at 6, 10.
481. H.B. 3540, § 13(4).
482. Id. § 11(6). The transferee must exercise her development right within ten years of the
transfer. Id.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
establishing specific criteria for determining fair market value,4 83 (3)
clarifying what constitutes a "land use regulation, 'A84 (4) specifying that
the governing body that enacted the land use regulation was responsible
for compensation,485 (5) creating an express cause of action for neighbor-
ing landowners adversely affected by Measure 37 decisions,486 and (6)
requiring the governor to appoint an ombudsman to "analyze problems of
land use planning, real property law and real property valuation and fa-
cilitate resolution of complex disputes., 487  Measure 49 also prospec-
tively narrowed several of the exceptions to Measure 37: The health and
safety exception will not apply to future regulation of agriculture and
forest practices unless the "primary purpose" of the regulation was to
protect human health and safety,488 and the exception of regulations de-
signed to comply with federal law will not apply to any future regulation
of agriculture or forest practices unless the government enacting the
regulation has "no discretion" to decline to comply.489 However, Meas-
ure 49 left unchanged Measure 37's provision excepting from compensa-
tion those land use regulations prohibiting pornographic activities or
restricting activities "commonly and historically recognized as public
nuisances under common law.",
490
On balance, Measure 37 was, at most, an imperfect compromise.49'
On the one hand, it limited Measure 37's worst excesses by (1) restrict-
ing compensation (and waivers) to landowners affected by land use laws
restricting residences, thereby eliminating the use of Measure 37 for in-
483. Id. §§ 7(6), (7), 12(2) (setting forth a valuation system, measuring loss of value by com-
paring the value of the land one year prior to the enactment of the land use law with the value of the
land one year after its enactment).
484. Id. § 2(14) (listing specific provisions in the land use code, local comprehensive plans,
forestry and agricultural regulations, LCDC rules and goals).
485. Id. § 4(6) (amending Measure 37 to provide "[t]he public entity that enacted the land use
regulation that gives rise to the claim.., shall provide just compensation").
486. Id. § 16 (providing that not only Measure 37 claimants, but also adversely affected per-
sons "who timely submitted written evidence, arguments or comments to a public entity concerning
the [Measure 37] determination" with a cause of action to seek judicial review of the determination).
487. Id. § 17.
488. Id. § 4(4)(b) (providing that public health and safety exception "does not apply to any
farming or forest practice regulation that is enacted after January 1,2007, unless the primary purpose
of the regulation is the protection of human health and safety").
489. Id. § 4(4)(c) (providing that the exception for land use regulations required to comply with
federal law "does not apply to any farming or forest practice regulation that is enacted after January
1, 2007, unless the public entity enacting the regulation has no discretion under federal law to de-
cline to enact the regulation").
490. Id. §§ 4(3)(a), (c), (d).
491. As Professor Echeverria has pointed out, the compromise satisfies two of the most power-
ful interest groups in the Measure 37 debate-1000 Friends of Oregon, which advocates for protec-
tion of rural land and headed up opposition to original Measure 37, and the timber industry, the
group that provided most of the financial backing for the pro-Measure 37 campaign in an effort to
curtail the state from further regulating forest practices. See ECHEVERRIA, supra note 479, at 8-9.
Measure 49 responded to the former by restoring most, but not all, of the pre-Measure 37 restrictions
on development of the state's agricultural and forest land base. Id. And Measure 49 accomodated
the latter by making future restrictions of forest practices (along with restrictions of residential
development and agriculture) compensable, thereby granting the timber industry immunity from
future regulation of forest practices. Id.
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dustrial or commercial development waivers, (2) eliminating the inheri-
tance right, and (3) curtailing the number of housing sites to which
Measure 37 claimants are entitled.492 As one observer put it, Measure 37
went "a long way toward restoring restrictions on development of Ore-
gon's farm and forest lands that were in place for 30-plus years prior to
the adoption of Measure 37. "493 On the other hand, Measure 49 retained,
at least to a large extent, the promise at the heart of Measure 37-
entitling landowners to compensation for loss of value or a regulatory
waiver when a government enacts a regulation restricting residential de-
velopment, agriculture, or forestry practices-thereby curtailing govern-
mental ability to manage future growth.494
CONCLUSION
Even though Oregon voters decided to amend Measure 37 by enact-
ing Measure 49, Measure 37 will continue to have profound effects on
the Oregon landscape and on the nature of property rights in the state.
Measure 37 reflected an assumption by a majority of the Oregon elector-
ate that the state's land use regulations had unfairly intruded on land-
owner development rights, at least on those landowners who acquired
their land before the regulations. The political campaign which suc-
ceeded in passing Measure 37 emphasized the lost development rights of
elderly widows and small landowners,495 but the language of the measure
was not limited to small developments, 496 and consequently many large-
scale claims were filed.497 Under Measure 49 those large-scale develop-
ments will no longer be possible, since Measure 37 is now restricted to
relatively small developments.498
Although Measure 37's proponents heralded it as a compensation
measure, in application the measure has produced no compensation pay-
ments. Instead, fiscally-strapped Oregon governments have uniformly
waived regulatory requirements rather than pay compensation.499 Thus,
there have been neither challenges over the amount of compensation due
492. H.B. 3540, § 4(1) (residential and farm or forest practices); § 4(3) (eliminating inheritance
right); §§ 11(5), 7(1), (2), (5)(g), 9(1)-(2) (restricting number of dwellings for claimants with claims
based on pre-January 1, 2007 claims).
493. ECHEVERRIA, supra note 479, at 9.
494. H.B. 3540, §§ 12(4)(a), (b). A government that in 2008 enacted a law increasing mini-
mum lot sizes, for instance, would be required to compensate (or waive the law) all affected land-
owners who acquired their property prior to the enactment and who could show diminution in value.
Id. Professor Echeverria has predicted that "the most important effect of revised Measure 37 is
probably that it would discourage state and local officials from adopting new land use regulations
affecting residential or farm or agricultural [or forestry] practices" because "[i]n simple terms, gov-
ernment officials would see no advantage in investigating resources and political capital in develop-
ing and adopting new regulations if they would then be forced to issue numerous waivers."
ECHEVERRIA, supra note 479, at 11.
495. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
497. See supra notes 451-55 and accompanying text.
498. See supra notes 464-94 and accompanying text.
499. See supra note 456 and accompanying text.
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nor claims that the effect of regulation was to add value, not reduce it. In
effect, Measure 37 has operated as a large-scale deregulatory measure,
repealing land use regulations for select landowners.
The wisdom of this deregulation initiative is certainly open to ques-
tion. Measure 37 is a planner's nightmare, as it awards development
rights on the basis of duration of ownership, not suitability to location or
compatibility with a neighborhood. Moreover, its premise that develop-
ment rights are fundamental property rights has never been accepted as
dominant in Anglo-American law. Development rights have always
been cabined by the maxim of sic utere tuo ut non laedas50 -- the "do no
harm" rule. As Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts memorably phrased it over a century-and-a-half
ago:
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well
ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute
and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it may be be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoy-
ment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.
All property in this commonwealth... is derived directly or indirectly
from the government, and is held subject to those general regulations,
which are necessary to the common good and general welfare.
Rights of property ...are subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to reason-
able restraints and regulation established by law, as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. 50 1
One way to explain Measure 37 is that the Oregon electorate redefined
the "do no harm" rule so as provide compensation or regulatory waivers
to certain landowners whose land acquisition antedated regulation. In so
doing, the electorate chose to define "reasonable" land use so as to make
duration of ownership determinative rather than adverse effects on
neighbors or ecological damage. Whether this choice was a wise one in
an increasingly interconnected, carbon-limited world is for other jurisdic-
tions to evaluate. And in fact Oregon voters decided to curb the scope of
Measure 37 rights in recognition of their costs on third parties and the
environment.502
Another way to explain Measure 37 is that Oregon voters decided,
that the fetters the state's land use system placed on certain landowners'
development rights were inconsistent with ordinary notions of the moral
500. Or use your property as not to injure that of another's. See JEREMY BENTHAM,
PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE ch. 13, n. 1 (1843), available at
http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/pcc/index.html.
501. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 84-85 (Mass. 1851).
502. See supra notes 464-94 and accompanying text.
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dimension of property rights.5 °3 This interpretation would also account
for Measure 49's reduction in the scope of Measure 37 rights to small
developments, rectifying the perceived unfairness of alleged overregula-
tion. To the extent that Measure 37 is explainable on fairness grounds-
and not on a deregulatory effort phrased in fairness terms-Measure 49
may seem to be a suitable-albeit imperfect 5 4-antidote.
But perhaps the most telling way to understand Measure 37 is that
the Oregon electorate was sympathetic to the notion that development
rights were the equivalent of property rights. And that these develop-
ment rights existed in the abstract, regardless of the geographic or envi-
ronmental context of their exercise. However ahistorical, or out of touch
with the complexities of the twenty-first century,50 5 or inconsistent with
sophisticated definitions of what property rights actually entail, 50 6 or in
conflict with contemporary concerns over urban sprawl or carbon emis-
sions, this abstract vision of property rights as equivalent to development
rights apparently resonated with Oregon (and, apparently, Arizona) vot-
ers.
An abstract vision of property prevailed in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, leading to decisions like Lochner v. New
York,5°7 a result now widely reviled. 8 Measure 37 (and its ensuing
adoption in Arizona50 9) may reflect a revival of interest in viewing de-
velopment rights as idealized abstractions that are fundamental, regard-
less of their context. The costs of such abstractionism will eventually
become evident to Oregonians, although perhaps not in the short run.
But Measure 37's readjustment of property rights will surely serve as a
laboratory for other jurisdictions, which also grapple with what a cen-
tury-and-a-half ago Justice Shaw described as the effort in a "well or-
dered civil society" to avoid "injurious" uses, including those adversely
affecting neighbors and "the rights of the community." 510 The challenge
503. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1850 (2007); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 10-15, 97-100 (1977) (noting the power of the "ordinary observer's" definition of
property).
504. See ECHEVERRIA, supra note 479, at 10-11 (noting that under an amended Measure 37,
state and local governments would still routinely choose to waive regulatory requirements, rather
than pay compensation, and that new land use regulations would be chilled).
505. See generally FREYFOGLE, supra note 17.
506. See ACKERMAN, supra note 503, at 10-15 (distinguishing a "Scientific Policy Maker"
from an "Ordinary Observer").
507. 198 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1905) (striking down a New York statute setting maximum hours for
bakers as inconsistent with the freedom of contract guaranteed by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
508. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-5-8-6 (3rd ed.
2000) (discussing the demise of Lochner 's vision of substantive due process review of the merits of
socio-economic legislation).
509. See supra notes 427-33 and accompanying text.
510. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 84-85 (Mass. 1851); see also supra note 501 and
accompanying text.
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of the future will be to ascertain whether the radical changes in develop-
ment rights ushered in by Measure 37 and its copycats are an accurate
reflection of the morality of property rights of the twenty-first century.
DISQUALIFYING A DISTRICT ATTORNEY WHEN A
GOVERNMENT WITNESS WAS ONCE THE DISTRICT
ATTORNEY'S CLIENT:




Should a district attorney be disqualified from a criminal case if a
prosecution witness is a former client of the district attorney?1 Although
there has been significant academic, legislative and judicial attention to
disqualification of district attorneys in general,2 and to disqualification of
district attorneys who represented the defendant in particular, 3 a prosecu-
t Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.A., Tel-
Aviv University; LL.B., Tel-Aviv University; LL.M., Harvard Law School (waived); S.J.D., Har-
vard Law School. I thank Arthur Best, Erik Lemmon and Kris Miccio for their useful comments and
Bryce llvonen and University of Denver Sturm College of Law research librarian Diane Burkhardt
for their research assistance. This article explores grounds for disqualification of district attorneys,
among them personal and financial conflicts of interest. It thus seems appropriate to disclose my
own "interest" in the subject matter addressed in this article: I served as a paid expert witness in
People v. Lincoln, a case the article explores in detail and testified for the defense arguing that Colo-
rado law allows in some circumstances for the disqualification of a district attorney who represented
a former-client-turned-witness for the government. On the duty to disclose possible conflicts or
factors potentially effecting scholarship, see Graham Brown, Should Law Professors Practice What
They Teach? 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 316 (2001); Richard Lippitt, Intellectual Honesty, Industry and
Interest Sponsored Professional Works, and Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the Money,
or Is the Money Earning the Viewpoint? 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1075 (2001); see also William Simon,
The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example,
(Columbia Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper Number 07-158,
2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1025984.
I. Issues of first impression blur the line between positive (what the law is) and normative
(what the law should be). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1231-32 (1987) (summarizing and challenging the
positive-normative dichotomy). Because disqualification of district attorneys who represented
former-clients-turned-witnesses for the government is an issue of first impression not previously
decided, positive law is silent in the sense that it does not clearly allow nor disallow such disqualifi-
cations. The question of whether the law should allow for disqualification of district attorneys under
such circumstances thus becomes a normative one. See Wallace D. Loh, Book Review, In Quest of
Brown 's Promise: Social Research and Social Values in School Desegregation, 58 WASH. L. REV.
129, 165 (1982) (arguing that first impression cases call upon the courts to engage in a jurisprudence
of discretion and decide both applicable law and the facts).
2. See, e.g., Abby L. Dennis, Note, Refining in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial Over-
sight and the Superseder Power, 57 Duke L. J. 131 (2007). See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS,
ARBITRARY JUSTICE - THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 123-161 (2007); Bennett L.
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393 (1992) (observing that prosecutors are
greatly insulated from judicial control over their conduct); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006
WiSC. L. REV. 399, 425-27; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prose-
cutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000).
3. Allan L. Schwartz & Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Disqualification of Prosecuting
Attorney in State Criminal Case on Account of Relationship with Accused, 42 A.L.R. 5th 581, II.A.
(1996); What Circumstances Justify Disqualification of Prosecutor in Federal Criminal Case, 110
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tor's disqualification when a former client becomes a government wit-
ness has received no academic attention, has not been addressed by stat-
utes, and has not been decided by courts. 4 Studying the grounds for dis-
qualification of district attorneys whose former clients become govern-
ment witnesses sheds light on the complex battle between the judiciary
and the state for authority and control over the Office of the District At-
torney and the criminal justice system.5
In this conflict, the judiciary invokes its inherent powers to disqual-
ify district attorneys and the state responds by asserting executive powers
and promulgating disqualification statutes asserting exclusive authority.
Recognizing the state's immense power and inherent advantage over
defendants, the criminal justice system incorporates safeguards, often by
means of broad judicial interpretation, to protect the right of the accused
to a fair trial.6 In the context of disqualification of district attorneys, the
judiciary's role in expanding and protecting defendants' rights against
the state suggests a sympathetic approach towards motions to disqualify
district attorneys.7 However, to further its interest in effective pursuit of
law and order, the state may seek to protect the Office of the District
Attorney from undue interference. This motivation may lead to a general
approach disfavoring disqualification motions and to displeasure with the
exercise of judicial inherent powers to disqualify district attorneys.
The issue of disqualification of district attorneys when a former cli-
ent becomes a government witness thus involves more than balancing the
state's interests in administering law and order via the Office of the Dis-
trict Attorney against the interests of defendants and former-clients-
A.L.R. FED. 523, 1.-II. (1992); 63C AM. JUR. 2d Prosecuting Attorneys §§ 26-28, 48 (2007) [herein-
after Circumstances].
4. The question did come up as an issue of first impression before a Colorado trial court in
the spring of 2007 in the matter of People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274, 1276 (Colo. 2007). The trial
court answered the question in the affirmative. Id. The state of the law, however, is unclear because
the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded without directly addressing the issue. Id. at
1282. For a review of the power struggle between the courts and the state over the regulation of the
Office of the District Attorney, see generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCON-
DUCT vi (2d ed. 2005) (lamenting the passivity of the judiciary in overseeing prosecutorial power).
5. In the battle for control over the District Attorney's Office the "state" is represented by
both the executive branch and the legislative branch, working together to curb the power of the
judiciary and its exercise of inherent powers. To be sure, I do assert this alliance between the execu-
tive and legislative branches generally in the context of the criminal justice system, only that the two
branches do cooperate in asserting authority over the Office of the District Attorney vis-A-vis the
judiciary.
6. The role of the judiciary in safeguarding the rights of the criminal defendant given the
power of the state over the accused has been well documented. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Book
Review, Why Do You Think They Call It Capital Punishment? Reading the Killing State, 36 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 783, 795 (2002) (exploring "examples of the Supreme Court expanding the rights of
criminal defendants at the expense of state power"); Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment
and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1263 (1998) (examining the role
of the defense attorney in limiting "the arbitrary exercise of coercive state power by safeguarding the
defendant's entitlement to basic ... rights").
7. For example, disqualification of a district attorney may be ordered as a remedy for prose-
cutorial misconduct. See Circumstances, supra note 2, at § 10[a].
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turned-witnesses. It provides an opportunity to explore how law is cre-
ated in the shadow of, and as the result of, the battle between the courts
and the state and to appreciate the consequences for parties caught in the
crossfire.
Part I of this article explores the doctrine of inherent powers, its use
by the judiciary to disqualify district attorneys in the shadow of its rela-
tionship with the executive branch, and legislative attempts to abrogate it
by means of promulgating disqualification statutes asserting exclusive
authority over the regulation of the District Attorney's Office. It asserts
that such exclusive provisions are unconstitutional because they violate
the separation of powers doctrine and that courts have the inherent power
to disqualify a district attorney beyond the authority granted to them by
statute. Finally, Part I examines the circumstances under which courts
should exercise their inherent power and disqualify a district attorney
whose former client is a government witness.
Part II studies disqualification statutes, argues that such statutes
should generally be read to allow for the disqualification of a district
attorney who represented former-clients-turned-witnesses for the gov-
ernment, and explores the circumstances under which such disqualifica-
tion would be appropriate. Part III analyzes a recent Colorado case to
illustrate that lack of resolution of the issue of disqualification of district
attorneys whose former clients become government witnesses has unfor-
tunate consequences for those witnesses, for defendants and for the in-
tegrity of the judicial process.
I. COURTS' INHERENT POWER TO DISQUALIFY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
A. Courts 'Inherent Powers - a Doctrine of "Happy Indeterminacy "?
The inherent powers doctrine is a long-established,8 cumulative, 9
expansive,1° judicial assertion of possessing the exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law. Analytically, the doctrine consists of two
8. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 2.2.3, at 27 n.45 (1986) (The first
American case commonly cited for asserting the inherent powers doctrine was In re Mosness, 39
Wis. 509 (1876)); see also Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the
Practice ofLaw: An HistoricalAnalysis, 32 Buff. L. Rev. 525,536 (1983).
9. See id §2.2.1 at23.
10. Some of the powers claimed by various jurisdictions include the following:
[T]he power to promulgate an official lawyer's code; to admit lawyers to practice under
specified conditions and to disbar or otherwise discipline admitted lawyers; to define the
unauthorized practice of law and to fashion remedies to banish nonlawyers from the de-
fined realms of exclusive lawyer practice, even when the assertedly unauthorized practice
has nothing to do with court proceedings; to construct an integrated bar of which all law-
yers must be members in good standing in order to continue practicing law; to levy an as-
sessment that every lawyer must pay toward support of the court's activities in regulating
the legal profession; and to regulate the conduct of judges and to issue and enforce com-
pliance with the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Id. § 2.2.2 at 24-5; see also Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of
Law--A Proposed Delineation, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 783, 785 (1976) [hereinafter Delineation].
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steps. First, courts claim that various "'implied,' 'essential,' 'incidental'
or 'inherent""' powers are necessary to maintain the integrity of the ju-
dicial process.' 2 Second, courts invoke the constitutional law separation
of powers doctrine to protect their self-proclaimed inherent powers. The
separation of powers doctrine, recognized under federal and state law,
generally empowers each governmental branch-legislative, executive,
and judicial 3-to act within its prescribed sphere, and states that "no
branch may attempt to exercise a power [bestowed] upon [another]
branch."' 4 Applying the separation of powers doctrine, courts have as-
serted that any attempt by either the executive or the legislative branch to
encroach upon the courts' inherent power to regulate the practice of law
was unconstitutional.
15
Over time, the regulation of the practice of law pursuant to the
courts' inherent powers has been recognized as a traditional judicial
function. 6  However, the scope of the doctrine and its application are
unclear.' 7 Indeed, while courts have clearly established their power to
regulate the practice of law, their claim to have this power exclusively
and the manner in which courts exercise it in particular instances have
been greatly challenged. Interestingly, this state of uncertainty is inten-
tional: courts have generally avoided comprehensively addressing all the
competing considerations embedded in inherent powers generally and
have instead focused "on the individual inherent power involved in each
case."
, 18
Specifically, in Link v. Wabash19 the Court established the frame-
work for courts' acquiescence to statutory limitations on their inherent
powers, holding that a statute will not abrogate an inherent power of the
court absent clear legislative intent.20 In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,21 the
11. Henry M. Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 635, 636 (1935).
12. See Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. lkner, 438 S.E.2d 613, 617 (W. Va.
1993) (quoting In re Grubb, 417 S.E.2d 919, 922 (W. Va. 1992) (Generally, courts "have an inherent
responsibility under... general supervisory powers to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and to
maintain the public confidence in our court system.")). Courts possess the power to regulate the
practice of law in order to protect the public and to uphold the public confidence in attorney reliabil-
ity and integrity. Id at 616; see also Delineation, supra note 10, at 785-86.
13. Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent-
Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 1, 5 (1989).
14. WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 2.2.3 at 27.
15. Id.; see also Alpert, supra note 8, at 525 ("With but few exceptions, the courts have de-
termined that the doctrine of the separation of powers limits or even precludes legislative regulation
of this vital profession."); Delineation, supra note 10, at 785-86.
16. Id.; see also Delineation, supra note 10, at 784 ("Judicial regulation of the legal profes-
sion has predominated for many years.").
17. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 738 (2001) (asserting that the fundamental questions of the
source and scope of courts' inherent powers have never been satisfactorily addressed).
18. Id. at 739.
19. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
20. Id. at 630-31.
21. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
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Court added that authority granted under a statute only applies to the
circumstances specified within it, whereas the inherent powers of the
court extend to a full range of circumstances,22 concluding that even with
the grant of statutory power, "inherent power[s] ... continue to exist to
fill in the interstices. 23  Some have celebrated this uncertain state of
affairs as one of a "constitutional artistry" and "happy indeterminacy,,
24
arguing that courts have been declining to decide the broader issues em-
bedded in inherent powers, acquiescing to legislation concerning courts'
powers and leaving open a zone of undefined judicial discretion in order
to avoid direct inter-branch confrontations.25 Others, however, have
critically argued that courts refuse to decide the greater issues because
the case-by-case approach allows them to stretch the narrow terms "im-
plied," "essential," "incidental," and "necessary" to rationalize a wide
range of actions that are in fact not essential to their exercise of judicial
authority.
26
In any event, and regardless of competing positions regarding the
desirability of this state of affairs, the inherent powers doctrine is in dis-
array with no comprehensive theory regarding its scope and application.
On the one hand courts routinely assert the possession of inherent powers
and invoke them regularly; and on the other hand courts frequently ad-
monish that such powers must be exercised cautiously, 27 and acquiesce to
legislation controlling and restricting their inherent powers. 28 The ques-
tion becomes, therefore, not whether courts possess inherent powers but
whether courts should exercise their inherent powers in a particular in-
stance.29
22. Id. at 46.
23. Id.
24. Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.
J. 929,971 (1996).
25. Id. at 967-71; see also Pushaw, supra note 17, at 782-83.
26. Pushaw, supra note 17, at 738.
27. See Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) ("Principles of deference counsel
restraint in resorting to inherent powers .... ).
28. See, e.g., State v. Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2001) ("We have recognized that
some inherent powers may be controlled or restricted by statute. Some inherent powers may even be
overridden by statute. Other inherent powers may be so fundamental to the operation of a court that
any attempt by the legislature to restrict or divest the court of the power could violate the separation
of powers doctrine. (citations omitted)); see also Carrington, supra note 24, at 967-71.
29. Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect
State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times? 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1049 (2004) ("The question, therefore, is not
whether court can exercise this [inherent] power, but rather when they should do so." (alteration in
original)). Colorado case law illustrates the indeterminacy: on the one hand, the inherent powers
doctrine has been recognized consistently and repeatedly by the Colorado Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo. 1984) ("[The inherent powers of the judiciary
include] '[a]ll powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial func-
tions, to protect its dignity, independence, and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective.
These powers are inherent in the sense that they exist because the court exists; the court is, therefore
it has the powers reasonably required to act as an efficient court."' (quoting Jim Carrigan, Inherent
Powers and Finance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 22) (alteration in original)). On the other hand, the
court has admonished the strict and limited use of inherent powers. See, e.g., In re Estate of Myers,
130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo. 2006).
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B. Inherent Powers and Disqualification of District Attorneys
The expansive inherent powers doctrine generally encompasses the
power to disqualify attorneys. 30 Courts have routinely justified this pow-
er on the ground that attorneys are officers of the court, 1 and as such,
their conduct directly affects the integrity, efficiency, and public percep-
tion of the judiciary.32 For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that inherent powers include the power to disqualify attorneys to
preserve the court's integrity.
33
Courts' inherent powers also include, more specifically, the power
to disqualify prosecuting attorneys.34  That said, courts have been quite
reluctant to exercise their power to disqualify district attorneys and quick
to follow the Link and Chambers framework acquiescing to statutes lim-
iting their exercise of inherent power. Reasoning that the function of
prosecuting criminal cases has historically been within the province of
30. See Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Viii. of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.
2005) ("The authority of federal courts to disqualify attorneys derives from their inherent power to
"preserve the integrity of the adversary process' (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241,
1246 (2d Cir.1979)); Talecris Biotherapeutics, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513
(D. Del. 2007) (the court has the power to govern conduct of any attorney appearing before it-
including disqualification); Conley v. Chaffinch, 431 F. Supp. 2d 494, 496 (D. Del. 2006) (the
court's inherent power to govern attorneys "appearing before it" includes disqualification as a regu-
latory measure); Roush v. Seagate Technology, LLC, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 275, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(courts possess inherent power to disqualify attorneys in order to further justice and control officers
of the court); Oaks Management Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 567 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (explaining Judge's authority to disqualify attorneys originates from courts' inherent power to
further justice and control over those who appear before it).
31. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (upon acceptance as a member of
the bar, "[h]e became an officer of the court" (quoting Justice Cardozo in People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71 (N.Y. 1928))); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the
Court, 42 VAND. L. REv. 39 (1989) (examining the dubious meaning of officer of the court with
regard to the attorney's roles and responsibilities in contemporary practice realities).
32. Delineation, supra note 10, at 785; Dowling, supra note 11, at 639 ("The court is regu-
larly engaged in administering correct principles of justice and of fair dealing among men . "
Consequently, if an attorney disregards the principles of justice, then the court "has the right to
discipline the unworthy member, and exclude those who, in contempt of the tribunal, seek to practice
law before it without proper admission, or otherwise disparage the court's dignity.").
33. E.g., Myers, 130 P.3d at 1025. ("[C]ourts have the inherent power to ensure both the
reality and appearance of integrity and fairness in proceedings before them; and to that end, they
necessarily retain the discretion to disqualify attorneys from further representation."). Consistent
with the "happy indeterminacy" approach, immediately following its affirmation of the inherent
power to disqualify attorneys the court admonished its careful use. Id.; see also People v. Witty, 36
P.3d 69, 73 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
34. Rhodes v. Miller, 437 N.E.2d 978, 979-80 (Ind. 1982) ("[A] trial judge does have the
authority, and, in fact, the responsibility, to find that a prosecuting attorney, and/or members of his
staff, should be disqualified if he finds facts to be true with reference to such disqualification and to
then appoint a special prosecuting attorney to try the cause"); Lux v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
484 S.E.2d 145, 149 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) ("In order to protect prosecutorial impartiality, a trial court
has the power to disqualify a Commonwealth's attorney from proceeding with a particular criminal
prosecution if the trial court determines that the Commonwealth's attorney has an interest pertinent
to a defendant's case that may conflict with the Commonwealth's attorney's official duties"); see
also State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tenn. 2000); Cole v. State, 2 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999); Brown v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 504 S.E.2d 399, 402 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); State
v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 840 (Mo, 1996).
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the executive branch, 35 and that the legislative and executive branches
maintain a strong interest in the appointment of and the exercise of au-
thority over district attorneys, courts have concluded that the interest in
the appointment and disqualification of district attorneys is and should be
shared by all branches of government.36
Recent amendments to disqualification statutes, however, seem to
have pushed the envelope and crossed the line from sharing authority
over the regulation of district attorneys to usurping it. For example, it
seems that the Colorado legislature has attempted to abrogate the courts'
inherent power to disqualify a district attorney. Colorado Revised Stat-
ute section 20-1-107 purports to specify the "only" grounds for which a
district attorney may be disqualified.37
The statute itself gives ample support for the preemption intent of
the Colorado legislature. First, subsection 20-1-107(2) states: "A district
attorney may only be disqualified in a particular case. . ." and goes on to
specify three grounds for disqualification. "Only" is explicitly exclusive
and renders Chambers meaningless: the authority granted by the Colo-
rado statute does not apply to certain circumstances, rather it purports to
exhaustively define all the circumstances permitting disqualification of
district attorneys. Further, the exclusive language of the statute makes it
clear that the legislature envisions no "interstices" for the courts to fill in.
Second, subsection 20-1-107(1) states in relevant part: "The general as-
sembly finds that ... [it has] the exclusive authority to prescribe the du-
ties of the office of the district attorney .... ." The exclusivity language
suggests that courts do not have authority over the duties of the district
attorney and arguably no authority to disqualify a district attorney.
Third, subsection 20-1-107(2) states that a disqualification motion shall
not be granted unless a court finds one of the three grounds specified in
the subsection, once again lending support for the proposition that a court
cannot grant a motion and disqualify a district attorney for reasons other
than the ones enumerated in the statute. It further restricts the ability of
the courts to disqualify a district attorney by mandating an automatic stay
of a disqualification order pending a mandatory interlocutory appeal be-
fore the Colorado Supreme Court.38
35. See United States v. Jacobo-Zavala, 241 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2001). State v. Hoegh,
632 N.W.2d 885, 889-90 (Iowa 2001) (finding that a statute granting the power of appointment of a
special prosecutor to the county board of supervisors, while removing a power from the courts and
vesting it in the legislature, did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the legislature
legitimately shared an interest in and responsibility for the regulation of special prosecutors).
36. Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d at 889-90 (finding that a statute granting the power of appointment of
a special prosecutor to the county board of supervisors, while removing a power from the courts and
vesting it in the legislature, did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the legislature
legitimately shared an interest in and responsibility for the regulation of special prosecutors).
37. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-107 (West 2007).
38. Arguably, by promulgating an open-ended standard of disqualification which calls for
judicial interpretation, see infra Part 1I, the legislature left courts ample room in which to exercise
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Furthermore, the legislative history suggests that the Colorado legis-
lature amended the statute in 2002 in response to two 2001 decisions. In
City and County of Denver v. County Court,39 the Colorado Court of
Appeals held that appearance of impropriety alone justifies disqualifica-
tion of city attorney's office, despite the fact that the term "appearance of
impropriety" no longer appeared in a relevant authorizing statute; and in
People v. Palomo,4 ° the Colorado Supreme Court held that appearance of
impropriety can be the basis for disqualification of the District Attor-
ney's Office.4 ' Both cases found support for the appearance of impropri-
ety as a ground for disqualification in the courts' inherent powers.42 It
seems clear that the Colorado legislature intended to override these deci-
sions.43 Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court has found explicitly that
the revised statute "eliminates 'appearance of impropriety' as a basis for
disqualification of district attorneys.
'"4
A narrow interpretation of the statute, according to which it did not
intend to abrogate inherent powers but only meant to disallow the ap-
pearance of impropriety as an independent ground disqualification is
implausible. First, the legislature could have explicitly disallowed the
appearance of impropriety as a ground for disqualification rather than
specify the "only" grounds, omitting the appearance of impropriety.
Second, the "appearance of impropriety" is, and means, the courts' invo-
cation of inherent powers.45 That is, disallowing the appearance of im-
propriety is tantamount to challenging the courts' inherent power to dis-
qualify a district attorney.
The Colorado legislature is not alone in trying to restrict the courts'
inherent power to disqualify district attorneys. Following the California
power and discretion. The straightforward language of the statute and the legislative history, how-
ever, contradict this construction and clarify that the legislature intended to exercise exclusive au-
thority over disqualification of district attorneys.
39. 37 P.3d 453 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
40. 31 P.3d 879 (Colo. 2001).
41. Id. at 882; see also People v. County Court, 854 P.2d 1341 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that appearance of impropriety is not only a proper ground for disqualification of a district attorney,
it is also a compelling basis for such action).
42. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879; People v. County Court, 37 P.3d at 456 ("Whether an attorney
should be disqualified is a matter within the discretion of the court").
43. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-107 (West 2007).
44. People v. Chavez, 139 P.3d. 649, 653 (Colo. 2006); People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d 671, 675
(Colo. 2006) ("We conclude that, in using the word 'only' and defining with specificity the circum-
stances under which disqualification is proper, the amended version of section 20-1-107 eliminates
'appearance of impropriety' as a basis for disqualification."); People v. Manzanares, 139 P.3d 655,
658 (Colo. 2006); In re E.L.T., 139 P.3d 685, 687 (Colo. 2006). It is possible to assert that while the
legislature eliminated the appearance of impropriety as an independent ground for disqualification,
the appearance of impropriety nevertheless makes a backdoor reentry into the statute because it can
be considered as part of "special circumstances" under the statute. Justice Bender explicitly rejects
this approach, however, because he believes that the appearance of impropriety is tantamount to
courts' inherent powers which exist outside of and in spite of a disqualification statute. N.R., 139
P.3d at 682 (Bender, J., dissenting).
45. N.R., 139 P.3d at 682 (Bender, J., dissenting) ("The phrase 'appearance of impropriety'
establishes a nebulous standard, that broadly describes the court's inherent power.").
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Supreme Court decision in People v. Superior Court (Greer),46 the legis-
lature promulgated section 1424 of the California Penal Code, which
states in relevant part: "The motion may not be granted unless the evi-
dence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely
that the defendant would receive a fair trial (emphasis added). ' 47  In
other words, the California legislature seems to have stated the only
ground for disqualification of a district attorney because pursuant to the
statute a court may not grant a motion to disqualify unless it finds that
defendant has met the statutory standard for disqualification.48
To the extent they purport to usurp the inherent power of the courts
to disqualify a district attorney, both the Colorado and California statutes
violate the separation of powers doctrine and are unconstitutional. Ex-
ploring the interplay between the judiciary's inherent power and the
separation of powers doctrine, Wolfram argues that the inherent powers
doctrine consists of two separate aspects-the "affirmative aspect" and
the "negative aspect., 49 Courts invoke the affirmative aspect when they
hold that they have the inherent authority to regulate attorneys when
statutes are silent on the issue.50 The negative aspect, conversely, arises
when courts hold legislative or administrative laws unconstitutional be-
cause either the legislative or the executive branch violated the separa-
tion of powers doctrine by attempting to regulate attorneys and the prac-
tice of law.5 1 The negative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine asserts
that the courts, and only the courts, may regulate attorneys (emphasis
added).52  The statutes in Colorado and California clearly violate the
negative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine. The statutes do not pur-
port to share authority over the disqualification of district attorneys,
46. 561 P.2d 1164 (1977).
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1424(a)(1) (Deering 2007).
48. In People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 317 (Cal. 1996), the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the statute precluded the use of the appearance of impropriety standard as an independent
ground for recusal, holding that the critical analysis in determining the existence of a conflict instead
is that "the likelihood that the defendant will not receive a fair trial-must be real, not merely appar-
ent, and must rise to the level of a likelihood of unfairness." Importantly, because the statute did not
purport to exercise exclusive authority over the office of the district attorney, the California Supreme
Court did not consider whether the legislature's preclusion of the appearance of impropriety as an
independent ground interferes with the court's inherent power to disqualify the office of the district
attorney. Instead, it merely interpreted the statute and presumably found it consistent with its inher-
ent power and therefore not in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
49. Wolfram, supra note 13, at 4.
50. Id. Support for the affirmative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine is found in state
constitutions. The language tends to grant the judiciary general power over judicial functions, id. at
5, and often resembles a variation of the following: "The judicial power shall be vested in courts
consisting of a supreme court and such other courts of inferior jurisdictions as the legislature may
establish." Id. Pursuant to the affirmative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine state supreme
courts regulate attorneys in all fifty states. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of
Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?,
37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (2003).
51. Wolfram, supra note 13, at 7.
52. WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 2.2 at 24.
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rather, they vest exclusive authority in the legislature to promulgate the
grounds for disqualification.
The Supreme Courts of Colorado and California, however, have ig-
nored the unconstitutionality of the disqualification statutes. The Su-
preme Court of California, in People v. Conner,53 acknowledged that the
legislature promulgated section 1424 in order to change the disqualifica-
tion standard the Court announced in Greer, yet accepted and construed
the statute without even commenting on the constitutionality issue.
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court in People ex rel. N.R.,54 quoted
the legislative declaration of "exclusive authority," noted that such a
declaration contradicted the century long doctrine that courts have the
inherent power to disqualify a district attorney beyond the authority
granted to them by statute, cited at length numerous cases in support of
courts' inherent power but concluded that: "it is unnecessary in this case
to decide whether the legislature's claim of exclusive authority 'to pre-
scribe the duties of the office of the district attorney' in the context of
disqualification conflicts with the judiciary's inherent authority 'to pro-
tect its dignity, independence, and integrity."' 5 5 Presumably the court
did not need to decide the issue because the trial court did not explicitly
invoke its inherent powers to disqualify the district attorney.
In his dissent, Justice Bender strongly disagreed.56 Finding that the
trial court acted within its inherent powers, Justice Bender reasoned that
"by its use of the adverb 'only,"' the statute "narrows the traditional and
time-honored inherent power of the courts and thus violates the constitu-
tional doctrine of separation of powers. 57 Justice Bender rejected the
majority's assertion that addressing the declaration of exclusivity is un-
necessary, pointing out that by ignoring it the majority "effectively con-
cludes that the disqualification statute does in fact present an exhaustive
list of circumstances under which a trial court may disqualify a district
attorney." 58 He concluded that "the statute's claim to set forth such an
53. 666 P.2d 5, 8 (Cal. 1983).
54. 139 P.3d 671 (Colo. 2006).
55. Id. at 675 n.3.
56. The dissent generally explored courts' inherent authority to protect the integrity of the
judicial process as an embodiment of the separation of powers doctrine, and then specifically estab-
lished that the doctrine encompasses the trial's court inherent power to disqualify a district attorney
even beyond applicable disqualification statutes. Id. at 680-83 ("The court is, therefore it has the
powers reasonably necessary to act as an efficient court .... We have defined the inherent powers
of the judiciary to be the powers of that logically flow from the existence of the judiciary as a the
third co-equal branch of government.") (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). It concluded that
"trial courts must remain within their constitutional authority when they disqualify a district attorney
for reasons other than those specified in section 20-1-107." Id. at 682. Finally, it asserted that the
statute's language is narrower than the court's inherent powers and thus unconstitutional. Id. at 679.
57. Id. at 679 (Bender, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
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exhaustive list infringes upon the inherent power of the court to protect
the integrity of the judicial process ...."'9
The dissent reflects the insight that district attorneys occupy the
dual roles of officers of the court and executive officers of the state, and
therefore the issue of disqualification entails a power struggle between
the state and the courts. It notes that a district attorney:
has the dual roles of executive officer of the state, and, like every
other attorney, officer of the court. Hence, although a district attor-
ney is an elected constitutional officer whose duties are prescribed by
the General Assembly, she is also bound by the Rules of Professional
Conduct and the rules of the court.
60
Exactly because the question of disqualification of district attorneys
entails an important battle for authority between the state and the courts,
it is imperative to explore the attempt by the legislature to abrogate judi-
cial power.
61
Justice Bender further clarified his position in People ex rel.
E.L. T.62 He importantly explained that while he agreed with the majority
that the trial court's original findings were ambiguous and that E.L.T.'s
right to a fair trial was not necessarily jeopardized, disqualification was
nonetheless justified because the trial court had the inherent power to
disqualify the district attorney for reasons other than the ones enumerated
in the statute, and specifically, for reasons beyond "special circumstances
that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair
trial, 63 which were unclear in this case.64 Irrespective of the issue of
"fair trial," Justice Bender found that
these circumstances support the trial court's decision to disqualify the
district attorney's office pursuant to its constitutional authority to
protect the integrity and appearance of integrity of the court and the
judicial process, and therefore its order to disqualify the district at-
torney's office does not constitute an abuse of discretion [irrespective
of whether the E.L.T.'s right to a fair trial was compromised].
65
To the extent the California and Colorado statutes purport to curtail
the courts' inherent powers to disqualify district attorneys and limit dis-
59. Id. at 680.
60. Id. at 683 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 682 ("this case presents exactly the circumstances supporting disqualification pursu-
ant to the court's inherent powers because it presents facts which lie outside the narrow limits to the
trial court's authority as defined by the disqualification statute.").
62. People ex reL E.L.T., 139 P.3d 685 (Colo. 2006). Justice Bender reiterated his position
that the trial court has the inherent power to disqualify a district attorney outside of the grounds
specified in the statute. Id. at 688.
63. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-107(2) (West 2007); see infra Part II.
64. E.L. T., 139 P.3d at 688 (Bender, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
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qualification to statutory grounds, the statutes are unconstitutional.66
One must wonder therefore why both state supreme courts failed to in-
validate the unmistakable exclusive language in the statutes.
C. The Case Against Exercising Inherent Powers to Disqualify District
Attorneys
An interplay of constitutional and political considerations explains
why the Supreme Courts of California and Colorado have not rushed to
invalidate their states' district attorney disqualification statutes. From a
constitutional perspective, when courts exercise their inherent power to
disqualify district attorneys, they simultaneously assert and assault the
separation of powers doctrine. Generally, by invalidating a statute,
courts declare that the legislature has exceeded the power granted to it by
the constitution. By invalidating a disqualification statute, however,
courts declare that the legislature has usurped judicial power found not
explicitly in the constitution but rather in courts' interpretation of it and
of constitutional law theory.67 In other words, in order to invalidate a
disqualification statute courts must invoke the separation of powers doc-
trine. And yet, invalidating a disqualification statute is an act of judicial
interference with important state interests entrusted in the legislature,68
which the separation of powers doctrine would discourage.
Courts thus are in a bind: invalidating a disqualification statute re-
quires invoking the separation of powers doctrine, the very doctrine
which discourages the judiciary from intervening in legitimate interests
vested in the legislative and executive branches such as the regulation of
the Office of the District Attorney. The regulation of lawyers, let alone
the regulation of district attorneys, "strongly involves the traditional leg-
islative concerns with the peace, safety, and welfare of citizens and can
involve matters of constitutionally legitimate concerns to the executive
66. Indeed, in its amicus brief, the Colorado Attorney General appears to concede the point.
While paying lip service to the majority opinion, see Brief for Colorado District Attorney's Council
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 18, 21, People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007)
(Nos. 07SA82 and 07SA83) ("This Court has not defiantly resolved whether courts retain inherent
authority to disqualify district attorneys in situations that do not meet the requirements of revised
section 20-1-107 .... The state believes the majority's position is the wiser one."), the Attorney
General characterizes the difference between the majority and the dissent not in terms of whether
courts generally retain the inherent power to disqualify district attorneys independent of the disquali-
fication statute, but rather narrowly in terms of "whether courts may disqualify district attorneys in
order to preserve the 'appearance of fairness' even where there is no potential for an unfair trial." Id.
at 20. In other words, the Attorney General implicitly acknowledges that courts have the inherent
power to disqualify district attorneys. To him, the only difference between the majority and the
dissent is whether the courts should exercise their inherent power to disqualify a district attorney in
order to preserve the "appearance of fairness," not, importantly, whether they have the power to do
so generally.
67. More specifically, a disqualification statute violates courts' inherent powers, which is
justified in terms of the separation of powers doctrine.
68. "In American democratic theory, popularly elected legislatures are the primary source of
lawmaking." WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 2.2.3 at 31; see also Brief for Colorado District Attorney's
Office Council, supra note 66, at 8-10.
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branch as well.",69 Thus, invalidating a disqualification statute on the
ground that it interferes with the ability of the judiciary to regulate dis-
trict attorneys is somewhat compromised because the act of declaring the
statute unconstitutional interferes with the ability of the state to regulate
district attorneys.
From a political perspective, consistent with the "happy indetermi-
nacy" approach I speculate that the California and Colorado Supreme
Courts took the encroachment of their powers to be only of academic and
theoretical nature and therefore not worthy of a fight. The courts seemed
to have determined that the actual injury to their authority, as well as the
injury to the defendants was so minimal as to not justify an explicit con-
frontation with the legislative branch. As we shall see, however, such a
conclusion underestimates the impact of disqualification statutes on de-
fendants, fails to appreciate the consequences for witnesses who were
once a prosecutor's clients, and consequently their impact on the integ-
rity of the judicial process.
D. The Case for Exercising Inherent Power to Disqualify a District At-
torney Who Formerly Represented a Government Witness
If courts have declined to invalidate the unconstitutional component
of disqualification statutes because of a political motivation, the logic
would be disturbingly faulty. The stakes are much higher than an aca-
demic dispute over the separation of powers. Both the California and
Colorado statutes ground disqualification in unfairness to the defen-
dant.70 Importantly, because the statutes do not consider the interests of
other parties as relevant in assessing the fairness of the trial, 71 disqualifi-
cation based on the inherent power of the courts becomes the only viable
means of protecting the interests of third parties implicated in the trial,
such as witnesses.
In particular, the interests of former clients who become witnesses
for the government do not even enter the balance of considerations a
court could consider under the disqualification statutes. Consequently, a
district attorney may subpoena a former client to testify, compel him to
testify by offering immunity and then pursuant to a court order disclose
the former client's confidential information to the defendant if it consti-
tutes exculpatory evidence without the former client's consent. 72 Be-
cause the former-client-turned-witness is not the defendant, he will not
69. WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 30. The doctrine helps to demonstrate the unique and perva-
sive power of lawyers, and only lawyers (emphasis added), to regulate themselves. Id. at 29-31;
Wolfram, supra note 13, at 16-19.
70. See infra Part II.
71. Infra.
72. See, e.g., People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007); Infra Part III; notes 190-193 and
accompanying text.
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be able to protect his confidentiality interest by moving to disqualify the
district attorney, his former lawyer.
The harm suffered by a former-client-turned-witness from disclo-
sure of his confidential information may be significant. In addition,
compromising the confidentiality interests of witnesses harms an impor-
tant public interest: confidentiality is the cornerstone of the attorney-
client relationship.73 It establishes trust, enables an open and complete
exchange between attorney and client essential to effective representa-
tion,74 and generally fosters public confidence in the legal profession.75
Statutes that do not even allow courts the discretion to assess the harm to
the confidentiality interests of third parties as grounds for disqualifica-
tion are thus ill-advised.
Confidentiality, to be sure, is not an absolute doctrine. The state's
interest in prosecuting a criminal defendant in a particular instance may
require the disclosure of confidential information of a district attorney's
former-client-turned-witness. 76 For example, in a case in which a for-
mer-client of the district attorney is a key witness for the government,
confidential information shared by the former-client with the district
attorney constitutes exculpatory evidence, a special prosecutor cannot be
appointed and the harm suffered by the former-client-turned-witness
from the disclosure of his confidential information to the defendant is
negligible, the court may order the district attorney to reveal the confi-
dential information to the defendant.
Such a decision to compel disclosure of confidential information,
however--especially when the confidentiality interests at stake are those
of a third party witness whose only connection to the prosecution is the
fact that he happens to be a former client of the prosecuting district attor-
ney--cannot be a foregone conclusion. To the contrary, because of con-
fidentiality's fundamental importance to the client-lawyer relationship,
the Rules of Professional Conduct presume to protect confidential infor-
mation, not disclose it.77 Consequently, while in some circumstances a
district attorney may be ordered by a court, as an exception, to reveal
confidential information of a former-client-turned-witness, given the
73. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 1 (2007).
74. Id. at cmts. 2-3 (2007).
75. See generally Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics: Resolving the Tension Be-
tween Confidentiality Requirements and Contemporary Lawyers' Career Paths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF.
199,203-07 (2007).
76. Rule 1.6(b)(6) of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct will
allow a district attorney to reveal confidential information of a former-client-turned-witness assum-
ing the information constitutes exculpatory evidence and the court grants an order compelling dis-
closure. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2007)
77. See. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (establishing a presumptive duty of
non-disclosure regarding all information relating to the representation), as opposed to Rule 1.6(b)(6)
(carving an exception to confidentiality based on a court order). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6).
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harm to the witness and the interest of society in protecting confidential-
ity, the court must have the countervailing authority to exercise its inher-
ent power and disqualify a district attorney in instances where the harm
to the state is relatively small and the harm to the former-client-turned-
witness is great. For example, disqualification based on inherent powers
may be appropriate where the state can easily appoint another district
attorney to prosecute the defendant who has not represented any of the
key witnesses in the case against defendant.
Moreover, given the public interest in preserving confidentiality, the
court may exercise its inherent power and disqualify the district attorney
even if the former client waives his confidentiality interest. Such dis-
qualification may be warranted in circumstances where the court believes
that the former-client-turned-witness was facing a dilemma of having to
choose between protecting his confidentiality interest and winning favor
with the district attorney, or where the court finds that that the former-
client may be colluding with the district attorney. Such collusion, for
example, may be the result of the former relationship between the wit-
ness and the district attorney.
When a district attorney once represented a government witness, a
court should be able to assess the totality of the circumstances and use its
inherent power to disqualify the district attorney if disqualification is
necessary the protect the interests of a former-client-turned-witness and
the integrity of the trial. Otherwise, the important interest of the former
client in protecting his confidentiality may be compromised, and with it,
the integrity of the fact-finding process. To be sure, consistent with the
"happy indeterminacy" approach and the framework set by Link and
Chambers courts should use their inherent power to disqualify district
attorneys sparingly. And yet disqualification statutes that usurp the in-
herent power of the courts and deprive courts of the authority to protect
the interests of third parties, such as former-clients-turned-witnesses, are
not only unconstitutional but also undesirable.
II. STATUTORY DISQUALIFICATION OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
A. Statutory Disqualification
Providing an overview of disqualification statutes is difficult be-
cause the majority of states do not have disqualification statutes,78 some
state statutes do not directly state the grounds for disqualification but
rather grant the court the power to appoint a special prosecutor when,
among other reasons, the district attorney is disqualified, 79 and among
78. Suggesting perhaps that some state legislatures defer to courts regarding whether to dis-
qualify a district attorney.
79. For example, Nevada's statute states that: "[i]f the district attorney ... for any reason is
disqualified... the court may appoint some other person to perform the duties of the district attor-
ney." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 252.100.1 (West 2007); see also ALA. CODE § 12-17-186(a) (2007);
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the states with statutes clearly stating bases for disqualification the
grounds vary considerably. This section analyzes Colorado's legislation,
and uses it as a basis for comparative analysis of some other states' re-
sponses to this issue.
C.R.S. subsection 20-1-107(2) reads in relevant part:
A district attorney may only be disqualified in a particular
case at the request of the district attorney or upon a showing
that the district attorney has a personal or financial interest or
finds [sic] special circumstances that would render it unlikely
that the defendant would receive a fair trial .... 80
Whether "special circumstances" include representation by a district
attorney of former-clients-turned-witnesses for the government is a ques-
tion of first impression for the Colorado Supreme Court.8' The first two
prongs of the statute, request by the district attorney and showing of a
conflict of interest are irrelevant here. To date, the "special circum-
stances" prong of subsection 20-1-107(2) has mostly been invoked when
a district attorney previously represented the defendant. Subsection 1
thus explores "special circumstances" when the district attorney repre-
sented the defendant, subsection 2 examines other instances in which
"special circumstances" have been construed and subsection 3 studies
disqualification statutes in other jurisdictions.
1. "Special Circumstances" When the District Attorney Repre-
sented the Defendant: The Unfair Advantage Standard
In People v. Chavez,82 the Colorado Supreme Court construed, for
the first time, the "special circumstances" prong of the statute when the
district attorney previously represented the defendant. 83 The court held
IOWA CODE ANN. § 331.754(2) (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.12 (West 2007); N.Y.
CouNTY LAW § 701(1) (McKinney 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 859 (West 2007) ("If the
district attorney... is disqualified, the court must appoint some attorney-at-law to perform the duties
of the district attorney on such trial.").
80. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-107(2) (West 2007) (emphasis added). The statute's
ambiguous language means either that a district attorney may be disqualified upon a showing that
the district attorney has a personal interest or a showing that the district attorney finds special cir-
cumstances; or that a district attorney may be disqualified upon a showing that the district attorney
has a personal interest or a finding by a court that there are special circumstances. As Justice Bender
explains in People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d 649, 675 (Colo. 2006), the latter reading, vesting authority
in the courts to find "special circumstances," is both more reasonable and compelling.
81. One amicus brief filed in Lincoln suggests that no case decided the issue before because
"disqualification in this situation is such a leap of logic that no judge had previously granted such a
motion." Brief for Colorado District Attorney's Office Council, supra note 66, at 5. Of course, in
the alternative, this may simply be an issue of first impression.
82. 139 P.3d 649.
83. Id. at 653. The court noted that while it never construed subsection 20-1-107(2) before, it
did explore the kinds of facts that warrant disqualification to ensure that defendant receives a fair
trial in Farina and Osborn. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. The court explained that
while the cases were decided under the appearance of impropriety standard replaced by the statute,
their precedential value stems from the analysis of facts upon which the court may conclude that the
accused will probably not receive a fair trial. Chavez, 139 P.3d at 653 n.5.
[Vol. 85:2
DISQUALIFYING A DISTRICT A TTORNE Y
that "where the prosecuting attorney had an attorney-client relationship
with the defendant in a case that was substantially related to the case in
which the defendant is being prosecuted, 'circumstances exist that would
render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.' ' 84 The
court noted that the advantage that such an attorney-client relationship
could give the district attorney on cross-examination of the defendant 'is
obvious,' 85 and reasoned that both passage of time between the attorney-
client relationship and the prosecution, 86 and factual distinctions between
the two cases would be relevant in assessing "special circumstances. 87
It is noteworthy that the court did not find that that any representa-
tion of the defendant warrants disqualification of the district attorney, but
rather only representation that is the same or "substantially related to the
case in which the defendant is being prosecuted" supports disqualifica-
tion, subject to the passage of time consideration. 88 No doubt, any prior
representation of the defendant by the district attorney will give the gov-
ernment an "obvious" advantage on cross-examination of the defendant.
Yet the court reasoned that the advantage only results in unfairness to the
defendant when the prior representation is the same or "substantially
related" to the current prosecution, presumably because when the repre-
sentation is "substantially related" the advantage to the government re-
sults not only from the district attorney's general familiarity with the
defendant but also from knowledge of relevant confidential information
related to the current prosecution. 9
In People v. Manzanares,90 the Colorado Supreme Court expanded
its analysis of "special circumstances" in two ways. 91 First, with regard
to the identity of individuals who could trigger disqualification, it held
that "special circumstances" may exist not only when a district attorney
previously represented the defendant, but also when other employees in
the District Attorney's Office gained confidential information about the
defendant's case.92  Because the key issue is advantage to the govern-
ment at the expense of the defendant, the court disqualified the District
84. Chavez, 139 P.3d at 653 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-107(2) (2005)).
85. Id. (quoting Osborn v. Dist. Court, 14th Judicial Dist., 619 P.2d 41, 45 (Colo. 1980)).
86. Id. (citing Osborn, 619 P.2d at 48) (noting that the Osborn court found that the passage of
thirteen years between representation of the defendant and prosecution supported the conclusion that
the defendant had not met his burden of proving he would not receive a fair trial).
87. Id. at 653-54 (finding that the district attorney in question had an attorney-client relation-
ship with the defendant and that the relationship was substantially related to the instant prosecution,
the court disqualified the district attorney).
88. Id. at 653.
89. Id. at 654.
90. 139 P.3d 655 (Colo. 2006).
91. Id. at 658-59 (remanding because the court found that "[w]e are unable to determine, on
the record before us, whether 'special circumstances' exist ... [because] the record does not disclose
whether [the district attorney's] prior representation of the defendant was 'substantially related' to
the instant prosecution." (quoting Chavez, 139 P.3d at 653)).
92. Id. at 659. In Manzanares, a clerical employee who worked for the defense attorney who
represented the defendant later joined the district attorney's office. Id.
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Attorney's Office even when the tainted individual was not a former
defense attorney-turned-district attorney but a clerical employee: the
employee learned confidential information about the defendant while
working in private practice that would have given the district attorney an
advantage in cross-examining the defendant. Second, the court ex-
plained that an important factor in assessing "special circumstances"
when a district attorney has represented the defendant is the "possibility
that confidential information could be used to the advantage of the gov-
ernment."
93
The court therefore found "special circumstances" rendering it
"unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial" when the repre-
sentation of the defendant by the district attorney could give the govern-
ment an unfair advantage.94 The court reasoned that the government
benefits to the extent that the trial is rendered "unlikely fair" when the
district attorney can take advantage of the former relationship to more
effectively cross-examine the defendant, and explained that such an ob-
vious unfair advantage takes place when the former representation and
the current prosecution are "substantially related" because of the high
probability that the district attorney would have knowledge of relevant
confidential information.
95
Earlier decisions by the court preceding the statute further clarify
the appropriate scope of "special circumstance" and "fair trial., 96  In
People ex rel. Farina the trial court disqualified the district attorney who
thirteen years prior, while in private practice, represented the defendant
in an unrelated matter. 97 The court reversed. It found that "where the
two incidents arose from entirely unrelated transactions and are separated
by nearly thirteen years, no reasonable appearance of impropriety ex-
ists." 98 Specifically, the court found that the factual settings of the two
cases were significantly different. 99 In other words, the passage of time
93. Id. In a third case construing the statute, People ex rel. E.L.T., 139 P.3d 685, 686 (Colo.
2006), the defendants argued that the district attorneys represented them when they were in private
practice and gained confidential attorney-client information about defendants as a result of this
representation. The court remanded because it was unable to determine the legal basis for the trial
court's disqualification of the district attorney and directed the lower court to its decision in Chavez.
Id. at 687 (citing Chavez, 139 P.3d at 655).
94. Manzanares, 139 P.3d at 659.
95. See id.
96. As the court pointed out in Chavez, 139 P.3d at 653, earlier case law construing the
amended disqualification statute is nonetheless relevant to the extent it considered what type of facts
support the conclusion that disqualification is necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair
trial. See also People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d 649, 677 (Colo. 2006).
97. Osbom v. Dist. Court, 14th Judicial Dist., 619 P.2d 41, 47 (Colo. 1980). Osborne consoli-
dated two cases, Osborne and Farina which the court considered separately because of their differ-
ent facts. Id. at 44. Osborne is discussed below, infra note 148-52 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 47.
99. Id. ("[T]he [older] matter arose from a disturbance in a bar owned by [defendant's]
mother while the pending prosecution is in connection with an alleged burglary. Although both
incidents involved acts of violence, it can hardly be said that they are 'substantially related.' This is
particularly so in light of the fact that they are separated by nearly thirteen years.").
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and the unrelated nature of the former representation and current prose-
cution made it less likely that the government would benefit from the
former representation and therefore there was no unfairness to the defen-
dant.
2. "Special Circumstances" When the District Attorney Did Not
Represent the Defendant: The Balancing of Interests Standard
In People ex rel. N.R.,' 00 the Colorado Supreme Court was called
upon for the first time to construe "special circumstances" under the stat-
ute in a case not involving a district attorney's former representation of
the defendant. The court explored the defendant's contention that the
district attorney's attempt to reap political gain from the prosecution con-
stituted "special circumstances" which would render it unlikely he will
receive a fair trial. The court found that "even if [the district attorney]
owes his election to the Office of District Attorney in part to the efforts
of the [victim's] family, this fact [is not] likely to cause him to 'over
extend' in performing his prosecutorial function."' 0 '
The court's conclusion hinged on the facts of the case. The court
explained that the defendant must establish facts from which the court
could reasonably conclude that he would not receive a fair trial and
found that a mere assertion of political indebtedness is not sufficient to
establish special circumstances. 0 2 Rather, the defendant has to demon-
strate "over extension" in order to meet the "special circumstances" bur-
den. 0 3 In other words, the court did not rule out political indebtedness as
a relevant consideration in assessing "special circumstances" but instead
found that in this particular case the defendant did not prove that such
political indebtedness in fact caused the district attorney to over extend
himself.'0 Importantly, the dissent pointed out, however, that the trial
court specifically found that "the public would view the prosecution as a
'political payoff,' and if the district attorney continued to prosecute it




100. 139 P.3d at 671. A newly elected district attorney filed charges against a minor who was
involved in a car accident and left the scene after his predecessor decided not to file charges. Id. at
673. Defendant argued that the district attorney's decision was motivated by political pressure by
the victim's parents. Id. at 676. The court first explored what sort of "interest" may serve as the
basis for disqualification. Id. at 676-77. It held that the district attorney must stand to receive some
personal benefit and found that possible political capital the district attorney might gain in future
elections as the result of prosecuting the defendant is insufficient to meet the standard. Id.
101. Id. at 678.
102. Id. at 677-78.
103. ld. at 678.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 680 n.4 (Bender, J., dissenting). The dissent did not explore political indebtedness
as an instance of "special circumstances" but instead argued that "political payoff' that would "un-
dermine the credibility of the criminal process" triggers the courts' inherent powers. Id. at 684-85.
Justice Bender explicitly refused to limit the scope of its dissent to the construction of the "special
circumstances" grounds of disqualification pursuant to the statute exactly because he believes that
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Prior decisions of the court preceding the enactment of the statute
once again shed additional light on the construction of "special circum-
stances" and an "unfair" trial. In People v. C. V 106 the defendant moved
to disqualify the district attorney because the district attorney regularly
attended a church that was the scene of the alleged crime.' 0 7 Exploring
whether the defendant will be denied a fair trial, the court stated that it
looks to "whether the facts support a conclusion that the 'public would
perceive continued prosecution by the district attorney's office, under the
particular circumstances here, as improper and unjust, so as to undermine
the credibility of the criminal process in our courts.""' 10 8 Subsequently,
assessing the "particular circumstances here" the court balanced the in-
terests of the defendant against performance of the duties of the District
Attorney's Office. 109 It considered as relevant factors the size of the com-
munity in question and the impact of disqualification on it."0 The court
also cautioned against too low a standard that would allow defendants
the "unfettered option of disqualifying a prosecutor whenever a district
attorney had knowledge of any fact surrounding the case,""' and against
"the most cynical view" approach that would find "far too attenuated"
facts supportive of disqualification. "
2
In People v. District Court ex rel. Second Judicial District,' the
defendant argued that the district attorney who was also a mayoral can-
didate would reap political gain from prosecuting the defendant and
would be placed in a position of over extending in an effort to convict
and thus would unfairly try the defendant." 4  In evidence, defendant
submitted a copy of a news article which was later reprinted as a paid
advertisement by a committee to elect the district attorney. 15 The court
found this evidence insufficient to justify disqualification. 16 While the
court's language could be construed to refer only to the evidentiary
showing the defendant must make, it could also suggest the court's con-
courts have the inherent powers to disqualify district attorneys in addition to and irrespective of a
disqualification statute. Id. at 680 n.4.
106. 64 P.3d 272 (Colo. 2003) (en banc).
107. Id. at 274 (reversing disqualification on the ground that the trial court had insufficient
evidence to reach such a conclusion).
108. Id. at 276 (citations omitted).
109. The court found that disqualifying a district attorney who happened to attend a facility
where a crime later took place would "greatly impair the independence of the district attorney and
could serve to prejudice the constitutional duties he or she performs." Id.
110. "Especially in smaller communities, the defendant's argument could potentially disqualify
the district attorney in practically every prosecution." Id.
111. Id. at 276-77.
112. Id. at 275, 277.
113. 538 P.2d 887 (Colo. 1975) (en banc).
114. Id. at 888.
115. Id. at 889.
116. Id. ("The language of the editorial indicates only a newspaper's belief that the district
attorney is properly performing his responsibilities and duties as district attorney in the [] case.
There are no other inferences which could be drawn from this language. Clearly, it would be beyond
belief that anyone could state on the basis of this editorial that defendant [] would be subjected to an
unfair trial because of this district attorney's past, current, or future participation in the case.").
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cern with too quick a finding of "unfair trial" and "special circum-
stances" warranting disqualification.
Finally, in Wheeler v. District Court ex rel. Adams County,"17 de-
fendant argued that disqualification was warranted because he testified
against the district attorney in an unrelated case.' 18 Assessing whether
the district attorney's "personal antagonism, animosity, hostility or en-
mity" toward defendant would deny defendant a fair trial, the court was
concerned with the performance of the duties of the District Attorney's
Office." l 9 It reasoned that the mere fact that a defendant has testified
against or made derogatory remarks about a district attorney was insuffi-
cient to "convince a sane and reasonable mind" that the attacked district
attorney would be biased or prejudiced.
12 0
Twin standards emerge from the case law determining whether
"special circumstances" exist. When the district attorney formerly repre-
sented the defendant, the "unfair advantage" standard applies and "spe-
cial circumstances" exist when the former representation and the current
prosecution are "substantially related" because the district attorney likely
learned relevant confidential information and would be able to use it to
the benefit of the government while cross-examining the defendant.
Such an unfair advantage would undermine the credibility of the criminal
process in our courts.
When the district attorney did not represent the defendant, the pas-
sage of confidential information from the defendant to the district attor-
ney is obviously not a concern and the "balancing of interests" standard
applies. The likely fairness of the trial is assessed by balancing the inter-
ests of the defendant against the performance of the duties of the District
Attorney's Office. "Special circumstances" exist when the district attor-
ney is likely to "over extend," when the district attorney has "personal
antagonism, animosity, hostility or enmity" against the defendant, or
when the defendant can establish facts, such as political indebtedness,
that would render the trial unfair.'
2 1
3. Comparative Analysis
Before turning to the application of these standards to the first im-
pression issue of a district attorney who represented former-clients-
turned-witnesses for the government, we turn our attention to disqualifi-
cation statutes and experience of other jurisdictions. For purposes of
117. 504 P.2d 1094 (Colo. 1973) (en banc).
118. Id. at 1095.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1096.
121. In balancing the interests of the defendant against the performance of the duties of the
district attorney's office relevant considerations include the size of the legal community and the
impact of disqualification on the ability of the District Attorney's Office to perform its duties. See
People v. C.V., 64 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. 2003) (en banc).
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comparative analysis, it is helpful to draw a distinction between the three
grounds for disqualification in the Colorado statute. The first two-a
request by the district attorney and a personal or financial conflict of
interest-are narrowly and specifically defined, whereas the third
ground--"special circumstances"-is, relative to the former two ground-
s, open-ended.122 As we have seen, the latter covers at least disqualifica-
tion of a district attorney who represented the defendant in the same or
substantially related case and opens the door for disqualification even
when the district attorney did not represent the defendant.
Most jurisdictions with a disqualification statute state only narrow
and specific grounds for disqualification, akin to Colorado's first two
grounds. Interestingly, some cover in a narrowly stated ground the situa-
tion Colorado covers in its open-ended "special circumstances" ground,
that is, representation of the defendant by the district attorney. 23 Several
jurisdictions do have open-ended standards of disqualification, however,
their respective case law interpreting the standards is scant. 1
24
California's statute is in substance similar to Colorado's. It states in
relevant part that: "[a disqualification] motion may not be granted unless
the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it
122. Yet not open-ended enough to include the appearance of impropriety as a ground for
disqualification. See supra notes 39-45.
123. For example, the Alabama statute allows for disqualification when the district attorney is
"connected with the party against whom it is his duty to appear," ALA. CODE § 12-17-186(a) (2007);
the Kentucky statute states, in relevant part, that a prosecuting attorney shall disqualify himself if he
"[h]as served in private practice or government service, other than as a prosecuting attorney, as a
lawyer or rendered a legal opinion in the matter in controversy." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15.733(2)(e) (2007); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2603(a) (2007) (allows for disqualification
when the district attorney "acted as counsel or attorney for a party accused in relation to the matter
of which the accused stands charged, and for which he is to be tried on a criminal charge."); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 680(3) (2007) ("A district attorney shall be recused when he... [h]as
been employed or consulted in the case as attorney for the defendant before his election or appoint-
ment as district attorney.").
124. Iowa's statute permits the appointment of a special prosecutor if the district attorney is
"disqualified because of a conflict of interest from performing duties." IOWA CODE § 331.754.2
(2006); see State v. Brandt, 253 N.W.2d 253, 262 (Iowa 1977) (the prosecutor disqualified herself
and requested the appointment of a special prosecutor). Indiana's statute allows the court to disqual-
ify a district attorney if it finds "by clear and convincing evidence that the appointment [of a special
prosecutor] is necessary to avoid an actual conflict of interest." IND. CODE § 33-39-1-6(b)(2)(B)
(2007). Georgia's statute similarly states: "When a solicitor-general's office is disqualified from
interest or relationship to engage in the prosecution." GA. CODE ANN. § 15-18-65(a) (2007); see
also 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-9008 (2007) ("Whenever the State's attorney is... interested in
any cause or proceeding ...."); MICH COMP. LAWS SERV. § 49.160(1) (2007) ("If the prosecuting
attorney ... [is] disqualified by reason of conflict of interest ...."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 56.110
(2007). Oregon's statute combines specific grounds for disqualification such as "if a district attor-
ney ... represented the accused in the matter to be investigated ... or the crime charged" with an
open-ended ground "or because of any other conflict cannot ethically serve as a district attorney in a
particular case." OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8.710 (2007); see State v. Gauthier, 231 P. 141 (Or. 1924).
Virginia's statute is open-ended, allowing for disqualification if the district attorney "is so situated
with respect to such accused as to render it improper.., for him to act." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-155
(2007); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-8 (2007) (applying the "improper" standard for disqualifi-
cation). The Virginia Supreme Court applies the rule of ejusdem generis to the general statutory
language of "reason of a temporary nature" and holds that the term must be restricted to meanings
"analogous to 'sickness' or 'disability."' In re Morrisey, 433 S.E.2d 918, 918 (Va. 1993).
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unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.'' 125  The standard
for the interpretation of the statute was set in People v. Conner,126 in
which the California Supreme Court defined a conflict for purposes of
construing the statute as existing "whenever the circumstances of a case
evidence a reasonable possibility that the DA's office may not exercise
its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner.' '127 The conflict is
disabling under section 1424 when it is "'so grave as to render it unlikely
that the defendant will receive fair treatment' during all portions of the
criminal proceedings."'
' 28
In People v. Eubanks,129 the California Supreme Court specified a
two-part test for determining whether recusal of a district attorney is nec-
essary based on a conflict of interest: (1) whether there is a conflict of
interest, and (2) if so, whether the conflict is so grave or severe as to dis-
qualify the district attorney from acting. 30  Under the second prong of
this test, the potential for prejudice to the defendant must be real, not
merely apparent, and must rise to the level of a likelihood of unfair-
ness.
131
With regard to the "unfair advantage" standard, consistent with
Colorado law, the California Supreme Court disqualified a district attor-
ney who represented a defendant in a "substantially related" case.
132
Regarding the "balancing of interests" standard, California case law is
instructive because California courts have interpreted the California stat-
ute, and specifically its "fair trial" element, in circumstances where the
district attorney did not represent the defendant.
33
The first category of cases involves circumstances where the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was concerned with the independence of the dis-
trict attorney's exercise of discretion. If a victim or another party funds
or helps fund the prosecution's case, a conflict of interest is worthy of
disqualification if the facts show that "the private financial contributions
are of a nature and magnitude likely to put the prosecutor's discretionary
decision-making within the influence or control of an interested party.' 34
125. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1424(a)(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
126. 666 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1983).
127. Id. at 9.
128. People v. Snow, 65 P.3d 749, 773-74 (Cal. 2003).
129. 927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1996).
130. Id. at 318; see Snow, 65 P.3d at 773-74; Conner, 666 P.2d at 8-9; People v. Choi, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 922, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
131. Hambarian v. Superior Court, 44 P.3d 102, 114 (Cal. 2002).
132. City of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, 135 P.3d 20 (Cal. 2006) (holding District attor-
ney's possession of a criminal defendant's confidential attorney-client information regarding the
charged offenses is a proper basis for disqualifying the district attorney from participating in the
prosecution to ensure a fair trial).
133. See People v. Jiang, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 184, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
134. See Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 322. If the prosecutor/district attorney's office requests pay-
ment from victim for costs that the office already incurred during the prosecution, disqualification
may be possible. Id. at 323. In other words, if the prosecutor solicited financial assistance, the
prosecutor's discretionary judgment may be skewed. Id. at 324 (George, C.J., concurring).
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The size of the contribution is compared to the normal level of funds
generally allotted to this or a similar prosecution. 135 In other words, the
court must determine whether the contribution was substantial compared
to the District Attorney's Office's normal budgetary allotment or re-
sources. 136 The strength of the case against the defendant matters in as-
sessing the importance of the financial factor. 37  In addition, the court
must determine whether the financial provider had an interest in prose-
cuting the specific defendant, or an interest in benefiting the general pub-
lic corresponding with the interest of the prosecution. 138  That is, two
related factors are whether the financial provider is a private party 139 and
whether the defendant's actions directly harmed the financial provider.'
40
Moreover, even an institutional agreement between government agencies
may create a conflict of interest that triggers disqualification because the
arrangement would negatively affect the prosecutor's discretionary judg-
ment.1 41  Similarly, the court held that close family relationship between
the defendant and longtime employees of a District Attorney's Office
may qualify as grounds for disqualification because such ties are likely to
influence the district attorney's discretion. 1
42
A related category deals with publicly disclosing information rele-
vant to the case and information that may taint the public's perceptions
of defendant. For example, in People v. Choi,143 the court was concerned
that the district attorney's loss of a close friend had adversely affected his
independent judgment in such a way that defendant's right to a fair trial
135. Id. at 323.
136. Id. at 324 (George, C.J., concurring).
137. "Arguably, a factually weak case is more subject than a strong case to influence by extra-
neous financial considerations, since in the absence of financial assistance from the victim the prose-
cutor is more likely to abandon or plea bargain such a case." Id. at 323.
138. Compare Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, where the interested party that provided financial assis-
tance was a corporation from which defendant allegedly stole trade secrets, with People v. Parmar,
where a government agency contracted with the district attorney's office to provide financial assis-
tance in order to prosecute public nuisances generally. 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
139. Hambarian v. Superior Court, 44 P.3d 102, 109 (Cal. 2002); Parmar, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
42; Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 320.
140. Parmar, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42.
141. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 250 (1980); Parmar, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42;
Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 320 (emphasis added) ("For example, a scheme that provides monetary re-
wards to a prosecutorial office might carry the potential impermissibly to skew a prosecutor's exer-
cise of the charging and plea bargaining functions.").
142. People v. Vasquez, 137 P.3d 199, 203 (Cal. 2006) (finding close family ties where defen-
dant's mother worked as an administrator in the district attorney's office for about 13 years, and her
husband, defendant's stepfather had been employed for around the same amount of time as a deputy
district attorney). The fact that the prosecutor admitted fear of the appearance of favoritism towards
defendant, and that fear influenced the decision to reject defendant's request for bench trial rather
than jury trial showed the existence of a conflict of interest and its extreme gravity. Id. at 203-04.
However, compare this to People v. Petrisca, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182, 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), where
the defendant was charged with murder and other felonies for driving at excessive speeds on the
wrong side of the road and colliding with two vehicles. The driver of one vehicle incurred fatal
injuries and was also the mother of a deputy district attorney in the office. Id. The prosecutor was
chosen for the specific reason that the deputy district attorney and the prosecutor did not have a
social relationship-disqualification was not required. Id. at 185.
143. 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
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was endangered. 44 It found that the district attorney's disclosure of in-
formation related to the case demonstrated the adverse impact and dis-
qualified the district attorney. 45 Finally, the court decided cases trigger-
ing disqualification based on the district attorney appearing as a witness.
For example, when a prosecutor witnesses the defendant's illegal actions
the conflict may be so grave as to require disqualification.
46
Read together, California's extensive case law construing its dis-
qualification statute expands Colorado's "balancing of interests" stan-
dard. It clarifies that not every conflict of interest gives rise to "special
circumstances" warranting disqualification, rather, the prejudice against
defendant must be severe enough to constitute unfairness.
B. Disqualification of a District Attorney Whose Former Client is a Wit-
ness for the Government: Striking a Balance at the Point of Unfair
Advantage
First impression construction of the "special circumstances" prong
when the district attorney represented former-clients-turned-witnesses for
the government should build on and combine both the "unfair advantage"
and the "balancing of interests" standards. Reliance on the "unfair ad-
vantage" standard is warranted because representation of witnesses for
the government by the district attorney resembles representation of the
defendant in two important ways.
First, the unfair advantage to the government stems from the district
attorney's former representation of clients-turned-witnesses. "Special
circumstances" simply do not require that the former representation be of
the defendant. Indeed, in Manzanares the court recognized that people
other than the district attorney and the defendant might cause disqualifi-
cation. 147
Second, the former representation gives the district attorney an "ob-
vious" advantage over the defendant in terms of questioning the former-
client-turned-witness. An instructive case is Osborn v. District Court,
Fourteenth Judicial District.' 48 Osborne involved a former district attor-
ney who after participating in the prosecution of the defendant joined a
law firm that handled defendant's appeal and re-trial. 149 The court up-
held the disqualification of the former district attorney. 50 It found that
the district attorney "took part in the interview of the victim, the arresting
officers, and many other important prosecution witnesses. Most impor-
144. Id.
145. Id. at 927.
146. People v. Jenan, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
147. People v. Manzanares, 139 P.3d 655, 658-59 (Colo. 2006); supra notes 90-92 and accom-
panying text.
148. 619 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1980).
149. Id. at 44-45.
150. Id at 45.
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tantly, [the district attorney] had an ongoing relationship with the victim,
who was then a juvenile undergoing a number of problems which re-
quired extended supervision."'1 51 The court concluded, "[t]he advantage
that such a relationship could give a defense lawyer on cross-
examination of the victim is obvious."' 5 2 That is, the court held that the
former district attorney's substantial participation in the same case and,
importantly, the nature of her relationship with the witness (the victim)
warranted her disqualification.
Yet analysis of the "unfair advantage" standard indicates that not
every advantage to the government renders the trial "likely unfair" from
the defendant's point of view. When the district attorney represented the
defendant the court determined that the former representation results in
an unfair advantage if it was the same or substantially related to the cur-
rent prosecution because the relationship raised a serious concern that the
district attorney might take advantage of related confidential information
the defendant revealed.
Representation of a former-client-turned-witness differs from repre-
sentation of the defendant because a key concern in the latter case is the
passing of confidential information from the defendant to the district
attorney which can give the government an unfair advantage. The ad-
vantage to the government here stems not from its access to confidential
defendant's information, but from the relationship of the district attorney
with a witness. To be sure, if the representation of the former-client-
turned-witness is in the same or "substantially related" matter, the district
attorney may have learned relevant confidential information while repre-
senting the witness. Such information, however, will not yield the gov-
ernment an unfair advantage because the district attorney will have to
reveal all such exculpatory information to the defendant.
53
It is important to note that the primary concern with regard to the
representation of witnesses is the extent of their relationship with the
district attorney and therefore mere discovery of information the district
attorney learned about the witness is not sufficient to ensure fairness to
the defendant. First, the district attorney could have learned confidential
information about the witness that the defendant will not be entitled to
and that the witness may not be under a duty to reveal. Second, the dis-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. While COLO. R. PROF'L COND. R. 1.6(a) (2007) extends confidentiality to all information
related to the representation of clients, COLO. R. PROF'L COND. R. 1.9(a) (2007) prohibits an attor-
ney from representing another person in the same or substantially related matter in which that per-
son's interests are materially adverse to the interests of a former client, COLO. R. PROF'L COND R.
1.9(c) prohibits an attorney from using or revealing confidential information of a former client, and
COLO. R. PROF'L COND R. 1.1 l(d)(1) (2007) subjects a district attorney to these provisions, nonethe-
less, COLO. R. PROF'L COND R. 1.6(b)(6) states that an attorney may reveal confidential information
if required by other law. As the court pointed out in Lincoln, other law requires the disclosure of
exculpatory information to the defendant. People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Colo. 2007).
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trict attorney's relationship with the witness will give the district attorney
an advantage in examining the witness. For example, the district attor-
ney might use information that does not meet the exculpatory threshold
but nonetheless might help in eliciting favorable testimony from the cli-
ent-turned witness. Moreover, given the prior relationship the witness
might be partial toward his lawyer-turned-district attorney.
15 4
Osborne clarifies that the court's concern is the fairness of the trial,
and that knowledge of confidential information is not the standard for
disqualification but rather an example of "special circumstances," and of
an unfair advantage warranting disqualification. 15 5 To be sure, the court
disqualified the district attorney-turned-defense attorney not because she
possessed confidential information about the witness. Rather, the court
disqualified the attorney because her former relationship with the witness
in the case gave her an unfair advantage over the state in cross-
examining the witness. 1
56
The issue therefore becomes how to quantify the advantage to the
government in assessing when the advantage from the former representa-
tion of former-clients-turned-witnesses compromises the fairness of the
trial. The "balancing of interests" standard is on point and the California
Supreme Court's two-step analysis requiring a conflict and then assess-
ing its severity is helpful. The mere representation of the former-client-
turned-witness satisfies the conflict requirement and yet unfairness to the
defendant is only likely when the representation meets the severity re-
quirement.157 Balancing the interests of the defendant against the inter-
ests of the state in the performance of the duties of the District Attor-
ney's Office and striking the balance at the point of an unfair advantage
to the government means that a district attorney should be disqualified if
she formerly represented a witness in a "substantially related" matter
because the representation would give the district attorney an advantage
over the defendant in examining the witness. Osborn is directly on point.
The court held that the former district attorney's substantial participation
in the same case warranted her disqualification.'
58
Moreover, even if the representation of the witness is not "substan-
tially related" to the prosecution of defendant, the district attorney should
be disqualified if her relationship with the witness would give her an
unfair advantage over the defendant. The fact-specific, case-by-case
determination will depend on elements such as the importance of the
testimony (i.e., whether the former client is a key witness), the passage of
154. The desire of a former-client-turned-witness to help his former lawyer-turned-district
attorney need not amount to committing perjury. The advantage to the government stems from the
efforts of the witness to cooperate with thee district attorney given their relationship.
155. See Osborn v. District Court, Fourteenth Judicial Dist., 619 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1980).
156. Id. at 47.
157. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
158. "619 P.2d at 45.
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time, the nature of the relationship between the witness and the district
attorney, whether the relationship has concluded and the size of the
community.
This proposed standard-combining the insights of both "unfair ad-
vantage" and the "balancing of interests"-leads to the question of how
to assess factually the nature of the relationship between the district at-
torney and the former-client-turned-witness. Based on Brady v. Mary-
land,'59 in which the court held that a declaration by the district attorney
that all exculpatory information has been disclosed would suffice, and
the defendant could only challenge it with a good faith basis, a declara-
tion by the district attorney outlining the nature of the relationship with
the former-client-turned-witness should suffice to allow the court to as-
sess the fairness to the defendant.
60
In conclusion, representation of a former-client-turned-witness may
constitute "special circumstances" that would render it unlikely that the
defendant would receive a fair trial. Whether the advantage such repre-
sentation gives the government over the defendant warrants disqualifica-
tion depends on the facts of the representation. Balancing the interests of
protecting the defendant's rights and ensuring the fairness of the trial
against the state's interests of protecting the performance of the duties of
the District Attorney's Office the court may rely on a declaration by the
district attorney attesting to relevant facts regarding the relationship. For
example, "special circumstances" do not exist when the district attorney
briefly represented a witness ten years ago on an unrelated matter, had no
significant contact with the former client since, and where the commu-
nity is small, rendering it likely that a local defense-attorney-turned-
district attorney will have contacts with people in the community. On
the other hand, "special circumstances" do exist when the witness is
likely to play a critical role in the prosecution, the district attorney had a
longstanding relationship with the former-client-turned-witness, the rela-
tionship ended shortly before the current prosecution, or there are ongo-
ing contacts between the former client and district attorney, for example,
due to unpaid fees.
C. "Special Circumstances " and Imputed Disqualification
Next, a court would need to consider whether disqualification of a
district attorney warrants disqualification of the entire District Attorney's
159. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
160. Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1281 ("A trial court can ask for and accept a prosecuting attorney's
assurance that he or she has diligently reviewed the facts and circumstances of the prior representa-
tion and there is no exculpatory information required to be revealed by the constitution, statutes, and
case law. This is so because, like all attorneys, the prosecuting attorney as an officer of the court
must not lie or misrepresent facts to the court .... In addition, as a duty of office, a prosecutor,
who wishes to continue prosecuting the case, must disclose to the court that he or she has exculpa-
tory information and reveal that information if ordered to do so by the court.") (citations omitted).
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Office. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Opinion 342 sets the stage for relaxed imputed disqualification of
government attorneys.' 61 The Committee held that disqualification of a
former government attorney should not usually lead to the disqualifica-
tion of the governmental agency in question.162 It reasoned that the na-
ture of the relationships between governmental attorneys, specifically the
lack of a common shared interest in financial success contrasted with
private lawyers practicing in a firm, allows for a more lax disqualifica-
tion rule. 163 It concluded that a governmental agency need not be dis-
qualified if the tainted attorney is appropriately screened.164 The Opinion
was adopted in United States v. Caggiano,65 in which the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that "when the individual attorney is separated
from any participation on matters affecting his former client, 'vicarious
disqualification of a government department is not necessary or
wise.""90
66
In People v. Choi the California Court of Appeals held that the "fair
trial" analysis under section 1424 is applicable to the issue of imputed
disqualification. That is, it found that in deciding whether to acknowl-
edge a screen or disqualify an entire District Attorney Office, the court
must assess the impact on the likelihood of the defendant receiving a fair
trial.
167
Colorado courts follow both Opinion 342 and Caggiano with regard
to generally allowing effective screens within governmental agencies in
lieu of disqualification of the entire department, and Choi in terms of
deciding whether to impute a conflict to the entire District Attorney's
Office or allow a screen based on an analysis of "special circumstances"
and "fair trial." In Chavez the Colorado Supreme Court held that a prop-
erly drafted screening policy is relevant to the court's assessment of
whether "special circumstances" require the disqualification of the entire
office.' 68 It found that "if the screening policy is adequate, then no dis-
qualification [of the entire office] is necessary."' 69 If the screening pol-
icy is inadequate, no immediate disqualification follows, rather, the court
then must "determine whether confidential information from a prior rep-
161. 62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1976). The committee found that compelling policy considerations
justify drawing a distinction between private and governmental lawyers for purposes of disqualifica-
tion and held that a special, more lax government-friendly disqualification rule should apply to the
latter attorneys. Id. at 518-20.
162. Id. at 521.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 660 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1981).
166. Id. at 191 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975)). The court sustained the disqualification of the individual defense attorney-turned district
attorney and reversed the disqualification of the entire district attorney's office.
167. 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 926-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). The court affirmed the trial court's
disqualification of the entire office.
168. 139 P.3d 649, 654 (Colo. 2006).
169. Id.
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resentation nevertheless has been and can continue to be adequately
screened from others actually prosecuting the case."' 170 In other words a
conflict of interest and inadequate screening are not sufficient to warrant
disqualification of the entire office. Instead, the key issue is whether
confidential information can be screened not from all attorneys in the
office but only from those actually prosecuting the defendant. In Man-
zanares, the court reiterated that a "properly drafted screening policy is
indeed relevant to the determination of whether disqualification is neces-
sary to ensure the defendant receives a fair trial," 17 1 and remanded to the
trial court to determine whether in fact confidential information has been
and can continue to be protected.
172
While a conflict of interest and an inadequate screening policy do
not automatically lead to disqualification of the entire District Attorney's
Office, a defective policy would place on the District Attorney's Office a
higher burden of proving that no confidential information and other in-
formation benefiting the government regarding the former-client-turned-
witness had been shared by the conflicted district attorney, and mere
assurances by members of the Office would not be enough.
Specifically, while a declaration made by a district attorney assuring
the court that all exculpatory information relating to a former-client-
turned-witness has been revealed to the defendant or that no such excul-
patory information required to be revealed exists would usually suffice
without more to avoid disqualification, 173 the Colorado Supreme Court
held in Chavez and Manzanares that such declaration would not be suffi-
cient to prevent disqualification of the entire District Attorney's Office if
a conflict exists and the screening policy is inadequate. Under such cir-
cumstances, the court required "something more" than the testimony or
assertions of members of the District Attorney's Office.
We note that the testimony of members of the District Attorney's Of-
fice alone would not mitigate any "special circumstances" present in
this case.... [E]vidence of sharing of confidential information within
the District Attorney's Office, "being under the control of the prose-
cution, would be well-nigh impossible for a defendant to bring
forth.'
174
Similarly, evidence of sharing of confidential information and other
information benefiting the government regarding the former-client-
turned-witness by the conflicted district attorney would be "well-nigh
170. Id. at 654-55 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 659.
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 163-64.
174. People v. Manzanares, 139 P.3d 655, 659 (Colo. 2006) (citations omitted).
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impossible" for a defendant or the former-client-turned-witness to bring
forth. 1
75
Disqualification of a district attorney due to representation of a for-
mer-client-turned-witness for the government should not normally lead
to the disqualification of the entire District Attorney's Office. Unlike
representation of the defendant, the main concern regarding a former-
client-turned-witness is not the passing of relevant confidential informa-
tion but rather the advantage the government would yield from the for-
mer relationship. That advantage is the result of the relationship between
the former defense attorney-turned-district attorney and the former-
client-turned-witness. Thus effective screening of the district attorney in
question would normally address the underlying concern by eliminating
the advantage to the government while affirming the policy analysis of
Opinion 342 and Caggiano.
III. RECENT COLORADO EXPERIENCE
In two separate cases, the Mesa County District Attorney's Office
charged the defendant with criminal attempt to commit first degree mur-
der, first degree assault and vehicular eluding. 76  Two prosecutors as-
signed to these cases, Richard Tuttle and Tammy Eret, previously acted
as principal shareholders in a private law firm, Tuttle, Eret and Ruben-
stein, P.C. ("TER").
177
In the pending cases against defendant, the prosecution endorsed
over two hundred witnesses. 178 After learning that three of the endorsed
175. Indeed, the trial court in Lincoln found that:
Further, even if they declare that all exculpatory has been disclosed, as they have done,
the guidelines enunciated in Chavez and Manzanares would necessitate something more
than the testimony or assertions of the members of the District Attorney's Office in order
to mitigate the "special circumstances" evidenced... The required "something more" has
not been provided here. There is no written conflict screening policy, the oral screening
policy is nebulous and therefore inadequate, and no attempt at a "Chinese wall" to screen
those with confidential information has been made.
Supplemental Clarifying Order, People v. Lincoln, Nos. 05 CR 2027, 05 CR 2093, at *6 (D. Colo.
Mar. 14, 2007) (on file with author).
176. People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007). The first incident occurred on November
23, 2005, when defendant allegedly attempted to murder a fellow meth user. Id. at 1276. Several
days later, on December 1, 2005, defendant allegedly fired shots at two Mesa County Sheriffs
deputies as they were attempting to pull over his car after a week-long manhunt. Id. at 1276-77.
Defendant, 25, is in prison for aggravated robbery. See Nancy Loholm, Family Finds Solace in
Offering Hope, Warmth to Wayward Son, DENVER POST, Nov. 9, 2006, at B-01, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_4627495. His conviction and the pending charges all stem
from an alleged methamphetamine-fueled rampage in 2005. Id.
177. Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1277 ("Tuttle and Eret served as district attorneys in Mesa County
until 2002 when they left to open TER. The firm closed in December 2004 and Tuttle and Eret
returned the District Attorney's Office. Dan Rubenstein also acted as a principal shareholder in TER
and returned to the Mesa County District Attorney's Office at the same time as Tuttle and Eret.
Rubenstein was not assigned to prosecute defendant's pending cases, but did act as a Chief Deputy
District Attorney in Mesa County. The record is unclear about whether Rubenstein has any role
connected with the prosecution of Lincoln's cases.").
178. Id. at 1277.
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witnesses were previously represented by TER in unrelated matters,1 79
defendant filed discovery motions seeking, inter alia, potentially exculpa-
tory information concerning those former clients which could be used in
cross-examination to question the credibility of the clients-turned wit-
nesses. 180  Tuttle, Eret and the District Attorney's Office objected to
these discovery motions, and in a related court hearing Mr. Tuttle repre-
sented that he did not know of any potentially exculpatory information
that needed to be disclosed.1 8' Defendant then moved to disqualify Tut-
tle, Eret and the District Attorney's Office pursuant to the Colorado dis-
qualification statute and in the alternative pursuant to the court's inherent
power on the basis that the involved prosecutors were unwilling or un-
able to provide potentially exculpatory information about their former
clients, and because there was no way to ascertain whether Tuttle's claim
of no potentially exculpatory evidence was accurate.
182
The trial court did not generally decide when representation of for-
mer-clients-turned-witnesses will constitute "special circumstances" and
lead to disqualification of a district attorney, but appropriately focused its
attention on the specific claims raised by defendant, namely the inability
of the prosecutors to reply to the discovery motions filed by defendant
and the inability of the court to ascertain whether the prosecutors' claims
of possessing no potentially exculpatory evidence were accurate.
1 83
179. Id. ("Sheriff's Deputy Michael Miller, a named victim in the second case, was represented
by Eret in a contested domestic relations case, which concluded in 2004. A second witness, Corey
Winkel, was represented by Eret in a 2002 felony marijuana distribution prosecution. TER was not
fully paid for its legal services and turned the debt over to a collection agency in 2003. According to
the record, the debt is still outstanding. In addition, [in 2006 Winkel was prosecuted by Tuttle, after
Tuttle returned to the District Attorney's Office for a felony accessory charge related to the first
pending case against defendant.] [A] third witness, Robert Thorpe, and several members of his
family were represented by TER on a variety of business and personal matters between 2002 and
2004. Thorpe's daughter was prosecuted by the Mesa County District Attorney's Office on an
unrelated charge in 2005 after Tuttle and Eret returned to that Office. Eret was involved in the
review, charging and oversight of the prosecution of Thorpe's daughter, but she did not personally
prosecute the case."). Thorpe and his family objected to the District Attorney's Office prosecution
of the case filing their own request for a special prosecutor, which motion was ultimately denied.
People ex rel. E.L.T., 139 P.3d 685, 685-88 (Colo. 2006).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *4; see also Mike Wiggins, Lincoln to Seek Special Prosecutor, GRAND JUNCTION
DAILY SENTINEL, Jan. 30, 2007, at B- 1. The defendant moved to disqualify the district attorneys and
the District Attorney's Office based on representation of witnesses in the case only after the gov-
eminent moved to disqualify a defense attorney on the same ground - that he previously represented
witnesses in the case against defendant. See Mike Saccone, Motion May Delay Trial in Murder
Attempt Case, GRAND JUNCTION DAILY SENTINEL, Dec. 31, 2006, at B-8. Subsequently, Lincoln
dismissed the defense attorney in question, rendering the People's disqualification motion moot. See
Mike Saccone, Suspect Dismisses Attorney, GRAND JUNCTION DAILY SENTINEL, Jan. 6, 2007, at B-
1.
183. Clarifying Order, supra note 175. The issue of first impression was not presented to the
trial court as such. Rather than explicitly asserting that the Colorado disqualification statute author-
ized disqualification of district attorneys who represented former-clients-turned-witnesses and, in the
alternative, that courts should exercise their inherent power to disqualify district attorney's in these
circumstances, the defendant in Lincoln narrowly argued that the district attorneys' failure or inabil-
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The trial court mistakenly held that district attorneys owe their for-
mer clients-turned-witnesses a duty of confidentiality that bars them
from revealing any information about their former clients, let alone po-
tentially exculpatory information,' 84 that the confidentiality duty conflicts
with the district attorneys' duty to reveal exculpatory information and
concluded that the conflict results in an "irresolvable dilemma. 1 85
Moreover, the trial court held that the confidentiality duty owed to cli-
ents-turned-witnesses precludes the district attorneys from even divulg-
ing that they know of no exculpatory information related to prosecution
and consequently that there is no way to assess whether such potentially
exculpatory evidence exists.1 86 The trial court concluded that the district
attorneys' inability to reveal exculpatory evidence and the inability to
assess its existence constitute "special circumstances" warranting dis-
qualification under the statute.' 
87
Next, the trial court asserted its inherent authority to protect the in-
tegrity of the court's fact-finding process and it disqualified the district
attorneys, holding:
The court cannot countenance the withholding of potentially material
and exculpatory evidence, nor can it allow the public to have the im-
pressions that legal ethics [rules] are enforced only when it is con-
venient to do so, that legal ethics [rules] do not apply to prosecutors,
or that prosecutors can withhold or use confidential information to
their advantage. 
88
The appearance of impropriety finding was based on two related legs:
the impression of non-disclosure of exculpatory information and the im-
pression that the rules of ethics such as confidentiality do not apply to
prosecutors.
Finally, finding that "[t]here is no written conflict screening policy,
the oral screening policy is nebulous and therefore inadequate, and no
attempt at a 'Chinese wall' to screen those with confidential information
has been made," the trial court imputed an "irresolvable dilemma" and
disqualified the entire District Attorney's Office.1
89
The trial court's opinion established a very broad standard for dis-
qualification of district attorneys who represented witnesses for the gov-
ity to respond to discovery requests warranted disqualification. The trial court thus appropriately
decided the narrow issue before it.
184. Id. at *5. To be sure, district attorney's do owe their former clients a duty of confidential-
ity, but whether the duty bars revealing information, or in other words, whether an exception applies,
requires an analysis of COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6(b) (2007).
185. Id. at *5-6.
186. Id.
187. Id. ("Neither the People's non-disclosure nor their use of any such confidential informa-
tion must create an advantage to the government or disadvantage to the criminal defendant.")
188. Id. at *6.
189. Id.
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ernment. What the trial court called an "irresolvable conflict" was in fact
an irrebuttable presumption: that confidentiality duties to their former
clients-turned-witnesses precluded district attorneys from disclosing pos-
sibly exculpatory information to the defendant, and therefore the defen-
dant would be at a disadvantage and the district attorneys must be dis-
qualified. As a result, every district attorney who represented a witness
for the government faced an irresolvable and irrefutable conflict and
would be disqualified.' 90 The opinion caused a stir. Among others, the
Attorney General filed an amicus brief in which he characterized the
broad holding of the court as intruding "unnecessarily on the authority
the people of Colorado have vested in local district attorneys through
statute and the Constitution."' 9'
The People filed an interlocutory appeal with the Colorado Supreme
Court. 192 The court reversed and remanded. 193  It correctly held that a
district attorney's disclosure requirement of exculpatory evidence pursu-
ant to both federal constitutional law and Colorado state law trumps con-
fidentiality duties owed by the district attorney to her former clients-
turned-witnesses. 94  The conflict faced by the district attorney, con-
cluded the court, "may be a dilemma, but it is not irresolvable."'
' 95
The court's decision was surprisingly narrow. Suggesting that the
only issue of contention in Lincoln was whether non-disclosure of excul-
patory information gave rise to "special circumstances" under the Colo-
rado statute, the court (correctly) held that as a matter of law exculpatory
information must be disclosed, and thus, arguably disposing of the
"only" issue before it, reversed and remanded the case with directions to
the trial court not to disqualify the district attorneys. The court, however,
ignored the important question of law raised in Lincoln: does the law
allow for disqualification of a district attorney who represented a witness
190. This broad standard had the peculiar result of automatically disqualifying district attor-
neys who represented clients-turned-witness, while not automatically disqualifying district attorneys
who represented the defendant.
191. Brief for Colorado District Attorney's Council, supra note 66, at 6; see also Mike Sac-
cone, Attorney General to Support DA 's Appeal, GRAND JUNCTION DAILY SENTINEL, Mar. 17,
2007, at A-I.
192. Pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-12-102(2) (West 2007) and COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-1-107(3) (West 2007).
193. People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274, 1282 (Colo. 2007).
194. Id. at 1279-81. The court concluded:
The accused's due process right to a fair trial and the constitution, statutory, and ethical
rules require a prosecuting attorney, if she or he wishes to remain on the case, to disclose
exculpatory information even if it was obtained from a prior representation. In this situa-
tion, a prosecuting attorney has several options. She or he may obtain consent from the
prior client waiving attorney-client confidentiality and authorizing disclosure of the ex-
culpatory information. If consent is not obtained, she or he may (1) disqualify from
prosecuting the accused and be screened from the office's prosecution of the case or (2)
proceed with the prosecution, disclose to the court that she or he has exculpatory infor-
mation, and reveal the information to the defense upon order of the Court.
Id. at 1281.
195. Id. at 1281.
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for the government? Instead, the court merely cited its own case law
construing "special circumstances" under the Colorado statute, which
only deals with the disqualification of a district attorney who represented
the defendant and fails to explore representation of clients-turned-
witnesses. To be sure, ignoring the broader question of law was plausi-
ble based on a narrow reading of the trial court's order as disqualifying
the district attorneys pursuant to the statute solely on the ground of non-
disclosure of exculpatory information. Nonetheless, the court passed on
an opportunity to decide a first impression question of law and failed to
explore the circumstances under which the Colorado statute allows for
disqualification of a district attorney who represented a witness for the
government.
Worse, the Colorado Supreme Court ignored the issue of whether
pursuant to its inherent powers a court may disqualify a district attorney
who represented a witness for the government. The court's omission was
peculiar: the defendant clearly raised the issue and sought disqualifica-
tion based on the court's inherent powers in addition to invoking the dis-
qualification statute, the trial court explicitly invoked its inherent powers
in disqualifying the district attorney, and even the Attorney General ex-
plored the issue in detail in its amicus brief. Why the court ignored an
issue clearly before it is unclear. Arguably, the court decided to avoid
the issue because in asserting exclusive authority over district attorneys
the Colorado statute is unconstitutional and deciding the issue would
have required the court to strike this element of the statute down and pick
a fight with the Colorado legislature. Moreover, deciding the issue
would have required the court to explore the traitorous grounds of courts'
inherent powers, a subject matter courts inside and outside of Colorado
have been systematically avoiding.
The court's refusal to construe the Colorado disqualification statute
and the inherent powers doctrine in the context of former representation
of former-clients-turned-witnesses not only obscured this important legal
question,' 96 but also deprived the defendant of his "day in court" with
regard to exploring the disqualification of involved district attorneys
pursuant to the Colorado statute. Finally, the court left former-clients-
turned-witnesses exposed to the possibility of being forced to testify and
forced to waive confidentiality, without providing the trial court with the
opportunity to consider all the relevant circumstances and act consistent
with the interests of justice and preserving the integrity of the fact-
finding in the case. Deciding Lincoln consistent with the standards es-
tablished above would have allowed the court to remand the case to the
trial court to determine whether the representation of former-clients
196. For example, the court's narrow opinion in Lincoln might erroneously be construed to
mean that when a district attorney discloses exculpatory evidence no "special circumstances" exist.
As demonstrated, however, mere disclosure of exculpatory evidence does not automatically and
conclusively put to rest concerns regarding unfairness to the defendant.
2007]
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Miller, Winkel and Thorpe constituted "special circumstances" warrant-
ing the disqualification of the district attorneys involved in the case; and,
as importantly, to determine whether protecting the confidentiality inter-
ests of Miller, Winkel and Thorpe justified disqualification pursuant to
the court's inherent powers.
CONCLUSION
Courts' exercise of inherent powers and disqualification statutes are
two arenas in which the executive, legislative and judicial branches battle
over the regulation and control of the District Attorney's Office. A state
of "happy indeterminacy" with regard to the exercise of inherent powers,
and judicial deference to the other two branches with regard to the con-
struction of disqualification statutes may-from the perspective of the
state and the courts-appropriately resolve allocating power and author-
ity among the competing branches of government. However, in the con-
text of disqualification of district attorneys whose former clients become
government witnesses, this state of affairs harms defendants who are
unable to disqualify district attorneys notwithstanding the possible exis-
tence of "special circumstances" that may render the trial unfair, and it
harms former clients who become government witnesses and are unable
to prevent disclosure of their confidential information.
In the context of this battle, the article advances the law of disquali-
fication between the courts and the state. First, it explores the circum-
stances under which courts, in order to protect the confidentiality inter-
ests of former-clients-turned-witnesses, should exercise their inherent
power to disqualify a district attorney whose former client has become a
witness for the government even when the disqualification statute will
not allow disqualification. Second, it proposes an interpretation of "spe-
cial circumstances" which appropriately strikes a balance between pro-
tecting defendants' right to a fair trial against the state's legitimate inter-
ests of effectively pursuing law and order through the Office of the Dis-
trict Attorney and explores the circumstances under which this standard
should result in the disqualification of the district attorney.
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PREACHING, FUNDRAISING AND THE CONSTITUTION: ON
PROSELYTIZING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
MARK STRASSERt
INTRODUCTION
In a series of cases in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the United
States Supreme Court recognized that proselytizing, even when including
attempts to raise money, is a paradigmatic example of religious activity
and is constitutionally protected when performed by private actors. The
Court recently reaffirmed that approach in Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton.' Yet, the Court's atti-
tudes towards proselytizing and religious fundraising become much more
difficult to discern when one also considers cases involving the Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON).
Members of the Court have implied that the apparent inconsistency
in the jurisprudence can readily be explained if one considers the differ-
ing roles played by the government in these cases. However, that is
false. The jurisprudence is much more confused in this area than the
Court or commentators would have one believe, even if one factors in the
government's varying roles in these cases. The Court is of at least two
minds both with respect to whether religious speech should simply be
treated as any other form of protected speech and with respect to whether
fundraising for religion is afforded robust constitutional protection.
Part I of this Article discusses the door-to-door solicitation line of
cases, noting the robust protections which the Court implies are constitu-
tionally guaranteed. Part II discusses the major opinions involving
ISKCON, in which the Court differentiates between proselytizing and
religious fundraising, suggesting that the former must be protected while
upholding the government's policies limiting or prohibiting the latter.
This part explores some of the possible explanations for this apparent
differential treatment, explaining why these rationales cannot account for
this apparent inconsistency. The Article concludes that this differential
treatment can be explained, at least in part, by the Court's own ambiva-
lence with respect to whether religious speech and practice must be
treated differently than other kinds of speech and practices, and with
respect to whether religious fundraising should indeed be treated as reli-
gious speech.
t Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School; B.A., Harvard University,
1977; M.A., University of Chicago, 1980; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1984; J.D., Stanford Uni-
versity, 1993.
1. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
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I. WITNESSES AND THE CONSTITUTION
In a series of cases beginning about seventy years ago, the Court
made clear that proselytizing-attempting to convert individuals from
one religious belief to another,2 which may but need not include fund-
raising 3 -is protected constitutional activity when performed by private
actors.4 Sometimes, the Court treats private proselytizing as a subset of
the general category of private speech afforded First Amendment protec-
tion.5 At other times, however, members of the Court suggest that it has
special protection precisely because it involves religious expression. The
Court's ambivalence about this issue is suggested but rarely discussed
explicitly in many of its opinions, perhaps because this line of cases can
arguably be explained in terms of speech considerations alone. Thus, one
cannot tell in this line of cases whether the fact that religious proselytiz-
ing is at issue plays any role in the constitutional analysis, although
members of the Court consistently hint that it does.
A. Proselytizing and the State
One of the seminal proselytizing cases is Lovell v. City of Griffin,
6
in which Alma Lovell was convicted of distributing literature without a
permit.7 She did not deny that she had committed the action alleged,8 but
instead claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it
2. See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998).
3. Cf Howard 0. Hunter & Polly J. Price, Regulation of Religious Proselytism in the United
States, 2001 BYU L. REV. 537, 538-39 (2001) ("We use the term 'proselytism' here to include
speech and associated conduct involved in spreading the word of God and persuading others to
convert or to follow the message delivered by the person or group of persons engaged in proselytism
.... The focus is on preaching, soliciting, canvassing, distributing tracts, and other methods of
persuasion and teaching about one's religion.").
4. David M. Smolin, Exporting the First Amendment?: Evangelism, Proselytism, and the
International Religious Freedom Act, 31 CJMB. L. REV. 685, 686 (2000-2001) ("[T]he question of
restricting evangelism/proselytism is a 'no-brainer' within the American context, at least so long as
such activities are not conducted in public schools or by governmental officials operating in their
official capacities. Few question the right of private citizens to engage in speech designed to per-
suade others to adopt a certain religion, and even fewer would limit the right to change one's relig-
ion.") (footnote omitted); Richard W. Garnett, Changing Minds: Proselytism, Freedom, and the
First Amendment, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 453, 457 (2005) ("[T]he [First] Amendment is well under-
stood as protecting and celebrating not just expression but persuasion-or, if you like, prosely-
tism.").
5. Hunter & Price, supra note 3, at 539 ("Courts in the United States have treated prosely-
tism as a form of free speech within the coverage of the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.").
6. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
7. Id. at 447. The ordinance at issue said
[t]hat the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, ad-
vertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or
whether same are being sold, within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtain-
ing written permission from the City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall
be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin.
8. See id. at 448.
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abridged the freedom of the press and her right to the free exercise of her
religion.
9
When analyzing the implicated constitutional guarantees, the Lovell
Court noted that "[f]reedom of speech and freedom of the press ... are
among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action."' 0 After
noting that the prevention of prior restraint was "a leading purpose in the
adoption of the constitutional provision"'" and suggesting that the ordi-
nance's "character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the
freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship,"'' 2 the
Court struck down the statute.13 The Court expressed special concern
about the breadth of the ordinance, which prohibited the "distribution of
literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner."'
4
Perhaps equally worrisome was that the ordinance required those seeking
to distribute literature to obtain a permit from the City Manager 15 without
any specification concerning the criteria to be used by that manager
when deciding whether to issue a permit.' 6 In striking down the ordi-
nance based on these concerns, the Court sounded themes which are
commonplace in First Amendment cases-the importance of assuring
that ordinances targeting speech are not overbroad 17 and the importance
of not giving officials unfettered discretion with respect to which kinds
of speech will be permitted.18
Almost as an afterthought, the Court indirectly noted that permit re-
quirements can impose special burdens on certain religious groups. In
explaining why Lovell had never even applied for a permit, the Court
noted that "she regarded herself as sent 'by Jehovah to do His work' and
that such an application would have been 'an act of disobedience to His
9. Id.
10. Id. at 450.
11. Id. at 451-52.




16. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 537-538 (1981) ("According
such wide discretion to city officials to control the free exercise of First Amendment rights is pre-
cisely what has consistently troubled this Court in a long line of cases starting with Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938)."); see also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951) (striking
down an ordinance giving the police commissioner unlimited discretion with respect to whether a
permit would be issued for a meeting for public worship).
17. Indeed, limiting the breadth of statutes and their possible chilling effects are thought to be
so important that statutes may be struck down even if the individual challenging the statute engaged
in unprotected speech. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 237 (2002) ("[O]ver-
breadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount
of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.").
18. Cf Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 306-307 (1984) ("A principle underlying many of our
prior decisions in various doctrinal settings is that government officials may not be accorded unfet-
tered discretion in making decisions that impinge upon fundamental rights.") (emphasis added).
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commandment."" 19 Thus, in Lovell's view, the very act of asking a civil
authority for permission to do God's work would be a violation of con-
20science.
While implicitly admitting that permit requirements might interfere
with religious exercise, the Lovell Court did not address the constitution-
ality of requiring individuals to seek permits before they would be al-
lowed to engage in religiously inspired activity. 2' That issue was ad-
dressed in Cantwell v. Connecticut.
22
B. State Licensing
At issue in Cantwell was a statute requiring individuals to obtain a
certificate before they could solicit funds in support of their religion.23
The Court suggested that it was permissible to regulate solicitation to
protect the public against fraud, even if such regulation might also affect
efforts to solicit funds for religious causes.24 The defect in the Connecti-
cut statute was that it permitted the secretary of public welfare to deter-
mine which causes were religious in nature, which would determine
whether the solicitation would be permitted.2
19. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 448.
20. See Hunter & Price, supra note 3, at 541 ("The ordinance required that anyone who
sought to distribute 'circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind' first had to obtain a
permit from the city manager. Lovell did not do so for religious reasons. She was called by God to
spread the word and she needed no permit from a secular authority. Indeed, in her religion's view,
to seek a permit would have been an insult to God.").
21. The Court was able to sidestep this issue because the ordinance was void on its face. See
Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452-53 ("As the ordinance is void on its face, it was not necessary for appellant
to seek a permit under it. She was entitled to contest its validity in answer to the charge against
her.").
So, too, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), did not settle whether free exercise rights
are implicated by a statute requiring individuals to get a permit before proselytizing, notwithstanding
that the case involved Jehovah's Witnesses who had been prosecuted for and convicted of failing to
get a permit before engaging in expressive activity. See id. at 570-71; see also Hunter & Price,
supra note 3, at 542-43 (noting that in Cox, the "Witnesses had refused to seek a permit for the same
reason as Alma Lovell-they were following God's mandate to spread the word and they needed no
human permission to do so").
The sole charge against the appellants in Cox had been that they had engaged in a parade without
a permit. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 573. As the Cox Court made clear, "[t]hey were not prosecuted for
distributing leaflets, or for conveying information by placards or otherwise, or... for maintaining or
expressing religious beliefs." Id. Thus, the Court was not even forced to discuss whether requiring a
permit was itself an undue infringement of religious rights.
22. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
23. See id. at 304 ("If a certificate is procured, solicitation is permitted without restraint but,
in the absence of a certificate, solicitation is altogether prohibited.").
24. Id. at 305 ("The general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation.., is not open to
any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose.").
25. Id. ("[T]he Act requires an application to the secretary of the public welfare council of
the State; ... he is empowered to determine whether the cause is a religious one, and.., the issue of
a certificate depends upon his affirmative action. If he finds that the cause is not that of religion, to
solicit for it becomes a crime .... He is authorized to withhold his approval if he determines that
the cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right
to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which
is within the protection of the Fourteenth."); see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164
(1939) ("Conceding that fraudulent appeals may be made in the name of charity and religion, we
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One of the issues addressed by the Cantwell Court was whether
Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness,
26 had been guilty of inciting violence.
27
The Court explained that when Cantwell's Catholic listeners28 grew an-
gry after Cantwell had played a phonograph record attacking the Catholic
Church, they had asked him to leave and he had complied with their re-
quest. 29 The Court concluded that his conduct did not constitute a breach
of the peace.30
Part of the reason that his conduct did not constitute a breach in-
volved the specific contents of the speech. While understanding that "the
contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity,"' the Court
distinguished what Cantwell had said and played from "provocative lan-
guage which ... consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks di-
rected to the person of the hearer." 32 The former, but not the latter, is
"communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitu-
tion., 33 Although the Cantwell Court could have concluded its analysis
after noting that the speech was not profane, indecent, or abusive, it did
not, instead suggesting that Cantwell's speech had to be given more lee-
way by the state.34
Cantwell is important for a few reasons. It suggests that the state
will not be allowed to decide which sets of beliefs qualify as religious
hold a municipality cannot, for this reason, require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present them
first to police authorities for their consideration and approval, with a discretion in the police to say
some ideas may, while others may not, be carried to the homes of citizens; some persons may, while
others may not, disseminate information from house to house. Frauds may be denounced as offenses
and punished by law. Trespasses may similarly be forbidden. If it is said that these means are less
efficient and convenient than bestowal of power on police authorities to decide what information
may be disseminated from house to house, and who may impart the information, the answer is that
considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press.").
26. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 300 ("Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell, mem-
bers of a group known as Jehovah's witnesses, and claiming to be ordained ministers, were arrested
in New Haven, Connecticut, and each was charged by information in five counts, with statutory and
common law offenses.").
27. Id. at 309 ("Cantwell's conduct, in the view of the court below, considered apart from the
effect of his communication upon his hearers, did not amount to a breach of the peace.").
28. See id at 303.
29. Id. ("On being told to be on his way he left their presence.").
30. Id. at 309.
31. Id. at 311.
32. Id. at 309.
33. Id. at 310.
34. Id. ("In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise.
In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others
to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of
men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people
of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the
part of the citizens of a democracy."). Cf Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change
Religion in International Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 292 ("[P]roselytism can
include criticism of the religious beliefs of a target; the unsuccessful attempt to change those beliefs
is thus likely to cause injury to religious feelings. When states seek to curtail such injury by limiting
proselytism, these restrictions must be carefully structured.").
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and thus might be worthy of support,3 5 and also that soliciting on behalf
of a religion is itself protected, since that may be the only way that the
religion can survive.36 The decision further suggests that proselytizing is
protected,37 since Cantwell had been playing a record very critical of
Catholicism in a neighborhood whose population was 90 percent Catho-
lic.
3 1
When suggesting that the state could require individuals to get a
permit before proselytizing, the Cantwell Court was not thereby validat-
ing any licensing system, e.g., even one which required individuals to
pay fees before they could proselytize. At issue in Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania39 was an ordinance requiring that individuals selling merchandise
within the city of Jeannette buy a license from the borough treasurer.40
Petitioners challenging the law were Jehovah's Witnesses,4' who went
door to door distributing literature and asking people to buy religious
books and pamphlets.4 2 None of the individuals selling the books had
obtained a license.4 3
One of the ways to analyze the implicated issues in Murdock is in
terms of whether these transactions should be construed as sales. It was
petitioners' "practice in making these solicitations to request a 'contribu-
tion' of twenty-five cents each for the books and five cents each for the
pamphlets but to accept lesser sums or even to donate the volumes in
case an interested person was without funds."44 Arguably, one might
treat a request for a contribution as something other than a sale, espe-
cially because the petitioners would sometimes give the materials away
for free. However, the Court did not rely on the fact that petitioners were
35. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307 ("But to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of
religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination
by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of
liberty protected by the Constitution.")
36. Id. at 305 ("I[T]he secretary of the public welfare council of the State... is empowered to
determine whether the cause is a religious one .... He is authorized to withhold his approval if he
determines that the cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means of de-
termining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included in
the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth.").
37. Id. at 302-03 ("Jesse Cantwell ... stopped two men in the street, asked, and received,
permission to play a phonograph record, and played the record 'Enemies,' which attacked the relig-
ion and church of the two men, who were Catholics.").
38. Id. at 301 ("On the day of their arrest the appellants were engaged in going singly from
house to house on Cassius Street in Ncw Haven. . . . Cassius Street is in a thickly populated
neighborhood, where about ninety percent of the residents are Roman Catholics.").
39. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
40. Id. at 106.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 107.
44. Id. Cf Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 154
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) ("Whether or not the fair goer decides to purchase one of these items, the Krishna
devotee will ask the fair goer to make a monetary donation. Even if the fair goer does not make a
contribution, usually the Krishna devotee would permit the fair goer to keep the prasada or token,
and sometimes even the more religious paraphernalia if it had been shown to the fair goer.").
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merely asking for contributions or even that they would give the materi-
als away for free on occasion. On the contrary, the Court characterized
the transactions at issue as sales and then discussed the constitutionality
of the Jeannette ordinance.
The Court began its analysis by admitting that it will sometimes be
difficult to determine whether an activity is religious or "purely commer-
cial, ' 45 but suggested that such a distinction may be "vital, 'A6 because it
may make the difference between whether or not a practice can be pre-
cluded. For example, the Court suggested that the state is constitution-
ally permitted to prohibit the distribution of purely commercial leaflets
on the streets but is not afforded similar leeway with respect to religious
tracts.4 7 The Court also made clear that the state cannot legally "prohibit
the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly religious activity
merely because the handbills invite the purchase of books for the im-
proved understanding of the religion.
'A8
Here, when suggesting that the Constitution precludes the state from
prohibiting invitations to purchase books that will enhance religious un-
derstanding, the Court did not rely on the possible difference between
selling something on the one hand and giving out something and then
asking for a donation on the other.49 Rather, the Court focused on the
invitation to purchase written materials, i.e., an offer to sell them. The
Court noted that "the mere fact that the religious literature is 'sold' by
itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not transform evangelism
into a commercial enterprise,, 50 reasoning that otherwise "the passing of
the collection plate in church would make the church service a commer-
cial project." 
5'
Yet, this justification is unpersuasive. When one offers a product for
free and then asks for a donation, one is not tying the provision of the
product to the receipt of dollars--on the contrary, the product has already
been transferred and the receipt of a donation will not determine the
product's ownership. Indeed, where donations are anonymous (as might
occur with the passing of a collection plate), the provision of the ser-
vice/product to a particular person cannot depend upon whether that per-
45. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 110.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 110-11.
48. Id. at 111.
49. Cf id. at 119 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("Petitioners suggest that their books and pamphlets
are not sold but are given either without price or in appreciation of the recipient's gift for the further-
ance of the work of the witnesses. The pittance sought, as well as the practice of leaving books with
poor people without cost, gives strength to this argument. in our judgment, however, the plan of
national distribution by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society, with its wholesale prices of five or
twenty cents per copy for books, delivered to the public by the witnesses at twenty-five cents per
copy, justifies the characterization of the transaction as a sale by all the state courts.").
50. Id. at 111.
51. Id.
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son donated, since it simply will not be clear who donated (as long as
there are some donations and those donations cannot be tied to a particu-
lar person, e.g., because they are in cash rather than by check).52 How-
ever, if the religious product is sold and, for example, either will not be
transferred or will be taken back if the individual does not pay the re-
quested amount, the process at issue is much closer to a standard sale.53
Possible ways to distinguish notwithstanding, the Murdock Court
made clear that seeking donations to support religion should be differen-
tiated from mere commercial activities. 4 The Court noted that it is "plain
that a religious organization needs funds to remain a going concern," 55
and classified the practice of handing out religious tracts in exchange for
donations as religious activity. 56 Indeed, the Court waxed eloquent when
describing this activity:
The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of mis-
sionary evangelism-as old as the history of printing presses. It has
been a potent force in various religious movements down through the
years.... It is more than preaching; it is more than distribution of re-
ligious literature. It is a combination of both. Its purpose is as evan-
gelical as the revival meeting.57
The Court explained that the Constitution affords significant protec-
tion for this practice, pointing out that this "form of religious activity
occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship
in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. 58
The Murdock Court likened taxing these sales to the taxing of the
exercise of other First Amendment freedoms and held the tax unconstitu-
tional,59 characterizing the ordinance as requiring "religious colporteurs
52. Cf Calvin H. Johnson, Was It Lost?: Personal Deductions Under Tax Reform, 59 SMU L.
REv. 689, 706 (2006) ("The preacher was paid by passing the collection plate and, at least in theory,
contributions into the plate were voluntary. Payments into the collection plate are, thus, considered a
loss without quid pro quo. One might protest that passing the hat works just as well to pay for the
services as a ticket, pew rent, or other explicit one-to-one payment arrangement, but if the service is
available for nothing, then the donation into the plate is considered a loss to the payor.").
53. Cf Stahnke, supra note 34, at 263 (suggesting that some religious "activities could be
described in a more commercial vein, such as selling or soliciting orders for books or other mer-
chandise").
54. See also Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) ("The state can prohibit the use of
the street for the distribution of purely commercial leaflets, even though such leaflets may have 'a
civic appeal, or a moral platitude' appended. They may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in
the pursuit of a clearly religious activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase of books
for the improved understanding of the religion or because the handbills seek in a lawful fashion to
promote the raising of funds for religious purposes." (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,
55 (1942))).
55. Murdock, 319U.S. at 111.
56. See id. at 109.
57. Id. at 108-09.
58. Id. at 109.
59. Id. at 108 ("The First Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states,
declares that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .' It could hardly be
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to pay a license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities," 60 and
comparing the tax at issue to a tax on a preacher for the privilege of giv-
ing a sermon. 61 This, the Court suggested, could not be done, even
though it would be constitutional to "impose a tax on the income or
property of a preacher." 62 The Murdock Court alluded to a central con-
cern articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland63 by suggesting that were the
constitutionality of the taxes at issue upheld, taxes might be imposed that
would make it impossible for a particular religious practice to continue.
The Murdock Court explained:
Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its
exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its
maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this
form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do
not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and
honorable manner would thus be denied the needy.
64
Not only might such taxes impose a severe burden on relatively
poor religious groups but such taxes might have particularly onerous
implications for itinerant preachers, who might be taxed wherever they
preached and might then find the taxes too burdensome to permit them to
continue their preaching.65 However, the Court made clear in Follett v.
Town of McCormick66 that the Murdock protections also applied to non-
itinerant preachers.67
C. Free Speech or Something More?
In Martin v. City of Struthers,68 Thelma Martin challenged her con-
viction for distributing handbills at residences in violation of a local or-
dinance.69 She pled that the ordinance violated the "right of freedom of
denied that a tax laid specifically on the exercise of those freedoms would be unconstitutional. Yet
the license tax imposed by this ordinance is in substance just that.").
60. Id. at 110.
61. Id. at 112.
62. Id.
63. 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819) ("An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to
destroy ... ").
64. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112; see also Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573,
579 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring) ("It is wise to remember that the taxing and licensing power is a
dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of unscrupulous or bigoted men, could be used to
suppress freedoms and destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate bounds.").
65. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115 ("Itinerant evangelists moving throughout a state or from
state to state would feel immediately the cumulative effect of such ordinances as they become fash-
ionable .... This method of disseminating religious beliefs can be crushed and closed out by the
sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is exacted town by town, village by village. The spread of
religious ideas through personal visitations by the literature ministry of numerous religious groups
would be stopped.").
66. 321 U.S. 573.
67. Id. at 577 ("A preacher has no less a claim to that privilege when he is not an itinerant.").
68. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
69. Id. at 142. The ordinance read:
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press and religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. v When striking down the ordinance,7' the Martin Court ana-
lyzed the issue before it as it might have analyzed any claim involving
free speech, noting that the "authors of the First Amendment knew that
novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they
chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous
enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. 72 However,
Justice Murphy in his concurrence suggested that religious expression
was entitled to special protection--"nothing enjoys a higher estate in our
society than the right given by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
freely to practice and proclaim one's religious convictions." 73 That pro-
tection was extended to expression which was "aggressive and disputa-
tious as well as to the meek and acquiescent." 
74
At issue in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v.
Village of Stratton75 was an ordinance requiring individuals to get per-
mits from the mayor before going to residences to promote causes.
76
There was no charge for the permit, 77 and the permits would be issued
routinely once the applicant had filled out a fairly detailed form.78
The ordinance was challenged on its face and the Court examined
its constitutionality "not only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but
also to anonymous political speech and the distribution of handbills. 79
The petitioners, who had never applied for a permit 0 because they con-
sidered doing so as almost an insult to God,81 offered "religious literature
It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements to
ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of
any residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other
advertisements they or any person with them may be distributing.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 149 ("[W]e conclude that the ordinance is invalid because in conflict with the free-
dom of speech and press.").
72. Id. at 143.
73. Id at 149 (Murphy, J., concurring); see also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 311(1951)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the Court is to enable those who feel a call to proselytize
to do so by street meetings.").
74. Martin, 319 U.S. at 149 (Murphy, J., concurring).
75. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
76. Id. at 154 ("[Any canvasser who intends to go on private property to promote a cause
must obtain a "Solicitation Permit" from the office of the mayor.").
77. Id. ("[T]here is no charge for the permit.").
78. Id. at 154-55 (noting that the permit "is issued routinely after an applicant fills out a fairly
detailed 'Solicitor's Registration Form').
79. Id. at 153.
80. Id. at 156 ("Petitioners did not apply for a permit.").
81. Id. at 157-58 ("Although Jehovah's Witnesses do not consider themselves to be 'solici-
tors' because they make no charge for their literature or their teaching, leaders of the church testified
at trial that they would honor 'no solicitation' signs in the Village."). They also explained at trial
that they did not apply for a permit because they derive their authority to preach from Scripture. Id.
at 158 ("For us to seek a permit from a municipality to preach we feel would almost be an insult to
God.").
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without cost to anyone interested in reading it."82 They claimed that they
did not "solicit contributions or orders for the sale of merchandise or
services,"83 although they were willing to accept donations. 84
The Village argued that it had legitimate interests which were
served by the ordinance-the protection of privacy and the prevention of
fraud and crime. 85 While accepting that these were important interests,
86
the Court nonetheless was not persuaded by the Village's argument.
The Court noted its long history of invalidating door-to-door canvassing
restrictions as part of its analysis, 87 commenting that it was no accident
that "most of these cases involved First Amendment challenges brought
by Jehovah's Witnesses, because door-to-door canvassing is mandated by
their religion., 88 Further, the Court made clear that its decision to invali-
date the statute did not depend on the claim that funds were not being
solicited,89 explaining that because of the lack of "significant financial
resources, the ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is seriously dimin-
ished by regulations that burden their efforts to canvass door-to-door." 90
The Court distinguished what was before it from, for example, regula-
tions designed to prevent fraud by door-to-door salespeople, saying,
"[e]ven if the interest in preventing fraud could adequately support the
ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial transactions and the solici-
tation of funds, that interest provides no support for its application to
petitioners, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular
causes." 9' Thus, the Court made clear that this kind of solicitation was
different from other kinds of solicitation and was entitled to more protec-
tion.
Once again, while striking the statute, the Court mentioned but did
not rely on the fact that registration imposed a special burden on those
who believed that seeking a permit would itself be a violation of their
religious beliefs. 92 Rather, the Court focused on the breadth of the ordi-
82. Id. at 153.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 164-65 ("The Village argues that three interests are served by its ordinance: the
prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the protection of residents' privacy.").
86. See id. at 165 ("We have no difficulty concluding, in light of our precedent, that these are
important interests that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solici-
tation activity.").
87. Id. at 160.
88. Id.
89. Cf supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Murdock Court's refusal to
base its decision on whether funds were being solicited).
90. Stratton, 536 U.S. at 161.
91. Id. at 168.
92. See id. at 167 ("requiring a permit as a prior condition on the exercise of the right to speak
imposes an objective burden on some speech of citizens holding religious or patriotic views"); see
also Kathryn Lusty, Proselytizers, Pamphleteers, Pests, and Other First Amendment Champions:
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 229,
233 (2003) ("[Tlhe idea of applying for the imprimatur of Stratton's municipal bureaucracy repulsed
and offended the Witnesses, who instead sought a federal court injunction.").
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nance, noting that the "mere fact that the ordinance covers so much
speech raises constitutional concerns."
93
The Court accepted that the prevention of crime was a legitimate
state interest but was unconvinced that the ordinance was well-tailored to
achieve that interest, noting that "it seems unlikely that the absence of a
permit would preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging
in conversations not covered by the ordinance. 94  The Court further
noted "an absence of any evidence of a special crime problem related to
door-to-door solicitation in the record. 95 Indeed, Justice Breyer noted in
his Stratton concurrence that the Court has "never accepted mere conjec-
ture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden. 96
An examination of the Lovell-Stratton line of cases might seem to
reveal a consistent approach with respect to religious proselytizing. Yet,
this apparent consistency is deceptive if only because the cases are so
similar. One cannot tell, for example, whether the Court has endorsed a
robust right to proselytize in a variety of contexts or, instead, has simply
recognized a relatively limited right, for example, involving door-to-door
solicitation. In the long period between Martin and Stratton,97 the Court
decided a few major cases that involved religious proselytizing but did
not involve door-to-door solicitation and also did not involve Jehovah's
Witnesses. Regrettably, the Court obscured rather than clarified the rele-
vant jurisprudence when handing down those opinions.
II. TIME, PLACE, MANNER REGULATIONS
A discussion of the constitutional protections afforded to proselytiz-
ing should also include a case decided in the 1980s and two companion
cases decided in the 1990s. These cases, all involving ISKCON, cloud
the jurisprudence considerably, if only because the Court does so much
to undercut the constitutional protections allegedly afforded to prosely-
tizing. It is simply unclear what implications these cases have for prose-
lytizing jurisprudence more generally, because they involve several vari-
ables not in the other cases. Nonetheless, some interpretations of these
cases and the jurisprudence more generally must be rejected and others
accepted with qualification because those interpretations only capture
some of the conflicting elements in the case law. Basically, when one
considers the ISKCON cases, the proselytizing jurisprudence seems
Justice Scalia in his concurrence suggested that such a burden would not itself justify an exemp-
tion from the statute, writing, "[i]f a licensing requirement is otherwise lawful, it is in my view not
invalidated by the fact that some people will choose, for religious reasons, to forgo speech rather
than observe it." Stratton, 536 U.S. at 171 (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Stratton, 536 U.S. at 165.
94. Id. at 169.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 170 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Miss. Gov't. PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 392 (2000)).
97. Martin was decided in 1943 and Stratton was decided in 2002.
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much less clear and the protections afforded to private proselytizing
much less robust.
A. Restricting Where Solicitation Can Occur
Many of the religious solicitation regulations struck down by the
Court involved attempts to regulate solicitation through licensing or fee
requirements.98 The Court worried that such regulations, if upheld, had
the potential to cripple solicitation attempts by religious groups,
99
thereby both limiting speech and impairing the financial health of the
religious organization. When similar concerns were implicated in Hef-
fton v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,' 00 the
Court suddenly and inexplicably seemed to downgrade the importance of
religious organizations being able to maintain financial health or even
distribute written literature, while maintaining the importance of such
organizations being able to engage in oral expression.
In Heffron, the Court considered whether the Constitution permits a
state to require religious groups soliciting donations at a state fair to do
so only within a booth, even if such a requirement would impose a limi-
tation on the group's religious practices.10 1 The challenged rule did not
prevent the group's members from having "face-to-face discussions"
' 10 2
anywhere in the fair; its focus instead was on where the group's members
could seek donations or hand out written literature.'
0 3
The Court noted both that ISKCON wanted to proselytize at the
Minnesota State Fair because it believed that it could do so success-
fully,'°4 and that the group believed that it could only be successful if it
could stop people and solicit donations as those people walked about the
Fair.'0 5 The Court reiterated the established understanding both that the
oral and written dissemination of ISKCON's religious views are pro-
tected speech, 0 6 and that the fact that the materials are sold rather than
handed out for free does not somehow waive or destroy those rights.'
0 7
98. See supra notes 7-96 and accompanying text (discussing many of the licensing and permit
cases in which solicitation was regulated).
99. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the fear that regulation might
make it impossible for religious groups to spread their message).
100. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
101. Id. at 642.
102. Id. at 643-44.
103. Id. at 644.
104. Id. at 653.
105. Id. ("In its view, this can be done only by intercepting fair patrons as they move about,
and if success is achieved, stopping them momentarily or for longer periods as money is given or
exchanged for literature.").
106. Id. at 647 ("The State does not dispute that the oral and written dissemination of the
Krishnas' religious views and doctrines is protected by the First Amendment." (citing Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938))).
107. Id. ("Nor does [the State] claim that this protection is lost because the written materials
sought to be distributed are sold rather than given away or because contributions or gifts are solicited
in the course of propagating the faith.").
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Given that the dissemination of religious views was protected and
that seeking donations did not somehow waive those protections, it
seemed that the Heffron Court's analysis would follow the kinds of
analyses offered in Lovell, Cantwell, Murdock and Martin.1 8 However,
the Heffron Court explained, "the First Amendment does not guarantee
the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any
manner that may be desired."' 10 9 Rather, First Amendment freedoms are
subject to "reasonable time, place, [and] manner restrictions,"' 1  and the
Court suggested that the relevant legal question was whether the rule at
issue was a "permissible restriction on the place and manner of commu-
nicating the views of the Krishna religion."11'
When offering its constitutional analysis, the Heffron Court ex-
plained that the rule at issue did not suffer from some of the obvious de-
fects that the Court had seen in other proselytizing cases. For example,
the Court noted that "[s]pace in the fairgrounds is rented to all comers in
a nondiscriminatory fashion on a first-come, first-served basis,""l12 and
that the rental rates were not intended to discourage speech, since the
"charge [was] based on the size and location of the booth." 113 Indeed, to
illustrate how evenhanded the system was, the Court pointed out that the
rule "applies alike to nonprofit, charitable, and commercial enter-
prises,"1 4 noting with approval that the rule at issue was "not open to the
kind of arbitrary application that this Court has condemned as inherently
inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such
discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a par-
ticular point of view."' 5 Yet, the fact that the challenged rule did not
contain these defects did not establish that the rule was free from all de-
fects, especially considering that application of the rule to ISKCON
might make it extremely difficult for that group to raise money.
1 16
When the Murdock Court examined a tax on itinerant preachers, it
noted that imposing a tax on "the privilege of engaging in this form of
missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a
full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable
manner would thus be denied the needy."" 7 While Heffron did not in-
108. Indeed, Lovell, Murdock, and Cantwell are all cited in the opinion. Id
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
111. Id. at 648.
112. Id. at 644.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 649.
116. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
117. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943); see also Follett v. Town of McCor-
mick, 321 U.S. 573, 579 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("It is wise to remember that the taxing and licens-
ing power is a dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of unscrupulous or bigoted men,
could be used to suppress freedoms and destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate
bounds.").
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volve a tax, it nonetheless involved monies that would have to be paid if
ISKCON was to distribute written materials or solicit donations.1 8 Fur-
ther, monies were at issue in a different sense as well, because the ordi-
nance was limiting the effectiveness of the solicitations. Thus, even had
the state not been renting the booths but instead had merely required that
all solicitation be performed in booths,1 9 the suit presumably still would
have been brought, precisely because ISKCON would suffer opportunity
costs by being required to do all solicitation from within a booth.
The Heffron Court placed some emphasis on the "nondiscriminatory
fashion" in which the booths were rented 20 and that the rental rates were
tied to the size and location of the booth.1 21 Yet, one infers, these very
same factors would not have won the day in Murdock. For example, the
Murdock Court rejected the contention that the ordinance at issue should
be upheld because it was not in fact particularly onerous to pay, 22 and
the fact that the ordinance was "nondiscriminatory" 123 did not render it
immune from further constitutional review. Indeed, the Murdock Court
criticized the tax, notwithstanding its facial neutrality,' 24 because it was
"fixed in amount and unrelated to the scope of the activities of petitioners
or to their realized revenues.1 25 Yet, the same point might have been
made about the system in place at the Minnesota State Fair, since the flat
rates were tied to the size of the booths rather than realized gains.
The Heffron Court criticized the Minnesota Supreme Court for only
considering the burdens on the state that would have been imposed by
creating an exception for ISKCON. 126 At least one of the important is-
sues to resolve involved the proper focus of analysis, for example,
whether the Minnesota Supreme Court instead should have considered
how much of a burden would have been imposed on the state had those
religious groups who made "peripatetic solicitation as part of a church
118. While oral advocacy was permitted anywhere in the Fair, even the distribution of written
material for free had to occur from within a booth. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 644.
119. The Heffron Court noted that the rental rates were not being contested. Id. at 644 n.4
("The propriety of the fee is not an issue in the present case.").
120. Id. at 644.
121. Id.
122. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112-13 (rejecting the contention that "the fact that the license tax
can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so"); see also id. at 118 (Reed, J.,
dissenting) ("This dissent does not deal with an objection which theoretically could be made in each
case, to wit, that the licenses are so excessive in amount as to be prohibitory. This matter is not
considered because that defense is not relied upon in the pleadings, the briefs or at the bar.").
123. Id. at 115 ("The fact that the ordinance is 'nondiscriminatory' is immaterial. The protec-
tion afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted.").
124. See id. at 106 ("'For one day $1.50, for one week seven dollars ($7.00), for two weeks
twelve dollars ($12.00), for three weeks twenty dollars ($20.00)'...
125. Id. at 113.
126. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 652 ("As we see it, the Minnesota Supreme Court took too narrow a
view of the State's interest in avoiding congestion and maintaining the orderly movement of fair
patrons on the fairgrounds. The justification for the Rule should not be measured by the disorder
that would result from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON.").
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
ritual' ' 127 been relieved of the burden of solely soliciting funds from
booths 12 8 or, perhaps, had religious groups as a general matter been re-
lieved of that burden. Had the Minnesota Supreme Court not solely fo-
cused on the burden created by exempting ISKCON but instead focused
on the burden which would be imposed on the state by exempting reli-
gious groups in general from the in-booth requirement, it would only
have been following the example set by the Murdock Court when it had
restricted its analysis to "a single issue-the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance which as construed and applied requires religious colporteurs to
pay a license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities.
' '129
To ask how much of a burden would have been imposed on the state
by exempting religious groups generally is not to answer it. It is simply
unclear, for example, how much of a burden would have been imposed
on the state by exempting those religious groups who had ritualized so-
licitation or, perhaps, by exempting religious groups more generally from
the requirement. Religious groups were already permitted to walk the
grounds to engage in oral advocacy, so if a religious group exemption
had been recognized it is at best unclear which groups would then have
taken the opportunity to solicit throughout the fair or whether the traffic
flow would have been greatly affected. 130  Neither the Minnesota Su-
preme Court nor the United States Supreme Court speculated about who
might decide to take advantage of any recognized proselytizing exemp-
tion, although the United States Supreme Court did note some of the
religious groups who already had a presence at the State Fair.' 31 In any
event, the Minnesota Supreme Court had already found that the state
would not have been severely burdened by affording the Krishnas an
exemption,1 32 and it would seem at best speculative to claim that a
somewhat broader exemption would create severe traffic difficulties.
The Murdock Court suggested that the "power to impose a license
tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of
censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down,"' 3 3 a point
127. See id.
128. Cf Brian Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory of
First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 Mo. L. REV. 9, 64
(2001) ("No other religions are known to require its members, as a religious ritual, to distribute and
sell religious literature and to solicit donations.").
129. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 110.
130. E.g., Ronald Baxt Turovsky, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc.: Confusing Free Speech with Free Exercise Rights, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1012, 1027 (1983) ("Con-
sidering the small number of groups that could have made the religious claim, and the fact that all
persons or groups could make speeches, argue, and proselytize within the fairground, the additional
congestion caused by . . . [granting the exemption] would not have been so overwhelming as to
render the system unworkable.").
131. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 644 n.5 (mentioning the Church of Christ and the Twin Cities
Baptist Messianic Witness among others).
132. Id. at 652 ("the court concluded that although some disruption would occur from such an
exemption, it was not of sufficient concern to warrant confining the Krishnas to a booth.").
133. Murdock, 319U.S. at 113.
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which analogously applies to the Minnesota regulation. If requiring the
Krishnas to solicit from their booths would preclude them from soliciting
effectively,134 that would make the booth requirement as potent as the
power of censorship. Basically, by restricting ISKCON to soliciting
from within a booth, the Court may have upheld a policy which in effect
prevented solicitation by that group entirely.
Murdock is instructive in yet another respect. Just as one of the
fears articulated in Murdock was that itinerant preachers would be taxed
in several localities, making it even more difficult for them to prosely-
tize, an analogous fear would be that many other event organizers would
similarly limit where solicitation could take place. 135 Were that to occur,
solicitation by ISKCON might effectively be precluded in a whole host
of venues.
The state's asserted interest in having the rule was "the need to
maintain the orderly movement of the crowd given the large number of
exhibitors and persons attending the Fair."'' 36 The Court believed that the
proper way to analyze the issue was not only to consider the added dis-
ruption which might be caused were an exception made for the Krish-
nas,137 but to consider how much potential disorder might be caused were
the state required to permit many more groups to solicit freely.1 38 After
all, the Court reasoned, religious organizations do not
enjoy rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the fairgrounds
superior to those of other organizations having social, political, or
other ideological messages to proselytize. These nonreligious organi-
zations seeking support for their activities are entitled to rights equal
to those of religious groups to enter a public forum and spread their
views, whether by soliciting funds or by distributing literature.
139
Indeed, when offering its analysis, the Court did not limit its focus to
political, religious, or charitable organizations, noting that the "question
would also inevitably arise as to what extent the First Amendment also
gives commercial organizations a right to move among the crowd to dis-
134. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 156
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) ("The Krishnas state flatly that they cannot practice Sankirtan from the confines of
a fair booth. They base this conclusion on both religious dogma and considerations of practical-
ity.").
135. See, e.g., id. at 153 (noting that Krishnas also solicit at airports, bus terminals, expressway
rest stops, shopping centers, parks national monuments, naval bases, conventions centers, football
games and horse and auto race tracks among other places).
136. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649-50.
137. Id at 652 ("As we see it, the Minnesota Supreme Court took too narrow a view of the
State's interest in avoiding congestion and maintaining the orderly movement of fair patrons on the
fairgrounds. The justification for the Rule should not be measured by the disorder that would result
from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON.").
138. Id. at 653 ("Obviously, there would be a much larger threat to the State's interest in crowd
control if all other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial organizations could likewise move
freely about the fairgrounds distributing and selling literature and soliciting funds at will.").
139. Id. at 652-53.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tribute information or to sell their wares as respondents claim they may
do.
1 40
If all of these groups had to be accorded the same rights, then the
burden imposed on the state by making an exception for ISKCON had
the potential to be quite great. The Court reasoned that an exemption for
ISKCON could not "be meaningfully limited to ISKCON, and as applied
to similarly situated groups would prevent the State from furthering its
important concern with managing the flow of the crowd."'' Yet, it was
not at all clear that the Court was correct when claiming that no mean-
ingful limitations could be offered. The Court wrote:
None of our cases suggest that the inclusion of peripatetic solicitation
as part of a church ritual entitles church members to solicitation
rights in a public forum superior to those of members of other reli-
gious groups that raise money but do not purport to ritualize the
process. Nor for present purposes do religious organizations enjoy
rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the fairgrounds supe-
rior to those of other organizations having social, political, or other
ideological messages to proselytize. These nonreligious organizations
seeking support for their activities are entitled to rights equal to those
of religious groups to enter a public forum and spread their views,
whether by soliciting funds or by distributing literature. 1
42
Yet, this is false. The Court has indeed suggested that solicitation
that is part of a ritual is entitled to special protection, having likened it to
other protected religious practices. Indeed, the Murdock Court suggested
that "the hand distribution of religious tracts is ... [a] form of religious
activity [which] occupies the same high estate under the First Amend-
ment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits,"'
' 43
expressly contrasting religious sales with mere commercial sales and
suggesting that the latter could more readily be limited or prohibited than
the former.' 44 Further, as Justice Brennan noted in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Heffron, "governmental regulations which interfere
with the exercise of specific religious beliefs or principles should be
scrutinized with particular care."'
145
At least a few points might be made about the Heffron Court's
analysis. Nowhere in the series of cases in which the Court examined
limitations on the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses to solicit funds did the
140. Id. at 653.
141. Id. at 654.
142. Id. at 652-53.
143. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943).
144. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
145. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 660 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Turovsky, supra note 130, at 1023-24 ("The Court erred in equating ISKCON's free exercise
claim with the speech rights of secular groups at the fair. The free speech and free exercise tests are
different. A religious claimant such as ISKCON has greater protection under the free exercise clause
than under the free speech clause.").
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Court suggest that the state was prohibited from imposing limitations on
merely commercial activities, so the Court's invoking the specter of
various commercial vendors hawking their wares throughout the State
Fair was simply an exercise in misdirection. Further, there are obvious
differences between commercial vendors, who might well be quite suc-
cessful even when vending from a booth, and others wishing to receive
monies, who might well find their success dependent upon not being
geographically restricted. 46  Indeed, different religious groups might
have varying degrees of success when attempting to distribute literature
or raise monies from booths.1
47
The Heffron Court noted in passing that ISKCON members were
permitted to walk the grounds discussing their religious views. This
means that the State was willing to permit ISKCON members to engage
in possibly long religious discussions thereby impeding traffic flow, as
long as they did not at the same time solicit funds. Yet, solicitation of
funds might involve less of an obstruction to traffic flow than would oral
advocacy. Solicitation might involve one or a few people stopping mo-
mentarily to give money, while oral advocacy would be more likely to
attract a crowd, especially if one or more individuals of differing views
wished to engage in a debate.
One of the most confusing elements of Heffron was why the Court
chose to offer the analysis that it did. Apparently, ISKCON had not ar-
gued that it was entitled to special consideration because its solicitation
was part of a religious ritual. 48 The Court might simply have chosen not
to address whether ritualized solicitation practices pose special constitu-
tional concern, and might instead have addressed the matter as applied to
any group challenging the rule. In that way, the Court simply would not
have offered any comments about the kinds of exceptions that should be
made so that free exercise guarantees would not be violated.
149
146. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 156 (N.D.N.Y.
1980) ("The Krishnas further maintain that, from a practical point of view, the fair goers are unlikely
on their own to go out of their way to find a Krishna booth at the State Fair. This being the case, the
Krishnas would be denied or restricted in their opportunity to spread the 'truth,' solicit contributions,
and gain converts.").
147. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 439, 447 (1995) ("The unpopular must go to the mountain, we said, for the mountain will not
come to them. Minnesotans will flock to the booths of the Methodists, Presbyterians or Episcopali-
ans, but if Hare Krishna devotees sit in their booth waiting for listener-initiated contact, they will
have a long and very quiet day.").
148. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 660 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("In their brief and in oral argument, however, respondents emphasize that they do not claim any
special treatment because of Sankirtan, but are willing to rest their challenge wholly upon their
general right to free speech, which they concede is identical to the right enjoyed by every other
religious, political, or charitable group.").
149. See id. at 660 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Having chosen
to discuss it, however, the Court does so in a manner that is seemingly inconsistent with prior case
law.").
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In the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, the Court viewed the breadth of
the ordinance as itself raising constitutional concerns.150 In contrast, the
Heffron Court implied that the regulation's breadth was the reason to
uphold the regulation, claiming that the inability to make distinctions and
thus limit the exemption would make crowd control very difficult. Yet,
the Court's claimed inability to make distinctions was belied by its own
analyses in other cases, even if one brackets the religion factor.
In Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
151
the Court laid out some of the factors that must be considered when judg-
ing the constitutionality of state regulations of solicitation. There must
be:
due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech
seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on
economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that
without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy
would likely cease.
152
Here, the Schaumberg Court is suggesting that one of the factors
that must be considered in any analysis restricting solicitation is how
much of a burden would thereby be placed on the group seeking funds.
Both in Schaumberg and in the Jehovah's Witnesses line of cases, the
Court is thus offering yet another way to distinguish among groups that
might be affected by solicitation regulations, namely, whether imposing
the limitation at issue would severely impair the ability to raise money
or, perhaps, bring about the group's financial ruin. Given that the Court
mentioned ISKCON's claim that its being confined to a booth would
severely hamper its attempt to raise monies, one might have expected the
Court to offer a more detailed analysis regarding why that consideration
did not win the day. The Court offered no such analysis and did not even
consider whether such a rule would in effect prohibit the Krishnas from
soliciting at the State Fair, instead merely announcing that it was "un-
willing to say that Rule 6.05 does not provide ISKCON and other or-
ganizations with an adequate means to sell and solicit on the fair-
grounds."'
153
One issue mentioned in Heffron was given much too little discus-
sion. The Court noted the state's claims that the rule "forwards the
State's valid interest in protecting its citizens from fraudulent solicita-
tions, deceptive or false speech, and undue annoyance,"' 154 but then said
that in "light of our holding that the Rule is justified solely in terms of
150. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
151. Vill. of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
152. Id. at 632.
153. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 655.
154. Id. at 650 n. 13 (citing Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620).
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the State's interest in managing the flow of the crowd, we do not reach
whether ... [this other purpose is] constitutionally sufficient to support
the imposition of the Rule."'' 55 Justice Brennan in his concurrence and
dissent took a different tack, suggesting that the record supported the
state's claim that it needed the rule to prevent fraud, although he did not
specifically discuss what in the record led him to that conclusion.
56
While the Court expressly declined to decide whether prevention of
fraud would suffice to justify the ordinance, 157 it seems safe to assume
that the Justices were considering the fraud aspect of the case, given the
majority's express refusal to decide whether that would suffice as a justi-
fication and Justice Brennan's reliance on that factor. Further, Justice
Blackmun in his Heffron concurrence and dissent also indicated that he
was considering the fraud factor. However, he expressly rejected the
fraud rationale because there was:
nothing in this record to suggest that it is more difficult to police
fairgrounds for fraudulent solicitations than it is to police an entire
community's streets; just as fraudulent solicitors may "melt into a
crowd" at the fair, so also may door-to-door solicitors quickly move
on after consummating several transactions in a particular neighbor-
hood.
58
Thus, Justices Brennan and Blackmun each suggested that fraudulent
solicitation was a problem at the Fair, although they disagreed about
whether other, more limited measures might be taken which would suf-
fice to prevent that evil.
There might have been at least two unarticulated reasons that would
help explain why the Court did not rely on the fraud rationale. First,
ISKCON had mounted a facial challenge to the ordinance. Even were
the Krishnas fraudulently inducing individuals to donate, that would not
resolve the constitutionality of the ordinance-the Court still would have
had to decide whether the regulation was substantially overbroad.159 For
example, if the regulation prevented a variety of other groups from non-
fraudulently engaging in protected expression, then the regulation might
be struck down even if the appellants could not themselves claim that the
155. Id.
156. Id. at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[B]ecause I believe on
this record that this latter interest is substantially furthered by a Rule that restricts sales and solicita-
tion activities to fixed booth locations, where the State will have the greatest opportunity to police
and prevent possible deceptive practices, I would hold that Rule 6.05's restriction on those particular
forms of First Amendment expression is justified as an antifraud measure.").
157. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text
158. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[P]articularly where conduct and
not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.").
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regulation was preventing them from engaging in protected expres-
sion.
160
Second, it was not at all clear that the record revealed fraudulent ac-
tivity by the Krishnas at the Minnesota State Fair. Indeed, the Minnesota
Supreme Court implied that the record did not contain the damning evi-
dence that one might have inferred was there, suggesting instead that
claims about fraudulent behavior had been made elsewhere.' 61
By focusing on crowd control rather than fraud, the Court was able
to avoid the difficulties inherent in claiming that the regulation was well-
tailored to prevent fraud, given the absence of evidence of fraud at the
Fair. However, the Court's claims about the need for crowd control
seemed rather speculative, especially because the Court overestimated
the difficulties in crafting an exemption which would have permitted
some but not others to distribute literature and solicit donations outside
of booths. 162  This makes the Court's justification rather tenuous-as
later explained by Justice Breyer in his Stratton concurrence, speculation
will not suffice to defeat a First Amendment claim. 
63
In his Heffron concurrence and dissent, Justice Blackmun accepted
the Court's crowd control rationale at least with respect to solicitation,
arguing that "common-sense differences between literature distribution,
on the one hand, and solicitation and sales, on the other, suggest that the
latter activities present greater crowd control problems than the for-
mer." 64 For example, Justice Blackmun noted that the "distribution of
literature does not require that the recipient stop in order to receive the
message the speaker wishes to convey; instead, the recipient is free to
read the message at a later time."'165 Precisely because the reader might
decide not to read the literature immediately, Justice Blackmun noted
that "literature distribution may present even fewer crowd control prob-
lems than the oral proselytizing that the State already allows upon the
fairgrounds."'' 66 In contrast, where money is changing hands, there is a
greater likelihood that foot traffic will be slowed, because "sales and the
collection of solicited funds not only require the fairgoer to stop, but also
160. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1980) ("We
agree with the Court of Appeals that CBE was entitled to its judgment of facial invalidity if the
ordinance purported to prohibit canvassing by a substantial category of charities to which the 75-
percent limitation could not be applied consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, even
if there was no demonstration that CBE itself was one of thesc organizations.").
161. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 85 (Minn.
1980) ("Although we are limited by the record in this case, we recognize that an additional concern
of defendants may involve the manner in which some members of ISKCON are reputed to practice
Sankirtan." (emphasis added)).
162. See supra notes 126-53 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
164. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 665 (1981) (Blackmun,
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'engender additional confusion... because they involve acts of exchang-
ing articles for money, fumbling for and dropping money, making
change, etc."' 167
A few points might be made about Justice Blackmun's common-
sense observation. First, it undercuts the constitutionality of the state's
requirement that all literature be distributed from booths. Oral advocacy
might be expected to cause more crowd control problems than would
handing out free written materials, because those materials might be read
at the recipient's leisure. If the worry really was that traffic control and
oral advocacy would be more likely to disrupt traffic patterns than would
the distribution of free literature, then one would expect the Court to
strike down the restriction on the distribution of free literature outside of
booths. Second, while Justice Blackmun's common-sense observation is
accurate as far as it goes, he does not thereby settle the relevant constitu-
tional question, which involves how much more difficult it would be to
control crowds if solicitation were permitted, which itself depends upon
how many groups would seek to solicit. Common sense would not be
particularly helpful in determining whether the increased burden would
be enough to justify the prohibition. Indeed, one might expect that inter-
mediate scrutiny 68 would require a more persuasive analysis than just an
appeal to common sense, especially where the relevant question is not
merely whether traffic flow problems would be greater were an exemp-
tion recognized but whether the increase would be sufficiently onerous to
justify the regulation at issue.
B. Solicitation and Literature Distribution at Airports
In Heffron, the Court upheld a regulation which limited sankirtan
69
to booths. At issue in International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee 170 was a ban on sankirtan in airport terminals-the challenged
regulation prohibited "the repetitive solicitation of money or distribution
of literature"' 7' within the Newark International Airport, John F. Ken-
nedy International Airport, and La Guardia Airport terminals. 
72
167. Id. (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 87
(Minn. 1980)).
168. See Kevin Francis O'Neill, Privatizing Public Forums to Eliminate Dissent, 5 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 201, 223 (2007) (discussing "the intermediate scrutiny normally reserved for con-
tent-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions").
169. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674-75 (1992) ("[The]
ritual known as sankirtan ... consists of 'going into public places, disseminating religious literature
and soliciting funds to support the religion."' (citing Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 577 (2d Cir. 1991))).
170. Id. at 672. Below, this opinion will be referred to as "ISKON." The companion case, Lee
v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992) will be referred to as
"Lee."
171. ISKON,505 U.S. at 675.
172. See id.
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In upholding the ban on sankirtan in these terminals, the ISKCON
Court explained both that individuals wishing to avoid the Krishnas'
solicitation "may have to alter their paths, slowing both themselves and
those around them,"'1 73 and that "[d]elays may be particularly costly in
this setting, as a flight missed by only a few minutes can result in hours
worth of subsequent inconvenience." 174 The Court further noted that
"face-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an appropriate
target of regulation. The skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target
the most vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those
suffering physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicita-
tion." 
175
Perhaps as a way of establishing that the Port Authority was provid-
ing a reasonable alternative whereby ISKCON would still be able to
communicate its message, the Court noted that the Post Authority per-
mitted solicitation and distribution of materials "in the sidewalk areas
outside the terminals,"1 76 an "area . . . frequented by an overwhelming
percentage of airport users."' 177 Indeed, Justice Kennedy in his concur-
rence suggested that the regulation passed muster precisely because there
were "ample alternative channels for communication."
1 78
Yet, the Port Authority's willingness to permit sankirtan in the
sidewalk areas around the terminals cuts both ways. Worries justifying
regulation within the terminal would also justify regulation outside of the
terminal-individuals hurrying to a plane might be delayed whether
within or immediately outside the terminal, and people rushing to a plane
who are stopped to receive literature or make a donation might feel co-
erced or under duress whether within or outside the terminal. 79 If the
Port Authority did not feel these concerns justified preventing distribu-
tion and solicitation outside the terminal, 180 it is not clear why they
would justify preventing solicitation within the terminal.
Many of the justifications cited by the Court for upholding a ban on
sankirtan within the terminal would also seem to justify a ban on the
173. Id. at 683.




178. Id at 707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179. Cf ISKCON Miami, Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, Florida, 147 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir.
1998) (upholding bans on solicitation and sales of materials on sidewalks adjacent to Miami Interna-
tional Airport for same reasons that such bans were permissible inside the airport).
180. It might be argued that the sidewalks outside the terminal were public fora and thus the
test for prohibiting speech there was much more onerous for the government to meet. However, just
as the Court used United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) to justify its employing a more
deferential test to determine whether the government's prohibition within the terminal passed consti-
tutional muster, see ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678, the Court might also have cited Kokinda for the
proposition that the sidewalks next to the airport were not public fora. After all, Kokinda held that
the sidewalks leading to a post office were not public fora. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (holding
that the sidewalk leading to the post office was not a public forum).
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distribution of literature within the terminal.' 8' Yet, in Lee v. Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,'82 the Court struck down
the limitations on the distribution of literature within the terminals in a
per curiam opinion.1
8 3
One of the interesting aspects of the Lee opinion was the Court's
justification for its position. Rather than articulate a rationale, the Court
simply said that for the "reasons expressed in the [ISKCON] opinions of
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter, . . . the judgment
of the Court of Appeals holding that the ban on distribution of literature
in the Port Authority airport terminals is invalid under the First Amend-
ment is Affirmed."'
184
The Court's citing to rather than repeating the different ISKCON
opinions would not be worthy of comment were all of those opinions
basically making the same points. However, there were profound dis-
agreements among these opinions about, for example, whether an airport
should be considered a public forum,185 which test should be used to de-
termine the constitutionality of the policies at issue, 186 and which prac-
tices, if any, could be prohibited without offending the relevant test.
187
By referring to those opinions without explaining which aspects of those
opinions persuaded the Lee majority, the Court was able to avoid the
181. See Lee, 505 U.S 830, 831 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he risks and burdens
posed by leafleting are quite similar to those posed by solicitation.").
182. Id. at 830.
183. See id. at 831 (affirming the local court holding that the ban on the distribution of litera-
ture in the terminals was unconstitutional).
184. Id.
185. Compare ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 686 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I... agree that publicly
owned airports are not public fora.") with id. at 693 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment) ("In
my view the airport corridors and shopping areas outside of the passenger security zones, areas
operated by the Port Authority, are public forums, and speech in those places is entitled to protection
against all government regulation inconsistent with public forum principles.") and id. at 709-10
(Souter, J., with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens join, dissenting) ("I agree with Justice
Kennedy's view of the rule that should determine what is a public forum and with his conclusion
that the public areas of the airports at issue here qualify as such.").
186. Compare id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We have said that a restriction on speech
in a nonpublic forum is 'reasonable' when it is 'consistent with the [government's] legitimate inter-
est in 'preserv[ing] the property .. .for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."' (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1983))) with id. at 703 (Kennedy,
J. concurring) ("The regulation is in fact so broad and restrictive of speech, Justice O'Connor finds
its void even under the standards applicable to government regulations in nonpublic forums .... I
have no difficulty deciding the regulation cannot survive the far more stringent rules applicable to
regulations in public forums. The regulation is not drawn in narrow terms, and it does not leave
open ample alternative channels for communication." (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
187. Compare id. at 703 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he Port Authority's ban
on the 'solicitation and receipt of funds' within its airport terminals ... may be upheld as either a
reasonable time, place, manner restriction, or as a regulation directed at the nonspeech elements of
expressive conduct.") with id at 712 (Souter, J., with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens
join, dissenting) ("Even if I assume, arguendo, that the ban on the petitioners' activity at issue here
is both content neutral and merely a restriction on the manner of communication, the regulation must
be struck down for its failure to satisfy the requirements of narrow tailoring to further a significant
state interest." (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
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difficult but possibly helpful task of explaining why the policy at issue
was unconstitutional.
Basically, the ISKCON majority upheld the ban on solicitation,
188
and the Lee majority struck down the ban on the distribution of litera-
ture. 189 Certainly, the two opinions are compatible if, for example, the
distribution of literature is viewed as paradigmatic speech and solicita-
tion is viewed as akin to commercial activity and thus more readily sub-
ject to regulation. Yet, that way of differentiating between solicitation
and literature distribution runs counter to the existing jurisprudence. 190
If, indeed, solicitation of money in support of religion "occupies the
same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the
churches and preaching from the pulpits,"' 9 it might be surprising that
the prohibition on the distribution of religious materials would be struck
down but that the ban on solicitation would be upheld. Arguably, the
distribution of religious literature is also analogous to preaching, and
thus the Court would seem to be protecting one kind of preaching and
not protecting another. Even more surprising are the justifications offered
by some members of the Court regarding why the solicitation and litera-
ture distribution bans are so different for constitutional purposes that one
but not the other could be upheld.
One of the important issues about which the Justices could not agree
in ISKCON was whether the airport should be considered a public forum.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, Thomas and
O'Connor rejected that the airport was a public forum' 92 and suggested
that the regulation should be upheld as long as it was reasonable. 93 Jus-
tices Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens and Souter all suggested that the air-
port was a public forum, 194 and thus that the "regulation must be drawn
in narrow terms to accomplish its end and leave open ample alternative
channels for communication."'
' 95
As one might expect, the ISKCON majority upheld the constitution-
ality of the solicitation ban in light of the deferential reasonableness
188. See id. at 685.
189. See Lee, 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992) ("[T]he judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that
the ban on distribution of literature in the Port Authority Airport is invalid under the First Amend-
ment is affirmed.").
190. See supra notes 45-47 (discussing the rejection of the equivalence between solicitation for
religious causes and solicitation for commercial causes).
191. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943).
192. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 679; see also id. at 686 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing
that "publicly owned airports are not public fora").
193. See id. at 683 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The restrictions here challenged, therefore,
need only satisfy a requirement of reasonableness.").
194. See id. at 693 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The airport corridors and shopping areas out-
side of the passenger security zones, areas operated by the Port Authority, are public forums, and
speech in those places is entitled to protection against all government regulation inconsistent with
public forum principles.").
195. Id. at 707.
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test. 196 However, those rejecting that mere reasonableness would suffice
disagreed about whether the Port Authority regulation passed the more
rigorous intermediate scrutiny test. Justices Souter, Blackmun and Ste-
vens all argued that the state's regulation had to be "struck down for its
failure to satisfy the requirements of narrow tailoring to further a signifi-
cant state interest,"' 97 whereas Justice Kennedy suggested that the "Port
Authority's ban on the 'solicitation and receipt of funds' within its air-
port terminals should be upheld under the standards applicable to speech
regulations in public forums."' 98 While the mere fact of disagreement
with respect to whether a test has been met is not so unusual, 199 there are
several considerations that make the opinion of Justice Kennedy and the
opinion of Justice Souter, onto which both Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens signed, worth a closer look.
One element to consider when analyzing the ISKCON and Lee opin-
ions is that three of the Justices were also on the Heffron Court-Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens and Blackmun. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinions in Lee and ISKCON were compatible with his view
in Heffron in that in each he suggested that the state regulation passed
constitutional muster. However, one could not have predicted the posi-
tions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun in Lee and ISKCON based on
their positions in Heffron.
Justice Stevens had signed onto Justice Brennan's Heffron concur-
rence and dissent,200 which suggested that the state's interest in the pre-
vention of fraud justified the restriction at the Minnesota State Fair. Yet,
one might have expected that the fraud rationale would also win the day
in ISKCON, since that was also cited as a concern. For example, the
ISKCON majority noted that the "unsavory solicitor can . . . commit
fraud through deliberate concealment of his affiliation or through delib-
erate efforts to shortchange those who agree to purchase," 20'1 although the
fraud cited occurred in a different case. 202 Justice O'Connor also alluded
to fraud in her concurrence-"[t]he record in this case confirms that the
problems of congestion and fraud that we have identified with solicita-
196. But see infra notes 209-18 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's rejec-
tion of the reasonableness of the ban on the distribution of literature).
197. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 712 (Souter, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 703 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
199. Compare, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860, 870 (2005) (Ten Com-
mandments display violates Lemon's purpose prong) with id. at 902-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dis-
play meets Lemon test).
200. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 656 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 684 (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bar-
ber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 159-63 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)).
202. See id (citing Barber, 506 F. Supp. at 159-63).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tion in other contexts have also proved true in the airports' experi-
ences."
20 3
As had been true in Heffron, there was some question whether there
was significant evidence of fraud in ISKCON. Thus, Justice Souter noted
in his dissent that the "evidence of fraudulent conduct here is virtually
nonexistent. It consists of one affidavit describing eight complaints,
none of them substantiated, 'involving some form of fraud, deception, or
larceny' over an entire 11-year period between 1975 and 1986. ' '2°4 Yet,
if the evidence of fraud in cases not before the Court was nonetheless
enough to justify the restriction in Heffron,20 5 one might have expected
similar evidence plus some complaints to justify the policy at issue in
ISKCON, although it may be that Justice Stevens changed his mind about
whether a restriction on solicitation was permissible primarily based on
allegations of fraud occurring in another case. Indeed, one infers that the
ISKCON majority was somewhat defensive about its assertions regarding
fraud, since it felt compelled to offer a conjecture about why there were
not many complaints alleging fraud.20 6
Justice Blackmun rejected his own Heffron common-sense analysis
in ISKCON, although the ISKCON majority as well as Justice O'Connor
in concurrence cited that reasoning to support their position. °7 While one
would infer from the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion that there was
no smoking gun in Heffron,20 8 it may be that both Justices Stevens and
Blackmun saw something in the Heffron record that was not present in
the ISKCON record.
What was most surprising were the positions offered by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy justifying their concurrences in both ISKCON
and Lee. For example, Justice O'Connor agreed that the literature distri-
bution ban was unconstitutional, notwithstanding her agreement that the
relevant test was whether the restriction was "reasonable., 20 9 To justify
her position, she explained that while the airport was not a public fo-
rum, 21 it nonetheless should not simply be understood as having "a sin-
gle purpose-facilitating air travel. 21' Instead, she suggested that the
"airports house restaurants, cafeterias, snack bars, coffee shops, cocktail
203. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing app. 67-111 (affidavits)).
204. Id. at 713-14 (Souter, J., dissenting).
205. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (pointing out that the Minnesota Supreme
Court had implied that there was little if any evidence of fraud at the Minnesota State Fair).
206. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 684 ("Compounding this problem is the fact that, in an airport, the
targets of such activity frequently are on tight schedules. This in turn makes such visitors unlikely to
stop and formally complain to airport authorities. As a result, the airport faces considerable diffi-
culty in achieving its legitimate interest in monitoring solicitation activity to assure that travelers are
not interfered with unduly.").
207. See id. at 683; see also id. at 689-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
209. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 686.
211. Id. at 688.
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lounges, post offices, banks, telegraph offices, clothing shops, drug
stores, food stores, nurseries, barber shops, currency exchanges, art ex-
hibits, commercial advertising displays, bookstores, newsstands, dental
offices, and private clubs.' 2 12 She reasoned that the Port Authority was
operating a shopping mall as well as an airport,21 3 which was open to
travelers and non-travelers alike,2t 4 and examined whether the restric-
tions were reasonable in light of "the multipurpose environment that the
Port Authority has deliberately created. 21 5
Justice O'Connor argued that the ban on solicitation was reasonable
because it might delay travelers, since the "individual solicited must de-
cide whether or not to contribute (which itself might involve reading the
solicitor's literature or hearing his pitch), and then, having decided to do
so, reach for a wallet, search it for money, write a check, or produce a
credit card.",2 16 She distinguished this from the individual who would just
receive a leaflet, since that individual would not need to read the litera-
ture immediately and might instead decide to look at it when there was
217
greater time.
Of course, she noted, merely because the distribution of literature
was protected would not mean that it would be immune from content-
neutral time, place, manner regulation. She pointed out:
For example, during the many years that this litigation has been in
progress, the Port Authority has not banned sankirtan completely
from JFK International Airport, but has restricted it to a relatively
uncongested part of the airport terminals, the same part that houses
the airport chapel .... In my view, that regulation meets the standards
we have applied to time, place, and manner restrictions of protected
expression.
21 8
Yet, if the Port Authority was able to operate well by using a kind
of neutral time, place, manner restriction which limited sankirtan to un-
congested areas, much of the rationale justifying the limitation of solici-
tation would seem to fall by the wayside. Were sankirtan permitted only
in those areas which were not crowded, individuals who were in a hurry
would presumably not stop to consider the pros and cons of contributing
and individuals who might stop because they were not in a hurry would
not thereby make the area too congested and delay others who were hur-
rying.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 689.
214. Id. at 688.
215. Id. at 689.
216. Id. (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733-34 (1990)).
217. Id. at 690.
218. Id. at 692-93 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
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Justice O'Connor also mentioned the worry posed by fraud.219
However, the Port Authority did not seem so worried by that, since they
permitted sankirtan to be practiced during the litigation. Further, Justice
O'Connor was a little circumspect when describing the kind of fraud that
was allegedly taking place, neither specifying what kind of fraud had
taken place nor by whom.2 20 For example, if the worry was that Krishnas
were failing to self-identify,22! then it would seem that a less onerous
burden would be to require appropriate identification.222 Further, if fraud
was believed to be such a pervasive problem, it is at the very least sur-
prising that such solicitations were permitted in the areas around the air-
port or in the airport during the litigation.
Justice O'Connor's analysis was surprising in yet another way. She
agreed that the appropriate standard was reasonableness and cited the
common-sense proposition that distribution of literature would cause
fewer congestion problems than would solicitation. Yet, one might have
expected Justice O'Connor to defer to the state's reasonable belief that
the distribution of literature might lead people to discuss the contents of
the materials, which might lead to congestion and impaired traffic
flow. 2 23 Thus, Justice O'Connor's explanation was surprising in that her
failure to defer to the Port Authority's policy on literature distribution
indicates that her reasonableness standard was somewhat more robust
than one might have inferred-a deferential reasonableness standard
would presumably permit a literature distribution ban in both a shopping
mall and an airport. Yet, were a more robust reasonableness test em-
ployed, the Port Authority's policy on sankirtan during the litigation
would suggest that the ban on solicitation was not reasonable, since
sankirtan could have been permitted without unduly interfering with pas-
sengers trying to catch planes. Assuming that she is using the same rea-
sonableness standard, it is difficult to understand why the solicitation ban
was reasonable but the literature ban was not. It may be that Justice
219. Id. at 690 (citing app. 67-111 (affidavits)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 684 (citing Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147,
159 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)). The New York district court noted some fraudulent practices:
For example, one ex-devotee from the Baltimore temple was sent out by her Sankirtan
leader with two of the best female solicitors of the temple. She was instructed not to
wear an identification badge and, if possible, to avoid verbally affiliating herself with the
Krishnas to potential donors. If someone were to ask her affiliation, she was taught to try
to confuse that person by slurring the word "Krishna" into sounding like the word "Chris-
tian." She was also instructed to make up "purposes" for requesting donations. For ex-
ample, she was told to say that she was soliciting for worldwide education and food dis-
tribution programs or children's drug programs.
Id.
222. Cf Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 664 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[R]espondents have offered to wear iden-
tifying tags.").
223. See Lee, 505 U.S. 830, 832 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Others may choose not
simply to accept the material but also to stop and engage the leafletter in debate, obstructing those
who follow.").
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O'Connor is employing a less deferential reasonableness test for the lit-
erature distribution ban and a more deferential reasonableness test for the
solicitation ban because she believes that speech must be given greater
protection than fundraising, notwithstanding that the airport is not a pub-
lic forum and notwithstanding that neither solicitation nor the distribu-
tion of literature would seem to fall within the purposes of the airport or
the shopping mall.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the judgment in ISkCON was
also surprising. He believed that intermediate scrutiny was the relevant
test, but nonetheless felt that the state had met its burden with respect to
the solicitation ban. To see why this is somewhat surprising, it is helpful
to consider why he believed that the literature distribution ban could not
pass muster.
Justice Kennedy noted that the Port Authority argued "that the prob-
lem of congestion in its airports' corridors makes expressive activity
inconsistent with the airports' primary purpose, which is to facilitate air
travel. 224 However, he rejected that argument because the "First
Amendment is often inconvenient" 225 and "[i]nconvenience does not
absolve the government of its obligation to tolerate speech. 22 6 He noted
that the "Authority has for many years permitted expressive activities by
petitioners and others, without any apparent interference with its ability
to meet its transportation purposes."22 7
Indeed, Justice Kennedy cited to Justice O'Connor's concurrence
discussing the feasible alternatives that had been adopted by airports.
Yet, Justice Kennedy failed to note that these alternatives also included
ways that groups were permitted to solicit donations,2 28 and his point
concerning less restrictive policies regarding the distribution of literature
might also be made about solicitation policies. After all, he both recog-
nized that "solicitation is a form of protected speech ' 229 and that the ob-
jectives with respect to solicitation could be achieved without banning
it.
23° He simply concluded that these narrower means were not constitu-
tionally required for the solicitation policy but were required for the lit-
erature distribution policy, without adequately explaining why that was
SO. 
2 3 1




228. See id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 704 (Kennedy J., concurring).
230. See id. at 707 ("other means, for example, the regulations adopted by the Federal Aviation
Administration to govern its airports, may be available to address the problems associated with
solicitation.").
231. See id. ("My conclusion is not altered by the fact that other means, for example, the regu-
lations adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration to govern its airports, may be available to
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One aspect of Justice Kennedy's analysis was especially notewor-
thy, namely, that the ban on the sale of books was unconstitutional.232
Yet, the sale of books might lead to more congestion than would solicita-
tion, given the greater likelihood that change might be required during a
sale. Thus, if, as seems reasonable, people who make donations are more
likely to give money without expecting change, e.g., by giving change
themselves or by their giving a one or five dollar bill without expecting
anything back in return, whereas people who make purchases are more
likely to use a larger bill and expect money back, then sales might be
expected to cause more foot traffic disruption than donations. While the
solicitation of funds might cause more congestion than the distribution of
(free) literature, e.g., because some individuals might need change, the
solicitation of funds would presumably cause less congestion than would
the sale of literature. Yet, the Port Authority's main argument was that
"the problem of congestion in its airports' corridors makes expressive
activity inconsistent with the airports' primary purpose, 233 which means
that Justice Kennedy's solution would likely be more disruptive than, for
example, permitting solicitation but prohibiting the sale of literature.
The majority ISKCON opinion refers to a district court opinion
234
discussing fraudulent practices engaged in by some ISKCON members
in the context of donations and sales,235 e.g., the wrong change might be
given or there might be a delay giving change in the hopes that the per-
son waiting for the correct change would grow impatient and leave. 36
This kind of fraud would be more likely to occur in the context of sales
than donations if only because of the greater likelihood that change
might be expected by those making a purchase. Further, if the worry was
that vulnerable travelers might be taken advantage of, e.g., because they
are unfamiliar with local language or customs,2 37 sales would provide at
least as great an opportunity for mischief as requests for donations.
address the problems associated with solicitation, because the existence of less intrusive means is not
decisive.").
232. See id. at 708 ("The application of our time, place, and manner test to the ban on sales
leads to a result quite different from the solicitation ban.").
233. Id. at 701 (majority opinion).
234. See id. at 684 (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp.
147, 159-63 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)).
235. The Barber opinion was referring to training allegedly given to ISKCON members. See
Barber, 506 F. Supp. at 159-63. At issue in Barber were New York State Fair regulations which
allegedly would have an adverse effect on ISKCON's ability to practice Sankirtan. See id. at 150.
236. See id. at 159 ("Other techniques for increasing monetary contributions included: flirting
with males, attempting to get people to donate larger bills, intentionally miscounting change, folding
over bills to shortchange people, and holding large bills for a long time in an effort to make the
donor tired of the idea of getting the desired amount of change back.").
237. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Travelers who are unfamiliar with
the airport, perhaps even unfamiliar with this country, its customs, and its language, are an easy prey
for the money solicitor.").
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Justice Kennedy understood that many of his criticisms about solici-
tation would "apply to the sale of literature, 238 but reasoned that "sales
of literature must be completed in one transaction to be workable. 239
Solicitation on the other hand need not take place in one transaction-
one could seek donations in one place but, for example, give the indi-
viduals envelopes and ask them to send the contributions in the mail.
Yet, it is at the very least ironic that Justice Kennedy believed that the
ban on literature sales must be struck down because "the Port Authority's
regulation allows no practical means for advocates and organizations to
sell literature within the public forums which are its airports,2 40 given
that the Court's ban on solicitation left the Krishnas no practical means
by which to solicit donations within airports.
One of the confusing aspects of Justice Kennedy's ISKCON concur-
rence in the judgment is that he offered a much narrower interpretation of
the regulation at issue than did the other members of the Court. In Jus-
tice Kennedy's view, the only kind of solicitation precluded in the air-
ports was solicitation coupled with the immediate receipt of funds.24'
However, no other Justice expressed agreement with this portion of his
opinion,242 so it is even more unclear what to make of Justice Kennedy's
concurrence or even how he would characterize the judgment with which
he was concurring, since the limitation on solicitation upheld by that
Court seems broader than what he said the Constitution permitted.
Although the Court never expressly discusses Justice Kennedy's in-
terpretation, the Court presumably upheld a ban on solicitation even
where the solicitor was not accepting monies but instead, for example,
was providing envelopes whereby individuals might send in their contri-
butions, since both the advocacy and the solicitation might lead to con-
gestion, fraud or both, even when not coupled with receipt of funds.243
However, one infers from Justice Kennedy's concurrence that he did not
believe that a solicitation ban would pass constitutional muster if the
solicitations were not coupled with the immediate receipt of funds.244
238. Id. at 708.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 708-09.
241. See id. at 705 (discussing why it is permissible to prohibit in-person solicitation when that
solicitation is coupled with immediate receipt of funds).
242. Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Stevens joined only Part I of Justice Kennedy's opinion.
See id. at 693.
243. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia and Thomas all would have upheld the
leafleting ban. See Lee, 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992). They presumably believed that solicitation, even
without receipt of money, was permissible to prohibit, because of potential congestion difficulties.
Justice O'Connor in her concurrence would presumably uphold a broader solicitation ban than
would Justice Kennedy, since both congestion and fraud would still be worries. See ISKON, 505
U.S. 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
244. See id. at 709 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("the Port Authority has not prohibited all solici-
tation, but only a narrow class of conduct associated with a particular manner of solicitation") and
id. at 708 ("Attempting to collect money at another time or place is a far less plausible option in the
context of a sale than when soliciting donations ....").
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Thus, when he says that he is concurring in the judgment, he presumably
means that he agrees that solicitation when coupled with immediate re-
ceipt of funds is subject to regulation, although it seems likely that many
reading the opinion would read the judgment more broadly.245
There is some difficulty in interpreting the proselytizing jurispru-
dence in light of Heffron, ISKCON, and Lee. It might be argued that the
Court is simply unsympathetic to the protection of a minority religion,246
but the Court is upholding the Krishnas' right to proselytize including the
right to distribute written literature in airports.247 The Court has likened
solicitation to speech, but is clearly distinguishing them in the ISKCON
cases, since the Court is upholding the right to disseminate religious
views, while upholding state limitations or prohibitions on solicitation.
The Court alludes to worries about fraud, but bases its decisions on wor-
ries about traffic congestion. Yet, the traffic flow problem which the
Court allegedly finds so worrisome might arise as readily from what the
Constitution allegedly protects as from what the Court held was appro-
priately subject to regulation. In short, the ISKCON cases raise a variety
of questions but offer few coherent answers about what the Constitution
protects.
CONCLUSION
Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court's jurisprudence
with respect to private proselytizing is far from clear. It may well be that
part of that lack of clarity involves the Court's own ambivalence about
how to treat religious fundraising, especially when part of a ritual. Thus,
the Murdock Court treated solicitation as akin to preaching and worthy of
robust protection, while the Heffron Court suggested that solicitation on
245. For example, when the opinion is cited in the literature, it is often cited as upholding the
regulation of solicitation rather than as only upholding the regulation of solicitation when coupled
with the immediate receipt of funds. See, e.g., Matthew D. McGill, Unleashing the Limited Public
Forum: A Modest Revision to a Dysfunctional Doctrine, 52 STAN. L. REV. 929, 943 (2000) ("The
Court held that the airport was a non-public forum and the ban on solicitation of contributions was a
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral exercise of government authority."); R. Alexander Acosta, Reveal-
ing the Inadequacy of the Public Forum Doctrine: International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992), 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 269, 269 (1993) ("Holding that
airports were non-public fora, the Supreme Court, in International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee, ('ISKCON'), employed public forum analysis to disallow a prohibition on leaflet-
ting but uphold a ban on solicitation in the major airports of the New York City metropolitan area.").
246. But see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 524 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A
critical function of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of members
of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority
beliefs and practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar.").
247. Cf W. Burlette Carter, Book Review, Can This Culture Be Saved? Another Affirmative
Action Baby Reflects on Religious Freedom, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 488 n.47 (1995) (reviewing
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993)) ("For example, in telling readers that the Court banned solicitation of
money by the adherents in Krishna Consciousness, Carter does not mention that, in a companion
case, the Court sustained plaintiffs' challenge to a related ban on distributing literature (as opposed
to soliciting money) inside the same airport. Whether or not the linedrawing makes sense, the fact is
that the Court sided with religious plaintiffs.").
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behalf of religions, even when a part of established ritual, was not enti-
tled to greater constitutional protection than was solicitation on behalf of
other organizations, whether religious or non-religious. The JSKCON
Court was willing to uphold a ban on solicitation, notwithstanding that
the Port Authority had already demonstrated that solicitation could be
limited in a way that would accommodate the needs of airport passen-
gers.
Throughout the ISKCON cases, members of the Court hint that their
concern is to prevent fraud. If that was the worry and there was suffi-
cient evidence of fraud,248 then there was no reason for the Court to con-
tradict the existing jurisprudence. Cantwell had already established that
states could impose restrictions on solicitation for religious purposes to
protect against fraud. The Heffron and ISKCON Courts go farther than
Cantwell, however, suggesting that religious solicitation can be prohib-
ited even when less restrictive regulations provide adequate safeguards
against fraud. Then, Stratton suggests that even the interest in prevent-
ing fraud may not suffice when the regulation of religious solicitation is
at issue. 24 9 Thus, the Court is sending very mixed messages with respect
to the steps that can permissibly be taken to prevent fraud by those solic-
iting on behalf of a religion and to the kinds of evidence of past fraud
that must exist to justify the state's taking prophylactic measures to pre-
vent future fraud.
Members of the Court have recognized that solicitation limitations
can impose a severe burden on religious organizations, but have been
ambivalent about whether the possible increased burden on religious
groups has constitutional weight. Members also seem ambivalent about
whether religious speech, especially when in the context of religious
ritual, is entitled to special protection or instead should only be treated in
the same way that protected speech is treated more generally.
At least part of the difficulty in interpreting the proselytizing cases
is that most of the opinions are compatible with the Court's not giving
religious speech and solicitation special consideration. Murdock is an
exception, suggesting that religious speech deserves extra protection,
although the ISKCON cases, especially Heffron, seem to stand for the
proposition that religious organizations are not to be given special solici-
tude constitutionally. To add to the interpretive difficulties, the ISKCON
cases seem inexplicable both internally and in light of the background
jurisprudence. For example, one would have thought that it would be
permissible to prohibit all literature distribution in airports if reasonable-
ness were the relevant standard. If the distribution of free literature
248. But see supra note 204 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Souter's ISKCON dissent
in which he notes the very scant evidence of fraud).
249. See Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168
(2002).
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could not be prohibited in airports, then it is not clear why a very severe
limitation of free literature distribution is permissible at a state fair.
Nor can it be claimed that the proselytizing jurisprudence is best
explained by noting that many of the cases offering robust protection
were decided in the 1930s or 1940s, since Stratton was decided in 2002.
Further, to make matters more confusing, none of the Justices deciding
Stratton even mentioned the ISKCON cases, not even Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent.250 However, the majority opinion does refer to
Cantwell,251 Martin, 252 Murdock 253 Follet?54 and Lovell,255 all cases de-
cided in the 1930s and 1940s.256 It is almost as if the Court believes that
the ISKCON cases do not involve proselytizing.
The Supreme Court has suggested that proselytizing, whether or not
coupled with solicitation of funds, is accorded robust protection by the
Constitution. Yet, the Court has upheld restrictions on proselytizing
based on speculation about traffic flow or unsubstantiated allegations of
fraud. It may be that members of the Court are distinguishing between
speech and solicitation sub silentio, but even that does not explain the
decisions entirely. The Heffron Court upheld and the Lee Court struck a
limitation on the distribution of written literature, where traffic flow con-
siderations were paramount in both cases, and the potential harms caused
by the congestion, e.g., missing a plane versus waiting a little longer be-
fore one could enjoy a ride, militated in favor of greater deference in the
airport context.
The Court's proselytizing jurisprudence may simply be a function
of the Court's confused and confusing approach to the Religion Clauses
more generally. 257 Nonetheless, it might at least be hoped that the Court
would try to clarify the existing jurisprudence rather than simply pretend
that certain cases were never decided or offer justifications that simply
are not credible. That does not seem too much to ask, although in an
area as contentious as the Religion Clauses, 258 it seems unlikely in the
250. The majority opinion written by Justice Stevens begins at id. at 153; Justice Breyer's
concurrence begins at id. at 169; Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment begins at id. at 171;
and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent begins at id. at 172.
251. Id. at 160, 162.
252. Id. at 160, 163.
253. Id. at 160-62.
254. Id. at 160.
255. Id.
256. Lovell was decided in 1938, Cantwell in 1940, Martin and Murdock in 1943, and Follett
in 1944. See id. at 160-61.
257. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he
incoherence of the Court's decisions in this area renders the Establishment Clause impenetrable and
incapable of consistent application. All told, this Court's jurisprudence leaves courts, governments,
and believers and nonbelievers alike confused-an observation that is hardly new.").
258. For example, those who would preclude a display of the Ten Commandments on constitu-
tional grounds are sometimes accused of being hostile to religion. See McCreary County v. ACLU,
545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion... modifies Lemon to ratchet up
the Court's hostility to religion."); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("At the
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near term that the Court will be able to offer an approach on which the
members can even agree, much less one which can plausibly account for
the jurisprudence and offer guidance to lower courts.
same time, to reach a contrary conclusion here, based primarily upon on the religious nature of the
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REVIEWED BY DAVID K. DEWOLFt
TEN TORTURED WORDS by Stephen Mansfield is not a scholarly
work, by the author's own admission. Although he holds a doctorate
from Whitefield Theological Seminary and has written a number of best-
selling books of history and biography, he is not a specialist in early
American history, and he has not attempted to do original research.
Moreover, his book is marred by some embarrassing gaffes, most promi-
nent of which is the back of the dust jacket, which describes the ten tor-
tured words "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . ." as having resulted "[i]n the steamy summer of 1787, as
America's founding fathers fashioned their Constitution. . . ." As Chap-
ter 1 accurately describes, the First Amendment was drafted by the new
Congress in 1789 and became law in 1791. The error was undoubtedly
the result of a careless publicist for Thomas Nelson (the publisher), but
there are other examples of a lack of attention to detail.'
t Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law; B.A., Stanford University, 1971; J.D.,
Yale Law School, 1979. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Mark E.
DeForrest and Robert G. Natelson.
1. An extensive and highly critical review of the book has been written by CHRIS RODDA,
author of LIARS FOR JESUS: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT'S ALTERNATE VERSION OF AMERICAN HISTORY
(2006). The first installment of the review is found at http://www.talk2action.org/story/
2007/8/13/16117/9532/Front Page/_StephenMansfield s quot TenTorturedWordsquot A B
ookReview Part 1_, with links to the second and third installments.
In addition to the dust jacket error, Rodda highlights a sentence in the introduction to Mansfield's
book referring to Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists as having been written "fourteen years
after the First Amendment became law." Chris Rodda, Stephen Mansfield's "Ten Tortured Words-
A Book Review (Part 1), TALK TO ACTION, Aug. 13, 2007, http://www.talk2action.org/story/
2007/8/13/16117/9532/FrontPage/_StephenMansfield_squotTenTorturedWordsquot AB
ook Review Part 1 _. In fact, as Rodda points out, the First Amendment became law in 1791, and it
was barely ten years later that Jefferson wrote the letter. Id. Similarly, Mansfield refers to "the
convention that drafted the First Amendment," when in fact Congress drafted the First Amendment.
Id. These errors do not affect the weight of Mansfield's claims (there is no significant difference
between a ten-year and a fourteen-year gap; Mansfield here misidentifies the body that drafted the
First Amendment, but later in the book he carefully reviews the Congressional debates); but they
provide cheap ammunition for Mansfield's detractors.
The only significant error I noted is the use of an alleged quotation from James Madison, "Relig-
ion is the basis and Foundation of Government." STEPHEN MANSFIELD, TEN TORTURED WORDS:
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Although some savage attacks have been directed at the book, they
can be ascribed more to the overarching thesis of the book than to a con-
cem that, for example, the date for the adoption of the First Amendment
is accurate. Mansfield's overarching thesis is that the popular under-
standing of the adoption of the First Amendment has been badly dis-
torted. In this Mansfield resembles the boy who points out that the em-
peror is wearing no clothes. Even if the boy's shirt-tail is hanging out,
the question is not what he is wearing but whether or not the emperor has
any clothes on and whether that ought to cause us concern. As Mansfield
demonstrates, the official interpreters of the Constitution (the United
States Supreme Court), with no significant objection from mainstream
scholars, have maintained an image of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment that is not only wrong, but so obviously wrong that it is
difficult to understand how it could have been maintained for so long
with such success. To put it in a nutshell, the commonly accepted notion
is that our Founding Fathers, having had a bad experience with estab-
lished churches, enacted the First Amendment in order to place a wall
between church and state; accordingly, so it goes, both the letter of the
law and our unbroken tradition compel fidelity to this core principle of
the "American experiment."
Mansfield deliberately chooses not to mount an exhaustive legal or
historical case against this interpretation. Instead, the five chapters in
Mansfield's short book approach his subject by telling a series of stories,
each incorporating an actual historical event, but with the overarching
theme of puncturing some popular but misguided myth about the Estab-
lishment Clause. Chapter 1 tells the story of how the First Amendment
was adopted. Chapter 2 addresses the role of Thomas Jefferson in how
the Founding Fathers understood the relationship between church and
state, in particular the letter that Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Danbury
Baptist Association in which he used the phrase "wall of separation
HOW THE FOUNDING FATHERS TRIED TO PROTECT RELIGION IN AMERICA . . . AND WHAT'S
HAPPENED SINCE 146 (2007). Although he cites Robert Rutland's collection of Madison's papers
and the words he quotes do appear, they are separated by several intervening words, indeed pages,
and the omission is not acknowledged in the quotation. Although "Religion" is in Madison's Memo-
rial and Remonstrance, and Madison talks about "the basis and foundation of government," the
subject of the latter phrase is the Virginia Declaration of Rights, not "Religion." Id.
It turns out that the same quotation is found in DAVID BARTON'S book THE MYTH OF
SEPARATION 120 (3d ed. 1992) (1989), although he withdrew it from a later edition of the book,
ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION (1996). Rodda cites similar
examples of Mansfield's borrowing from the scholarship of David Barton, which is neither here nor
there in terms of the validity of Mansfield's argument, but it again suggests that in providing a
popular, as distinguished from scholarly, treatment of the subject Mansfield would have been wise to
obtain the assistance of a knowledgeable proofreader, who would have spared him a lot of grief. All
of this is unfortunate since the primary claims that Mansfield is making, as the rest of this review
describes, would not be affected by correcting the errors that are pounced upon by Mansfield's
critics.
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between church and state."2 Chapter 3 describes the opinion in Everson
v. Board of Education3 -the first decision by the United States Supreme
Court to treat the Jeffersonian phrase as the Rosetta Stone for interpret-
ing the First Amendment. Chapter 4 describes the rise of the ACLU and
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and their use of
litigation, particularly the fee-shifting provisions in the United States
Code, to enforce the separationist vision. Finally, Chapter 5 is a bit of an
altar call-it describes how the distorted vision of a secular America can
and probably will be replaced by one that corresponds more closely to
the Founders' vision for America. Each chapter bears closer inspection.
Chapter 1, "What the Founders Founded," tells what should be the
well-known story of how the First Amendment was adopted. In the
popular mind, even in widely accepted scholarly treatments of the First
Amendment, the Founders self-consciously rejected the past practices of
the American colonies, which featured an overlap between religious and
governmental authority. As Frank Lambert, Professor of History at Pur-
due University, puts it in his book The Founding Fathers and the Place
of Religion in America, the attitude of the "Planting Fathers" contrasts
sharply with the vision of the "Founding Fathers." Whereas the Planting
Fathers wanted to establish a "City upon a Hill" and thought that religion
and state were inextricably linked,
The Founding Fathers had a radically different conception of reli-
gious freedom. Influenced by the Enlightenment, they had great con-
fidence in the individual's ability to understand the world and its
most fundamental laws through the exercise of his or her reason. To
them, true religion was not something handed down by a church or
contained in the Bible but rather was to be found through free ra-
tional inquiry. Drawing on radical Whig ideology, a body of thought
whose principal concern was expanded liberties, the framers sought
to secure their idea of religious freedom by barring any alliance be-
tween church and state.
4
2.
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God,
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers
of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign rever-
ence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and State.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Associa-
tion (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332, 332 (Adri-
erne Koch & William Peden eds., 1972) (1944). In fact the use of the phrase "wall of separation" in
this context originated with Roger Williams, who advocated a "hedge or wall of separation between
the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world." PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 98 (Atheneum, 1962) (1953).
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 3
(2003). This quotation was used (originally without attribution, presumably because it was not
thought to present anything particularly original), in a commencement address by Judge John E.
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(To mitigate some of the embarrassment from the anachronism on the
dust jacket of Mansfield's book, it is significant that Lambert places the
defining moments in our nation's history to be 1639 and 1787, thus blur-
ring the distinction between the adoption of the Constitution and the
adoption of the First Amendment. 5)
A brief consideration of Lambert's description illustrates the central
point that Mansfield makes in Chapter 1: We have the story fundamen-
tally wrong. Neither the Constitution written in 1787 nor the First
Amendment drafted in 1791 and ratified in 1791 "barr[ed] any alliance
between church and state." It would be more accurate to say that the
First Amendment protected those existing establishments of religion. In
fact, it was in part the fear that the national government would interfere
with state establishments of religion that produced the language of the
Establishment Clause-the ten tortured words.6
How could something so obvious as the purpose of the First
Amendment be turned on its head? One answer of course is that, regard-
less of what was intended by the First Amendment, later constitutional
developments, such as the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, might
have accomplished precisely what Lambert and others claim was in-
Jones, who decided Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
See Judge John E. Jones III, Commencement Address at Dickinson College (May 21, 2006),
http://www.dickinson.edu/commencement/2006/address.html.
5.
The constitution that [George Washington] swore to uphold was the work of another
group of America's progenitors, commonly known as the "Founding Fathers," who in
1787 drafted a constitution for the new nation. But unlike the work of the Puritan Fathers,
the federal constitution made no reference whatever to God or divine providence, citing
as its sole authority "the people of the United States." Further, its stated purposes were
secular, political ends: "to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty." Instead of building a "Christian Commonwealth," the supreme
law of the land established a secular state. The opening clause of its First Amendment in-
troduced the radical notion that the state had no voice concerning matters of conscience:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof." [citation omitted] In debating the language of that amendment, the
first House of Representatives rejected a Senate proposal that would have made possible
the establishment of the Christian religion or of some aspect of Christian orthodoxy. [ci-
tation omitted] There would be no Church of the United States. Nor would America rep-
resent itself to the world as a Christian Republic.
LAMBERT, supra note 4, at 2. Just as 1639 represents a defining moment in Americans' religious
heritage, so does 1787. ld.
6. See generally Van Alstyne, What is "'an Establishment of Religion"?, 65 N.C. L. REV.
909, 910 (1987) (suggesting that the intent of the First Amendment may have been simply to prevent
the federal government from usurping states' power to establish religion). Of course, the First
Amendment was also drafted to specify how the national government would deal with religion; it
could neither make a law that would establish religion, nor could it prohibit the free exercise of
religion. But in between those two extremes there was room for nonpreferential aid to religion and
nondiscriminatory enforcement of laws (e.g., against polygamy) that might impinge on the practice
of religion. It is not clear that the Founders had a clear conception of the appropriate boundaries to
be drawn in limiting government action affecting religion. Like many commentators, I have pro-
posed my own set of principles: David K. DeWolf, State Action under the Religion Clauses: Neu-
tral in Result or Neutral in Treatment?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 253 (1990).
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tended by the Founding Fathers. (Whether the Fourteenth Amendment,
or any other constitutional authority in fact did so is a significant part of
the discussion in Chapter 3 of Mansfield's book.) Even conceding, as
every examination of the First Amendment must, that the First Amend-
ment not only did not impose separation of church and state upon the
states, but prevented the federal government from interfering with the
establishment of religion or the suppression of the exercise of religion,
defenders of the popular understanding will say that the Fourteenth
Amendment changed the landscape. We will deal with that question
later in this review. But whatever was done in the late 1800's cannot be
used to interpret the intention of the Founding Fathers. To say that the
Founding Fathers "barr[ed] any alliance between church and state" is so
wildly inaccurate that one searches for other explanations of how such a
characterization could be made. Even the existence of established state
churches, of which there were five at the time of the Constitutional Con-
vention, 7 is not seen as irrefutable proof that the purpose of the First
Amendment was not to bar an alliance between church and state, but
rather is assumed to show that most states had by that time rejected the
idea of an established state church (from the time of Revolutionary War
broke out in 1775 until the Constitutional Convention the number of
colonies with established churches dropped from nine to five8).
By reading back into the Founding Fathers' later decision to aban-
don state establishments of religion, historians like Frank Lambert claim
for them an attitude that they simply did not share: that public life could
be governed by secular principles, while private life would be guided by
whatever source of spiritual sustenance the individual chose. It is pre-
cisely to refute this notion that Mansfield describes, albeit in abbreviated
and popular fashion, a more accurate history of how the First Amend-
ment was adopted and what it was intended to accomplish.
The most basic starting point for the First Amendment is to identify
the impetus for the Bill of Rights generally and the First Amendment in
particular. This part of the history is generally agreed upon: In the de-
bates over the ratification of the proposed constitution, the primary criti-
cism of the new constitution was that its grant of greater power to the
national government left the states and ordinary citizens vulnerable to the
usurpation of their rights and prerogatives. Although the Constitution in
theory granted only limited powers, history is replete with examples of
limited power turning into unlimited power, and the anti-federalists ar-
gued that the new Constitution offered precious little protection from yet
7. MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 120, (citing ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 4 (1982)).
8. Id.
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another installment in that sorry history. 9 The defenders of the Constitu-
tion tried to reassure the state ratifying conventions that the Constitution
only gave the national government enumerated and limited powers, and
that it was more dangerous to specify limitations on that power, since
any omission from the list of limitations could be converted into a claim
of implied authority. But this argument in the end was successful only
by tying it to a promise that after the Constitution was ratified it would
be supplemented by a Bill of Rights in which explicit limitations were
placed upon the national government. The resulting "Gentleman's
Agreement" paved the way for the ratification of the Constitution.'0
In other words, it would be a mistake to characterize the Bill of
Rights as a guarantee of the rights of the people in general; instead it was
a limited protection against depredation by the national government. It
supplemented the enumerated powers limitation by further requiring that
even if the national government were engaged in an activity authorized
by Articles I, II or III of the Constitution, it could only do so within the
boundaries set up by the Bill of Rights. What is typically forgotten (or
deliberately obscured) in the popular telling of the story of the Bill of
Rights is that the states retained the power to do precisely those things
(establishing a state religion, punishing unpopular speech, denying the
right to trial by jury, etc.) that were forbidden to the national govern-
ment. Of course, that allocation of power may have been drastically al-
tered by subsequent events, but if so, we should locate the authority for
limiting state power in subsequent events, not in the design of the Foun-
ders.
Chapter 2 of TEN TORTURED WORDS, "Of Cheese, Walls, and
Churches," addresses the role that Thomas Jefferson played in the erec-
tion of the wall between church and state. He is significant for two rea-
sons. First, he is the author of the phrase "wall of separation between
church and state"; and second, he is iconic of the mind of the Founders.
More than almost any of the Founders, he is given credit for verbalizing
the beliefs that led to the Revolution, to the adoption of the Constitution,
and to the Bill of Rights. Jefferson of course was the primary author of
the Declaration of Independence, but he was in France when the Consti-
tutional Convention met, as well as when the First Amendment was
drafted, debated, and adopted (although he returned in time to observe its
ratification). But when President John F. Kennedy made the famous
remark in front of forty-nine Nobel Laureates that the combined talent
and human knowledge assembled in the room were exceeded only by the
9. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAfee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The
Presumption in Favor of Liberty over Law and the Court over the Constitution, 75 U. CrN. L. REV.
1499, 1560-61 (2007).
10. Under this "Gentleman's Agreement," "the federalists made important concessions, and in
exchange, the moderates agreed to support the Constitution." Robert G. Natelson, The Original
Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 73, 82 (2005).
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occasions when Thomas Jefferson dined alone," he exemplified the kind
of reverence in which Jefferson is held in the public understanding of the
American experiment. Thus, if Jefferson was indeed a passionate separa-
tionist, that fact (in addition to the phrase he composed) might affect our
understanding of the Founders' vision for the way in which religion and
government would coexist in the new republic.
Mansfield approaches the subject by telling the story of the Dan-
bury Baptists to whom the letter was written. On the same day that Jef-
ferson wrote the letter to the Danbury Baptists, he had publicly wel-
comed the arrival of a half-ton of cheese that was the gift of another
group of New England Baptists, from Cheshire, Massachusetts, anxious
to express their affection and support for a President they thought might
sympathize with their plight of being a minority religion in a state that
still recognized Congregationalism as the official state religion.' 2 In-
deed, Jefferson did sympathize with them, and it is clear from the letter
that Jefferson favored a much more restrictive role for government in
promoting religion. On the other hand, Mansfield makes two important
points. First, although Jefferson claims in his letter that the First
Amendment was an act of the whole American people "building a wall
of separation between church and state," this statement should not be
taken (as it has been since the Everson opinion, addressed by Mansfield
in Chapter 3) as an authoritative description of the purpose, much less
the legal effect, of the First Amendment.
Mansfield reviews the basic, almost irrefutable, reasons for refusing
to accord such weight to Jefferson's phrase. First, Mansfield recalls the
history of the origin of the First Amendment, previously described in
Chapter 1. It was not to satisfy separationists (assuming Jefferson to be
one) that the amendment was proposed, but precisely to prevent separa-
tionist impulses (or for that matter, sectarian impulses) in the national
government from interfering with whatever approach to religion (includ-
ing state establishment of religion) then prevailed in the several states.
Second, Jefferson took no part in the actual drafting of the First Amend-
ment, and thus could not be considered an authoritative source for what
was meant by the language of the amendment. Third, the letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association was written long after the amendment had
been drafted, passed, and ratified, and at a time when Jefferson occupied
a political office. As a politician Jefferson was entitled, even obligated,
to advance a more partisan agenda than the one he advocated when he
occupied the more statesman-like role as one of the Founding Fathers.
Finally, when Jefferson referred to the wall between "church and State,"
he probably meant "State" to mean the national government (which is the
11. Remarks at a Dinner Honoring Nobel Prize Winners of the Western Hemisphere, 1962
PUB. PAPERS 347 (Apr. 29, 1962).
12. Connecticut did not abandon Congregationalism until 1818; Massachusetts did so in 1833.
MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 120.
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target of the First Amendment), not our more generic understanding of
"state" as governmental power in general.
But I would like to amplify a point that Mansfield makes by draw-
ing on the rules of interpretation in a legal context. When a contract is
being made between two parties, the meaning of the contract depends
upon the external manifestations of the parties, not any hidden subjective
intent. Suppose my neighbor loves to burn wood in his fireplace but
lacks any ready supply of firewood. I, by contrast, have lots of firewood.
On the other hand, I would prefer (if I did not need money) to leave my
property in its natural state. Suppose he and I walk through my property
identifying firewood that would meet his needs, and we subsequently
enter into a contract that states "In exchange for $500, Neighbor has the
right to collect a one-year supply of firewood for his personal use from
DeWolf's property." If a subsequent court is required to interpret this
contract (as to the amount of firewood contemplated by "personal use,"
or what equipment Neighbor may use in harvesting the firewood), a court
will look at the objective manifestations of my behavior; the fact that I
believe that wood-burning is a form of air pollution, or that I hate chain
saws, will form no part of the "intent of the parties" reflected in the con-
tract. 13  Even if I wrote the words to the contract that we both signed, it
is my actions (including words I spoke in the formation of the contract),
not what I subjectively thought or believed, that will control. Thus, even
if Jefferson had been an author of the First Amendment, or others sharing
his point of view (like Madison14) were key contributors to the language
of the Constitution or the First Amendment, it was the representation of
its meaning to the ratifying state conventions that determines what the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights meant from a legal standpoint. Once
it became clear that the lack of a Bill of Rights was a major stumbling
block to securing approval of the Constitution, and after the proponents
of the Constitution promised that the addition of a Bill of Rights would
be the first order of business for the new Congress, the Constitution was
ratified.' 5 Thus, the meaning of the First Amendment is not to be found
13. On the other hand, the intention of the Neighbor may be relevant, if it is either expressed
(thus forming part of the basis of the agreement) or if it can be demonstrated that the actual intent of
one of the parties is so different from what the other party thought the bargain was about. In the case
of the ratifiers of the First Amendment, they clearly thought that the Bill of Rights was the payment
on the promissory note executed by the Federalists to secure ratification of the Constitution. See
Natelson, supra note 10, at 82-84, 87.
14. Madison's subjective intent, based on writings he produced in other contexts, is often
cited as the meaning of the First Amendment, but it is clear that despite Madison's preeminent role
in the drafting and the historical record of the Constitutional Convention and the drafting of the Bill
of Rights, Madison frequently acted as a facilitator and his personal preference was frequently set
aside by the majority. For example, Madison favored giving the national government the power to
override state actions that violated individual liberties, but the majority wanted to retain the auton-
omy of the states. I ANNALS OF CONG. 440-42 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see generally Natelson,
supra note 9.
15. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 37-38 (Random House
2005).
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in the subjective intent of those who put the words on paper, but in the
communicated demands of the state ratifying conventions, who made it
clear that they wanted to protect the states and individual citizens from
having the national government tell them what to do; the power of the
states to regulate their own relationship with the people was to be left
undisturbed.' 6 At the risk of becoming repetitious, this is the principle
that has been stood on its head in the frequent citation of Jefferson and
other Founders as the origin of a "right" to prevent the endorsement of
religion by state or local governments.
Mansfield also spends considerable time exploring Jefferson's true
feelings about religion in general and Christianity in particular, and
whether he can properly be claimed for the Deist or even the infidel posi-
tion. Mansfield cites a number of sources suggesting that Jefferson was
more pious than is popularly assumed, 17 and that his theological beliefs,
while less orthodox than those of the other Founders, were not a place-
holder for the kind of militant secularism that is being advanced today.
The debate is likely to continue about Jefferson, and this part of the book
is less persuasive precisely because in the end it hardly matters. Jeffer-
son was likely a conflicted soul, who found himself unable to affirm key
tenets of orthodox Christianity, and feared the influence on civil society
of religious institutions,' 8 but he never disputed (and seems to have
agreed with) the assumption that religious belief was critical to maintain-
ing a republican form of government. When John Adams said that our
form of government required a religious people, 19 or when George Wash-
ington's Farewell Address reminded his listeners that to subvert religion
and morality would be to abandon true patriotism,2 0 they were expressing
16. As one example, while the Constitution prohibited the national government from employ-
ing a religious test for public office (Article VI), in 1789 "[a]ccording to one tally, eleven of the
thirteen states had religious qualifications for officeholding." AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 33 (Yale University Press 1998).
17. Mansfield repeats the story of Jefferson's encountering someone on his way to church and
assuring him that "no nation has ever yet existed or been governed without religion. Nor can be."
MANSFIELD, supra note I, at 49-50. Critics of Mansfield have accused him of exaggerating Jeffer-
son's personal piety and relying on apocryphal accounts. See RODDA, supra note 1 ("I have to
wonder if this best-selling author even realizes that he is spreading an inaccurate and deceptive
version of American history to a new and wider audience."). But the quotation is believed by many
competent historians to be reliable. See GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, Two CULTURES 86
(2001) (based on "recently discovered handwritten history of a Washington parish"); see also James
H. Huston, James H. Huston Responds, THE WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY, 3rd Ser., Vol. 56,
No. 4. Oct., 1999, at 823-824.
18. "History, I believe, furnishes no example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil
government. This marks the lowest grade of ignorance of which their civil as well as religious lead-
ers will always avail themselves for their own purposes." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron
von Humboldt (Dec. 6, 1813), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?amrnem/
mtj:@field(DOCID+@lit(tj 110127)).
19. "Our constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate
to the government of any other." MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 144; John Adams, To the Officers of
the First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 THE
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an almost universally shared belief, even if there was passionate debate
over whether it was a proper object of government to encourage such
belief. Jefferson may have defended the position that not one penny of
government support should be furnished to religious institutions, but he
was not indifferent to the benefits from religion, either on a personal
level or as a basis for political stability. But regardless of how he recon-
ciled the conflict these sentiments might have created, Jefferson's views
ultimately have precious little to say about the meaning of the First
Amendment.
This logically takes us to Chapter 3, "The Turning," which focuses
on the case in which Jefferson's phrase and the separationist view was
adopted by the United States Supreme Court. Again, Mansfield begins
with a story-the story of the murder of a Catholic priest in Alabama in
1921 and the lawyer who successfully appealed to the religious and ra-
cial biases of the jury in securing an acquittal for the murderer. The law-
yer subsequently joined the Ku Klux Klan-and later the Supreme
Court.2 1 The lawyer of course was Hugo Black, and in many ways his
fleeting membership in the Ku Klux Klan is irrelevant to the opinion he
wrote in 1947 approving tax-supported reimbursement of bus transporta-
tion for Catholic school students. But part of Mansfield's purpose in
telling the story is to dislodge the sort of reverence that has been ac-
corded to the string of U.S. Supreme Court opinions imposing stringent
limitations on governmental support of religion.
Most lawyers, but few lay people, know the story of how the Estab-
lishment Clause was first invoked as a limitation on what state or local
government could do to support religion. In Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion of Ewing Township,22 a group of taxpayers challenged a school dis-
trict's policy of reimbursing parents for the cost of bus fares to transport
their children to school, including both the public high schools and "the
Catholic schools." Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, which
framed the issue as whether or not the policy violated the "wall of sepa-
ration between church and state" mandated by the Constitution. Justice
Black (along with the rest of the Court) assumed that the First Amend-
ment, by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, made it unconstitutional to
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality
are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism who
should labor to subvert these great Pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the
duties of men and citizens .... Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined
education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect
that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.
GEORGE WASHINGTON, FAREWELL ADDRESS (Sept. 19, 1796), reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 205, 212 (New York, Bureau of Nat'l Literature
1897), available at http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/farewell/transcript.html.
21. An account of the trial and controversy over Hugo Black's Klan membership can be found
in William H. Pryor, Jr., The Murder of Father James Coyle, the Prosecution of Edwin Stephenson,
and the True Calling of Lawyers, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 401, 407 (2006).
22. 330 U.S. I (1947).
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"contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches
the tenets and faith of any church., 23 Having laid down the principle,
Black's opinion proceeded to apply it to the facts of the case, and con-
cluded that the policy was not a support to the schools, but rather was an
extension of "general state law benefits." 24 Only four of the other mem-
bers of the court agreed with him; the other four vigorously dissented,
finding that in meeting the transportation needs of the Catholic school
students, the school board was supporting the religious mission of the
school. In arguing over the application of the principle to the facts of the
case, no one questioned the way in which the principle was expressed, or
its application of the First Amendment to the actions of state and local
government.
Mansfield spends several pages reviewing the legitimate questions
that can be raised about whether the 14th Amendment was intended to
reverse the logic of the original Bill of Rights and disable the states in
precisely the same way that the federal government was disabled by the
Bill of Rights.25 There are good reasons to be skeptical, including the
contemporaneous rejection of this argument in several U.S. Supreme
26Court cases. Moreover, particularly in the case of the religion clauses,
the logic of the First Amendment (preventing the national government
from interfering with states' regulation of religion) makes no sense if one
simply substitutes "state" for "Congress" (or "national government").
Finally, as Mansfield demonstrates through the opinion of Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree,27 the "wall of separation" metaphor
has proven to be unworkable in practice as well as being based on a mis-
reading of history. But the debate over the incorporation doctrine is vo-
luminous and complex; even if one rejected the rationale presented in
Everson-and Mansfield explains why one should-one might legiti-
mately ask whether there is a substitute principle that limits the power of
state or local government to promote or suppress religious belief and
practice. The lack of such a principle may help explain the perpetuation
of the stunning anachronism of using the language and intentions of Jef-
ferson and Madison as the basis for imposing constitutional limits on tax
support for parochial schools. But it is not Mansfield's purpose--or his
responsibility-to reconfigure the law defining the limits of governmen-
tal action affecting religion. His object was to correct an inaccurate ac-
count of our history, and in this he succeeds quite well.
Nonetheless, because Mansfield did not attempt a lawyer's argu-
ment about the Constitution, I cannot resist an avenue that would have
23. Id. atl6.
24. Id.
25. See the discussion in text accompanying notes 8 and 9.
26. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). See generally Jerold H. Israel, Selective
Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 256 (1982).
27. 472 U.S. 38, 66 (1985).
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shed a slightly different light on Justice Black's opinion. To use one of
the basic tools of legal analysis, Justice Black's claims regarding the
incorporation doctrine and Jefferson's wall of separation were plainly
dicta-that is, they were not necessary to the holding of the case and thus
did not constitute binding precedent, even under the principle of stare
decisis. In fact, the next case to address the issue of state aid to religious
schools, Board of Education v. Allen,28 was not decided until twenty
years later, and it too permitted state aid to parochial schools in the form
of providing textbooks. Thus, although the Court had used language that
sounded very threatening to the type of non-preferentialist support for
religion that Mansfield persuades us the Founders would have permitted,
the Court had protected such aid from constitutional attack for almost a
quarter century after the Everson case. In fact, in the Allen case the
Court explicitly rejected the argument made by Justice Black in a furious
dissent that aiding the educational mission of the parochial school vio-
lated the constitutional prohibitions in a way that transporting children in
the Ewing Township did not.29 Only in 1971, in the famous decision of
Lemon v. Kurtzman (source of the so-called Lemon test), 30 did the U.S.
Supreme Court for the first time invalidate state aid based upon the dicta
in Everson.31  Thus, in seeking the guilty party for'the unworkable
Lemon test one might turn more readily to Chief Justice Burger's mis-
placed pragmatism in Lemon than to the bad history found in Justice
Black's dicta in Everson.
Mansfield doesn't follow this branch of the Everson progeny, but
instead cites the myriad examples of the arbitrary application of the
Lemon test. The Lemon test is not the only judicially formulated rule that
is vulnerable to criticism, but it helps to prove Mansfield's point about
the significance of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence having been
built upon a bad foundation. It is particularly ironic that those who de-
fend decisions protecting the "wall of separation between church and
state" often treat this phrase as though it were the cornerstone upon
which the republic was built and that abandoning it would constitute
28. 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
29. See DeWolf, supra note 6, at 253.
30. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Under the Lemon test, a state action is unconstitutional
unless (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) it has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and (3) it does not result in excessive entanglement between the state and religion. Id
31. It is true that the U.S. Supreme Court had invalidated religious instruction on school
grounds and state-sponsored school prayer. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433-36 (1962); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
231-32 (1948). But these could be distinguished in that they were the direct involvement of the state
in religious practice or instruction. Everson and Allen appeared to countenance governmental aid
flowing to religious organizations as long as the aid was available on a neutral basis and did not
require entanglement with the religious aspect of the schools. Thus, Lemon, while it incorporated
the dicta from Everson, was in sharp contrast to the actual legal precedent. Moreover, it was flatly
inconsistent with its companion case, Tilton v. Richardson, which permitted state aid to flow almost
without restriction to religious colleges and universities. 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971). See gener-
ally DeWolf, supra note 6, at 253.
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capitulation of constitutional principle in favor of mob rule. As Mans-
field points out, however, nothing could be further from the truth. Most
Americans are quite happy with a general policy of keeping religious
authority and governmental authority separate; but they also puzzled by
the zeal with which religious expression has been excluded from the pub-
lic square. When the U.S. Supreme Court insists on counting reindeer in
a "winter holiday" display32 or agonizes over the placement of the Ten
Commandments on government property, they cannot claim the authority
of the Founders.
Mansfield then moves on in Chapter 4, "Faith-Based Blackmail," to
detail the way in which litigating Establishment Clause cases has become
a cottage industry for organizations like the American Civil Liberties
Union and Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Again,
he begins with a story. The protagonist in this chapter is an ACLU attor-
ney inspired by his hero Cesar Chavez, who started his legal career fight-
ing the good fight for union workers and civil rights. He eventually grew
disillusioned with the ACLU's use of techniques that capitalize on the
"fee-shifting" provisions of the civil rights laws. 33  Fee-shifting was
originally a device to insure that victims of racial discrimination would
be able to enforce the civil rights laws, but today it is applied to a much
broader set of cases.
It works like this: If the policy or practices of a public entity, say a
school board, are challenged by the ACLU,34 that public entity faces a
scary prospect. If the case is litigated, and the school board loses, it will
be forced to pay the attorney fees incurred by the ACLU in litigating the
case. On the other hand, if the school board succeeds in defending its
policy or practices, it has no statutory right to recover its fees, and it will
still incur the expense of hiring its own lawyers. Since the ACLU is of-
ten able to recruit volunteer lawyers who will pursue the case pro bono
based on their commitment to the agenda of the ACLU, there is a huge
risk on one side and very little risk on the other. It is no surprise that
where the legal status of the policy is in the least doubtful, the school
board will have a strong incentive to capitulate.
32. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the Supreme Court narrowly upheld a
"seasonal display" by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, which included a creche along with Santa
Claus and reindeer. In describing the difficulty of applying the test for what violates the Establish-
ment Clause, Judge Nelson of the Sixth Circuit complained:
The application of such a test may prove troublesome in practice. Will a mere Santa
Claus suffice, or must there also be a Mrs. Claus? Are reindeer needed? If so, will one do
or must there be a full complement of eight? Or is it now nine? Where in the works of
Story, Cooley or Tribe are we to find answers to constitutional questions such as these?
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1569 (6th Cir. 1986) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
34. The same principle applies to litigation brought by Americans United for Separation of
Church and State and similar organizations, and in some cases more than one group will work to-
gether, as they did in the case of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Board, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709-
710 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 1 will use the ACLU as the prime example for convenience.
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Now it is only fair to point out that religious groups have used this
same "fee-shifting" provision of the law to extract attorney fees from
public entities, including school boards, that violated the First Amend-
ment by, for example, refusing to provide equal access to student groups
with religious viewpoints.35 One might conclude from this fact that the
law operates symmetrically-that is, it is no more permissible (and there-
fore incurs a symmetrical risk) to discriminate against religion as to dis-
criminate for religion. But this appearance of symmetry is deceptive.
The best way to illustrate this is by example. I have often had occasion
to reflect on the Establishment Clause during the choir performances at
the public schools my children have attended. For the "Winter Holiday"
concert, the director must select music suitable to the season. A natural
candidate would be Christmas music-religious music. What is the rela-
tive likelihood that a federal judge would find the selection unconstitu-
tional if the percentage of Christmas carols (traditional Christian music)
were 0%? 25%? 50%? 100%? It seems inconceivable that a parent
who complained that none of the songs had religious content would suc-
ceed in obtaining an injunction and attorney fees.36 On the other hand, if
100% of the songs were Christmas carols, it would be very easy to claim
that the policy constituted an endorsement of Christianity.37 We have
been acclimated to the consequences of a school district appearing to be
"too religious." But imagine for a moment if federal judges started pun-
ishing school districts for being "insufficiently religious" with injunc-
tions and huge attorney fee awards. One can hear the-justified-howls
of outrage. Yet precisely that is what has happened (with the identities
reversed) when a school district has been found to be "too religious."
For example, when the Dover, Pennsylvania School Board adopted a
policy requiring that students hear a four-paragraph statement about in-
telligent design at the beginning of their study of evolution, it was sued
35. See, e.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d
1062, 1074 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding defendant school district's denial of access to school facilities
based upon discrimination against plaintiff's religious viewpoint entitled plaintiff to recoup attorney
fees).
36. Sechler v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 121 F. Supp. 2d 439, 453 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (discuss-
ing how a "winter holiday" "song program" at public elementary school that featured Kwanzaa and
Chanukah songs, but no songs reflecting the Christian origin of the Christmas holiday, was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause).
37. School districts are very sensitive to the accusation that their inclusion of religious music
or religious art might create the impression of an establishment of religion. See, e.g., Florey v. Sioux
Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding school district policy that permits
singing of Christmas carols was not unconstitutional on its face). However, perfect neutrality is
impossible. When my oldest son was in the sixth grade the "Winter Holiday" concert at his elemen-
tary school featured each grade in succession, from youngest kindergarten to 6th grade, singing a
variety of secular and religious carols. Just before the last number on the program the students put
on white gloves, which puzzled me. Then they began to sing Silent Night, which I thought was very
fitting. But after the first verse, the stage lights went out and the students were bathed in black light.
All that could be seen was their white gloves, and while the accompanist played the music to Silent
Night, the students silently "sang" the words in sign language. I was moved to tears. I felt great
admiration for the bravery of the choir teacher, but reflected bitterly on the fact that my reaction
could be Exhibit A in a suit to attack the practice under the Establishment Clause.
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and lost. After trial they were threatened with a $2 million attorney fee
bill, and settled by paying over $1 million.38
In terms of the title of Chapter 4, "Faith-Based Blackmail," lest it
appear to be an exaggeration or hyperbole, consider these words from the
lawyer who succeeded in forcing the Dover School Board to abandon its
policy of telling students about intelligent design: "This sends a message
to other school districts contemplating intelligent design that the price tag
can be truly substantial ... Precisely. If school boards were being
threatened with similar penalties for not being sufficiently religious, what
would we call such a legal climate? Faith-based blackmail? Should we
not be just as outraged if the identities were reversed?
Lest Mansfield's readers end on a note of despair, he includes a fifth
chapter, "The Return." In it he sounds an optimistic note based on two
converging phenomena. On the one hand, we have the public appetite
for religion resulting from the 9/11 tragedy and other reminders of our
individual and corporate need for God. On the other, we have militant
atheism represented by such figures as Christopher Hitchens40 and Rich-
ard Dawkins,4' who agree with religious believers that religious ideas
matter, but they disagree with the Founders about whether religious be-
lief has a positive effect on the body politic. Until recently religious be-
lief had been relegated by the cultural elite to the status of a personal
preference-a leftover from a bygone era that might provide individuals
with a source of comfort and reassurance in times of stress, but that was
largely irrelevant to the important questions of how we should live.42
Hitchens, Dawkins, and others have reminded Americans that ideas do
have consequences, and that our Founders' conviction about the relation-
ship between religious belief and our body politic deserves renewed at-
tention.
This relationship-between the religious imagination and public
policy-is one that Mansfield emphasizes throughout the book. Every
American war has been fought not only by soldiers, but with the help of
clergy who helped Americans understand what the fight was all about.
38. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 709. The attorney team representing the parents claimed
that their fees were over $2 million, but they agreed to settle with the school board for over $1 mil-
lion. Amy Worden, Dover District to Pay $1 million in Legal Fees, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb.
22, 2006, at B01; see also David K. DeWolf, John West, and Casey Luskin, Intelligent Design will
Survive Kitzmiller v. Dover, 68 MONT. L. REV. 7, 8 (2007).
39. Worden, supra note 38, at B01 (quoting Richard Katskee, attorney for Americans United
for Separation of Church and State).
40. CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: How RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING
(2007).
41. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006).
42. This view is aptly summarized in the James Taylor song, "Sweet Baby James": "There's a
song that they sing of their home in the sky / Maybe you can believe it if it helps you to sleep / But
singing works just fine for me." JAMES TAYLOR, Sweet Baby James, on SWEET BABY JAMES (War-
ner Bros. Records 1990) (1970), available at http://www.lyricsfreak.com/j/james+taylor/
sweet+baby+james_20069087.html.
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Even in the Civil War, when opposing armies each had chaplains reas-
suring the troops that they were doing God's will,43 it has never been
thought that religion was just a private matter. It is relatively easy to find
the kinds of statements from John Adams and Washington connecting
religious belief to survival as a nation, but even in recent history religion
was a driving force behind the civil rights movement," and it appears
that Americans take religion into account when they choose their elected
representatives. 45  Mansfield predicts that "[t]he next presidential elec-
tion promises to be a contest of religious worldviews as much as, if not
more than, any other in American history." 46 Mansfield's prediction is
subject to being proven wrong (and it is hard to imagine how one would
rigorously test such a hypothesis), but it may also prove prophetic.
Mansfield is encouraged to note a number of legislative efforts that
would help restore balance in our approach to the role of religion in pub-
lic life. One initiative, House Bill 2679, the Public Expression of Relig-
ion Act, was passed by the House of Representatives in 2006."7 It would
prevent the fee-shifting provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 from applying to
cases involving the Establishment Clause. Another initiative, House Bill
235, the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, would remove
the threat of the loss of non-profit tax-deductible status on the part of
churches when they address political issues, particularly the conduct of
politicians when their policies encourage or conflict with a church's view
of what God demands of the nation.48 Since the time that Old Testament
prophets warned about God's expectations and the consequences of dis-
regarding them, religious leaders have claimed the right, indeed the obli-
gation, to "speak truth to power." Although some religious leaders be-
43. As Abraham Lincoln's Second Inaugural noted, with some bitter irony:
Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the
other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in
wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces, but let us judge not, that we be
not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered. That of neither has been an-
swered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes.
Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1865).
44. CHARLES MARSH, GOD'S LONG SUMMER: STORIES OF FAITH AND CIVIL RIGHTS passim
(Princeton University Press 1997); Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain "The Just Rewards of So Much
Struggle": Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37,
94 n.260 (2006) ("[T]he recurring potent grass-roots forces in popular movements for economic
inclusion-justice under law-have been religious leaders and congregants."). For a recent example
of the involvement of religious leaders in a political/legal struggle, see Reverend Nelson Johnson,
Reflections on an Attempt to Build "Authentic Community" in the Greensboro Kmart Labor Strug-
gle, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 675, 675 (2000).
45. Sam Harris, an author of one of the militantly atheist books, complained about a poll in
which 90% of Americans said they would vote for an otherwise qualified candidate who was female,
Jewish, or black, and 79% would vote for a gay candidate; however, only 37% of Americans would
vote for an atheist candidate, otherwise qualified. Nicholas D. Kristof, A Modest Proposal for a
Truce on Religion, N.Y. TIMES, December 3, 2006, § 4, at 13.
46. MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 130.
47. The Public Expression of Religion Act, H.R. 2679, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).
48. Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 235, 109th Cong. § 1(a)
(2005).
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lieve that it is imprudent, indeed unbiblical, to make specific pro-
nouncements about the wisdom of particular political practices, the
judgment about what is morally required (as distinguished from politi-
cally wise) is essentially a theological judgment, and it should be no part
of the government's jurisdiction to substitute its judgment for what topics
the preacher should address. If a government bureaucracy (the Internal
Revenue Service) is given the authority to withdraw significant benefits
(the right to deduct contributions from one's taxes) because of com-
plaints that the church "is too much involved in politics," we should rec-
ognize that religious liberty is seriously jeopardized. As Mansfield
points out, this is bad not only for religion, but for government. If gov-
ernment is denied the unique perspective that religious traditions provide
(and in light of the limited influence that religious leaders exert in com-
parison to other influences on the electorate), we are the poorer for it.
But that brings us back to the question which is bound to result from
Mansfield's analysis. If the popular view of the First Amendment is
wrong, and if our public discourse would benefit from correcting the
misperception that religious expression somehow turns toxic in the pub-
lic square, where will we find the boundary between appropriate and
inappropriate interaction between government and religion? Should a
state be able to establish a religion? Should it be able to provide non-
preferential support to all religions? Can a city deny Wiccans the right to
worship? Mansfield is not a constitutional lawyer, and it is perhaps un-
fair to ask him to come up with a tidy and inclusive legal doctrine. It is
of course permissible to imagine the solution our Founders adopted: Let
individual states develop their own unique solutions to the problem.
Given the protection of religious liberty in many state constitutions and
our historical experience with a tradition of tolerance, we may be confi-
dent that, even if there were no federal constitutional doctrine prohibiting
state interference with religious liberty, there is not much to worry about.
Even if there were individual departures from what most Americans
would favor, such departures might be permitted based on the principle
that Louis Brandeis articulated: "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country. 49 On the other hand, perhaps
some general protection might be found in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the effect that if some state practice is so egregious that it violates "privi-
leges and immunities of citizens, 50 then a federal court has authority to
prevent such abuse; but this power would be used sparingly rather than
creating a cottage industry for litigation.
49. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983 " in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229,
1233 (1994).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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This brings up the third of the solutions Mansfield reviews, a sort of
"nuclear option" for religion clause cases. The appellate jurisdiction of
the federal courts 5' is subject to being withdrawn, or selectively with-
drawn (via the "exceptions" clause 52) by Congress. Thus, at least in the-
ory, Congress could declare that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction
to hear cases involving school prayer, or public displays of religious
symbols. Ron Paul, a candidate in the 2008 Presidential campaign, has
sponsored the We the People Act, House Bill 5739,53 which would re-
move the jurisdiction of federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
from "any claim involving the laws, regulations, or policies of any State
or unit of local government relating to the free exercise or establishment
of religion., 54 Mansfield is not wedded to any of the three proposals. He
is confident that even if all of them fail, "others like them will surely
arise. The sense in the nation that something has gone horribly wrong in
matters of religion and government is too pronounced for the current
status quo to remain much longer." 55  Given the fact that the Everson
case has been around for sixty years, and similar measures in the past
have come to naught, one might question Mansfield's confidence. But
those who would view the measures as extreme ought not be complacent.
If Mansfield is correct (as I believe he is) that today's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is based on a series of demonstrably false premises,
and if he is also correct (as virtually everyone would concede, albeit for
different reasons) that current "Establishment Clause jurisprudence" is an
incoherent mess, then the prospect of significant, even dramatic, change
becomes more plausible. The development of a persuasive alternative
method for deciding Establishment Clause cases will make it much more
likely that such change will occur. Twenty years ago I proposed a modi-
fied version of Philip Kurland's neutrality rule,56 and I still would prefer
51. The Supreme Court is given original jurisdiction over certain types of cases: those "af-
fecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party."
U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2. However, virtually all the cases involving freedom of religion arise as a
result of the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the U.S. Supreme Court. Even the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts (what the Constitution refers to as "inferior courts" -trial courts and courts
of appeal) is in the plenary control of Congress: "The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (emphasis added). Congress in theory could abolish
federal trial and appellate courts, or authorize them for limited types of cases.
52. After describing the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Article III, § 2 states, "In
all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to
law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
53. We the People Act, H.R. 5739, 109th Cong. § 3(l)(a) (2006). In the Senate an equivalent
bill, S. 520, has been sponsored by Senator Shelby. The Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S.
520, 109th Cong. § 101(a) (2005).
54. MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 127.
55. Id. at 129.
56. DeWolf, supra note 6, at 254-59. In essence, I proposed that state action be judged ac-
cording to whether it treated religion neutrally, permitting state aid to religion so long as it was
available on a neutral basis regardless of viewpoint. I contrasted this standard with what I called the
"affirmative action" model, prohibiting aid to religion wherever it was perceived that "too much"
benefit was inuring to religion. I also proposed that a neutrality rule would allow "secular space" for
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it to the current state of affairs and to virtually all of the substantive pro-
posals that have been proposed to bring order out of the current chaos.
But some ingenuity and political savvy will be required to identify the
thread by which we may escape this labyrinth.
Mansfield concludes with an epilogue that invokes the history of the
Berlin Wall. As Mansfield puts it, "there is another wall whose time has
come to an end.",57 He is quick to point out that it is not the wall of sepa-
ration between the institutions of church and state that needs to be torn
down; rather, it is the wall "that is assumed to stand between all govern-
ment and all religion." 58 Mansfield wants to return to the vision of the
Founders, in which the nation "welcomes the riches of faith into the pub-
lic sphere":
This is the dream of a new generation and not because [its members]
wish to religiously oppress their neighbors. Instead, they know that
the secular State has been tried and found wanting in their time, and
they wish for an age in which, as Dr. King dared to hope, religion
once again becomes the conscience of the State.59
Mansfield draws upon the Berlin Wall metaphor for another reason.
Not only was it an instrument of oppression, but it came down relatively
suddenly. Even those who bitterly opposed it had reason to think it was
more or less permanent. Its collapse also left a number of very difficult
practical problems to resolve. The abandonment of our current approach
to the First Amendment would also create practical difficulties, but a
false sense of complacency or security may arise from thinking that such
problems logically entail preservation of the status quo. Thus, Mansfield
may be right in thinking that the future may be dramatically different
from the past.
To summarize, Mansfield's aim in writing this book was to present
the origin of the Establishment Clause (and the misused phrase "wall of
separation between church and state") in a lively and persuasive way. In
this he has succeeded. A previous book about George Bush sold over a
million copies,60 and Mansfield may get a similar audience for this book.
Despite its cosmetic flaws, the book may serve as a catalyst, or at least
reflects a larger cultural hunger, for the adoption of a more sensible ap-
proach to the relationship between religion and government in America.
religion, including special zoning rules for churches, chaplains in the military, and accommodation
for religious practice (like prayer) where it furthered the state's interests.
57. MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 138.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 138-39.
60. STEPHEN MANSFIELD, THE FAITH OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2004).
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(IM)BALANCE AND (UN)REASONABLENESS: HIGH-SPEED
POLICE PURSUITS, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND SCOTT
V. HARRIS
INTRODUCTION
History teaches that suspects, on occasion, flee from police officers.
While this principle has changed very little since the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment in 1791, the appropriate response to a suspect's
flight has changed very much. At the time of the founding, the law per-
mitted officers to simply kill a fleeing felony suspect rather than allow
him to escape;' two centuries later, an officer who uses deadly force
against a fleeing suspect may be liable in constitutional tort.
2
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Harris3 is
the latest in a line of cases that seek to construct a framework for deter-
mining when an officer's use of force becomes unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.4 But Scott, unlike the Court's prior decisions on the
constitutionality of excessive or deadly force, addressed a thoroughly
modem phenomenon: the high-speed pursuit. In an 8-1 decision, the
Court held that an officer may terminate a high-speed pursuit even if
doing so entails great risk to the fleeing suspect.
5
The analysis in Scott, however, is problematic. Although the major-
ity followed the Court's Fourth Amendment precedents by applying a
balancing test to determine the reasonableness of using deadly force to
terminate a high speed pursuit,6 the majority's characterization of the
facts tilted the metaphorical balance in favor of deadly force. This tilting
occurred from the majority's reliance on two questionable factual prem-
ises.
First, to determine the facts of the case, the majority viewed a
videotape of the pursuit shot from dash-mounted cameras on the patrol
cars.7 Although the Northern District of Georgia, the Eleventh Circuit,
and Justice Stevens concluded that jurors could have watched the video-
tape and determined that the officer's use of deadly force was unreason-
1. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (discussing the history of the common law
rule).
2. See Michael M. Rosen, A Qualified Defense: In Support of the Doctrine of Qualified
Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, With Some Suggestions for its Improvement, 35 GOLDEN GATE
L. REV. 139, 141-43 (2005).
3. 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
4. See Garner, 471 U.S. 1; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
5. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1779.
6. Id. at 1778.
7. Id. at 1775.
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able, the majority held otherwise: it found that the suspect's driving was
so obviously dangerous that no reasonable jury could disagree. But the
substantial differences in interpretation of the videotape voiced in the
opinions of Justice Stevens and the Eleventh Circuit suggest that a rea-
sonable jury could indeed disagree with the majority.
In light of the potential for multiple reasonable interpretations of the
videotape, the majority relied too heavily on its own interpretation of the
videotape to determine the "facts" in Scott. By ignoring others' interpre-
tations of the videotape, the majority tilted the balancing test in favor of
deadly force. The majority's tilting of the balance may make future uses
of deadly force in high-speed pursuits more likely to be found reason-
able, and the majority's rationale for its interpretation of the videotape
seems to undercut well-established summary judgment standards,
thereby giving judges greater interpretational leeway at the summary
judgment stage.
Second, in deciding the reasonableness of the officer's use of deadly
force to terminate the high-speed pursuit, the majority assumed that the
officer had two options at his disposal: complete cessation of the pursuit
or deadly force.9 In reality, however, more than two options existed. An
understanding of pursuit psychology, a restrictive pursuit policy, the use
of devices such as "stopsticks," the photographing of the suspect's li-
cense plate number for apprehension at a later time, and a final loud-
speaker warning were all viable, realistic, and available alternatives to
deadly force.
By ignoring these alternatives, the majority created an artificial di-
chotomy of complete cessation or deadly force that did not fully repre-
sent reality. Because it did not factor in the efficacy of alternatives, this
artificial dichotomy tended to make deadly force appear more reasonable
than it perhaps was. By setting a precedent that relied on this artificial
dichotomy, Scott created the risk that lower courts may not look at all of
an officer's available options to terminate future high-speed pursuits, and
also may have inadvertently discouraged law enforcement agencies from
adopting these alternatives to deadly force.
Part I of this comment discusses the legal background of deadly
force and Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Part II summarizes the
Court's decision in Scott. Part III argues that, although Scott followed
Fourth Amendment precedents in principle, the majority's application of
those precedents, in practice, rested upon questionable factual premises
stemming from the majority's interpretation of the videotape, and the
majority's refusal to account for alternative methods of ending high-
speed pursuits. Part IV concludes this comment.
8. Id. at 1775-76.
9. Id. at 1778.
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I. BACKGROUND 0
The Fourth Amendment provides citizens with a constitutional right
against unreasonable seizures by the government.1" At the time of the
founding, officers were entitled to use deadly force to prevent a fleeing
felon's escape.' 2 Although most American jurisdictions discouraged it,
the option of using deadly force to stop a fleeing felon remained avail-
able well into the twentieth century.' 3 In Tennessee v. Garner,14 how-
ever, the Court held that this common law rule violated the Fourth
Amendment.15  The Court expanded Garner's holding in Graham v.
Connor16 to encompass excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, as
well.' 7 After Garner and Graham, therefore, the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness standard governed the propriety of an officer's use of
excessive or deadly force. The doctrines developed in both Garner and
Graham are crucial to the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis in Scott.
In Garner, the Court held that an officer who shot an unarmed flee-
ing suspect in the back of the.head in order to prevent his escape violated
the suspect's right against unreasonable seizure.18  The Court came to
this conclusion by balancing the "nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."' 9 Because the
suspect's interest in his own life outweighed the state's interest in captur-
ing him, the Court found that the officer acted unreasonably.
20
Although the Court held that deadly force "may not be used unless
it is necessary to prevent the [suspect's] escape and the officer has prob-
able cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death
or serious physical injury to the officer or others,' it also emphasized
10. The Court granted certiorari to Scott as an interlocutory appeal from summary judgment
against the officer's defense of qualified immunity. Id. at 1773-74. The first step in a qualified
immunity analysis asks whether an officer violated a claimant's constitutional rights. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). See generally Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity in the Fourth
Amendment: A Practical Application of § 1983 as it Applies to Fourth Amendment Excessive Force
Cases, 21 TOURO L. REV. 571, 576-80 (2005). Although Scott came to the Court as a qualified
immunity case, Scott's analysis deals only with the first step of the analysis. 127 S. Ct. at 1774,
1776. Because qualified immunity is only tangentially related to the scope of this comment, it will
be dealt with only when necessary to address the Fourth Amendment issues.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ).
12. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 5.1(d), at 38 (4th ed. 2004); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1985).
13. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 5. l (d), at 38.
14. 471 U.S. 1(1985).
15. Garner, 471 U.S. at 10.
16. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
17. Id. at 388.
18. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3-4.
19. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (internal quotations
omitted)).
20. Id. at 9-10.
21. Id. at 3.
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that Garner's balancing test was fact-driven: an officer's "reasonableness
depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried
out. '22 Furthermore, the Court looked to "whether the totality of the
circumstances justified a particular sort of... seizure. 23 In sum, Garner
stood for the proposition that the state's interest in deadly force must be
balanced against the suspect's interest in his life in order to determine
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
Despite the Court's framing of Garner as a Fourth Amendment is-
sue, there remained confusion in the decisions as to whether excessive
force claims should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reason-
ableness standard, or the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due proc-
ess approach. 24 In Graham, the Court held that "all claims that law en-
forcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonable-
ness' standard .... ,25 This holding not only reaffirmed the balancing
test laid out in Garner, but added "objective reasonableness" to the
analysis.
2 6
Objective reasonableness asks "whether a reasonable police officer
in the same circumstances would have used such force. 2 7 The Court set
out factors to assist in determining objective reasonableness, including
the severity of the crime, the immediacy of the threat, the suspect's resis-
tance, and the potential for evasion. 8 In applying these factors, however,
the Court recognized that "officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolv-
ing-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situa-
tion., 29 The trier of fact, therefore, must determine the "'reasonableness'
of a particular use of force.., from the perspective of a reasonable offi-
cer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.
30
After Garner and Graham, therefore, courts determined the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness of excessive or deadly force by balancing
the suspect's interest in his Fourth Amendment rights against the gov-
ernment's interest in the intrusion. If the government's interest in the
intrusion could be deemed objectively reasonable under the circum-
stances, then its intrusion on the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights
would, on a metaphorical balance, be deemed to outweigh the suspect's
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 8-9.
24. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989); see also 2 WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES
& SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 22:17, at 48.1 (2d ed. 2007).
25. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
26. Id. at 396-97.
27. 2 RINGEL, supra note 24, § 22:17, at 46.
28. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
29. Id. at 397.
30. Id. at 396.
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interest in his Fourth Amendment rights. The government's intrusion
would, in short, be reasonable. It is this framework that the majority
used in analyzing the Fourth Amendment question in Scott.
II. SCOTT v. HARPJS
A. Facts
Around 11 o'clock on a Thursday night in 2001, a Coweta County,
Georgia, sheriffs deputy clocked Victor Harris's vehicle traveling 73
miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone.31 The deputy activated his
lights and siren and pursued Harris, but Harris refused to stop.32 Harris
then led the deputy on a high-speed pursuit down a rural two-lane high-
33way.
Although the pursuit began on an open highway, Harris soon en-
tered Peachtree City, Georgia, and pulled into the parking lot of a shop-
ping center.34 By this time, more officers had responded to the pursuit
and attempted to block the exits from the parking lot with their vehi-
cles.35 One of these officers was Deputy Timothy Scott. 36 The shopping
center was closed for the evening, and the parking lot was empty except
for Harris and the officers. 37 It appeared that Harris had decided to sur-
render, but he suddenly began driving toward the exit of the parking lot
and collided with Deputy Scott's patrol car as he headed back onto the
highway. 38 After this collision, Deputy Scott took over as the lead police
vehicle in the pursuit.
39
Because they were not informed of the underlying reason for the
pursuit, the Peachtree City police did not directly participate in pursuing
Harris. 40  The Peachtree City police did, however, block intersections
along the pursuit route to ensure that cross-traffic would not travel into
Harris's path.4 1 Despite the lessened risk to innocent motorists due to
these roadblocks, Deputy Scott radioed his supervisor for permission to
"take [Harris] out" through a Precision Intervention Technique (PIT)
maneuver.42  Deputy Scott believed, however, that the vehicles were
31. Harris v. Coweta County, No. 01-CV-148, slip op. at I (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003) (deny-
ing summary judgment in part), revd in part, 433 F.3d 807 (1lth Cir. 2007), rev 'dsub nora. Scott v.
Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
32. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772.
33. Id.
34. Harris, No. 01-CV-148, slip op. at 1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee Victor Harris at 12-13, Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807
(1 1th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-15094).
38. Harris, No. 01-CV-148, slip op. at 1.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee Victor Harris, supra note 37, at 13.
41. Harris, No. 01-CV-148, slip op. at 1.
42. Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 811 (11th Cir. 2005), revd sub noam. Scott v.
Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). To execute a PIT maneuver, an officer pulls his squad car alongside
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traveling too fast to safely execute the PIT maneuver and, instead,
rammed Harris's vehicle from behind with the push bar of his squad
car.43  The collision sent Harris's vehicle careening off the road and
down an embankment.44 The crash, although effectively ending the pur-
suit, left Harris a quadriplegic at 19 years old.4 5
B. Procedural History
Harris filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil
cause of action against those who, under color of law, deprive a citizen
of his constitutional rights.46 Harris alleged that Deputy Scott, through
excessive force, violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreason-
able seizure.47 Deputy Scott moved for summary judgment on the basis
of qualified immunity,48 but the Northern District of Georgia denied his
motion, finding sufficient disagreement over issues of material fact to
"warrant submission to a jury. ' 49
On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Northern
District of Georgia, holding that a reasonable jury could find that Deputy
Scott violated Harris's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizure. 50  Deputy Scott appealed from this judgment, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 5 '
C. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court majority held that "[a] police officer's attempt
to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of
innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when
it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. 52
Because Scott came to the Court on interlocutory appeal from sum-
mary judgment, there had been no factual findings by either judge or
jury.53 The Court therefore reviewed the record de novo.54 Although the
the fleeing vehicle and collides with its rear quarter panel. Id. at 810. The force of the collision
causes the fleeing vehicle to spin out and typically brings it to a stop. Id.
43. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
47. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.
48. See discussion of qualified immunity supra note 10.
49. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.
50. Id. at 1773-74.
51. Id. at 1774.
52. Id. at 1779.
53. Id. at 1774.
54. Id. at 1774-75. Though the majority did not specifically label its review de novo, its
independent reexamination of the facts and law for the purpose of summary judgment suggests that
standard. See I STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
§ 5-02, at 5-10 to -Il (3d ed. 1999) ("[W]hile the language of material fact often is thought of as the
'standard of review' for summary judgments, it is more precisely the actual, substantive test applied
by all courts. The appellate review standard is de novo ... since the sufficiency issue is a question
of law.").
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majority recognized that courts are usually "required to view the facts
and draw reasonable inferences 'in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the [summary judgment] motion,"' 55 the majority found that, in
this case, a videotape showing the entire chase "so utterly discredited"
Harris's version of the facts that "no reasonable jury could have believed
him., 56 Accordingly, the majority held, no genuine factual dispute ex-
isted.57
Having absolved itself of a need to rely on a jury to determine the
facts, the majority decided the reasonableness of Deputy Scott's actions
as a "pure question of law., 58 Though the majority found it "clear from
the videotape that [Harris] posed an actual and imminent threat" to by-
standers, it also found it "clear that Scott's actions posed a high likeli-
hood of serious injury or death to [Harris] . . . ,59 Despite the fact that
the likelihood of injury to Harris as a result of the seizure was probably
greater than the likelihood of Harris's injuring bystanders, the majority
found that Harris's culpability put on him-rather than innocent by-
standers-the onus of injury. 60 After balancing the risk of injury to Har-
ris against Deputy Scott's interest in protecting the public, the majority
concluded that Deputy Scott was reasonable in pushing Harris's car off
the road.61
Harris, however, argued that Deputy Scott's action was in fact un-
reasonable.62 Harris first tried to analogize his case to Garner, arguing
that Deputy Scott's action was "per se unreasonable" because it did not
meet Garner's preconditions for the use of deadly force.63 Harris argued
that Garner required that the suspect pose a threat of immediate harm to
officers or others, that the suspect would have escaped but for the use of
deadly force, and that the officer must have given the suspect some
warning before using deadly force. 64 Although the majority tacitly ad-
mitted that these preconditions were not met, it nevertheless dismissed
Harris's argument on the basis of Garner's "vastly different facts.
65
The suspect in Garner was unarmed, on foot, and could not have rea-
sonably been considered a threat, the Court noted.6 6 Such facts were not
55. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774.
56. Id. at 1776.
57. Id. (explaining that on a motion for summary judgment, "[w]hen opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion
for summary judgment").
58. Id. at 1776 n.8.
59. Id. at 1778.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1777-78.
63. Id. at 1777; see discussion of Garner supra p. 465.
64. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1777.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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"even remotely comparable to the extreme danger to human life posed by
[Harris] in this case. 67
Harris next claimed that had the police simply ceased their pursuit,
Harris would have stopped driving recklessly and the public would have
thus been protected without the use of deadly force. 68 The majority re-
jected this argument outright, noting that while ramming Harris's car off
of the road "was certain to eliminate the risk that [Harris] posed to the
public, ceasing pursuit was not., 69 The majority pointed out that if the
police had ceased their pursuit, there was no way to know whether Harris
would continue driving recklessly or not.
70
D. Concurring Opinions
Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg each offered concurring opin-
ions. Justice Breyer noted that he disagreed with the majority's articula-
tion of a per se rule of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.71 Calling
Scott's rule "too absolute" for a Fourth Amendment analysis, Justice
Breyer argued that determining "whether a high-speed chase violates the
Fourth Amendment may well depend upon more circumstances than the
majority's rule reflects.,
72
Taking quite an opposite stance, Justice Ginsburg, whose short con-
currence largely responded to Justice Breyer's criticisms, pointed out that
Scott's rule was not as mechanical or per se as Justice Breyer's concur-
rence suggested. 73 Rather, she argued that Scott's inquiry and subse-
quent rule were "situation specific. 74 Justice Ginsburg listed the risk to
"lives and well-being of others," and the possibility of a safer way of
stopping the fleeing vehicle as "relevant considerations" underlying the
rule."
E. Dissenting Opinion
In the lone dissent, Justice Stevens chastised the majority for its re-
liance on the videotape, its speculation over Harris's behavior, and its
setting what he perceived to be an inflexible rule. Justice Stevens first
cast doubt on the majority's belief that the events on the videotape "bla-
tantly contradicted" the factual determinations of the Eleventh Circuit
and the Northern District of Georgia. 76 Contrary to the majority, Justice
Stevens argued that "the only innocent bystanders" placed at risk were
67. Id.
68. See id. at 1778.
69. Id. at 1778-79.
70. Id. at 1779.
71. Id. at 1781 (Breyer, J., concurring).
72. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
74. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"the drivers who either pulled off the road in response to the sirens or
passed [Harris] in the opposite direction when he was driving on his side
of the road."7 7  Justice Stevens next addressed Harris's argument-
rejected by the majority-that the police could have simply ceased pur-
suit and arrested Harris later. 8 The majority, Justice Stevens contended,
had no evidentiary basis for believing that a cessation of pursuit would
not have led to a change in Harris's driving-it simply used the video-
tape to replace "the rule of law with its ad hoc judgment., 79 Finally,
Justice Stevens criticized the majority for ignoring past precedent and
setting faulty future precedent.8 ° Justice Stevens argued that Garner "set
a threshold" for the reasonableness of deadly force, and that the reason-
ableness question should go to a jury.8' The majority's rule, he con-
cluded, "[flies] in the face of the flexible and case-by-case 'reasonable-
ness' approach" of Garner and Graham: the reasonableness of the deci-
82sion should be left up to jurors in Georgia-not justices in Washington.
III. ANALYSIS
The majority, following Garner and Graham, relied on a balancing
test to decide the Fourth Amendment issue in Scott.83 Although the ma-
jority did not include the phrase "balancing test" in its holding, it never-
theless considered "the risk of bodily harm that Scott's actions posed to
[Harris] in light of the threat to the public that Scott was trying to elimi-
nate. 84 The majority's analysis balanced Deputy Scott's interest in "en-
suring public safety" with the "high likelihood of serious injury or death"
to Harris and concluded that Deputy Scott reasonably used deadly
force.8 5 But it is not the majority's application of the balancing test, in
and of itself, that makes the decision in Scott problematic; rather, it is the
"facts" that the majority applied the balancing test to. This comment
argues that the majority tilted the balance toward deadly force by relying
on questionable factual premises stemming from the majority's singular
interpretation of the videotape, and the majority's refusal to consider
available alternatives to deadly force.
A. Interpretation of the Videotape
To determine the threat that Harris's flight posed to the public, and
to thus analyze whether Deputy Scott reasonably used deadly force
against Harris, the majority relied on a videotape of the pursuit from
77. Id. at 1783.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1784.
80. Id. at 1784-85.
81. Id. at 1784.
82. id. at 1785.
83. Id. at 1778.
84. Jd.
85. Jd.
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Deputy Scott's dash-mounted camera.86 Although Justice Scalia quaintly
referred to the videotape as an "added wrinkle" to the Court's usual
adoption of the nonmoving party's version of the facts when determining
the appropriateness of summary judgment,87 in the context of Scott, the
videotape proved to be substantially more than a wrinkle. Indeed, be-
cause the majority relied on its interpretation of the videotape to deter-
mine the "facts," the videotape-and the majority's interpretation of it-
affected the entire outcome of the case.
The majority's reliance on its interpretation of the videotape is
questionable, however, in light of the differing interpretations of the
videotape discussed in opinions by Justice Stevens and the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.ss Despite the interpretations of these presumably reasonable judges,
the majority refused to acknowledge the validity of any interpretation
contrary to its own. Although the majority indeed analyzed the "facts" in
Scott using the balancing test laid out in Garner and Graham, its insis-
tence that the videotape could be interpreted in only one way tilted the
metaphorical balance in favor of deadly force. This tilting is not only apt
to make deadly force in the context of high-speed pursuits more likely to
be adjudged reasonable, but it threatens to undercut well-established
summary judgment standards by giving judges greater interpretational
leeway at the summary judgment stage.
It is well established that summary judgment requires courts to view
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.89 Only if
"no genuine issue as to any material fact" exists will the moving party be
granted summary judgment.90 Applying this standard and viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Harris, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
86. The use of videotape in the courtroom is a relatively common occurrence. Karen Martin
Campbell, Note, Roll Tape-Admissibility of Video-Tape Evidence in the Courtroom, 26 U. MEM. L.
REv. 1445, 1451-52 (1996). Its use in a United States Supreme Court decision, however, is some-
what rare: the Court has viewed videotape evidence in only a handful of cases. See, e.g., Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 212 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding that videotape suggested officer
not solely responsible for alleged excessive force); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S.
803, 812 (2000) (noting that videotape examples of signal bleed of pornographic programming
showed salaciousness and snow); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 86-87 (1996), superseded by
statute, Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, PUB. L. No. 108-21, 401(d)(1), 117 Stat. 670, as recognized in Rita v. United States, 127 S.
Ct. 2456, 2472 (2007) (describing videotaped events of LAPD's beating of Rodney King); Madsen
v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 785-90 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (describing videotape of protest at issue in the case); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 586
(1990) (determining which portions of defendant's post-DUI arrest videotape should be excluded for
lack of Miranda warning); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536-37 (1965) (finding that videotape of
the media frenzy at defendant's trial supported defendant's contention of due process deprivation).
87. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775.
88. See id. at 1781-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807,
815-17 (11 th Cir. 2005).
89. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) ("On summary judgment the
inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion.").
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
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that a reasonable jury could believe Harris's version of the facts. 91 The
Supreme Court majority, however, after viewing the videotape, con-
cluded that no reasonable jury could believe Harris's version of the facts:
"[flacts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party," it wrote, "only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts. 92
If a party's version of the events is "so utterly discredited by the record
that no reasonable jury could have believed" it, then "a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment."
93
At first blush, the majority's position appears sensible. Surely a
plaintiff whose version of the facts misrepresents what actually happened
should not be given the benefit of the doubt in the face of videotape evi-
dence. Furthermore, ignoring a videotape of the actual events and rely-
ing solely on the pleadings would seem anachronistic in the ubr-tech
environment of the twenty-first century. Indeed, one commentator notes
that plaintiffs sometimes "allege sufficiently egregious facts in order to
clear the summary judgment hurdle" and thereby circumvent the quali-
fied immunity privilege altogether-whether deservedly or not.94  But
the decision in Scott, based as it was on the majority's interpretation of
the videotape, which happened to be quite different from those of Justice
Stevens and the Eleventh Circuit, begs the question of whose interpreta-
tion of the videotape better predicted the inclinations of a reasonable
jury.
Only by watching the videotape-as Justice Breyer invited "inter-
ested reader[s]" to do via a link on the Court's website95 -- can one get a
sense of the disagreement among the majority, Justice Stevens, and the
Eleventh Circuit. Shot in low-resolution black-and-white, with the po-
lice officers' radio traffic barely discernible even when played at high
volume, the videotape depicts the chase from two different police vehi-
cles: the first deputy's (who clocked Harris's speeding), and then Deputy
Scott's, including the push from behind.96  The Eleventh Circuit de-
scribed the events almost nonchalantly, emphasizing the positive aspects
of Harris's driving:
97
91. Harris, 433 F.3d at 810, 814.
92. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
93. Id.
94. Rosen, supra note 2, at 152.
95. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96. Videotape, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-1631), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scott v_harris.rmvb.
97. Nowhere in its opinion does the Eleventh Circuit confirm that it actually watched the
videotape. Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807 (1 1th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
However, the parties' briefs cite the videotape repeatedly, which indicates its presence in the appel-
late record. See Brief of Defendants-Appellants Mark Fenniger & Timothy Scott at 5-10, Harris v.
Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807 (11 th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-15094); Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee Victor
Harris at 10-19, Harris, 433 F.3d 807 (No. 03-15094); Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants Mark
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Harris remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and inter-
sections, and typically used his indicators for turns. He did not run
any motorists off the road .... Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in
the shopping center parking lot, which was free from pedestrian and
vehicular traffic as the center was closed. Significantly, by the time
the parties were back on the highway and Scott rammed Harris, the
motorway had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly
because of police blockades of the nearby intersections.
98
The majority described the same events quite differently, portraying
Harris as a madman set loose on the Georgia highway system:
[W]e see respondent's vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in
the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. We see it swerve
around more than a dozen other cars, cross the double-yellow line,
and force cars traveling in both directions to their respective shoul-
ders to avoid being hit. We see it run multiple red lights and travel
for considerable periods of time in the occasional center left-turn-
only lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to engage in the
same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up.
99
Oddly, both the Eleventh Circuit's version of the chase and the ma-
jority's version are plausible, if not accurate, when compared with the
videotape. Harris did seem to be in control of his vehicle, yet there is no
doubt that he was traveling at very high speeds.100 Harris also signaled
before making turns, but then wildly crossed the double-yellow-line nu-
merous times to pass motorists. 101 And while the highway had been
cleared of most of the traffic due to roadblocks, there is no doubt that the
police officers pursuing Harris had to drive unsafely in order to keep up
with him. 10 2 These interpretive differences suggest that a greater factual
dispute existed than the majority cared to admit. Justice Stevens inci-
sively commented, "[i]f two groups of judges can disagree so vehe-
mently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding
the pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could dis-
agree with this Court's characterization of events." 10 3 This observation
appears warranted after watching the videotape and comparing the re-
spective interpretations of the Eleventh Circuit and the majority.
Indeed, the majority's interpretation of the videotape has not gone
without criticism. In an excoriating editorial, Jessica Silbey noted that
the majority "disregarded all other evidence and anointed the film ver-
Fenniger and Timothy Scott at 1-3, Harris, 433 F.3d 807 (No. 03-15094). It seems to be a safe
assumption, therefore, that the Eleventh Circuit watched the videotape to inform its decision.
98. Harris, 433 F.3d at 815-16 (citations omitted).
99. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775.
100. Videotape, supra note 96.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sion of the disputed events as the truth."' 0 4 Professor Silbey argued that
the majority's failure
to recognize how all film manifests a distinct point of view (and not
others) and how it is inevitably framed (by the size of the camera and
the length of the film) to exclude what other witnesses to the event
would have seen is a grave error on the part of a fact-finder--or a
film critic. Films never speak for themselves; they require interpreta-
tion.
105
Professor Silbey is not alone in believing that videotape evidence re-
quires a more critical view than the majority seemed to give it in Scott.
A federal appellate judge, after interpreting the events of a videotaped
high-speed pursuit differently than his colleagues, argued in concurrence
that jurors and not judges "ought to be deciding whether the risk posed
by the fleeing suspect is too minimal, or the suspected crime too minor,
to make killing [the suspect] a reasonable way to halt the chase."'
0 6
When considered alongside Justice Stevens's skepticism about the dan-
gerousness of the events on the videotape, and alongside the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of the videotape, the majority's interpretation of
the videotape is questionable. As Professor Silbey summarizes, films
always require interpretation: what is left out of the film may be just as
important as what is in it.'0 7 By treating its own interpretation of the
videotape as indisputable fact the majority, much like a Faulknerian nar-
rator, faithfully related what it perceived but nevertheless missed the big
picture.
Although it did go on to analyze with a balancing test the "facts" it
culled from the videotape, the undue weight the majority gave to its in-
terpretation of the videotape tilted the balance in favor of deadly force.
The majority weighed "the risk of bodily harm that Scott's actions posed
to [Harris] in light of the threat to the public that Scott was trying to
eliminate."' 0 8 Conceptually, then, there were two "sides" to this meta-
phorical balance: Harris's "risk of bodily harm" on the one side, and the
"threat to the public" on the other. The majority's interpretation of the
videotape-finding Harris's driving indisputably dangerous-added
weight to the "threat to the public" side of the balance. Although factor-
ing in Justice Stevens's and the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the
videotape-finding Harris's driving only debatably dangerous-would
have subtracted weight from the "threat to the public" side of the bal-
ance, the majority declined to consider it. By ignoring Justice Stevens's
and the Eleventh Circuit's interpretations of the videotape, the majority
104. Jessica Silbey, Op-Ed., Justices Taken in by Illusion of Film, BALT. SUN, May 13, 2007,
at 21A.
105. Id.
106. Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1272 (11 th Cir. 2007) (Presnell, J., concurring).
107. Silbey, supra note 104.
108. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
transmogrified its own interpretation into objective truth and thus
weighted the "threat to the public" side of the balance to reflect a greater
threat than perhaps existed in reality. This greater threat, in turn, urged a
greater necessity for the use of deadly force.
Naturally, Scott's tilted balance will have some effect on future
cases dealing with the use of deadly force in high-speed pursuits. In ap-
plying Scott to these future cases, courts may have to account for not
only the objective reasonableness factors of Graham,109 but the major-
ity's interpretation of the videotape in Scott. Future high-speed pursuits
may, at the very least, be compared with the Scott videotape and the ma-
jority's pronouncements of Harris's indisputable dangerousness. If the
future high-speed pursuit is not less threatening to the public than the
pursuit in Scott (and the majority's interpretation of that threat), the use
of deadly force against the fleeing suspect would be, at least in theory,
almost per se reasonable.
1 10
But Scott's analysis of the videotape will likely reach further than
high-speed pursuit cases. The majority's implication that judges can
interpret videotapes as well as (or better than) jurors seems likely to en-
trust judges with greater interpretational authority at the summary judg-
ment stage. In the Fourth Amendment context, this has the potential to
put the disposition of excessive or deadly force claims much more
squarely into the hands of judges. 11
Although the Eleventh Circuit, following well-established summary
judgment standards,1 2 viewed the videotape in the light most favorable
to Harris, the Supreme Court majority took issue with those standards." 3
Using language bordering on the hyperbolic--characterizing Harris's
version of events as "blatantly contradicted" by the videotape, "utterly
discredited by the record," and "visible fiction"--the majority declared
109. See discussion of Graham supra p. 466.
110. Both Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens complained that Scott set an inflexible, "per se"
rule, at odds with the fact-driven inquiries normally used in Fourth Amendment cases. Scott, 127 S.
Ct. at 1781 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Some lower court opinions
have expressed this concern as well. See Beshers, 495 F.3d at 1272 (Presnell, J., concurring) ("For
all of its talk of a balancing test, the Harris court has, in effect, established a per se rule: Unless the
chase occurs below the speed limit on a deserted highway, the use of deadly force to end a motor
vehicle pursuit is always a reasonable seizure.").
111. Cf Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229 (2006).
Professor Chen argues that the Court has a pattern of ignoring the importance of factual disputes in
qualified immunity claims, treating reasonableness as a "pure legal analysis because of its desire that
judges, rather than juries, resolve such claims." Id. at 232. "The Court's characterization of quali-
fied immunity as a question of law," Professor Chen contends, "is not driven by analytical factors
ordinarily applied to the law/fact distinction, but by its purely functional decision to allocate all
decision making concerning qualified immunity to judges." Id. at 264. Professor Chen concludes
that the Court "has shed the doctrine of adherence to conventional understandings of summary
judgment procedure, cavalierly dismissing its strict and detailed requirements for adjudicating fac-
tual issues prior to trial." Id. at 277.
112. Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 810 (1 th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1769.
113. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
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that the Eleventh Circuit "should have viewed the facts in the light de-
picted by the videotape."' 14 This declaration assumes, as the majority did
in Scott, that there is only one reasonable interpretation of a videotape.'
5
This assumption of interpretational uniformity suggests that Scott will
provide all judges a similar power to unquestionably rely on their subjec-
tive interpretations of videotapes at the summary judgment stage.
By declaring Justice Stevens's and the Eleventh Circuit's interpreta-
tions of the videotape an impossibility, and relying instead on its own
interpretation, the majority might have added another hurdle to getting
excessive and deadly force claims past summary judgment: the alleged
Fourth Amendment violation must be so egregious that it is unquestion-
able. Close cases-like Scott-may now be disposed on summary judg-
ment because courts are apparently not obligated to view the facts in
light of the nonmoving party if the judge believes that the record does
not warrant this kind of treatment. A number of courts have already ap-
plied this rule. 16 As demonstrated by the differing interpretations of the
videotape in Scott, a "genuine" factual dispute is something quite differ-
ent depending on whose opinion one relies on. Post-Scott summary
judgment standards, allowing a subjective determination of "genuine,"
may turn out to be somewhat less restrained than the majority would
have anticipated.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1775, n.5. During oral argument, several justices shared their interpretations of the
videotape: "He created the scariest chase I ever saw since 'The French Connection,"' exclaimed
Justice Scalia. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Scott, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (No. 05-1631). Justice
Alito pointed out that he "looked at the videotape on this" and thought that Harris "created a tremen-
dous risk of [sic] drivers on that road." Id. Justice Ginsburg commented that Harris clearly endan-
gered the lives and safety of others: "Anyone who has watched that tape has got to come to that
conclusion, looking at the road and the way that this car was swerving, and the cars coming in the
opposite direction. This was a situation fraught with danger." Id. at 36. Justice Breyer questioned
the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the videotape, asking: "But suppose I look at the tape and I
end up with Chico Marx's old question with respect to the Court of Appeals: Who do you believe,
me or your own eyes?" Id. at 49.
116. See, e.g., Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1262 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (Presnell, J., concur-
ring) ("[In this case, as in [Scott], we have the benefit of viewing two videotapes from the patrol
cars involved in the pursuit. Thus, to the extent Appellant's version of the facts is clearly contra-
dicted by the videotapes, such that no reasonable jury could believe it, we do not adopt his factual
allegations."); Sharp v. Fisher, No. 406-CV-020, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54535, at *3 (S.D. Ga. July
26, 2007) ("[B]ecause [the] evidence includes three different videos of the [high-speed pursuit] in
question, the Court 'views the facts in the light depicted by the video[s]."'); Martinez v. City of
Auburn, No. C06-0447, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49236, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2007) (Because
"[t]he Supreme Court has recently endorsed reliance in [videotape] evidence,. . . the Court outlines
the events that lead [sic] to the shooting as shown in the video ...."); Miller v. Jensen, No. 06-CV-
0328, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39252, at *I I (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007) ("Even though plaintiff is
the nonmoving party, the Court will not adopt plaintiffs version of the facts if it clearly contradicts
the factual depictions in the videotapes."); Mott v. City of McCall, No. CV-06-063, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35241, at *2-3 (D. Idaho May 14, 2007) ("[F]or purposes of Defendants' summary judgment
motion, the Court will view the facts in the light most favor [sic] to Plaintiff, except for those facts
that are depicted by the videotape.").
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B. Refusal to Consider Alternatives to Deadly Force
As disturbed as the majority apparently was by the videotaped pur-
suit, it is not surprising that the it rejected Harris's suggestion that the
public's safety could have been equally well maintained had the officers
simply ceased their pursuit and let Harris "escape." '"1 7 In rejecting this
argument, the majority pointed out that ceasing pursuit would not have
ensured that Harris would have suddenly begun to drive normally again
and, therefore, the public would still be in danger." 18 But the majority's
analysis is suspect because it did not consider alternatives to end the pur-
suit other than complete cessation or deadly force. In fact, a number of
feasible alternatives existed between these two extremes that could have
ended the pursuit without injury to the public, the police, or the perpetra-
tor.119
By refusing to take these alternatives into account, the majority
painted itself into a syllogistic comer: ending high-speed pursuits pro-
tects the public; deadly force is guaranteed to end a high-speed pursuit;
therefore, in order to protect the public, deadly force must be used to end
high-speed pursuits. This overly simplified approach created an artificial
dichotomy of complete cessation or deadly force that lent deadly force a
semblance of objective reasonableness that it may not have deserved. By
relying on this artificial dichotomy, the majority had no need to recog-
nize that Deputy Scott had a third option, and this tilted the balance in
favor of deadly force. Under Scott, courts do not appear to have any
responsibility to factor alternative options for ending high-speed pursuits
into their balancing analyses; rather, they are free to rely on the major-
ity's artificial dichotomy. Furthermore, by taking a firm stance in sup-
port of deadly force, Scott may have inadvertently discouraged law en-
forcement agencies' adoption and use of alternative options for ending
high-speed pursuits.
The majority's position-that ceasing pursuit would not have been
as effective as the use of deadly force-is a disputable one. Indeed, one
survey found that seventy percent of "jailed suspects who had been in-
volved in a high-speed pursuit.., would have slowed down if police had
terminated the pursuit."' 20 Although the post-capture ponderings of sus-
pects likely facing substantial jail time are perhaps not the most reliable
predictor of future suspects' behavior, some commentators have come to
a similar conclusion by focusing less on the role of the suspect in the
pursuit and more on the role of the police.
117. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778.
118. Id. at 1779.
119. Id. at 1783.
120. Patrick T. O'Connor & William L. Norse, Jr., Police Pursuits: A Comprehensive Look at
the Broad Spectrum of Police Pursuit Liability and Law, 57 MERCER L. REV. 511, 513 (2005-06).
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Kathryn R. Urbonya suggests that police, by engaging in a pursuit,
exert "psychological force" on the suspect.' 2' The act of pursuit "not
only communicate[s] a command to stop, but also that the police will
continue to pursue until the individual stops.' 1 2 The psychological force
in a pursuit creates a vicious cycle: the more the police gain on a sus-
pect's vehicle, the faster the suspect will go in order to get away. 23 The
police, in turn, will increase their speed to keep up with the suspect.
24
The entire process carries on, presumably, until the vehicles reach their
mechanical limits. Thinking of a high-speed pursuit in terms of psycho-
logical force puts the pursuit squarely in the control of the police: "By
abandoning the pursuit, the psychological force compelling the [suspect]
to continue the pursuit ceases."' 25 If Professor Urbonya is correct, many
high-speed pursuits could be safely terminated by simply letting the sus-
pect go.
Whatever validity Professor Urbonya's theory may have, it is of
course inapplicable unless the police decide to actually pursue a suspect.
Although most commentators agree that the police should sometimes be
permitted to engage in high-speed pursuits, there is substantial disagree-
ment over when.' 26 Because the vast majority of high-speed pursuits do
not involve suspects whose underlying offenses pose a great danger to
society, 127 Travis N. Jensen argues that high-speed pursuits should be
limited to "violent felony suspects" whose escape would imperil soci-
ety.12 8  To facilitate this, Jensen puts forward a "categorical approach"
that would obviate the need for officers to "perform a complex balancing
test in the seconds before each decision to pursue.',12 9  "It is clear," he
121. Kathryn R. Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits Under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205, 233 (1991).
122. Id. at 234.
123. See id. at 235 n. 153 ("At a dog race, in order to make the dogs run faster, a metal frame is
placed in front of them with the appearance of a rabbit on it. The dogs' pace increases as the speed
of the frame moves faster.... [T]he police officers' vehicle represents a similar kind of compulsion
to the pursued driver, except this time the force is behind the driver.").
124. Id.
125. Id. at 234-35.
126. See, e.g., Michael Douglas Owens, Comment, The Inherent Constitutionality of the Police
Use of Deadly Force to Stop Dangerous Pursuits, 52 MERCER L. REv. 1599 (2001). Owens, a
former sheriff's deputy-turned-law student, argues that police officers are always constitutionally
justified to end high-speed pursuits through deadly force. Id. at 1600. Owens posits that a person
fleeing the police in a vehicle always presents a threat of death or serious physical harm to others.
Id. at 1631. This threat from a suspect who "has a two thousand-pound weapon at his fingertips," he
writes, is sufficient to warrant the use of deadly force. Id. at 1632. Furthermore, Owens points out
that the reasonableness of the use of deadly force should be "judged solely with reference to the
danger presented by the suspect's flight"-not by the suspect's underlying offense. Id. at 1633.
Because evading the police is a crime in and of itself, Owens argues, the "predicate offense for
which the stop was initiated" becomes irrelevant: it is the pursuit that endangers the public, not the
initial offense. Id. at 1635.
127. A high-speed pursuit's most frequent impetus is a minor traffic offense. O'Connor &
Norse, supra note 120, at 512; Urbonya, supra note 121, at 225.
128. Travis N. Jensen, Note, Cooling the Hot Pursuit: Toward a Categorical Approach, 73
IND. L.J. 1277, 1292 (1998).
129. Id.
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writes, "that a suspect's escape must equal [a pursuit's] inherent risk to
society before a pursuit could be justified." 130  Pursuits over "minor
crimes and traffic violations," Jensen concludes, are unacceptable.
31
Assuming that fewer high-speed pursuits create fewer injuries, it may be
safer for police to not engage in pursuits at all.
13 2
But neither Professor Urbonya's theory of slowing a high-speed
pursuit by letting the suspect go, nor Jensen's proposal of summarily
avoiding high-speed pursuits, answer a question that seemed crucial to
the holding in Scott: namely, if Deputy Scott would have discontinued
the pursuit, how would Harris have known that the pursuit was over?
Harris, the majority posited, "might have been just as likely to respond
by continuing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his
brow." 33 Rather than "tak[ing] that chance and hop[ing] for the best,"
the majority concluded that "Scott's action-ramming [Harris] off the
road-was certain to eliminate the risk that [Harris] posed to the
public ... ,,134
The majority's question is more than mere conjecture: at least one
survey of fleeing suspects revealed that they "often did not know
whether a pursuit had been called off.' 35 Even so, the majority failed to
consider alternative options that may have been equally "certain" to
eliminate the risk Harris posed to the public. Perhaps the most available
alternative is the "stopstick." This device is a spiked strip that is carried
in the trunk of a police car. 13 6 An officer deploys the stopstick in the
path of the suspect's vehicle and, after the suspect passes over it, the
officer pulls the stopstick off the road to allow the pursuing police vehi-
cles to pass.' 37 The spikes from the stopstick puncture the suspect's tires
and allow them to slowly deflate, bringing the vehicle to a controlled
stop.138 Also available is "air support and photographic evidence of iden-
tity."'3 9 Although a small department like the one Deputy Scott belonged
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1277.
132. Police departments have indeed implemented policies similar to that proposed by Jensen:
after adopting a policy restricting pursuits to violent felonies, for example, the Metro-Dade Police
Department reduced its pursuits from 279 in 1992 to 51 in 1993. Geoffrey P. Alpert, Andrew C.
Clarke & William C. Smith, The Constitutional Implications of High-Speed Police Pursuits Under a
Substantive Due Process Analysis: Homeward Through the Haze, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 599, 621
(1996-97). Likewise, the Houston Police Department experienced a 40 percent drop in pursuits after
adopting a more restrictive pursuit policy. Id.
133. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2007).
134. Id. at 1778-79
135. O'Connor & Norse, supra note 120, at 513.
136. John Hill, High-Speed Police Pursuits: Dangers, Dynamics, and Risk Reduction, FBI




139. Jensen, supra note 128, at 1294.
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to probably could not afford to operate a helicopter, 140 it definitely could
afford video equipment (as evidenced by the videotape of the chase).
With the suspect's license plate number and criminal activity clearly
recorded on videotape, the police could arrest him at a later time by sim-
ply showing up at his residence. Finally, as Justice Stevens suggested in
his dissent, "a simple warning issued from a loudspeaker ... could have
avoided such a tragic result."
' 14'
Though theories such as Professor Urbonya's, policy proposals such
as Jensen's, and devices such as the stopstick are all somewhat imper-
fect, they would necessarily affect the outcome of a Fourth Amendment
balancing analysis. In Scott, however, the majority proceeded as if these
alternatives did not exist: because Harris "intentionally placed himself
and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in [a] reckless, high-
speed flight" and ignored the implied warnings of the "[m]ultiple police
cars, with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring, [that] had been chasing
[him] for nearly 10 miles," it was Harris who "ultimately produced the
choice between two evils that Scott confronted.' 42 The problem with
this conclusion is that Deputy Scott had a choice between more than
"two evils."
Because it assumed that only deadly force would ensure the public's
safety, and that the public's safety took priority over the "risk of bodily
harm" to Harris, the majority unqualifiedly found Deputy Scott's use of
deadly force to be objectively reasonable.143 But the majority's objective
reasonableness analysis rests on a questionable premise. By classifying
complete cessation as allowing Harris to continue endangering the pub-
lic, and deadly force as preventing Harris from endangering the public,
the majority left itself with no real choice: of course Harris should be
prevented from endangering the public. Any reasonable officer in the
same circumstances-that is, a reasonable officer shackled by an artifi-
cial dichotomy of complete cessation or deadly force-would have used
such force. 144 The "threat to the public" side of the metaphorical balance
(already heavily weighted by the majority's interpretation of the video-
tape) would have been weighted even more if Deputy Scott had com-
pletely ceased the pursuit and let Harris drive on and further endanger the
public. Under the artificial dichotomy, therefore, Deputy Scott's only
objectively reasonable option was deadly force.
Yet had the majority taken pursuit psychology into account, Deputy
Scott's use of deadly force may have looked less objectively reasonable
140. The Coweta County Sheriffs Department is comprised of 54 officers who patrol 442
square miles of rural Coweta County and, apparently, do not possess a helicopter. Coweta County
Sheriff's Office, http://www.cowetaso.com/Patrol.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
141. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1785 (2007).
142. Id. at 1778.
143. Id. at 1779.
144. See discussion of Graham supra p. 466.
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in light of the theory that pursuit causes a fleeing suspect to drive faster.
Had the majority taken the lack of a categorical pursuit policy 145 into
account, Deputy Scott's use of deadly force may have looked less objec-
tively reasonable in light of the fact that the pursuit stemmed from an
insignificant traffic violation. 146 And had the majority taken the failure
to use stopsticks or issue a loudspeaker warning before resorting to
deadly force into account, Deputy Scott's use of deadly force may have
looked less objectively reasonable in light of the relative ease by which
these measures could have been taken. Of course none of these alterna-
tives, which all happen to fall somewhere between complete cessation
and deadly force, were ever considered by the majority in deciding the
objective reasonableness of Deputy Scott's use of deadly force.
The majority's artificial dichotomy of complete cessation or deadly
force may go well beyond the immediate result in Scott. First, it poten-
tially relieves courts of the responsibility to factor in alternative methods
of ending high-speed pursuits. Courts may be able to decide whether a
high-speed pursuit warranted deadly force without addressing all of an
officer's available options. Second, it may also have inadvertently set
back law enforcement agencies' adoption of safer methods of stopping
fleeing suspects by failing to provide any incentive for their implementa-
tion.
Although courts have characterized Garner as asking whether "a
reasonable non-deadly alternative exist[ed] for apprehending the sus-
pect," 147 Scott's holding seems to override this concern for alternatives in
high-speed pursuit scenarios. Even the importance of Graham's factors
for determining objective reasonableness-the severity of the crime, the
immediacy of the threat, the suspect's resistance, and the potential for
evasion-48 -seem diminished in light of the majority's artificial dichot-
omy. Rather, Scott directs courts to consider only the certainty of deadly
force, or the uncertainty of complete cessation. 149 Some courts have al-
ready embraced this rationale. 150
145. The Coweta County Sheriff's Department had a pursuit policy which left "decisions
regarding the initiation, continuation, and termination of pursuits.., to the discretion of the officer
and supervisor in the field." Harris v. Coweta County, No. 01-CV-148, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25,
2003) (order denying in part summary judgment). This "judgmental" policy is substantially more
liberal than the "categorical" policy advocated by Jensen.
146. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772.
147. Brower v. County of lnyo, 884 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1989).
148. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
149. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778-79.
150. The Eleventh Circuit held, for example, that an officer reasonably used deadly force when
he rammed the vehicle of a fleeing suspect whom the officer suspected of driving under the influ-
ence. Beshers v. Harrison, No. 05-17096, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19289, at *1 (11 th Cir. Aug. 14,
2007). The collision caused the suspect's vehicle to roll over several times, resulting in the suspect's
death. Id. at *5. The court reasoned that, because Scott "specifically rejected the notion that police
can protect the public by ceasing a pursuit," the officer's only reasonable option to ensure public
safety was to use deadly force against the suspect. Id. at *20-21. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held
that an officer's decision to ram a fleeing motorcyclist off the road, which resulted in the motorcy-
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Fourth Amendment reasonableness for the use of deadly force, even
before Scott, never insisted that courts second-guess the judgment of a
reasonable officer on the scene. 15 1 But with the many options to termi-
nate high-speed pursuits other than complete cessation or deadly force,
the majority's artificial dichotomy ignores the tools that are readily
available to reasonable officers on the scene. Under the majority's
analysis in Scott, therefore, courts do not have to account for objective
reality in determining objective reasonableness.
A further ramification of the majority's artificial dichotomy may be
its effect on law enforcement agencies. Although the trend in law en-
forcement has been toward adopting restrictive pursuit policies and de-
ploying alternative devices for terminating pursuits,1 12 Scott failed to
offer any kind of incentive to continue this trend. While officer safety is
a constant concern in attempting to end high-speed pursuits, the threat of
litigation, too, has loomed over law enforcement in high-speed pursuit
situations.153 Scott may have removed the threat of litigation as a check
against officers' use of deadly force in high-speed pursuits. It may also
have taken away law enforcement agencies' incentives to invest in the
development of restrictive pursuit policies and the adoption of alternative
tools to end pursuits. If it discourages law enforcement agencies from
adopting alternatives to deadly force, the majority's artificial dichotomy
may indeed prove a self-fulfilling prophesy.
CONCLUSION
It is true that the majority did not resurrect the draconian common
law precept of allowing officers to kill fleeing suspects rather than pur-
sue them. Far from it: the majority faithfully applied the Fourth Amend-
ment balancing test developed by Garner and Graham. But tilting the
metaphorical balance in favor of deadly force by relying on questionable
factual premises has the potential to compel similar results. After Scott,
the use of deadly force in high-speed pursuits appears almost per se rea-
sonable. And in cases where videotape evidence is presented, it looks as
if judges rather than juries have the final word in resolving questions of
reasonableness. Furthermore, Scott may free courts from analyzing all of
an officer's options for terminating a high-speed pursuit, and may also
clist's death, was reasonable under Scott because "an officer's decision whether to let a suspect go in
the hopes of catching him later is not governed by just how dangerous the suspect can make the
pursuit." Abney v. Coe, No. 06-1607, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15841, at *17 (4th Cir. July 3, 2007).
The court wrote that the officer faced a "dreadful choice" of complete cessation or deadly force. Id.
at *18. Following Scott's artificial dichotomy, the court concluded that the officer's only option to
protect the public was deadly force. Id.
151. See discussion of objective reasonableness supra p. 465-66.
152. Alpert, Clarke & Smith, supra note 132, at 604-06.
153. Erik Savas, Comment, Hot Pursuit: When Police Pursuits Run Over Constitutional Lines,
1998 DET. C.L. REV. 857, 858-59 (1998).
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have reduced law enforcement agencies' incentives to adopt alternatives
to deadly force for ending high-speed pursuits.
As Justice Stevens posited in his dissenting opinion, the answer to
the question of whether an officer reasonably used deadly force to end a
high-speed pursuit depends on the particular circumstances: it "may be
an obvious 'yes,' an obvious 'no,' or sufficiently doubtful that the ques-
tion.., should be decided by a jury, after a review of the degree of dan-
ger and the alternatives available to the officer." 154 But by concluding
that no reasonable jury could disagree with its interpretation of the video-
tape, and analyzing objective reasonableness in the context of an artifi-
cial dichotomy of complete cessation or deadly force, the Scott majority
took the decision from the hands of the jury and the constraints of reality,
and set a precedent of imbalance and unreasonableness.
Forrest Plesko*
154. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1781 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
*. J.D. Candidate, 2009. I am indebted to Professor Alan K. Chen for his guidance in trans-
forming this comment from a bare draft into a publishable piece, the editors of the Denver University
Law Review for their keen eyes and judicious red pens (especially David Ratner), and Meghan
Plesko for her patience and support.
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NON-OBVIOUSNESS: THE FULCRUM OF COMBINATION
PATENT VALIDITY
INTRODUCTION
Current patent law requires an inventor to demonstrate an invention
is novel,' useful,2 and non-obvious 3 for issuance of a valid patent.4  As-
suming the elements of utility5 and novelty 6 are satisfied for the "combi-
nation patent ' 7 at issue, the validity of the combination patent claim will
teeter on the fulcrum of the non-obviousness doctrine.
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,8 the United States Su-
preme Court held that inventors who apply for combination patents must
satisfy a two-pronged test for non-obviousness to obtain a valid combina-
tion patent. 9 The first prong merges two Supreme Court tests: (1) the
original "synergy" test,' 0 where issuance of a combination patent is pro-
hibited if a court or patent examiner determines the claimed subject mat-
ter was objectively obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art;" and (2) the Graham test, 12 examining relevant secondary factors of
obviousness. The second prong is the "teaching, suggestion, or motiva-
tion" (TSM) test 3 developed by the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals 14 as a soft standard to provide insight into patent claims.' 5 In the
context of combination patents, this dual-pronged analysis for non-
obviousness provides a broad approach to patent validity. Overall, the
Teleflex Court established a synthesized test that will affect patent law in
legal, social, and economic ways.
1. Tamir Packin, A New Test for Obviousness in Combination Patents: Economic Synergy,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 958 (2006); see also 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2007) (stating "[w]hoever in-
vents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent .... ).
2. Packin, supra note 1, at 958, n.10 (stating the inventor must prove the invention "is new
and that he invented it before anyone else"); see also 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (2007).
3. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (2007).
4. Packin, supra note 1, at 964 (citing 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-03 (2007)).
5. Id. at 959 n. 12 (stating the three part test to prove the utility element).
6. Id. at 959 n.13 (stating combination patents by definition are novel and therefore satisfy
the novelty element).
7. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a combination patent as a
"patent granted for an invention that unites existing components in a novel way").
8. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
9. See id. at 1734.
10. See infra Part l.B. I for a discussion of the Court's synergy test.
11. See Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1734.
12. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
13. See discussion infra Part 1.B.3.
14. See infra p. 491 and note 69 (stating the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals merged
with the United States Court of Claims in 1982 to form the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit).
15. See Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1734.
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Part I of this comment will examine the development of the non-
obviousness doctrine by Congress and the courts. Part II will summarize
the facts of Teleflex and the Supreme Court's holding. Part III will first
argue that, on its face, Teleflex clarified the analysis for combination
patent issuance. Additionally, it will argue that the Court's emphasis on
a broad non-obviousness standard actually will produce legal, social, and
economic benefits, along with some negative impacts on small busi-
nesses and independent innovators. However, further congressional leg-
islation is necessary to streamline non-obviousness analysis. Accord-
ingly, Part IV suggests Congress should intervene to clarify the non-
obviousness analysis because this determination involves a policy dis-
cussion more appropriately suited for Congress. Finally, this comment
concludes that the Court's interpretation of the non-obviousness doctrine
will promote innovation in combination patents while rewarding worthy
inventors with exclusive patent rights, but this policy decision should be
addressed by Congress, not the Court.
I. THE RISE OF THE NoN-OBVIOUSNESs DOCTRINE
Fundamentally, the thrust of the non-obviousness doctrine is an eco-
nomic policy striking a balance between encouiraging innovation and
protecting the public from monopolistic patent rights.16 Throughout U.S.
patent law history, the non-obviousness requirement evolved slowly,
reflecting uneasiness in general judicial application. 7 In a similar vein,
determining non-obviousness for combination patents is particularly
problematic because such patents involve combining existing elements,
or "prior art," 18 to form a novel invention.19 As background, the follow-
ing two sections will provide the legislative history and the judicial in-
terpretation of the non-obviousness doctrine.
A. Legislative History
Under its explicit power articulated in the Patent Clause of the U.S.
20Constitution, Congress historically passed patent legislation to promote
innovation, while simultaneously attempting to limit the grant of patent
rights to new and useful inventions worthy of the "monopolies [that]
produce more embarrassment than advantage to society."'21 Although the
well established patentability elements historically included novelty and
16. Packin, supra note 1, at 962-67.
17. Id. at 963 n.43.
18. id. at 957 n.2 (defining prior art as "[a]n invention that is already known"); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 119 (defining prior art as "knowledge ... that is avail-
able.., at a given time to a person of ordinary skill in [the] art ... .
19. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (2007).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 (stating "Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 326, 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al. eds., 1903).
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utility, 22 U.S. statutory patent law did not formally address obviousness
until 1952.23 In the absence of statutory guidance, the Supreme Court
interpreted the non-obviousness doctrine in case law.24 The Court most
plainly stated the "long discussed" 25 non-obviousness standard in Hotch-
kiss v. Greenwood.
26
In Hotchkiss, the plaintiffs held a patent for metallic knobs and sued
"the defendants for the alleged infringement of a patent for a new and
useful improvement in making door and other knobs of all kinds of clay.
and of porcelain[,]" instead of metal.27 The Court explained that,
[n]o one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of
materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the
materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason bet-
ter and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one; or, in the
sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.
28
Simply, the Court held that merely substituting the material of a product
is obvious, and therefore not patentable.
For over a century, courts tested the validity of patent claims based
on congressional statutes requiring novelty and utility29 and the third
judicially created non-obviousness standard. a In Cuno Engineering
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. ,31 the Court stated "[t]he principle of
the Hotchkiss case applies to the adaptation or combination of old or well
known devices for new uses. 3 2 Further, the Court held that "the new
device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius
not merely the skill of the calling."
33
Under the flash of creative genius test, patents were not granted for
new inventions "if the 'result claimed as new is the same in character as
the original result[,]' even though the new result had not before been
contemplated. 3 4 As the Court had done almost one hundred years prior,
it interpreted the non-obviousness doctrine in the absence of legislative
action. Eventually, Congress passed two statutes that included provi-
22. See Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel
"Cold Fusion " Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 419-
22 (2007).
23. See John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 476 (2003).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
27. Id. at 264.
28. Id. at 266.
29. See Harkins, supra note 22, at 419-22.
30. See id
31. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
32. Id. at91.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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sions for non-obviousness and that remained the primary statutory au-
thority of modern patent law.35
1. The Patent Act of 195236
In the late 1940s, patent law reformers concerned with the strict
flash of creative genius test put pressure on Congress to update U.S. pat-
ent law.37 To remedy this concern, Congress codified the Supreme
Court's Hotchkiss standard for non-obviousness 38 in the Patent Act of
1952.39 This statute requires all inventors applying for a patent to prove
their invention was a non-obvious advance over the prior art to obtain a
valid patent.4° Thus, as a policy matter, Congress superseded the flash of
creative genius test with a statutory non-obviousness element.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1966)
41
In 1966, Congress passed Title 35 of the United States Code, requir-
ing "an applicant to show that his [or her] invention is useful, novel, and
non-obvious in order to obtain a patent. ''42 With respect to obviousness,
35 U.S.C. § 103 provides that an inventor seeking a patent must prove a
person having ordinary skill in the art would not find the invention obvi-
ous in light of the prior art.43 Therefore, § 103 bars patent issuance when
"the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.'.
3. The Patent Reform Act of 200741
Notably, on April 18, 2007, Congress introduced "patent reform
legislation in the 'Patent Reform Act of 2007.' If signed into law, the
legislation would bring the biggest, most sweeping changes to U.S. pat-
ent law in over 50 years.' 6  However, "early reports suggest that the
Patent Reform Act of 2007 is hitting some snags and may not pass with-
,,47out amendments to or deletions of certain sections ....
35. See infra Parts I.A. 1 and I.A.2 for a brief discussion of both current congressional statutes.
36. Patent (Bryson) Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 10, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (2007)).
37. Barton, supra note 23, at 476 (citing Cuno, 314 U.S. at 91).
38. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248 (1850).
39. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792.
40. Packin, supra note 1, at 964 (citing Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792).
41. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.
42. Packin, supra note 1, at 964.
43. 35 U.S.C.A § 103.
44. Id.
45. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908 and S. 1145, 110th Cong. (ist Sess. 2007).
46. Harkins, supra note 22, at 422.
47. ld. at 423.
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Regardless, the proposed legislation does not address any potential
issues of non-obviousness arising out of Teleflex because the legislation
was drafted prior to the Teleflex decision. The proposed Patent Reform
Act of 2007 lists non-obviousness as a condition for patentability and
provides for the following amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 103:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained though the
claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section
102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art
are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been ob-
vious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention
pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which
the invention was made.
48
However, in this proposed amendment, Congress did not address any
specific test for the judicial application of non-obviousness. As this
comment will discuss in Part IV, Congress has an opportunity with the
Patent Reform Act of 2007 to clarify the broad non-obviousness standard
set forth by the Court.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Patent Law Statutes and Creation of Non-
Obviousness Tests
Judicial interpretation became an integral part of the non-
obviousness doctrine, especially for combination patents. The Supreme
Court preserved the authority of Hotchkiss49 even after Congress solidi-
fied non-obviousness as a requirement for patent issuance.5 ° Specifi-
cally, the Court has employed three tests to further define and guide the
non-obvious doctrine: (1) the synergy test for all patents; (2) the Graham
test for combination patents; and (3) the TSM test for combination pat-
ents.
1. The Synergy Test
5'
Prior to the Patent Act of 1952,52 the Supreme Court established the
synergy test for combination patents because, by their nature, "the com-
bination of existing elements failed to achieve unusual or surprising con-
sequences as the elements did not perform any additional or different
function in the combination than they perform out of it."'53 The synergy
test developed as a special lens to examine the obviousness of combina-
48. H.R. 1908 § 3(c).
49. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
50. Packin, supra note 1, at 968.
51. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1950)
(introducing the synergy test).
52. Patent (Bryson) Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 10, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (2007)).
53. Packin, supra note 1, at 968 (quoting Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 152 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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tion patents.5 4 Simply put, the synergy test takes a functional approach
to assess patent validity: a combination patent is not obvious if the patent
produces "a new or different function." 55 The Court explained further
that under the synergy test, a patent applicant can demonstrate non-
obviousness by showing "synergistic effects. 56
Following the enactment of § 103, the Court continued to apply and
elaborate on the synergy test.57 The Court expounded that the "func-
tional synergy test presumes invalidity of a combination patent unless
there is a synergistic effect of the elements in the combination claim.
5 8
Thus, current application of the synergy test requires an examination of
each individual element of the combination patent followed by a final
examination of the combined invention.5 9
2. The Graham60 Test
Fourteen years after Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 103, in the Gra-
ham case, the Court heard an obviousness issue requiring statutory inter-
pretation of § 103.61 In this seminal decision, the Court interpreted the
language of § 103 and established the framework for an objective, factor-
based test for obviousness.62 The Court held:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be deter-
mined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to
be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art re-
solved. Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness
[sic] of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considera-
tions as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of
others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances sur-
rounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
63
The Graham test encompasses this factor-based analysis; if the subject
matter of the patent is conclusively obvious, the patent claim is invalid.64
As a policy matter, the Court reasoned that consideration of these
secondary factors was essential to the constitutional foundations of the
54. Id. at 969.
55. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60 (1969) (quoting
Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938) (internal quotation marks
omitted))
56. Packin, supra note 1, at 969 (citing Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)).
57. See, e.g., Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 282; Anderson's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 61-63; United
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48, 50-52 (1966).
58. Packin, supra note 1, at 969 (citing Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELE-
COMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 379-80 (2001)).
59. Id.
60. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
61. Id. at3.
62. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007).
63. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
64. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1734.
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non-obviousness doctrine, 65 namely, promoting "the Progress of Science
and useful Arts. 6 6 The Court further proclaimed the original legal stan-
dards set forth in Hotchkiss remained valid, undisturbed precedent bol-
stered by the Graham test.67 Additionally, the Graham test provided "a
broad inquiry and invited courts ... to look at any secondary considera-
tions that would prove instructive. 68 The latter policy reflects the loos-
ening of the judicial standard for the non-obviousness doctrine.
3. The Teaching, Suggestion, or Motivation ("TSM") Test
In 1982, Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") to handle patent law cases. 69 The
Federal Circuit was created for three purposes: "ending forum-shopping
in patent suits, settling differences in patent-law doctrines among the
circuits, and allowing a single forum to develop the expertise needed to
rule on complex technological questions that arise in patent suits."
70
"Seeking to resolve the obviousness question with more uniformity and
consistency," the Federal Circuit independently developed the TSM test
as a third approach to non-obviousness. 7' The TSM test requires a patent
applicant to demonstrate "a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to com-
bine known elements in order to show that the combination is obvious. 72
Under this approach, a patent claim is obvious when "'some moti-
vation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings' can be found in
the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person
having ordinary skill in the art."73 This test is useful to "identify a reason
that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field
to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does. 74
In summary, Congress passed two statutes that currently control
patent claims, the Patent Act of 1952 and 35 U.S.C. § 103. Both statutes
require evidence of non-obviousness for patent issuance. In addition,
Congress recently proposed the Patent Reform Act of 2007 to further
65. Barton, supra note 23, at 477.
66. U.S CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
67. Packin, supra note 1, at 968.
68. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17(1966)).
69. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1570 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the Federal Circuit as "[a]n
intermediate-level appellate court with jurisdiction to hear appeals in patent cases .... The court
originated in the 1982 merger of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the U.S. Court of
Claims ... ").
70. Id.
71. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1734.
72. Id. at 1741. The TSM test was created by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to
provide helpful insight to combination patents. Id.; see also Application of Bergel, 48 C.C.P.A.
1102, 956-57 (1961) (holding that a specific chemotherapy compound is patentable because a prior
suggestion that it may be possible to combine known compounds to inhibit tumor growth did not
also suggest the desirability of combining those known compounds.).
73. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1734 (quoting Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323-
24 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
74. Id. at 1741.
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reform modern patent law, but the new legislation does not address the
appropriate standard for non-obviousness analysis. Further, the judiciary
has independently developed three analytical tests for the non-
obviousness element: the synergy test, the Graham test, and the TSM
test. With a basic understanding of the legislative and judicial history of
the non-obviousness doctrine, this comment will shift its focus to the
landmark Teleflex case.
II. KSR INTERNATIONAL CO. V. TELEFLEX INC.
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court unani-
mously rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the TSM test
for obviousness, 75 and reaffirmed the historical pedigree and current ap-
plicability of its broader approach to obviousness.76
A. Facts
In 1999, petitioner KSR International Company ("KSR") designed
and patented an adjustable accelerator pedal system for automobiles with
cable-actuated throttles." In 2001, Respondent Teleflex Incorporated
("Teleflex"), a competitor, obtained the exclusive license to the Engelgau
combination patent,78 describing an adjustable accelerator pedal system
for automobiles with electronically-actuated throttles, including an elec-
tronic sensor fixed to the pivot of the pedal. 79 However, in 2000, to meet
growing industry demands, KSR modified its design by adding a modu-
lar sensor to its adjustable pedal system for compatibility with vehicles
using computer-controlled throttles.80
Following KSR's modification and subsequent refusal to enter into
a royalty agreement, Teleflex sued KSR for infringing the Engelgau pat-
ent.81 In a motion for summary judgment, KSR argued that the Engelgau
combination patent was invalid because the design was obvious "in light
of the prior art in existence when the claimed subject matter was in-
vented. ' ,82 To determine the validity of the Engelgau patent, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan applied the
Graham framework and the TSM test.83 After finding KSR satisfied
both tests, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of KSR,
holding that the Engelgau combination patent was obvious.
84
75. Id. at 1739.
76. See id at 1739-41.
77. U.S. Patent No. 6,151,976 (filed July 16, 1999).
78. U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 (filed Aug. 22, 2000).
79. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1736-37.
80. Id. at 1735-36.
81. Id at 1737.
82. Id. at 1737-38.
83. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 587-96 (E.D. Mich. 2003), vacated
and remanded, 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
84. Id. at 596.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court decision
and held that the trial court did not apply a strict enough application of
the TSM test.85 Departing from Supreme Court precedent, the Federal
Circuit took a narrow view of obviousness, reasoning "that courts and
patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying
to solve. 8 6 The Federal Circuit further held that expert testimony as to
non-obviousness raised genuine issues of material fact that precluded
summary judgment.87 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.88
B. The Supreme Court's Holding
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme
Court reversed the Federal Circuit. 89 The Court identified four errors in
the Federal Circuit's strict TSM analysis.90 First, the Court held the
"particular motivation [or] the avowed purpose of the patentee" does not
control, rather "the objective reach of the claim" or "whether the combi-
nation was obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art" controls. 91
Second, it held the Federal Circuit was incorrect in assuming "a person
of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem" will utilize only certain
elements of the prior art.92 Moreover, the Court stated a person of ordi-
nary skill is creative, fitting "the teachings of multiple patents together
like pieces of a puzzle. 93
Third, the Court held the Federal Circuit erred in concluding "a pat-
ent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combina-
tion of elements was 'obvious to try.' ' ' 9 4 Instead, the Court explained
that "a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known op-
tions within his or her technical grasp" when the market applies pressure
for new designs.95 Fourth, the Court held the Federal Circuit erred in
arguing that courts and patent examiners risk "falling prey to hindsight
bias. 96 Although the Supreme Court recognized that hindsight bias is a
problem, the Court reasoned that strict "preventative rules that deny fact-
85. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1738; see also Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282,
288 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2006).
86. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1742 (citing KSR, 119 F. App'x at 288).
87. KSR, 119 F. App'x at 289-90.
88. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965, 2966 (2006).
89. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1735.
90. Id. at 1741-42. The Court also noted that since the decision in the instant matter, the
Federal Circuit has adopted a broader conception of the TSM test. Id. at 1743; see, e.g., DyStar
Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (2006) ("Our
suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible ...."); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286,
1291 (2006) ("There is flexibility in our obviousness jurisprudence .....
91. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1741-42.
92. Id. at 1742.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 289 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
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finders recourse to common sense . . . are neither necessary under our
case law nor consistent with it."
97
Contemporaneously, the Court reinforced its principal reason for
disallowing combination patent claims for what is obvious: "[A] patent
for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their
respective functions... obviously withdraws what is already known into
the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skill-
ful men." 98 The Court held the Engelgau patent claim was invalid as
obvious because "mounting a modular sensor on a fixed pivot point...
was a design step well within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill in
the relevant art."99
Based on precedent addressing non-obvious combination patent
claims, 00 the Court framed the appropriate issue as "whether the im-
provement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements accord-
ing to their established functions."'' 1  The Court reasoned that "[i]f a
person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103
likely bars its patentability."' 02  In this case, the Court noted the pedal
systems market created an increased demand to convert mechanical ped-
als to electronic pedals, and the prior art described many methods of
conversion.'0 3 Furthermore, the Court held KSR's combination of estab-
lished patent elements sufficiently supported the finding of obviousness
because the claim resulted from common sense and ordinary skill, not
innovation.l°4
Finally, the Court expounded that summary judgment was the ap-
propriate procedural device and held that "[t]he ultimate judgment of
obviousness is a legal determination."' 0' 5 This holding refuted the Fed-
eral Circuit's separate argument for reversing the district court on the
grounds that summary judgment was inappropriate based on expert tes-
timony. 10 6 The Federal Circuit's judgment reversing the summary judg-
ment of invalidity was itself reversed by the Supreme Court, and the case
was remanded for further proceedings.'0 7
97. Id. at 1742-43.
98. Id. at 1739 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1950)).
99. Id. at 1746.
100. See, e.g., Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
101. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
102. Id.
103. 1d. at 1744
104. See id at 1743-46.
105. Id. at 1745-46 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)).
106. Id. (noting that expert testimony should certainly be considered regarding questions of
fact, but the final legal judgment is that of the court).
107. Id. at 1746.
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In the wake of Teleflex, the precise impact of the Court's broad non-
obviousness standard is unknown. The remainder of this comment will
explore the potential legal, social, and economic effects of the Teleflex
decision. Also, Part III will explain a new test as an alternative to the
Teleflex standard.
III. ANALYSIS
On the surface, the Teleflex Court established a defined analysis for
the non-obviousness doctrine. 10 8 The resulting two-pronged test for non-
obviousness combined statutes and judicial tests into one comprehensive
analysis. In the context of combination patents, the decision to reverse
the Federal Circuit was proper because it reconciled the inconsistency of
a strict test for non-obviousness, while fostering "new works based on
instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and some-
times even genius.',' 0 9 The following analysis discusses the potential
beneficial impact of the recent Teleflex decision and the emerging broad
non-obviousness doctrine, despite some negative effects on small busi-
nesses and independent innovators.
A. The Legal Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court's broad non-obviousness standard is likely to
have ramifications on patent law. Most importantly, the Teleflex deci-
sion will alter patent law by decreasing the overall number of patents
issued. Additionally, the decision demonstrates the Court's reverence for
stare decisis over the independent judgment of the Federal Circuit.
1. Decreased Patent Issuance
The first beneficial legal implication of the Teleflex decision is ad-
ministrative. "The decision lowers the bar for proving obviousness.
Parties charged with infringement will have a stronger legal basis for
invalidating patents, particularly on summary judgment."'110 Logically, if
the Supreme Court's broad test makes it more difficult to demonstrate
the element of non-obviousness, then fewer patents will be issued and
more will be held invalid. Teleflex "promises to create a stir in the indus-
try by making it easier for defendants to prove invalidity, and thereby
suggesting a transition of making it harder obtain (and preserve the valid-
ity of) patents based on the combination of known elements.""'
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Irfan A. Lateef & Joshua Stowell, Special Feature: A Supreme End to Patent Trolls?, 49
ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 18, 22 (2007).
111. Harkins, supra note 22, at 467.
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The new test also advances the federal policy of promoting innova-
tion and rewarding true innovators with monopolistic patent rights.112 A
higher non-obviousness standard, coupled with the expenses of patent
applications, will create incentives for inventors to make genuine inven-
tions and deter applications for less innovative inventions. Furthermore,
"the decision decreases the impact of threatened patent suits, especially
when weak patents are at issue.
' 1 3
In contrast, the Federal Circuit's rigid TSM approach "ignores ex-
ogenous economic or technological changes, which make something
obvious suddenly valuable."'1 14  A lower standard for non-obviousness
would create an incentive for inventors "to apply for many 'obvious'
combinations, which increases the economic burden that the system im-
poses on a free market."' 15 On the other hand, the new higher standard
may produce excess litigation between parties fighting over the non-
obviousness element."1 6 Ultimately, the Supreme Court's standard ar-
ticulated in Teleflex will encourage innovation by rewarding inventors
who are genuinely original.
2. Stare Decisis
Another beneficial legal impact of the Teleflex decision is the vic-
tory for stare decisis. The Court unanimously refused to deviate from
precedent established over one hundred and fifty years ago." 7 Although
the concept of non-obviousness and the tests for non-obviousness devel-
oped over time,"18 the underlying policies set forth in Hotchkiss have not.
Grounding its decision in the Constitution, the Supreme Court's holding
in Teleflex reflects the underlying policy for the promotion and progres-
sion of useful arts.119
Although the Supreme Court adhered to precedent, the Federal Cir-
cuit has been critical of the Supreme Court's synergy test. 120 Presumably
relying on its expertise in patent law, the Federal Circuit applied a strict
TSM test because the synergy test invites hindsight bias. 12 1 But critics
suggest the Federal Circuit's strict approach "essentially reduce[d] the
112. Id. at 468 ("Buoyed by policies of promoting innovation and the progress of science on
the one hand, without the high price paid to legitimate competition on the other, one senses a return
to the notion that an inventor must actually have invented something before being rewarded a patent
monopoly[.]").
113. Lateef & Stowell, supra note 110, at 22.
114. Packin, supra note 1, at 977.
115. Id.
116. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the cost barriers for small businesses.
117. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
118. See supra Part I for discussion of the rise of non-obviousness.
119. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1746 (2007).
120. Packin, supra note 1, at 979 ("The Federal Circuit has criticized the Supreme Court's
synergy test because it invites ... the possibility that even though an invention is non-obvious and
therefore patentable, when viewed in retrospect in light of the prior art, a person of ordinary skill in
the art may use hindsight in determining that the invention is obvious.").
121. Id. at 980.
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'level of ordinary skill' to nothing .. .[and] assume[d] no common
knowledge."'' 22 In the end, the Supreme Court's application of the syn-
ergy test "has been said to be better suited for defining obviousness in
combination patents."'
123
However, the Federal Circuit's departure from Supreme Court
precedent implies a serious need for reform in patent law.' 24 Since the
Supreme Court's reversal, the Federal Circuit has moved away from a
rigid TSM test because the strict application "sets a low standard for pat-
entability and encourages patenting rather than innovation."',25  Ulti-
mately, the Federal Circuit's deviation prior to the Court's Teleflex deci-
sion does little to hinder the victory of stare decisis, but it does provide
an educated alternative for where the bar for non-obviousness should be
set.
Remarkably, the Federal Circuit is not alone in criticizing the Su-
preme Court for setting a "higher bar for combination patents than for
other types of patents."'' 26 The Federal Circuit applied a stricter applica-
tion of the TSM test to broaden the non-obviousness analysis to all types
of patents, thereby providing consistency. 27 Although the Court's deci-
sion abrogates the previous Federal Circuit test, the competing views of
each court necessitate clarification by Congress regarding the appropri-
ateness of the Supreme Court's new standard for non-obviousness.
B. The Social and Economic Implications of the Teleflex Decision
Only future studies will determine the long term social and eco-
nomic impact of the Teleflex decision. 28 However, the underlying con-
stitutional policies behind the Supreme Court's holding should shape the
impact of its decision, particularly in the areas of innovation and monop-
oly, and barriers to small businesses.
122. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
123. Id. (citing Lunney, supra note 58, at 390).
124. Id. at 979-80.
125. Id. at 977; see also Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying the Supreme Court's broad Teleflex standard and holding the patent
at issue invalid for failing to overcome a prima facie case for obviousness).
126. Packin, supra note 1, at 979; see also Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing the non-obviousness standard is too high and declaring "the
only patent that is valid is one which the Court has not been able to get its hands on"); Homer J.
Schneider, Non-Obviousness, the Supreme Court, and the Prospects for Stability, 60 J. PAT. OFF.
SoC'Y 304, 318 (1978) (stating application "of the non-obviousness test is muddied, not clarified, by
unexplained resort to... searches for 'synergism"').
127. Packin, supra note 1, at 976.
128. For the purposes of this comment, any foreign social and economic implications will not
be addressed, but should be topic for another scholarly comment. Recently, a "bipartisan effort in
Congress to overhaul the patent system ... is hitting resistance because of concerns the U.S. might
be exposed to greater foreign competition." Greg Hitt, Patent System's Revamp Hits Wall, WALL
ST. J. (Wash., D.C.), Aug. 27, 2007, at A3.
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1. Innovation and Monopoly
The fine balance of promoting innovation and protecting the right to
profit from invention underscores all of patent law.' 29 In Teleflex, the
Supreme Court found an equilibrium between these two competing goals
by rewarding genuine innovations with patents and denying patents for
uncreative inventors who fail the non-obviousness test. 30 Although
these policies are fundamentally different, the requirement for patent
validity provides a filter for truly innovative patents.
2. Barriers for Small Businesses
Notably, the high costs accompanying compliance with U.S. patent
law perpetuate a sweeping negative impact on small businesses and in-
dependent inventors. 131 The largest barrier for small businesses and in-
dependent inventors is the high litigation costs necessary to enforce pat-
ents against large corporations. 132 Also, "less-tangible costs related to
patent protection"'' 33 create further barriers for small entities, including
high filing costs, 134 patent insurance costs, 135 drafting and prosecution-
related costs, 136 and opportunity costs. 137  In totality, these additional
costs average a minimum total of $22,785.00 plus unrecoverable, intan-
gible costs. 38 Thus, these costs minimize the economic incentives for
innovation by small businesses and inventors.
Although the holding in Teleflex does not address these small busi-
ness concerns, Congress should arguably reform patent laws to provide
additional protection for the small entity innovators. The strongest area
of patent law demanding reform for small businesses is litigation. 39 35
U.S.C. § 282 addresses challenges to patent validity, stating that "a pat-
ent shall be presumed valid."'' 40  First, Congress can expand § 282 to
include reasonable expert witness fees because the statute already pro-
vides for "reasonable attorney fees."'141 Second, Congress can remove
the reduction cap on attorney fees when small entities prevail in patent
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8.
130. See KSR Int'l Co., v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1743 (2007).
131. See Jeff A. Ronspies, Does David Need a New Sling? Small Entities Face a Costly Bar-
rier to Patent Protection, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 184 (2004).
132. Id. at 196-99; see also Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent
Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 703-06
(2006).
133. Ronspies, supra note 131, at 195.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 199-200.
136. Id. at 200-01.
137. Id. at 201-02.
138. Id. at 195-202; see also AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, 2003 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 22 (2003) (stating the median estimates for costs).
139. Ronspies, supra note 131, at 207-11.
140. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (2007).
141. Ronspies, supra note 131, at 207.
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litigation.1 42 Third, Congress can mandate small-entity litigants in patent
disputes to attend arbitration, rather than pursue costly litigation. 14' Each
of these suggestions would help to reduce the costly barriers for small
entities, thus encouraging innovation for small businesses and independ-
ent inventors. Congress must explore these ideas because they are highly
policy based determinations, outside the scope of the Supreme Court's
powers.
IV. DEMAND FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Continued judicial definition of combination patent law through
case law interpretation is unnecessary. The most appropriate and direct
course of action is to call upon Congress to reform the non-obviousness
test, rather than to synthesize historic case law under the broad umbrella
of the non-obviousness standard. The Court established the broad Tele-
flex analysis for non-obviousness in the absence of any direction from
Congress. However, non-obviousness analysis needs further clarification
because the determination of non-obviousness involves a policy discus-
sion more appropriately suited for the legislative branch.
One glaring opportunity for Congress to address the appropriateness
of the Supreme Court's new test is in the Patent Reform Act of 2007.
With the proposed legislation meeting some resistance, 144 Congress can
still create a provision choosing to either: (1) codify the new broad Tele-
flex standard; (2) amend or modify the Teleflex standard; or (3) create a
different standard depending on the outcome of the much needed policy
discussion. As a starting point, and based on the previously conflicting
views between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, Congress
simply needs to have the dialogue to determine the most appropriate
analysis for non-obviousness. Then, Congress can decide which option
would best serve the needs of patent law.
For an example of an alternative to the Court's test, Tamir Packin
has suggested the "economic synergy" test for non-obviousness.145 Tak-
ing a purely economic approach, Congress may consider adopting a
variation of the proposed economic synergy test, which provides "that a
combination should be found non-obvious if the economic value of the
combination as a whole is greater than the economic value of the sum of
its parts."'146 This test relies on market demands to set the economic
value of inventions. "[T]he new combination cannot simply redistribute
.. in the existing demand curves, but must itself create a new demand..
142. Id. at 207-08.
143. Id. at 210-11.
144. Harkins, supra note 22, at 423.
145. Packin, supra note 1, at 981-90.
146. ld. at 982.
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• .,147 The social benefit of certain mathematical calculations for value
increases the efficiency of the combination patent application process.
As suggested by Pakin, the economic synergy test is superior to the
Supreme Court's synergy test in three ways. First, the Court's synergy
test assumes "those combinations that do not create a functional synergy
are not valuable to society."' 148 The economic alternative recognizes that
some combinations lacking a functional synergy may still have some
utilitarian value.149 Second, the economic synergy test is inclusive of the
Court's approach because "all functionally synergistic combinations will
also be economically synergistic and therefore patentable." 150  Finally,
the economic synergy test provides economic incentives for "inventors
who create functionally simple devices that benefit society" by adding
economic value.' 5 ' In response to the criticisms of the Supreme Court's
high standard of non-obviousness, the economic synergy test is one con-
ceivable alternative addressing the call for patent reform. However,
adopting this test would deviate from Supreme Court precedent requiring
an abandonment of the established synergy test.
In sum, Congress must determine the appropriate test for non-
obviousness by discussing different policies behind non-obviousness
analysis, exploring different options and alternatives to the Court's new
test, and deciding the most appropriate analysis. In light of the recent
reaffirmation of the synergy test by the Teleflex Court, the most appro-
priate course of action is for Congress to address the appropriate test for
non-obviousness. Legislative action would set a definitive statutory test,
without forcing the Court to continuously set policy standards.
CONCLUSION
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. ,152 the Supreme Court
unanimously established a clear two-pronged test for non-obviousness,
an essential element to obtain a combination patent. 53 The broad, high
standard incorporates the policies and tests developed cautiously
throughout U.S. patent law history.154 The Court created a standard re-
flecting the legislative intent of Congress, while simultaneously adhering
to precedent. 155 Looking to the future, the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the non-obviousness doctrine in Teleflex will promote innovation,
147. Id. at 982 n.151; see generally MARK A. GLICK, LARA A. REYMANN & RICHARD
HOFFMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAMAGES: GUIDELINES AND ANALYSIS 43-72 (2003).
148. Packin, supra note 1, at 984.
149. Id.
150. Id. (noting the consistency with the constitutional goal of promoting progress).
151. Id. at 986.
152. 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741-43 (2007).
153. id.
154. See id at 1739-43.
155. See id.
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while rewarding worthy inventors with exclusive patent rights. 56 De-
spite these steps forward, other methods remain for effectively address-
ing the non-obviousness standard, but it would require congressional
reform outside of the scope of the judicial branch.
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